FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Picos v Hyatt Hotel Canberra (No 2) [2015] FCA 262
Citation: Picos v Hyatt Hotel Canberra (No 2) [2015] FCA 262 Parties: CONNIE LOUISE PICOS v HYATT HOTEL CANBERRA File number(s): NSD 23 of 2015 Judge(s): YATES J Date of judgment: 25 March 2015 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for disqualification for bias – whether actual or apprehended bias established – application dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for order requiring Registrar to accept an interlocutory application for filing – where substance of application seeks relief under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether application should be accepted for filing – application dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for review of an exercise of power by a Registrar to reject documents for filing – application dismissed
Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act1986 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 3.04, 9.63
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (CthCases cited: British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283
Concrete Pty Limited v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488
Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288
Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427
Murphy v Doman (2003) 58 NSWLR 51
Picos v Hyatt Hotel Canberra [2015] FCA 101
Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423Date of hearing: 6 March 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 50 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant did not appear Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Orlov Solicitor for the Respondent: Snedden Hall & Gallop Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 23 of 2015
BETWEEN: CONNIE LOUISE PICOS
ApplicantAND: HYATT HOTEL CANBERRA
Respondent
JUDGE:
YATES J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 MARCH 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 17 February 2015 be dismissed, with costs.
2.The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 27 February 2015 be dismissed.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 23 of 2015
BETWEEN: CONNIE LOUISE PICOS
ApplicantAND: HYATT HOTEL CANBERRA
Respondent
JUDGE:
YATES J
DATE:
25 MARCH 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
There are two interlocutory applications before the Court, each filed by the applicant.
The first interlocutory application, dated 17 February 2015, seeks an order that I be “disqualified for bias”. The second interlocutory application, dated 27 February 2015, seeks, in substance, an order that the Registrar accept for filing an interlocutory application in which the applicant seeks orders concerning the winding up of Tropical Almond Development (PTC) Ltd (Tropical Almond Development).
When the first interlocutory application and the second interlocutory application were called on…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Picos v Hyatt Hotel Canberra (No 2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2015] FCA 262
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the judge had exhibited actual or apprehended bias and whether the interlocutory application should be accepted for filing. The court examined the applicant's claims of prejudgment and the appropriateness of the relief sought in the interlocutory application. The court also considered whether the interlocutory application complied with the Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000.
The court dismissed the first interlocutory application, finding that there was no evidence of actual or apprehended bias. The court found that the judge had not prejudged the matter and that the applicant's claims did not meet the legal test for bias. Regarding the second interlocutory application, the court dismissed it on the basis that the relief sought was not appropriate for an interlocutory application and that the correct process for winding up a company had not been followed. The court held that the interlocutory application was incompetent on its face and should not be accepted for filing.
The court's reasoning and outcome demonstrate that the judge had not exhibited any form of bias and that the interlocutory application did not comply with the required legal process. The dismissal of both interlocutory applications highlights the importance of adhering to legal procedures and the stringent requirements for establishing bias in judicial proceedings.
ORDERS:
1. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 17 February 2015 be dismissed, with costs.
2. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 27 February 2015 be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 17 February 2015 be dismissed, with costs.
2. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 27 February 2015 be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
My treatment of this interlocutory application is relevant to another basis on which the applicant seeks my disqualification for bias.Consideration The written submissions make clear that the relief sought is based on actual bias. The applicant says that she “alleges real bias”. It would seem from the applicant’s affidavits and the written submissions that the form of bias alleged is prejudgment. Three matters emerge from the applicant’s affidavits and the written submissions. I will deal with each in turn. First, the applicant submitted that the first interlocutory application was filed before giving judgment in respect of her strike out application. The applicant submitted:His Honour completely ignored the application and out and out lied by doing so. The strike out application was filed on 21 January 2015, listed for directions on 5 February 2015 and, on that day, with the agreement of the applicant and the respondent, listed for hearing before me on 19 February 2015. On 15 February 2015, the applicant sought to file the first interlocutory application. It was rejected on the basis that it was not supported by an affidavit. Subsequently, on 18 February 2015, the applicant lodged the first interlocutory application for filing with an affidavit in support. This was the day before the appointed hearing date for the strike out application. The first interlocutory application was accepted for filing on 19 February 2015, that is, on the day of the hearing of the strike out application. On filing, the first interlocutory application was given a hearing date, namely 6 March 2015, which was the first available day on which I could hear the matter. The first interlocutory application was not ignored. It was processed promptly and, on filing, given a hearing date. As I have noted, it was received for filing on the day before the hearing of the strike out application. As I have also noted, the date for hearing the strike out application was one agreed to by the parties. I do not understand the applicant’s submission that I “lied” by “ignoring” the first interlocutory application. I am unable to see how these events manifest, let alone establish, actual bias on my part. Secondly, the applicant referred to the making of orders in chambers (see [11] above) on the basis of the email correspondence I have quoted at [9]-[10] above, providing for the listing of the proceeding for directions before Perry J on 5 February 2015, including for directions in relation to the strike out application. The applicant has not sought to explain how these events manifest actual bias on my part. In her written submissions, the applicant submitted:The Applicant is not accepting this. His Honour is hereby on Notice that the Applicant wishes to prosecute torture, crimes against humanity and crimes against her personally in an international forum of which his Honour is not immune. My reliance on the email correspondence submitted by both parties, and the making of orders on 21 January 2015 vacating the directions hearing on 2 February 2015 and listing the proceeding for directions before Perry J on 5 February 2015, although contrary to the wishes of the applicant, does not manifest or establish actual bias on my part. The orders made on 21 January 2015 were entirely procedural in nature. They merely shifted the directions hearing from 2 February 2015 to 5 February 2015. Considerations of efficiency, as outlined in the respondent’s solicitors’ email, plainly commended this course, particularly in the absence of any reason advanced by the applicant for not doing so, apart from her disagreement.