Pianta v BHP Australia Coal Limited - [1995] QCA 53

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1995] QCA 053
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 230 of 1994

Brisbane
[Pianta v. BHP Australia Coal Ltd.]

BETWEEN:

PETER ALFORD PIANTA

Applicant

AND:

BHP AUSTRALIA COAL LIMITED

Respondent

Fitzgerald P.
Davies J.A.
McPherson J.A.

Judgment delivered 08/03/1995

Judgment of the Court.

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL REFUSED WITH COSTS.

CATCHWORDS: PRACTICE - AMENDMENT - O.32 - personal injuries - plaintiff sought leave to appeal against judgment of District Court refusing leave to amend plaint; whether amendment seeks to add new cause of action against defendant employer; whether the causes of action arose out of the same facts or substantially the same facts; whether important question of law or justice.

Section 92(2) District Courts Act 1967.

Counsel:	Mr. S. Williams Q.C. with him Mr. R. Dickson for the applicant
Mr. G. N. Egan for the respondent
Solicitors:	Murrell Stephenson for the applicant Neil O'Sullivan & Rowell for the respondent

Hearing Date: 13 February 1995
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 230 of 1994

Brisbane

Before

Fitzgerald P.
Davies J.A.
McPherson J.A.

[Pianta v. BHP Australia Coal Ltd.]

BETWEEN:

PETER ALFORD PIANTA

Applicant

AND:

BHP AUSTRALIA COAL LIMITED

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THE COURT

Judgment delivered 8th day of March 1995

This is an application for leave to appeal against a judgment in the District Court refusing the applicant leave to amend his plaint in an action in that court. The application was made a few days out of time. This was caused by an inability to obtain the judge's reasons within the time limited and the respondent consented to an extension being granted. It is appropriate in the circumstances to grant that extension.

It was conceded by the applicant that leave was necessary to appeal to this Court. That leave must not be granted unless some important question of law or justice is involved; subject to that an exercise of discretion is involved: District Courts Act 1967 s.92(2). The fact that the decision sought to be appealed from is plainly right will often be a sufficient reason for refusing leave even where an important question of law or justice is involved.

It is convenient to turn first to the question whether the decision below was plainly right.

The action in which the application below was made was one for personal injuries arising out of an accident alleged to have occurred during the course of the applicant's employment with the respondent. In summary his plaint alleges that on 24 August 1990, whilst driving a "cable reeler" (a large converted front-end loader) over rough terrain the applicant experienced severe pain in his lower back in consequence of which he suffered disabilities enumerated in the plaint. It was alleged that inadequate suspension of the cable reeler and roughness of the terrain over which it was driven were caused by negligent acts or omissions of the respondent as the applicant's employer.

The amendments which the applicant…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1995] QCA 53
Decision Date: 8/03/1995

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Pianta v BHP Australia Coal Limited, the applicant, Peter Alford Pianta, sought leave to appeal a judgment of the District Court, which had refused him permission to amend his plaint in an action for personal injuries. The District Court judgment had denied the applicant's request to include a new cause of action pertaining to a second injury, which occurred after the initial claim. The applicant argued that the second injury arose from substantially the same facts as the original claim. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the second cause of action arose from the same or substantially the same facts as the first, and if the District Court's decision was plainly right. Additionally, the Court had to decide if the appeal presented an important question of law or justice warranting leave to appeal.

The applicant argued that the two injuries were of the same kind and arose from the employer's negligence in similar employer-employee contexts. However, the Court found that the facts underlying the duty of care, the breach of that duty, and the injuries themselves were different in each case. The applicant conceded that the facts constituting the breaches of duty were not the same or substantially the same. Consequently, the Court of Appeal held that the District Court was correct in its assessment that the second cause of action did not stem from substantially the same facts as the first. The Court of Appeal concluded that the decision of the District Court was plainly right, and thus, the application for leave to appeal should be refused with costs.

The Court of Appeal's judgment reinforced the requirement that amendments adding new causes of action must arise from the same or substantially the same facts as the original claim. Given the distinct factual circumstances of the second injury, the Court found no basis to overturn the District Court's refusal to allow the amendment. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the costs of the appeal were awarded against the applicant.

Orders