Phosphate Co-Operative Company of Australia Limited v Shears
[1989] HCATrans 56
| IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA |
| Office of the Registry |
Melbourne No M2 of 1989 B e t w e e n -
THE PHOSPHATE CO-OPERATIVE
COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED
Applicant
and
DOUGLAS STEPHEN SHEARS and
CITYFARM PHOSPHATES PTY LTD
Respondents
Application for special leave
to appeal
MASON CJ DAWSON J McHUGH J
| Phosphate |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 17 MARCH 1989, AT 12.07 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
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| MR R.A. FINKELSTEIN ~C : | May it please the Court, I appear |
with my learned friend, MR J.A. MIDDLETON, for the applicant. (instructed by Arthur Robinson & Hedderwicks)
| MR J.D MER.RALLS, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear with |
my learned friend, MR D. SHAVIN, for the respondents
to oppose. (instructed by by Baker & McKenzie)
MR FINKELSTEIN: If it please the Court, could I hand to the
Court three folders which contain photOCQpies of
some authorities and some extracts from some textbooks.
We will only make passing reference to them.
| MASON CJ: | Yes. |
| MR FINKELSTEIN: | The article of association that was adopted |
by the members of Pivot in February 1987 produced this consequence: it deemed certain persons who were
not members of the Company to be members for the
purposes of the articles of association. It also had
the effect of disenfranchizing certain members ofthe Company.
One finding that the Full Court made, so far
as that article was concerned, is that it is
impermissible for a company - that is to say, any
company - to adopt articles of association giving avote to a person who is not a member of the company,
that is to say, to a person who is not registered
in the register of members as the holder of shares.
That point, we submiL, i~ an iruportant point. So far as we can gather, it is the first occasion, at least in Anglo-Australian courts that the point has been decided.
It has been the subject of textbook connnents from time
to time and most of the leading, I suppose, textbooks
that have dealt with the matter have concluded thatit is permissible for articles of association to
allow non-members the right to vote at company meetings.
And in our folder that we have handed to the Court,
we have got extracts from Gore-Browneand Palmer in the
practise volume, that is the precedent volume of Palmer and Gower also in his work on company law accepts the
proposition that non-shareholders can be given the
right to vote.
So far as we have been able to tell in our researches,
the point received passing consideration by this Court
in a tax case, KOLOTEX HOSIERY V DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF
TAXATION, (1975) 132 CLR 535. It is in the folder of
cases if the Court please. And Mr Justice Gibbs
, dealt with the point at page 569. His Honour there noted that the matter had not been considered before.
His Honour felt that the COMPANIES ACT 1961, which was
then in force, provided strong argument for the view
that non-members cannot be given the right to votebut at the bottom of the page His Honour then referred
to the texts which dealt with the matter and put forward
a ·contrary view and said that it was not necessary
to express a concluded view at that time.
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| Phosphate |
Now, since the KOLOTEX case, Professor Ford, in his text on company law, which is also ln our bundle of texts and cases, has himself made comment on the
KOLOTEX case and expressed a contrary view. So that
so far as Anglo-Australian law is concerned, there is,
we submit, an important outstanding question on
the rights of non-members to be given a power to vote
in the affairs of the company. We have looked elsewhere. We have looked at authorities in the United States and
last century there was a view put forward by
American courts that it was contrary to the public
interest to have split beneficial ownership of shares
and the right to vote in respect of those sharesbut modern American cases seem to now discredit that
old view. We hasten to add though that the American cases do not deal with articles of association. They tend to deal with voting trusts where shareholders
voluntarily, by contract or deed, give up their righcto vot~ in [avuur of a tru~tee.
So, we submit that there is, so far as
at least this aspect of the case is concerned, a matter
of general importance so far as corporate law is
concerned. It is likely that people - corporations
have ordered their affairs on the basis that non-members
can vote. So far as examples of that are concerned, the most likely example is when debenture holders are
given the right to vote. That is the example referred to in Palmer's work and we do have examples in the to vote. In other words, creditors of a company or
secured creditors of a company have been given the
right to vote at general meeting in order, no doubt, to protect their financial interests or investment in the company. So that there is that matter of general
importance.
The applicant lost the case before the Full Court·
on other grounds as well as the impermissibility of
having non-members given a right to vote. It lost
the case on the ground that the resolution passed by
members was a fraud on a power. It also lost the case on the basis of the applicability of section 320
of the COMPANIES CODE. In dealing with the fraud on the power question, that is, that the members acted
otherwise than for the benefit of the Company as a
whole and in good faith, the court accepted, as did
the primary judge, that the members were actuated by
good faich.- there were not acting in bad faith at all -
but nevertheless put forward these propositions as
vitiating the vote of the members. The court, in • effect, concluded that it was a fraud on a power - a power that the members of the Company have to alter articles of association - to give wide discretionary
powers to directors of a company; in particular, wide
discretionary powers to determine who may or who may
not have the right to vote. The court said that that
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| Phosphate |
was a fraud on a power even though the discretionary
power given to directors may be exercised in good faith.The court also held that it was a fraud on a power to
introduce articles of association which were not
self-contained. The article that was adopted picked up, incorporated by reference, provisions in an Act of
Parliament. The court said - weli, at least, one judge of the court said, Mr Justice Nathan, that that
was impermissible, that articles of association have to
be self-contained; that articles of association cannot
incorporate by reference provisions of an Act of
Parliament which itself might be changed by Parliament.
The court also found that it was a fraud on a
power to introduce articles of association which made the administration of the company difficult by reason
of the fact that the article was difficult to construe
or the article introduced caused difficulties in theconstruction of other articles.
| MASON CJ: | Now, you might explain to me, by reference to your |
draft notice of appeal, which of your grounds of appeal
go to the validity of the article, as such, and which
go to what might be described as purposes that are not
bona fide in the passage of the relevant resolution
that introduced the article into the Company:s articles
of association. The draft notice of appeal is at page 12.
| MR FINKELSTEIN: | Yes. | The last ground of appeal raises the first |
point that I have mentioned:
The Full Court erred in holding that there
was no room under the COMPANIES (Victorian)
CODE for the rights of members to be exercised
by persons who are not registered shareholders
or their duly appointed agents.
It may not be as happily expressed as it should be.
| MASON CJ: | No, it certainly is not. |
| MR FINKELSTEIN: | No, I understand that, Your Honour, but the |
point that was sought to be attacked by that ground
was the decision of two members of the court, because
the third, Mr Justice O'Bryan, the presiding judge,
did not deal with the point, making the finding that
it was improper under the Code to give non-members the
right to vote.
MASON CJ: Well now, (k) raises the same point, does it not?
| MR FINKELSTEIN: | Yes, it does. |
MASON CJ: Notices of appeal in Victoria seem to be almost a
competition in expressing the same point in different
ways.
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| Phosphate |
| MR FINKELSTEIN: | We will concede that it is not a happily |
expressed notice of appeal and we were minded to,
in fact, prepare - if we were given leave, the
Court might not be confronted with this particular
form of document.
MASON CJ: Yes, but the problem is, you see, from time to time
we grant special leave and confine the leave to certain points and we do so by reference to the draft notice of appeal and if we attempt to do it
by reference to this draft notice of appeal, I can
see us heading into stormy seas. But my impression was that when one looks at other grounds of appeal
they were also directed to the question of invalidity.
MR r-INKELSTEIN: Well, in this sense, yes, Your Honour, because
the principal finding made by the court was that the
article was invalid because it gave non-members the
right to vote or invalid because it was a fraud on a
power which goes to invalidity and the section 320
argument which was dealt with by two members of the
court and accepted by two members of the court as a
good argument was really the third and probably least
important finding made by the court.
The point that we desire to make about the fraud
on a power finding of the court is that in each case
the grounds relied upon by the court were novel; in
each case the grounds accepted by the court as giving
rise to a fraud on a power were very far-reaching.
It is not a case where the finding of the court will
be limited to the particular article in question.-
it was no more chan a vehicle for raising these
Lssues - but questions of giving directors wide
discretionary powers has application in circumstances quite different from the one that was confronting the
court here. The question of introducing articles which are not self-contained but pick up by reference
from elsewhere definitions or provisions is a far-reaching
finding, a novel finding, in our respectful submission.
Likewise, that an article should be a fraud on a
power because it is difficult of construction - creates difficulty in construction. It does not mean that members of the Company have to be draftsmen -
parliamentary draftsmen or lawyers and adopt that
form of precission but the court seemed to accept
the proposition that it was an invalid exercise of
power if what the members do is to create difficulty
in construction, difficulty in administration. And our
point is that each of those propositions is novel,
far-reaching and prima facie wrong.
The section 320 point probably adopted the same
grounds for giving relief under the section as were
applied by the court in corning to the decision on the
fraud on the power. It is probably true to say though
that only two of the members of the court directed
themselves expressly to the section 320 argument.
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Mr Justice O'Bryan had dealt with it specifically.
Mr Justice Nathan, who agreed with the learnedpresiding judge, and Mr Justice King rested his
decision on other grounds, the fraud on the power,
and the - - -
| MASON CJ: | And which ground of appeal is directed to section 320? |
| MR FINKELSTEIN: | The first ground, 2(a): |
prejudicially and discriminately against
a particular shareholder -
picks up the language of section 320 which is:
unfair discrimination, unfair prejudice or
oppression.
and, in fact, adopts the language of the court in
deciding the point rather than the language of the
section. Well, for those reasons we say that thecase is special and important, if the Court please.
MASON CJ: Thank you, Mr Finkelstein. Yes, Mr Merralls?
| MR MERRALLS: | If it please the Court, we submit that special |
leave ought not to be granted in this case, however
important from a theoretical point of view some ofthe matters raised by my learned friend may appear
to be. I say "appear to be" because, in our submission, all that this Court would be able to
do, if it were to hear an appeal from a decision of
the Full Court in respect of those matters, is
to produce a series of interesting obiter dicta because, in our submission, the appeal would be
bound to fail because of the text of the added article.
My learned friend addressed the Court as though
the added article merely affected voting power. In fact, it does not. We invite Your Honours to inspect it and to note the -
| MASON CJ: What page is it set out in the - - -? | |
| MR. MERRALLS: | It is all over the place. It is on page 14 of the |
articles of association. It is printed on the side.
I am sorry, does Your Honour have the appeal book?
MASON CJ: Yes, I have.
| MR. MERRALLS: | Does Your Honour not have a copy of the articles of |
' association?
| MASON CJ: | No. |
| MR. HERR.ALLS: | I thought they had been handed up to the Court. |
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| Phosphate | |
| MASON CJ: | But on page 19 SA is set out. |
| MR MERRALLS: | Page 19, yes. |
| MASON CJ: | The foot of page 19. |
| MR MERRALLS: | "For the purposes of these Articles" - |
not 11 for the purposes of voting":
For the purposes of these Articles a
per:son :shall be deemed to hold a share
if he has a relevant interest in the share
for the purposes of s. 9 of the COMPANIES
(ACQUISITION OF SHARES) (Victoria) CODE.
That is the takeover. That is the first part of
the article. The second part is that: The Directors may at any time and from
time to time require a shareholder to
furnish to the Company satisfactory
evidence that no other person has a
relevant interest in the shares held by
him and in the absence of such evidence the
shareholder shall not be entitled to vote
in respect of the shares held by him.
Now, there is a problem with construction in the last
sentence because it is not clear whether that is
intended to relate only to the actual shareholder,
the person who is on the register or whether
it includes a deemed shareholder in the.first line,
but it could lead to all sorts of complicationsif it included a deemed shareholder because you
would be going round and round in circles and, in
our respectful submission, special leave ought not
to be granted merely to resolve that question.
But concentrating upon the first sentence,
we draw Your Honours' attention to the width of its
expression, that it is:
For the purposes of these Articles a person shall be deemed to hold a share
if he has a relevant interest -
within the meaning of the takeovers Code. Now, that can lead to the position where, first of all,
a person who is not a member of the Company is
deemed to be a member and we say that that infringes
or contravenes section 35 and section 256 of the
COMPANIES CODE,. and that appears to be accepted by
this Court in MADDOCKS v D.J.E. CONSTRUCTIONS,
148 CLR 104 at 117 to 120. But the second point is
that it deems or may deem, in certain circumstances,
more than one person to be the holder of the same
share because the takeovers Code is not concerned
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with simply deeming one person to stand in the shoes
of another. The object of the relevant provision of
the takeovers Code, section 9 and those sections which
elaborate it, is to aggregate shares held
and interests in shares through a number of provisions
which deem interests to be held in certain circumstancesvery remote from the actual holding of shares through trusts, through other companies, through partnerships, through the holding of options, through holding options
end-to-end or back-to-back so that you have got
an option in-respect-of-an-option, in-respect-of-an-
option on the same share. Each person is deemed to
hold a relevant interest. Not with the object ot having 100 per cent relevant interests, persons holding
interests - that is, persons holding interests
including relevant interest to equal 100 per cent of
the company, but which provide for or allow forhundreds of per cent of the issued shares of the
company to be deemed to be relevant interests.
So that in our submission the Company in this
case, whether or not it has acted bona fide in the
interests of the Company in the sense that it perceived
a problem or, rather, perceived a weakness of the
status of the Company that might be affected by the
activities of outsiders who wish to acquire shares,
it has adopted an article which fails on a number of
grounds: because it is contrary to law inasmuch as
if it is possible to deem a person other than - or to
give to a person other than a member a right in respectof a share, it is certainly not possible and,_in our
respectful submission, not even arguable that it is
possible to give such a right simultaneously to more
than one person, so that it is contrary to law,
unreasonable, on the same basis and uncertain because
of the extent of the deeming, tracing and otherprovisions of the takeovers Code labyrinthing in
their extent and operation that·would necessarily be brought into the article by the first sentence.
We have copies of the relevant provisions of
the takeovers Code for the Court.
| MASON CJ: | Thank you. |
| MR MERRALLS: | I apologize for not having handed them up before. |
I thought they had been handed in. We also have MADDOCKS' case which Your Honours may also wish to see.
| McHUGH J: | Mr Merralls, could you just explain this to me: | why |
or how was it that the chairman was able to disallow the proxies by reason of this article? That is what
happened, was it not?
| MR MER.RALLS: | I do not know. | I did not appear in the case below. |
I have not investigated that aspect of the evidence.
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| McHUGH J: | I just have not got it clear in my mind how article SA |
operates in this setting. Is its effect to increase the shareholding in respect of certain people but to
reduce the voting power in respect of Cityfarm?
| MR MERRALLS: | I think that is what was hoped. | The effective |
voting power in respect of - yes, of someone who
was not registered as a member but who had some sort
of contractual right. I think that is what was hoped to achieve. So that it would be deemed to be the holder of shares over which it had a contractual right
and therefore would be affected by the ceiling on
voting power which otherwise would apply to an
individual shareholder.
| McHUGH J: | It just seemed to me that it might actually increase |
the voting power of some members?
| MR MERRALLS: It would in some cases, yes. | Of course, this does |
operate only in respect of Cityfarm. It is here and
it is part of the charter of the Company until it is
removed. It certainly would. If you had people who
did not have other interests in the Company but who acquired options, it certainly would. In fact, you
could do it with the same shares.
So, in our submission, this case, whatever tse
interesting theoretical points that my learned friend raises through his textbook references, is hopeless -
simply hopeless, and should not be taken to the Court
for that reason.
My learned friend also made a point that the
terms of the article did not matter because it was
merely a vehicle for doing something. In our submission,
that is a most extraordinary submission because it is
the terms of the particular article upon which the case
depends. All he is saying is that - give the Court
an opportunity to expatiate upon the interestingquestions that he first raised if one could disregard
the rather inconvenient terms of this article.
It is true that in the Full Cotirt the reasons
for judgment of two of the judges were different or, rather, they proceeded along different paths but, in
our submission, that, in these circumstances, is no
ground for granting special leave. They do not override the other considerations that we have mentioned. It is
perhaps not insignificant that the third judge,
Mr Justice Nathan, although he spent a considerable time
, examining the nature of co-operative companies which,
in our submissions, is not a necessary element of
the case, did agree with the reasons for judgment
of both the other members of the court.
For those reasons, if Your Honours please, we wouldsubmit that it is not an appropriate case for special leave.
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MASON CJ: Thank you, ~r Merralls. Yes, Mr Finkelstein?
| MR FINKELSTEIN: | May it please the Court. | I was wondering whether |
I would take the opportunity to answer some of the
questions that Your Honour Mr Justice McHugh raised.
The effect of the article, by picking up the definition
of "relevant interests" in section 9,which is basically
to identify who has the power to vote a share or who
has the power to dispose of a share, has the
effect of - if one can identify a person who has
that power to vote or disclose, deeming him co be
a shareholder - member - it will not have the effect
of increasing the vote because the last sentence of
the article takes away the right to vote from -
it uses the word "the shareholder" but Mr Justice King,
when he considered the meaning of the article, in our
respectful submission, correctly construed it as
meaning "the shareholder (on the register of members)".
So that what it is effectively designed to do is
take away from one and give to the other and then
the aggregation provisions in article 52 say that
one person can only exercise up to five votes. And the chairman, according to the evidence - the
reason why the chairman was able to disallow thevotes of Cityfarm was because he had available to him
evidence that Cityfarm had acquired the beneficial title
and the right to vote the 20,000-odd shares
and therefore by application of the article the
registered members were deprived of the vote and
Cityfarm had a maximum of five votes. Probably the
chairman was in error by giving Cityfarm no votes
but I think that the learned trial judge, Mr Justice Beach,
said "five votes" and that is, by operation of the article,
we would say, a correct construction.
| McHUGH J: | It may be not what was intended by the article but |
supposing the shareholder does provide evidence that
other persons do have a relevant interest, then the
last limb of SA does not say anything, does it?
MR FINKELSTEIN: Yes, it does. If the evidence is provided
that somebody else has a relevant interest, then the member, the person on the register book, is not
permitted to vote his shares.
| McHUGH J: | The first paragraph says you: |
shall be deemed co hold a share.
| MR FINKELSTEIN: | Yes. |
| McHUGH Y: | Then the first limb of the second paragraph says - - - |
MR FINKELSTEIN: That is the evidentiary limb.
McHUGH J: Yes. Unless you produce:
satisfactory evidence that no other person has a
relevant - - -
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| MR FINKELSTEIN: |
interest in the shares.
McHUGH J:
-in the shares.
Then:
in the absence of such evidence -
you -
shall not be entitled to vote.
But supposing you produce the evidence, then the last
part does not operate at all, does it?
| MR FINKELSTEIN: | I suppose by express language, no, but by |
clear implication, still the right to vote is lost.
I suppose that raises the question again: if it is an article which could have been drafted more
carefully it might produce difficulties in construction
but does the quescion of creating difficulties of
constructiong produce the result that if it is a fraud
on a power to pass the article.
The only other point that we would desire to
make in reply is that there is nothing in MADDOCKS'
case which makes this article illegal in the sense
that it contravenes the law or contravenes the Code.
It is clear that a member, which is a person who the
COMPANIES CODE itself would regard as a member, is a person who must be on the register book - on the
register of members. But this article does not make outsiders members, it deems them to be members
for the purposes of the articles. So that the articles confer certain rights. They might be exerciseable.
It might be difficulty at whose suit. Maybe not at the suit of the person who is given the power but
at the suit of an actual member who can enforce the
contract created by the articles of association. But there is nothing illegal about deeming a person to be
a member and conferring rights, even though they may
not be enforceable directly at his suit. So that this is not a case where the applicant must fail
because the article is illegal, in that sense. May it please the Court.
| MASON CJ: | Mr Finkelstein, the Court will consider submissions |
, that have been made in this case and announce its
decision after the adjournment.
| MR FINKELSTEIN: | May it please the Court. |
AT 12.40 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED
UNTIL LATER THE SAME DAY
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| Phosphate | ||
| UPON RESUMING AT 2.18 PM: |
MASON CJ: The Court will grant special leave to appeal in this
case.
AT 2.18 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE
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Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Commercial Law
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Statutory Construction
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Jurisdiction
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Appeal
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