JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: PHOENIX EAGLE COMPANY PTY LTD -v- TOM McARTHUR PTY LTD [2017] WASC 130
CORAM: ALLANSON J
HEARD: 20 OCTOBER 2016
DELIVERED : 12 MAY 2017
FILE NO/S: CIV 1746 of 2016
BETWEEN: PHOENIX EAGLE COMPANY PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND
TOM McARTHUR PTY LTD
First DefendantTREVOR HOWARD BRICKHILL
Second DefendantLAURA COSTANTINA BRICKHILL
Third DefendantLAURA COSTANTINA BRICKHILL ATF THE TLAJ TRUST
Fourth Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Pleadings - Allegations of use of improperly obtained information as basis for pleading - Confidential information - Breach of directors duties - Iniquity principle - Turns on own facts
Practice and procedure - Application to restrain solicitors from acting - Access to improperly obtained confidential information - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 183, s 184
Result:
Plaintiff's statement of claim struck out with leave to re-plead
Plaintiff's subpoenas set aside
The defendants' application otherwise dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr L A Warnick
First Defendant : Mr G D Cobby
Second Defendant : Mr G D Cobby
Third Defendant : Mr G D Cobby
Fourth Defendant : Mr G D Cobby
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Piper Alderman
First Defendant : Roe Legal Services
Second Defendant : Roe Legal Services
Third Defendant : Roe Legal Services
Fourth Defendant : Roe Legal Services
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
A v Hayden [1984] HCA 67; (1984) 156 CLR 532
British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Gordon [2007] NSWSC 230
Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Limited [1969] RPC 41
Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) [1987] FCA 266; (1987) 14 FCR 434
Cowell v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2007] VSCA 301
DC Payments Pty Ltd v Next Payments Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 315
Duke Group Ltd (In liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364
GT Corporation Pty Ltd v Amare Safety Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 123
Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181; (2005) 64 NSWLR 561
Miller v Miller [1978] HCA 44; (1978) 141 CLR 269
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Kumar [2009] HCA 10; (2009) 238 CLR 448
Pearce v Button (1985) 8 FCR 388
Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236
Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) v Bond (No 2) [2001] SASC 70; (2001) 78 SASR 554
ALLANSON J: The plaintiff, Phoenix Eagle Company Pty Ltd, claims against four defendants for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of confidence in the use of confidential information, and contraventions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). In its claims, it alleges:
(1)In or about 13 October 2010, Trevor Brickhill (the second defendant) and Thomas McArthur consulted a solicitor to obtain legal advice on how to produce a pawpaw composition product that would have similar properties to OPAL A (a product to which Phoenix Eagle held an Australian patent) but would not infringe the Australian patent.
(2)In…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Phoenix Eagle Company Pty Ltd v Tom McArthur Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] WASC 130
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the information was obtained improperly and whether the use of that information constituted a serious enough impropriety to trigger the 'iniquity principle'. It noted that the principle was well established and that the courts would not lend their aid to enforce confidentiality obligations that would obstruct justice. The court also considered whether the plaintiff had established a sufficient evidentiary foundation for the claim of serious impropriety. The court found that the plaintiff had not provided adequate evidence to support a claim of serious impropriety, and thus, the 'iniquity principle' did not apply. The court also dismissed the application to restrain the defendant's solicitors from acting on the basis of the access to improperly obtained information.
The court concluded that there was no basis to restrain the defendant's solicitors from continuing to act, as the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the information was obtained improperly or that its use constituted serious impropriety. The court emphasised that for the 'iniquity principle' to apply, there must be sufficient public interest in the disclosure of the information to overcome the interest a party has in protecting it. In this case, the plaintiff had not met this threshold. The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims and the application to restrain the defendant's solicitors, leaving the parties to continue to pursue their respective positions in the ongoing litigation.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The 'iniquity principle' is clearly established: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Kumar [2009] HCA 10; (2009) 238 CLR 448 [25] - [26]: The consideration which impressed the Full Court was that the general law does not protect confidences about such matters as the commission of crimes and frauds. In A v Hayden, when giving their reasons for answering the questions in the case stated and questions reserved by Dawson J to the Full Court, Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ concluded that a court will not lend its aid to the enforcement of a contractual obligation of confidentiality undertaken by the Commonwealth, the effect of which would be to obstruct the administration of the criminal law. …It may be accepted that similar considerations to those which underpinned the result in A v Hayden apply also in the general law regarding non-contractual and purely equitable obligations of confidence. It has been said both in the courts of Australia and the United Kingdom that the disclosure of an 'iniquity' will not be restrained as the subject matter of an obligation of confidence. The limits of operation of the principle are less clear. A v Hayden [1984] HCA 67; (1984) 156 CLR 532 was concerned with confidentiality that would obstruct the administration of the criminal law. Other cases have referred to disclosure to a third party with a real and direct interest in redressing a crime, wrong or misdeed of public importance: see Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic), (445 - 446); Cowell v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2007] VSCA 301 [34]. Even if something less than that is sufficient, there must be sufficient public interest to overcome the interest a party has in protecting confidential information. The plaintiff submits that the court should find at least a prima facie case of serious impropriety - characterised in its submissions as improper and fraudulent conduct - and possibly a dishonest and intentional breach of director's duties amounting to an offence under s 184(3) of the Corporations Act. There must be some evidentiary foundation for the claim of iniquity before the court will deny protection to what would otherwise be confidential information. Speaking of the displacement of a claim to privilege, the court in Cowell v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd said:… A claim to legal professional privilege in respect of a communication is not displaced merely by making an allegation that the communication was made in furtherance of an illegal or improper purpose. Those who seek to exclude legal professional privilege must have some definite charge, either by way of allegation or affidavit, which must be made in clear and definite terms, and there must be some prima facie evidence that the allegation has a foundation in fact. The court will then exercise its discretion not merely as to the terms in which the allegation is made but also as to the surrounding circumstances for the purpose of seeing whether the charge is made honestly and with sufficient probability of its truth to make it right to disallow the privilege of professional communications [39]. (footnotes omitted)