Phillips v Wroe
[2022] WASC 9
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION: PHILLIPS -v- WROE [2022] WASC 9
CORAM: DERRICK J
HEARD: 12 JANUARY 2022
DELIVERED : 12 JANUARY 2022
FILE NO/S: SJA 1003 of 2022
BETWEEN: AMANDA PHILLIPS
Appellant
AND
ASHLEIGH WROE
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MAGISTRATE E O'DONNELL
File Number : PE 54407 of 2021, PE 54408 of 2021, PE 54409 of 2021
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Application for bail pending appeal against sentence from Magistrates Court - Whether grounds for bail made out - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Bail Act 1982 (WA)
Controlled Border for Western Australia Directions (WA)
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA)
Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA)
Presentation for Testing Directions (No 36) (WA)
Result:
Bail pending appeal granted
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr C M Townsend |
| Respondent | : | Ms J M Berry |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Timpano Legal |
| Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Fry v Collins [2013] WASC 371
JLD v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 156
Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42 WAR 99
Morrison v Chiera [2020] WASC 42
Scolaro v Shephard [2010] WASC 77
Vander Sanden v Johnson [2020] WASC 331
YSN v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 155
DERRICK J:
(These reasons were delivered extemporaneously and have been edited from the transcript.)
Introduction
The appellant applies pursuant to s 7F(1)(b) of the Bail Act 1982 (WA) (the Act) for bail pending the determination of her application for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed on her by a magistrate for three offences of failing to comply with a direction contrary to s 86(1) of the Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) (PE 54407/2021, PE 54408/2021 and PE 55409/2021) (offences).
The application for bail (the application) is supported by an affidavit sworn on 10 January 2022 by Mr Christopher Townsend, a solicitor employed by the firm of solicitors acting for the appellant. The appellant has also filed in support of the application the three prosecution notices for the offences and the Police Statements of Material Facts for the offences.
The respondent has provided me with the transcripts of the relevant hearings in the Magistrates Court.
The application is opposed by the respondent on the basis that the appellant may fail to appear in court in accordance with any bail undertaking and that there is no condition of bail that can reasonably be imposed that will sufficiently reduce the risk of this occurring.
Background to the application
The background to the application is as follows.
On 29 December 2021 the appellant was charged with the offences. The appellant was alleged to have committed the offences during the period 22 - 29 December 2021.
On 30 December 2021 the appellant had her first appearance in the Magistrates Court in relation to the charged offences. She was represented by duty counsel. She was not required to plead to the charges. She made an application for bail. The presiding magistrate refused the application on the basis that the appellant would be unlikely to comply with any directions under the Emergency Management Act. [1] The appellant was remanded in custody to appear again on 4 January 2022.
[1] ts 7, 30 December 2021.
On 4 January 2022 the appellant appeared in the Magistrates Court before Magistrate O'Donnell. She was again represented by duty counsel. She pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, the offences.
For each of the offences the subject of charge PE 54407/2021 and PE 54408/2021 the appellant was sentenced to 2 months imprisonment. For the offence the subject of charge PE 54409/2021 the appellant was sentenced to 2 months and 1 day imprisonment. The magistrate ordered the individual sentences to be served cumulatively giving a total effective sentence of 6 months and 1 day imprisonment. The magistrate then further ordered that 4 months of the total term of 6 months and 1 day was to be suspended for a period of 6 months. Thus the net result is that under the sentence imposed by the magistrate the appellant is required to immediately serve 2 months of the total term of 6 months and 1 day with the balance of the term, 4 months and 1 day, being suspended for a period of 6 months. It follows that the appellant's release date is 3 March 2022.
On 7 January 2022 the appellant filed her appeal notice containing her application for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed by the magistrate.
The appellant's application for leave to appeal is yet to be listed for hearing.
The appellant's pleaded grounds of appeal, which are not expressed as alternatives, are that the magistrate erred by not fully suspending the term of imprisonment imposed and that the magistrate erred by imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive as to type having regard to the circumstances of the offence and the appellant.
The facts of the offences
The facts of the offences as stated by the prosecutor to the magistrate during the sentencing hearing on 4 January 2022 are as follows.[2]
[2] ts 2 - 3, 6 and 7, 4 January 2022.
On 15 March 2020 a state of emergency was declared in Western Australia in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
On 13 November 2021 the Commissioner of Police and State Emergency Coordinator (being the same person) gave the Presentation for Testing Directions (No 36). The Presentation for Testing Directions required a low-risk traveller to present for a COVID-19 test within 48 hours of arriving in Western Australia and on the 12th day of their self-quarantine.
On 22 December 2021 the appellant arrived at Perth Airport from the Northern Territory on flight QF851. Upon arrival she was issued with a 'schedule 1 direction' to self-quarantine at 8 Pakenham Street in Fremantle (Fremantle address). She was also directed to present for a 48-hour COVID-19 test by 24 December 2021.
On 22 December 2021 the appellant attended Woolworths in Fremantle to buy camping supplies. Later that day she travelled to the south-west region to go camping.
On 28 December 2021 the police conducted a compliance check at the Fremantle address. The police discovered that the appellant was not at the address.
At 8.30 pm on 28 December 2021 the appellant responded to text messages sent to her by the police. In responding to the text messages the appellant claimed that she had been unaware of her self-quarantine obligations. At this point in time she appeared genuine in her desire to cooperate with the police. The appellant told the police that she was camping alone at Sues Bridge camp grounds in the Blackwood River National Park. The police directed the appellant to remain at that location as they would be attending to assist her to obtain suitable self‑quarantine premises.
Police from Margaret River travelled 55 km to the Blackwood River National Park in order to meet the appellant. Upon arrival they were unable to locate the appellant after searching nearby campsites via numerous tracks and roads in the area. In addition the appellant had turned her mobile phone off and was not responding to messages.
On 29 December 2021 police from Nannup travelled 55 km to the Blackwood River National Park in an attempt to locate the appellant. The police subsequently received information that the appellant may be at the Riverview Caravan Park in Margaret River.
Later on 29 December 2021 the appellant was located at the Riverview Caravan Park in Margaret River. She was in the process of purchasing a vehicle. She was arrested, cautioned and provided with her rights. She declined to speak to the police. When she was asked about her whereabouts she became hostile towards the police stating 'COVID is shit. It's absolutely bogus. It's bullshit'. Further, after her arrest and while she was being conveyed by the Margaret River police to meet Perth police the appellant, while in the secure police vehicle pod, removed her mask and tore it into pieces.
So they were the facts as stated by the prosecutor. The prosecutor's reference to the appellant being issued with a 'schedule 1 direction' was an apparent reference to a self-quarantine direction issued under the Controlled Border for Western Australia Directions given by the Commissioner of Police and State Emergency Coordinator.
Later in the sentencing hearing the magistrate asked the prosecutor to clarify precisely which of the stated facts related to each of the offences. In response to the magistrate's questioning the prosecutor confirmed, in substance, that the conduct the subject of one of the offences was comprised of the appellant failing to remain in self‑quarantine at the Fremantle address and travelling to the south-west region, that the conduct the subject of the second of the offences was comprised of the appellant failing to present for a COVID-19 test on 24 December 2021 and that the conduct the subject of the third of the offences was comprised of the appellant failing to remain at the Sues Bridge camp grounds when directed to do so.[3] It was on this factual basis that the magistrate sentenced the appellant for the offences.[4]
[3] ts 6 - 7, 4 January 2022.
[4] ts 6 - 7, 4 January 2022.
Although not much turns on the point for the purposes of the application, I note that the information provided to the magistrate as to the facts comprising each of the offences, and consequently the factual basis on which the magistrate sentenced the appellant for the offences, did not accord entirely with the Statements of Material Facts for the offences. Although the Statements of Material Facts for the offences the subject of charges PE 54407/2021 and PE 54409/2021 indicate that these two offences were comprised of the appellant's failure to remain in self‑quarantine and failure to present for a COVID-19 test on 24 December 2021 respectively, the Statement of Material Facts for the offence the subject of charge PE 54408/2021 indicates that the offence was comprised not of the appellant's conduct in failing to remain at the Sues Bridge camp grounds but rather by her failure to wear a mask at the time that she was apprehended at the Riverview Caravan Park in Margaret River.
The relevant legislative provisions
As I have already stated, the application is made pursuant to s 7F(1)(b) of the Act. Section 7F(1)(b) vests in a judge of this court jurisdiction to determine an application for bail made by a person who has commenced an appeal under pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) against a decision of a magistrate by virtue of which they are in custody.
Section 13(1) of the Act provides that the jurisdiction to grant bail is to be exercised subject to, and in accordance with, pt III of the Act and pt B, pt C and pt D of sch 1 of the Act. Thus a judicial officer exercising such jurisdiction must do so in accordance with sch 1.
Clause 5 of pt C of sch 1 of the Act provides that a person who is awaiting the disposal of appeal proceedings from the Magistrates Court shall be deemed to be awaiting an appearance in court before conviction for an offence. The effect of this provision is that the court, when considering an application for bail pending an appeal from the decision of a magistrate, is required by law to treat the applicant for bail as if they had not been convicted. That is, I am obliged to treat the appellant as if she is merely facing the charges of failing to comply with a direction notwithstanding that she has been convicted of the offences on her pleas of guilty.[5] The result is that in determining the application I am required to have regard to the questions specified in cl 1 of pt C of sch 1 of the Act and to any other matters that I consider to be relevant.[6]
[5] Scolaro v Shephard [2010] WASC 77 [11]; Fry v Collins [2013] WASC 371 [9] - [10]; Morrison v Chiera [2020] WASC 42 [20].
[6] Act, sch 1, pt C, cl 1.
Should bail be granted?
I propose to deal with each of the questions specified in cl 1 of pt C of sch 1 in turn to the extent that they are relevant. In dealing with the questions I will apply the relevant statements of principle made by the Court of Appeal in Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia,[7] YSN v The State of Western Australia[8] and JLD v The State of Western Australia.[9]
The questions posed by cl 1
Clause 1(a)
[7] Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42 WAR 99[39] ‑ [44].
[8] YSN v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 155 [14] ‑ [21].
[9] JLD v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 156 [51] - [53].
The first question specified in cl 1(a) of pt C is whether, if the appellant is not kept in custody, she may fail to appear in court in accordance with her bail undertaking, or commit an offence, or endanger the safety, welfare or property of any person, or interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice whether in relation to herself or any other person. Clause 1(a) is not concerned with a risk or possibility that is merely theoretical or hypothetical and would consequently apply to anyone and everyone charged with the offences with which the appellant is charged. Rather, the risk or possibility must be actual or real, as distinct from theoretical and hypothetical.[10]
[10] YSN v The State of Western Australia [17].
By cl 3 of pt C I am required, in considering whether the appellant may do any of the things mentioned in cl 1(a), to have regard to a number of matters as well as to any other matters which I consider to be relevant. The matters that I am required by cl 3 to have regard to are as follows:
1.The nature and seriousness of the offences and the probable method of dealing with the appellant for the offences;
2.The character, previous convictions, antecedents, associations, home environment, background, place of residence and financial position of the appellant;
3.The history of any previous grants of bail to the appellant; and
4.The strength of the evidence against the appellant.
Nature and seriousness of offences and probable outcome
As to the first of the matters specified in cl 3, I am in effect being required to consider the appellant's prospects of succeeding in her appeal against sentence.
I have not heard any detailed argument in relation to the appropriateness or otherwise of the sentence imposed on the appellant. This is for obvious reasons unsurprising. In any event, it is not appropriate that I attempt to undertake any detailed analysis of the merits of the appellant's appeal in dealing with the application. All I will say is the following.
The maximum penalty for the offence of failing to comply with a direction is 12 months imprisonment or a fine of $50,000.[11]
[11] Emergency Management Act, s 86(1).
During the sentencing hearing the appellant's counsel made submissions to the following effect in relation to the seriousness of the appellant's conduct in committing the offences:[12]
[12] ts 4 - 6 and 10 - 12, 4 January 2022.
1.The appellant came to Western Australia from the Northern Territory with a valid G2G pass;
2.The appellant was double vaccinated at the time she came to Western Australia;
3.The appellant was in a distressed state of mind on her arrival at Perth airport due to having recently witnessed her dog being taken by a crocodile while she was in the Northern Territory and consequently did not properly read and comprehend the quarantine and testing directions given to her on her arrival;
4.The appellant stayed at the Fremantle address for a night and then obtained a lift to Margaret River;
5.When the appellant went to Woolworths and travelled to Margaret River she wore a mask;
6.Once in the Margaret River region the appellant camped in the bush and stayed away from people as much as possible;
7.Due to the lack of a phone signal the appellant did not receive the text message directing her to remain at the Sues Bridge camp grounds until she entered the Margaret River townsite;
8.Once the appellant received the message directing her to remain at the camp grounds she contacted the police and told them where she was in Margaret River; and
9.The appellant did not deliberately attempt to avoid the police.
In sentencing the appellant the magistrate did not accept all of the submissions made on her behalf. In particular, in sentencing the appellant the magistrate made the following findings that are of relevance to the assessment of the appellant's culpability in committing the offences:
1.The appellant entered Western Australia with a valid G2G pass. She was fully vaccinated. She was wearing a mask; [13]
2.At the time of her arrival in Western Australia the appellant, although she had recently suffered the trauma of seeing her dog being taken by a crocodile and was in a state of distress, knew and understood that she was required to stay at the Fremantle address for the 14-day period;[14]
3.Although the appellant may have had good reason to think that she was 'low risk and indeed turned out to be low risk' she could not have known this at the time of engaging in her offending conduct;[15]
4.The appellant had demonstrated a level of deliberate avoidance of the police; [16] and
5.The appellant's conduct demonstrated a complete lack of regard for the rules that applied in this state. [17]
[13] ts 13, 4 January 2022.
[14] ts 13-14, 4 January 2022.
[15] ts 14, 4 January 2022.
[16] ts 14, 4 January 2022.
[17] ts 14, 4 January 2022.
Taking into account the maximum penalty for each of the offences, the facts of the offences as I have stated them, the magistrate's above stated findings of fact, and the factors identified by Hill J in Vander Sanden v Johnson[18] as being relevant to the assessment of the seriousness of conduct committed in contravention of s 86(1) of the Emergency Management Act, it is my opinion that the appellant's offences were relatively serious examples of their type. Further, the sentencing consideration of general deterrence is of obvious relevance. On the other side of the ledger, however, is that the appellant pleaded guilty to the offences at the first reasonable opportunity and has no prior convictions. Ultimately, balancing these competing considerations, although I am not on what is before me satisfied that the appellant's appeal has overwhelming prospects of success, I am satisfied that the appellant's appeal on the ground alleging that the Magistrate erred by failing to fully suspend the term of imprisonment imposed is reasonably arguable.
[18] Vander Sanden v Johnson [2020] WASC 331 [38] - [47].
I emphasise that the view that I have just expressed in relation to the merits of the appellant's appeal is a preliminary view only, expressed solely for the purpose of dealing with the application and without having had the benefit of hearing detailed argument on the point. If I am the judge who ultimately hears the appeal my expressed preliminary view will be of no relevance to my determination of the appeal. Further, and at the risk of stating the obvious, if another judge is ultimately allocated to hear the appeal nothing I have said in this context will in any way bind them when they come to consider the appeal.
Current circumstances, antecedents and history of grants of bail
As to the second and third of the matters specified in cl 3, I make the following remarks.
The appellant is now 27 years old.
The appellant was born in Canada. She is a Canadian citizen. She is in possession of a Canadian passport.
The appellant is currently living in Australia pursuant to a form of Visa (the type of Visa was not specified by counsel). I am told by the appellant's counsel that the appellant has made an application for a bridging Visa, but given that she has been remanded in custody she has not been able to submit the necessary supporting documentation and that as a consequence the application has been refused. Counsel also tells me that the appellant intends to challenge the denial of her application.
The appellant has lived in Australia for 4 - 5 years. She has during this time generally lived 'off grid' out of her car in remote locations. She has lived off her savings but has worked to earn income as necessary. It is her intention to remain in Western Australia. When she left the Northern Territory for this state it was her intention to live in the Margaret River area.
If the appellant is released on bail she proposes to live at either a caravan park that is within the metropolitan region or a Backpackers hostel that is within the metropolitan region.
As I have already stated, the appellant does not have a criminal record.
The strength of the evidence against the appellant
The last of the matters specified in cl 3 is the strength of evidence against the appellant. This is not a relevant consideration given that the appellant pleaded guilty to the offences and is appealing against her sentence only.
Determination of the question posed by cl 1(a)
So that deals with the four matters specified in cl 3 which I am required, to the extent that I am able, to take into account in determining the question posed by cl 1(a).
I come back then, in light of the observations that I have made in relation to the matters specified in cl 3, to the question posed for determination by cl 1(a).
The respondent submits that the appellant's status as a Canadian citizen and her lack of significant ties to this state or this country means that she is a flight risk.
If the appellant is released on bail she will face the prospect of being returned to custody in the event that her appeal is unsuccessful. However, given my preliminary assessment of the merits of the appeal I do not consider this prospect to be an inevitable one. Moreover, the period of time for which the appellant will, if her appeal is unsuccessful, be returned to custody is in relative terms not lengthy. In these circumstances I am not persuaded that the prospect the appellant ultimately being returned to custody is something that should be viewed as providing the appellant with a strong motivation for fleeing the jurisdiction and/or failing to appear in court if she is released on bail.
The appellant's lack of any prior criminal record provides support for the contention that she will appear in answer to her bail if she is released.
On the other hand, the appellant's conduct the subject of the offences, which on the magistrate's findings reveals a willingness to disregard the law if it suits her to do so, does suggest that there is some risk of her failing to appear in court in answer to her bail if she is not kept in custody. The fact that the appellant is a Canadian citizen and has no significant ties to this state also suggests the existence of such a risk.
Ultimately, taking these competing considerations into account, I am satisfied that there is some risk of the appellant not appearing in answer to her bail if she is not kept in custody. However, I am not satisfied that the risk is anything other than low to moderate.
As to the risk of the appellant committing an offence (which I take to include endangering the safety, welfare or property of any person), it would appear that the appellant at all times prior to the commission of the offences was compliant with COVID-19 requirements imposed in this country. She has clearly done the wrong thing on her arrival into this State but her good record indicates that she does not have any entrenched disregard for the law. The respondent does not contend that there is any material risk of the appellant committing further offences if she is not kept in custody. In these circumstances I am not persuaded, even taking into account the appellant's conduct the subject of the offences, that the risk of her committing further offences if she is not kept in custody is anything other than relatively low. Indeed, I am satisfied that the risk of the appellant engaging in any serious criminal conduct if she is not kept in custody is very low.
There is no basis for concluding that the appellant will, if released on bail, be at any particular risk of interfering with witnesses or otherwise obstructing the course of justice whether in relation to herself or any other person.
That deals with the question posed in cl 1(a).
Clause 1(b)
The question specified in cl 1(b) is whether the appellant needs to be held in custody for her own protection. There is nothing before me to suggest that the appellant does need to be held in custody for her own protection.
Clause 1(c)
The third question, specified in cl 1(c), is whether the prosecutor has put forward grounds for opposing the grant of bail.
I have already in part addressed the respondent's grounds for opposing bail in dealing with the question posed by cl 1(a). I will deal further with the respondent's grounds for opposing bail when I deal with the question posed by cl 1(e).
Clause 1(d)
The question specified in cl 1(d) is not relevant to the application.
Clause 1(e)
The fifth question for my consideration, specified in cl 1(e) is, so far as is relevant, whether there is any condition which could reasonably be imposed under pt D of sch 1 which would sufficiently remove the possibilities of the appellant, if she is not kept in custody, failing to appear in answer to her bail and committing any further offences. I will return to this question shortly.
Clauses 1(f) and 1(g)
The questions specified in cl 1(f) and cl 1(g) are not relevant to the application.
Other relevant matters
As I have already indicated, in dealing with the application I am required by cl 1 to have regard not only to the questions specified in the clause but also any other matters that I consider to be relevant. One such other relevant matter is the amount of time that the appellant will spend in custody if she is not granted bail prior to her appeal being determined.
As I have already stated, the appellant is due to be released on 3 March 2022. Accordingly, if the appellant is not granted bail pending the determination of her appeal she will, even if an order for the urgent hearing of the appeal is made, likely serve a reasonably significant portion of the immediate term of imprisonment imposed on her before her appeal is heard and determined (somewhere in the vicinity of one month would seem to me to be a reasonable estimate). This is, given that the appellant is to be treated as though she has not been convicted, a factor that weighs in favour of a grant of bail.
The imposition of conditions to sufficiently remove the risks
I come back now to the question whether there are any conditions which can reasonably be imposed which will sufficiently remove the possibilities, to the extent that they exist, of the appellant, if she is not kept in custody, failing to appear in court in answer to her bail and committing further offences. I note that the question is not whether the imposition of conditions will completely remove the possibility of the appellant engaging in such conduct, but rather whether the imposition of conditions will sufficiently reduce the possibility of this occurring.[19]
[19] YSN v The State of Western Australia [20].
The possibilities of the appellant, if she is not kept in custody, failing to appear in court and committing further offences will be sufficiently removed by conditions where the remaining risk no longer constitutes a proper ground for refusing her bail.[20] As was stated by the court in YSN v The State of Western Australia[21] this construction of cl 1(e) recognises that before bail is refused the nature and extent of the risk which the judicial officer assesses to remain after the imposition of reasonable conditions must be such as to warrant the detention of a person who has not been convicted (or in the present circumstances is deemed not to have been convicted).
[20] YSN v The State of Western Australia [20].
[21] YSN v The State of Western Australia [20].
The question whether the remaining risk no longer constitutes a proper ground for refusing bail must be assessed by reference to the nature and extent of the risk to the integrity of the criminal justice system and community safety, and also in light of the possibility that the appellant will suffer an injustice if she is held in custody pending the determination of her appeal and is ultimately successful in her appeal.[22]
[22] YSN v The State of Western Australia [19], [54]; JLD v The State of Western Australia [51], [53].
The conditions of bail proposed by the appellant are that she provide a personal undertaking in the amount of $1,000, that she reside at either of the two locations to which I have already referred and that she not leave the state or otherwise approach within 1 km of a point of departure.
The appellant cannot provide a surety. However, she has indicated that she is willing to subject herself to any other conditions considered by the court to be appropriate.
The respondent submits that the proposed conditions do not sufficiently reduce the possibility of the appellant not appearing in answer to her bail if she is not kept in custody. The respondent does not submit that the imposition of conditions will not sufficiently reduce the risk of the appellant committing further offences.
I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to grant bail only on the conditions proposed by the appellant. Although I am satisfied that the imposition of the proposed conditions would sufficiently reduce the possibility of the appellant committing further offences, I am not satisfied that they would sufficiently reduce the possibility of her failing to appear in court.
I am, however, satisfied that it is appropriate to grant bail on the conditions proposed by the appellant with some additional conditions. I am satisfied that the imposition of the proposed conditions and the additional conditions that I have in mind will sufficiently remove the risks of the appellant, if she is not kept in custody, failing to appear in court and committing further offences. To put the matter more fully, when I take into account the amount of time that the appellant will, as a person who must be treated as not having been convicted of the offences, spend in custody pending the determination of her appeal, I am of the view that the risks of her not appearing in court and committing further offences if she is not kept in custody will be sufficiently reduced by conditions such that the extent to which these risks remain no longer constitutes a proper ground for refusing bail.
The conditions that I intend to impose in addition to those proposed by the appellant are, in my view, warranted to further reduce the risks of the appellant not appearing in answer to her bail and committing further offences.
I therefore grant the application and order the release of the appellant on bail on the following conditions:
1.The appellant is to provide a personal undertaking in the amount of $1,000;
2.The appellant is to reside at [address redacted];
3.The appellant is to report daily to the Perth Police Station between the hours of 9.00 am and 5.00 pm;
4.The appellant is to surrender any passport held by her to the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court by 4.00 pm on 13 January 2022, and is not to apply for any further passport; and
5.The appellant is not to leave the State of Western Australia or approach within 1 km of any international or domestic point of departure.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
CP
Associate to the Honourable Justice Derrick
14 JANUARY 2022
4
0