Phillips v Wroe
[2022] WASC 48
•15 FEBRUARY 2022
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION: PHILLIPS -v- WROE [2022] WASC 48
CORAM: HALL J
HEARD: 9 FEBRUARY 2022
DELIVERED : 9 FEBRUARY 2022
PUBLISHED : 15 FEBRUARY 2022
FILE NO/S: SJA 1003 of 2022
BETWEEN: AMANDA PHILLIPS
Appellant
AND
ASHLEIGH JAYDE WROE
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MAGISTRATE E O'DONNELL
File Number : PE 54407/2021, PE 54408/2021 and PE 54409/2021
Catchwords:
Criminal Law - Appeal against sentence - Failure to comply with directions under the Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) - Magistrate misinformed as to the conduct relevant to one of the charges - Express factual error - Appeal allowed and appellant re-sentenced - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA)
Result:
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Appellant re‑sentenced
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | C Townsend |
| Respondent | : | J Berry |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Timpano Legal |
| Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
AAN v Butterfield [2021] WASC 228
Johnson v VanDer Sanden [2021] WASCA 27
RDS v Luplau [2021] WASC 280
Tonkin v Busby [2021] WASC 61
VanDer Sanden v Johnson [2020] WASC 331
HALL J:
This is an appeal against sentence. It was heard on an urgent basis on 9 February 2022. At the conclusion of the appeal hearing, I granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal and said that the reasons for my decision would be published at a later time.
The appellant arrived in Western Australia on a flight from the Northern Territory on 22 December 2021. She had been double vaccinated against COVID‑19 and had sought and obtained a valid G2G pass. A few days prior to her arrival, the State Emergency Coordinator signed a direction declaring the Northern Territory to be a low‑risk jurisdiction. The consequence of this was that on arrival the appellant was directed to self‑quarantine at an address in Fremantle for a period of 14 days, wear a mask when she was not at that address, and present for testing for COVID‑19 on specified dates. She failed to comply with these directions, and on 29 December 2021 was arrested, charged and remanded in custody.
On 4 January 2022, the appellant appeared in the Magistrates Court and pleaded guilty to three offences of failing to comply with directions made under the Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) (EM Act). She was sentenced to a total effective sentence of imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day, partially suspended after serving 2 months of the sentence.
The appellant sought leave to appeal against the sentence. The appeal was listed for hearing on an urgent basis due to the shortness of the custodial portion of the sentence. The grounds of appeal are that the magistrate erred by not imposing a wholly suspended sentence, that the sentence on each individual charge is manifestly excessive and that the magistrate made an express error as to the facts relevant to one of the charges.
The error the subject of the third ground occurred because the learned magistrate was misinformed by the prosecutor as to the conduct which constituted one of the offences. The respondent conceded that a material express error had occurred but submitted that no substantial miscarriage of justice resulted because, on the true facts, no lesser sentence would have been imposed.
In my view, the error that is the subject of the third ground is of a fundamental nature. The effect of it was that the appellant was not properly sentenced in respect of one of the charges. This impacted on the sentences imposed for the other charges as each of the sentences was made cumulative and the total effective sentence was then suspended. The interconnected nature of the sentences meant that it was not possible to separate out the sentence imposed for the affected offence.
In these circumstances, at the conclusion of the appeal hearing, I granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, set aside the sentences imposed by the learned magistrate and resentenced the appellant. In resentencing, it was relevant to take into account circumstances that had arisen since the original sentence was imposed. In particular, by the time of the hearing, the appellant had spent 6 weeks in custody (either in prison or immigration detention). I concluded that whilst the offences were serious enough to deserve a sentence of imprisonment, that sentence should be wholly suspended. This conclusion did not necessitate any finding that the sentences imposed by the magistrate in the first instance were manifestly excessive. There was no necessity to consider the other grounds of appeal and I have not done so.
The offences
The prosecution notice lodged on 29 December 2021 contained three charges each alleging that between 22 December 2021 and 29 December 2021, at Margaret River, the appellant failed to comply with a direction under the EM Act. Each charge made reference to s 86(1)(a) of the EM Act. There were no other particulars in the charges other than that the first charge stated that the direction was given under s 7 of the EM Act, the second charge stated that the direction was given under s 14 of the EM Act and the third charge stated that the direction was given under s 3 of the EM Act.
Those references to ss 3, 7 and 14 of the EM Act were clearly wrong as none of those sections relate to directions. It was not suggested by the appellant that this error affected the validity of the charges or that the appellant had failed to comply with three directions. It did, however, contribute to the lack of clarity as to what conduct each charge related to. I will return to this issue later in these reasons.
The statutory basis of the offence of this type was set out by Allanson J in Tonkin v Busby [2021] WASC 61. I have drawn on that summary for what follows.
The EM Act was enacted in 2005. Its long title is, 'An Act to provide for prompt and coordinated organisation of emergency management in the State, and for related purposes'. The Act was amended by the Emergency Management Amendment (COVID‑19 Response) Act 2020 (WA).
The relevant offence is under s 86(1), which provides:
A person given a direction under section 47, 67, 70, 71, 72A or 75(1)(i) must comply with the direction.
Penalty:
(a)imprisonment for 12 months or a fine of $50 000;
(b)for each separate and further offence committed by the person under the Interpretation Act 1984 section 71, a fine of $5 000.
Section 86 was amended in 2020 to include the penalty of imprisonment.
By s 56, the Minister responsible for the administration of the EM Act may, in writing, declare that a state of emergency exists in the whole or in any area or areas of the State. The declaration must not be made unless the Minister:
is satisfied that extraordinary measures are required to prevent or minimise ‑
(i)loss of life, prejudice to the safety, or harm to the health, of persons or animals; or
(ii)destruction of, or damage to, property; or
(iii)destruction of, or damage to, any part of the environment.[1]
[1] Section 56(2)(c).
Part 6 of the EM Act applies where an emergency declaration or a state of emergency declaration is in force and confers powers on specified office holders. The powers include the power to give directions. By s 77, directions may be oral (to be confirmed in writing) or in writing. By s 77(2A):
A direction under section 67, 70, 71, 72A(2) or 75(1)(i) that is given in relation to a class of person or thing ‑
(a)need not be given directly to the persons to whom it applies; and
(b)despite the Interpretation Act 1984 section 41 (to the extent to which it applies), need not be published in the Gazette; and
(c)must be published in the manner that the Minister considers suitable in the circumstances of the emergency.
The directions relied on in this matter were made under s 67, s 70 and s 72A. Relevantly, s 67 permits a hazard management officer, by direction, to prohibit the movement of persons within, into, out of or around an emergency area or any part of the emergency area.
Section 70 provides that a hazard management officer or authorised officer may direct 'any person who has been exposed, or any class of person who may have been exposed, to a hazardous substance’:
(a)to remain in an area specified by the officer for such period as is specified by the officer;
(b)to remain quarantined from other persons for such period, and in such reasonable manner, as is specified by the officer.
The period specified in s 70(1) must not be more than 24 hours unless the State Emergency Coordinator gives the direction or has given authorisation for a longer period to be specified 'in relation to persons exposed to the hazardous substance'.
Section 72A(2) provides:
For the purposes of emergency management during an emergency situation or state of emergency, a hazard management officer or authorised officer may take, or direct a person or a class of person to take, any action that the officer considers is reasonably necessary to prevent, control or abate risks associated with the emergency.
The facts of the offences
On 4 January 2022, after the appellant had pleaded guilty to the charges, the prosecutor read a statement of facts. That statement was as follows:
On 11 March 2021, the World Health Organisation declared COVID‑19 a pandemic. On 15 March 2021, the state of emergency was declared in the state of WA, Western Australia, in response to the COVID‑19 pandemic. On 13 November, the commissioner and the state of emergency coordinator gave the presentation for testing directions under 36. A part of those directions require a low‑risk traveller to present for a COVID‑19 test within 48 hours of arriving· into WA and on their 12th day of self‑quarantine.
On Wednesday, 26 (sic, 22) December 2021, the accused arrived at the Perth airport on flight QF851 from Northern Territory. Upon arrival, she was issued with a schedule 1 direction to self-quarantine at 8 Pakenham Street in Fremantle. A part of her directions was to present for a 48 hour COVID test by 24 December 2021. The accused failed to present to obtain a test from the healthcare professional.
… On 22 December, the accused attended the Woolworths in Fremantle to buy camping supplies, and later that day, she travelled into the south-west region to go camping. On 28 December of 2021, police conducted a compliance check at 8 Pakenham Street. Inquiries established the accused attended the Woolworths in Fremantle to buy camping gear, and later that day, she travelled to the south-west region to go camping.
At about 8.30 pm that night, the accused responded to text messages left on her mobile phone. She claimed to be unaware of her self‑quarantine obligations and appeared genuine in cooperating with police. She stated she was alone and camping at Saint - at - sorry, Sues Bridge Campgrounds in Blackwood River National Park. She was directed to remain at that location as police would be attending to assist in obtaining a suitable self-quarantine premises.
Margaret River police travelled 55 kilometres into the national park to meet the accused. Upon arrival, they were unable to locate her after searching nearby campsites, via numerous tracks and roads in the area. Further, the accused had turned her mobile phone off, and she was not responding to her messages. On 29 December 2021, Nannup Police again travelled the 55 kilometres into the national park to attempt to locate the accused before information was received indicating the accused may be at the Riverview Caravan Park in Margaret River. She was located in the process of purchasing a vehicle. She was arrested, cautioned and provided her section 137 and 38 rights.[2]
[2] Transcript, Magistrates Court, 4 January 2022, 2 ‑ 3.
Defence counsel who appeared for the appellant in the Magistrates Court stated that those facts covered all of the charges and that the facts were 'mostly accepted'. Defence counsel said that the appellant was a Canadian national and had been in Australia for 4 years and had mostly lived remotely. Prior to coming to Western Australia, she had been staying in the gulf country of Queensland when her car 'blew up'. She then travelled with a friend through the Northern Territory. On 19 December 2021, she and the friend were camping at a remote location in the Northern Territory when her dog was taken by a crocodile. The appellant was distressed by this event and immediately made plans to fly to Western Australia and obtained a G2G pass.[3]
[3] ts 4 January 2022, 3 ‑ 4.
Defence counsel said that the appellant was fully vaccinated before arriving in the State. It was accepted that on arrival she had been provided with a schedule of directions. However, she did not read them properly as she was not 'in the right frame of mind'. It was submitted that she had done quarantine in other states and intended to essentially stay away from people as much as possible by going to a bush location and wearing a mask when in company. She stayed in Fremantle for a night and then got a lift down to Margaret River with the intention of camping out.[4]
[4] ts 4 January 2022, 4 ‑ 5.
In regard to whether she had deliberately avoided police by turning her mobile telephone off, defence counsel said that that was not the case. Rather, the place that she was camping had intermittent telephone reception. It was said that she only received the information telling her to remain where she was when she went into the Margaret River townsite. She then voluntarily contacted the police, told them where she was and waited for them to arrive.[5]
[5] ts 4 January 2022, 5.
Defence counsel submitted that in camping out the appellant had attempted to stay away from people, however she accepted that she had done the wrong thing and had been very distressed by being arrested and transported back to Perth. The appellant had come from the Northern Territory which was considered a low-risk jurisdiction at that time and was fully vaccinated. Counsel said that she wore a mask in public, including when she attended at the supermarket in Perth prior to travelling to Margaret River. She had had very little contact with anyone and was not considered a close contact of anyone who had tested positive. Since being arrested she had had two negative tests.[6]
[6] ts 4 January 2022, 5.
The prosecutor accepted that the appellant had advised police of her initial location at the campsite but suggested that her travel to Margaret River was an effort to avoid being picked up by the police. However, the defence submission that the appellant had not received the relevant text message telling her to stay where she was until she arrived in Margaret River was not specifically disputed. Nor was it disputed that she had been located in Margaret River as a result of her telephoning the police. However, the prosecutor said that any suggestion of cooperation on the part of the appellant had to be seen in the light of her conduct in the police van while being transported to Perth. That conduct included refusing to wear a mask.[7]
[7] ts 4 January 2022, 7.
The magistrate then sought clarification as to the conduct relating to each of the three charges. It was confirmed that one charge related to the failure to have a COVID test and another charge related to the failure to stay at the self‑quarantine address in Fremantle. The magistrate then asked whether the third breach was constituted by the appellant failing to remain at the campsite as directed by police. The prosecutor responded by giving an account of the appellant's movements and then said that she was directed to remain at the Campsite. The implication was that the third breach did relate to that police direction.[8]
[8] ts 4 January 2022, 6 - 7.
The magistrate's sentencing remarks
The magistrate commenced her sentencing remarks by identifying the conduct that was the subject of the three charges:
… what's clear from-the facts - putting aside what's in the prosecution notices, is that the three failures consist of - first of all, failing to present to get a test on 24 December 2021 which was required. Secondly, departing from the quarantine location, which was 8 Pakenham Street in Fremantle and going to Woolworths to buy camping supplies and then proceeding from there directly to the south‑west. And then finally, failing to comply with a direction to remain at the campsite.
Now, it's said in that regard that that direction went through to her by text message and she didn't receive it until she went into the town site. But really, by that stage, I consider that there had been a level of evasion of the requirements of the emergency management regime that is in place in Western Australia. Now, counsel emphasises things such as the fact that Ms Phillips came into Western Australia with a valid G2G pass. She was fully vaccinated. She was wearing a mask.
Those things in one sense are in her favour but, on the other hand, they detract quite significantly, in my view, from any submission that she didn't know what she was required to do when she got here because she clearly ‑ she knows about COVID-19. She hasn't been living so remotely that she hasn't even heard of the pandemic. She's vaccinated. She knew about the requirement to wear masks. She knew about the requirement to have a G2G pass and she got one. So she knows about these things.[9]
[9] ts 4 January 2022, 13.
The magistrate accepted that the appellant was in some considerable distress over the fact that her dog had been taken by a crocodile and that she saw that happen. Her Honour said that whilst this was no doubt traumatising it was not something that would have caused the appellant to have failed to understand what was required of her on her arrival in this state. Her Honour accepted that there might have been some mobile telephone signal problems but said that the appellant should not have been in a place where communication was difficult in any event. Her Honour referred to the indications that the appellant was initially cooperating with the police but said that this was offset by her conduct in the police van.[10]
[10] ts 4 January 2022, 13 - 14.
Her Honour concluded that 'given the persistence in this behaviour' it was appropriate to impose a term of 2 months' imprisonment on each of the first two charges and 2 months and 1 day on the third charge with all of the sentences to be cumulative. She then said that the total effective sentence of 6 months and 1 day would be partially suspended after serving 2 months from the date of the sentence.[11]
[11] ts 4 January 2022, 15.
Grounds of appeal
The amended grounds of appeal are as follows:
1)The learned magistrate erred by not fully suspending the term of imprisonment imposed;
2)The learned magistrate erred by imposing a sentence with respect to each individual count that was manifestly excessive with respect to type of sentence, having regard to the circumstances both referable to the offending and personal to the offender;
3)The learned magistrate expressly erred by sentencing the appellant on facts inconsistent with the charges proffered.[12]
[12] Appellant’s Outline of Submissions, 31 January 2022, [31] ‑ [64].
Since ground 3 alleges an express error it is convenient to deal with that ground first. If that ground is made out and the error is material, then it is necessary to set aside the sentences and resentence the appellant. In those circumstances there would be no necessity to consider grounds 1 and 2.
Ground 3 - express factual error
It was not apparent, either from the charges themselves or the statement of facts read by the prosecutor, what conduct related to each of the charges. It was entirely understandable that the magistrate sought clarification in this regard. She was of the understanding that one of the charges related to the appellant failing to comply with a police direction to stay at the campsite. The information that the magistrate received from the prosecutor confirmed that understanding. That information was incorrect.
The respondent concedes that the magistrate made a material error in attributing the failure to stay at the campsite with one of the offences. The respondent suggests that the references to ss 3, 7 and 14 of the EM Act in the charges should be have been references to items 7 and 14 of schedule 1 of the Controlled Border for Western Australia Amendment Directions (No 53) (Quarantine Directions) and item 3 of schedule 1 to the Presentation for Testing Directions (No 36) (Testing Directions). Item 7 of the Quarantine Directions requires that a person directed is to remain inside suitable premises for a period of 14 days. Item 14 of the Quarantine Directions requires that a person directed is to wear a face mask and practice social distancing when outside suitable premises during the 14-day quarantine period. Item 3 of the Testing Directions contains a requirement to present for testing within 48 hours of arrival in Western Australia.[13]
[13] Respondent’s Outline of Submissions, 7 February 2022, [66] ‑ [82].
Assuming the respondent's suggestion is correct, then the first charge (charge number 54407), which referred to s 7 of the EM Act, was intended to allege a breach of item 7 of schedule 1 of the Quarantine Directions by failing to remain inside the nominated Fremantle premises for a period of 14 days. The second charge (charge number 54408), which referred to s 14 of the EM Act, was intended to allege a breach of item 14 of schedule 1 of the Quarantine Directions, that is a failure to wear a face mask and practice social distancing when outside the suitable premises during the 14-day self‑quarantine period. The third charge (charge number 54409), which referred to s 3 of the EM Act, was intended to allege a breach of item 3 of schedule 1 of the Testing Directions by failing to present for testing within 48 hours of arrival in Western Australia.
I accept that the respondent’s submissions are correct. It is apparent from this that none of the charges alleged that the appellant had breached the EM Act by failing to comply with a direction of the police to stay at the campground. In fact, the third charge related to a failure to wear a mask.
Whilst the respondent accepts that this was a material error in the sentencing process, it is said that it is not an error that operated adversely to the appellant. The respondent submits that a failure to wear a mask could be viewed as more serious than a failure to comply with a police direction to stay at a particular location and, had this error not been made, no lesser sentence would likely have been imposed. In these circumstances, the respondent suggests that the error has not resulted in any substantial miscarriage of justice and this ground should not succeed.[14]
[14] Respondent’s submissions, [79] ‑ [81].
An error as to what conduct is the subject of a charge is of a fundamental nature. The discretion to impose a sentence cannot be appropriately exercised if the magistrate is under a misapprehension as to what conduct constitutes the offence. In this case, the magistrate erroneously believed that one of the offences was for failing to comply with a police direction. It was for that conduct that the magistrate determined that a penalty of imprisonment was appropriate. The magistrate did not intend to impose a penalty for not wearing a mask and did not do so.
It is not to the point whether a penalty of the same nature as that imposed by the magistrate would have been imposed had the error not occurred. The purpose of sentencing is to decide what penalty is appropriate for the conduct that is the subject of the charge. That exercise requires an assessment of the seriousness of the conduct, as well as any relevant aggravating factors and any relevant mitigating factors. Only by undertaking such a process can the sentencing discretion be properly exercised. That process does not occur where there is a fundamental misunderstanding of what the offending conduct is.
In any event, I do not accept that the magistrate would necessarily have viewed the failure to wear a mask as being of the same level of seriousness as a failure to comply with a police direction. The only reference by the prosecutor to a failure by the appellant to wear a mask related to a period after she was apprehended and in the police van while being transported to Perth.[15] It was not alleged that she had failed to wear a mask during the whole period between her arrival in Western Australia and her apprehension in Margaret River. In fact, a defence submission that the appellant had worn a mask at all other times when in the company of other people, including when attending the supermarket in Perth, was not disputed. In these circumstances, the conduct of failing to wear a mask related to a relatively confined period when the appellant was in police custody, occurred at a time when she was in a distressed state and was not representative of a persistent course of conduct. These are factors that may well have borne upon the magistrate's assessment of the seriousness of this charge, had she had occasion to consider it.
[15] ts 4 January 2022, 6.
Conversely, the magistrate took a decidedly negative view of the appellant's failure to comply with what she understood to be a police direction. That view had its own difficulties, bearing in mind the defence submission that the appellant had not received the information from the police telling her to remain at the campsite until she came back into mobile coverage in Margaret River. If that assertion was true, then there had been no deliberate non‑compliance with the police directions. That would seem to be consistent with the accepted fact that it was the appellant who contacted police when she was in Margaret River to tell them where she was.[16]
[16] ts 4 January 2022, 5.
The factual error affects the whole of the sentencing process because the offences all arose out of the same incident and the individual sentences formed part of the same sentencing exercise. Since all of the sentences were made cumulative, and the total effective sentence was partially suspended, it would not be possible to extract one sentence without affecting the whole. In these circumstances, leave to appeal on this ground was granted, the appeal allowed, the sentences set aside and the appellant resentenced.
Grounds 1 and 2
It is unnecessary to determine grounds 1 and 2 and inappropriate to do so since the appellant must now be resentenced. Any assessment of whether the sentences imposed by the magistrate were individually excessive or inappropriate because they were not wholly suspended would be of academic interest only. The sentencing discretion must now be exercised afresh and in the circumstances that now exist, including circumstances that have arisen since the appellant was dealt with in the Magistrates Court.
Re-sentencing
The maximum penalty for an offence of this nature is 12 months' imprisonment or a fine of $50,000. Imprisonment is always a penalty of last resort, that is it is a sentence that should not be imposed unless all other sentences have been considered and found to be inappropriate.[17]
[17] Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), ss 6(4) and 39.
Offences against the EM Act of failing to comply with directions must be seen in the light of the context in which they occur. Where directions are given, as here, in the context of a pandemic, public safety depends upon uniform compliance. Personal and general deterrence is a significant factor in sentencing for such offences.
In this case, there are three offences though they all arose out of the same course of conduct. The appellant left the quarantine premises after only one day and could not have failed to understand that in doing so she was not complying with the directions she had been given. She did not attend for testing as required, though she later tested negative. Her breach of the self-quarantine direction was not a momentary aberration but continued for a period of approximately a week. Her actions resulted in the unnecessary expenditure of police resources in locating, apprehending and transporting her to Perth. Whilst she was distressed at being arrested, her conduct in relation to the police, including refusing to wear a mask, was disrespectful and foolish.
There are, however, a number of factors that were favourable to the appellant. She entered Western Australia lawfully and after obtaining a valid G2G pass. She travelled from a low-risk jurisdiction and was fully vaccinated. On her own account, which was not disputed, she wore a mask other than after her arrest by the police, when she was in a distressed state. Her intention by camping out was to avoid other people and there was no suggestion that she attended any densely crowded venues. She cooperated with the police by telling them where she was and waiting for them at the place where she was ultimately apprehended. She pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity and, in my view, this justifies a 25% discount pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act.
The appellant is relatively young woman, being 27 years old at the time of the offences. She has no prior convictions. She is a Canadian national and has been living and working in Australia for four years on various working and bridging visas. As a result of her conviction of these offences her current bridging visa was cancelled. After being arrested, she was held in custody until being granted bail pending appeal on 12 January 2022. She was then taken into immigration detention where she remained until bail was revoked on 28 January 2022. She was then returned to prison. Accordingly, the appellant has been in custody, either in a prison or an immigration detention centre, for 6 weeks. That loss of liberty is a relevant factor to be taken into account in considering what penalty should now be imposed.
Although every case is different, I have had regard to other appeal decisions relating to sentences imposed for offences of failing to comply with directions under the EM Act. These include Vander Sanden v Johnson [2020] WASC 331, Tonkin v Busby [2021] WASC 61, AAN v Butterfield [2021] WASC 228, RDS v Luplau [2021] WASC 280 and Johnson v Vander Sanden [2021] WASCA 27. Those cases all involved one offence (even where multiple directions were breached). Relevant factors identified in those cases were the degree of risk of the offender introducing disease in Western Australia, whether deception was involved in entering the State or avoiding police, the extent to which the offender sought to avoid the quarantine regime and the extent to which the offender complied with the regime.
Taking all those factors into account, I am satisfied that the only appropriate penalty in all the circumstances is one of imprisonment. However, in my view, that sentence should be wholly suspended. Such a sentence adequately reflects the seriousness of the offending whilst also giving appropriate weight to factors personal to the appellant, including the fact that she has been in custody since 29 December 2021.
Conclusion
For those reasons, at the conclusion of the appeal hearing I made the following orders.
1.Leave to appeal on ground 3 granted.
2.Appeal allowed.
3.The sentences imposed by the magistrate are set aside and in lieu thereof the appellant is sentenced to 2 months' imprisonment on each of counts 1 and 2, and 2 months and 1 day on count 3, cumulative, and the total effective sentence of 6 months and 1 day is suspended for a period of 6 months.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
JS
Associate to the Honourable Justice Hall
15 FEBRUARY 2022
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