Phillips and Phillips
[2010] FamCA 359
•11 May 2010
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| PHILLIPS & PHILLIPS | [2010] FamCA 359 |
| FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Parties entered consent orders and a binding financial agreement – Section 79A application – Wife asserts undervaluation of the asset pool and non-disclosure of assets –– Wife alleges duress and improper inducements – Failure to provide particulars in compliance with orders – Methodology for valuing shares of a company |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Phillips |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Phillips |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRC | 10818 | of | 2007 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 11 May 2010 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Brisbane |
| PLACE HEARD: | Brisbane |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Barry J |
| HEARING DATE: | 31 July 2009 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Page of Senior Counsel appearing for the Applicant Wife |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Wiltshire Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Kirk of Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent Husband |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Hirst & Company |
Orders
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The proceedings are adjourned to 10.00 am on 12 July 2010 for the determination of the threshold question as to the value which should have been ascribed to the Husband’s shareholding in VW Pty Ltd as at 31 January 2002.
The Wife is to file and serve all material upon which she intends to rely on the threshold question including written submissions on the legal aspects of her claim by 4.00 pm on 2 July 2010.
The Husband is to file and serve all material upon which he intends to rely on the threshold question including written submissions on the legal aspects of his claim by 4.00 pm on 9 July 2010.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Phillips & Phillips is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
FILE NUMBER: BRC10818/2007
| MS PHILLIPS |
Applicant
And
| MR PHILLIPS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
I have previously delivered determinations in this matter on 5 March 2008,
12 June 2008, 8 December 2008 and 5 May 2009.
Those reasons adequately canvass the background to the current dispute.
The last orders of the 5 May 2009 (which replicate the orders made on
8 December 2008) are in the following terms:
“- -
By 30 June 2009 the Wife is to file and serve full particulars as to what the Wife asserts was the nett value of the property pool at the time the consent orders were entered into and how such calculation is arrived at. Such particulars to include:
a.details of each item of property and the value of same which the Wife says should have been taken into account;
b.to the extent the Wife asserts the value for an item of property is different to that set out in the consent orders and/or the Binding Financial Agreement the basis upon which the Wife says such value was not correct;
c.details of each liability of the parties and/or company entities under their control as at the date of the consent orders and/or the date of the Binding Financial Agreement to the extent such liability differs from the liability expressed in the consent orders and the Binding Financial Agreement, the basis upon which the Wife asserts the liability was not correct;
d.details of any financial resources of the parties and/or any companies under their control as at the date of the consent orders and/or the Binding Financial Agreement and to the extent the value of such financial resources differs from the value expressed in the consent orders and/or Binding Financial Agreement, the basis upon which the Wife asserts the values of such financial resources were not correctly expressed;
e.full particulars of any property of the parties or either of them the Wife says the Husband has failed to disclose;
f.full particulars of any representation made by the Husband as to the value of such property which the Wife asserts was false with full particulars as to the impact the representation is said to have had on the value in question;
g.full particulars of any conduct of the Husband or anyone on his behalf in the course of the making of the consent orders and the Binding Financial Agreement which the Wife asserts was in the circumstances unconscionable.- -”
In response to earlier directions the Wife had previously filed particulars on the 4 August 2008. In my reasons delivered on 8 December 2008 I made observations on the particulars delivered – especially whether the particulars revealed evidence of a claim of non-disclosure of assets by the Husband or the undervaluing of assets. I found other than mere assertions it was so, the Wife had not provided evidence of non-disclosure or under valuing of assets.
In the reasons delivered in December 2008 I determined not to order the summary dismissal of the Wife’s application pursuant to section 79A and section 90K but I did order the wife to provide further and better particulars in accordance with the orders set out in paragraph 3 above.
The determination I am now required to make is whether the Wife’s application should be struck out as an abuse of process for failure to deliver proper particulars to substantiate her claim as required by the order of
8 December 2008.
Senior Counsel for the Husband relied on written submissions at the hearing on
31 July 2009. In paragraph 7.2 of those submissions (final paragraph) he noted:
“ - -
The orders [of 8 December 2008 and 5 May 2009] could not have been clearer as to what was required but the Wife provides none of the critical particulars which would demonstrate the nett pool relied upon for the consent orders/BFA was undervalued. She doesn’t even attempt to set out the “nett value of the property pool” that she currently asserts.”
Under the heading “Orders Sought by Husband” in the written submissions of Senior Counsel for the Husband it is submitted:
“8.1The Wife’s inability to comply with Your Honour’s Order of 5 May 2009 demonstrates the Wife’s application is an abuse of process and should be struck out. She has had ample time to do what she should have been in a position to set out before these proceedings commenced. If she subsequently is able to do what is required she can bring another application – striking out this application does not shut her out if she has a genuine complaint;
8.2 The main purpose of the Rules is set out in Rule 1.04 and it is:
“To ensure that each case is resolved in a just and timely manner at a cost for the parties and the court that is reasonable”;
8.3 In promoting the “main purpose” by Rule 1.06(c), the Court must:
“Identify the issues in dispute early in the case and separating and disposing of any issues that do not need full investigation and trial”;
Here, Your Honour has by the many orders you have made sought to achieve this and the Wife’s various responses have yet to identify any issue that currently needs “full investigation and trial”;
8.4Rule 11.1 provides Your Honour with the general power to “stay a case or part of a case” in the course of case management to achieve the “main purpose”.
An alternative to striking out the Wife’s application would be for Your Honour to stay the Wife’s application pending her producing what she was required to produce pursuant to Your Honour’s order of 5 May 2009. She should also be required to produce actual valuations in admissible form from registered valuers who have been provided with the valuations provide by the Husband’s valuers and a critique by her valuers thereon;
8.5If Your Honour is not prepared to strike out or stay the Wife’s application then, in terms of case management, the Husband would seek:
(a)a direction that the Wife’s application be set down for hearing on the “threshold” issue alone;
(b)that the Wife be restricted in relation to the issues upon which she relies to those that Your Honour considers she has properly raised pursuant to Your Honour’s order (we mean no disrespect, but we are unable to identify any such issue);
(c)that the Wife file the affidavits upon which she intends to rely by such date as Your Honour shall direct.”
For present purposes I proceed on the basis that the evidence adduced by the Wife may be accepted by the Court, not that it must.
In August 2006 when the Wife originally raised the issues pursuant to section 79 and section 90K on the basis the Husband had undervalued the assets the Husband produced certain valuations obtained in July 2001, December 2001 and January 2002 (annexures JNP4, JNP7 and JNP9 to the Husband’s affidavit sworn 17 January 2008). In addition he appends to that affidavit a series of further valuations of various properties obtained in the period August 2006 to December 2006 after the Wife’s solicitors made demand.
These various valuations have not been sworn to but no challenge has been made to this material in this form. The Husband’s challenge to the Wife was to produce her own valuations to show the Husband’s valuations represented an under value of the parties’ assets as at the relevant time, namely the date of the making of the consent orders and the signing of the Binding Financial Agreement.
At the hearing on 31 July 2009 Senior Counsel for the Wife produced a document headed:
“These are further and/or better particulars orders to be filed by Barry J on
5 May 2009. They are to read in addition to or in explanation of particulars provided on 4 August 2008”.Appended to these particulars are three documents, the first being a letter of
30 June 2009 to the Wife’s solicitor by Mr C a chartered accountant in private practice in Brisbane. The second attachment is a letter from CBRE (Richard Ellis) valuers of 29 June 2009 to the Wife’s solicitors and the third a letter from S Valuers to the Wife’s solicitors of 29 June 2009.
Before considering Mr C’s assessment I set out the assets of the parties which the Wife contends have been undervalued. I list the assets in the order as set out at page 17 of the consent orders. I limit the recitation of the assets to those where there is significant challenge:
VW Shares:
@ $.25 cents (value of Husband’s holding) $6,910,813
@ $.62 cents (value of Wife’s holding) $ 65,591
Y equity $1,525,000
G property $1,090,000
N land - liability ($2,000,000)
VW Shares
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the consent orders of 31 January 2002 provided as follows:
“3.
a.that on or before 14 February 2002 or on the date of the making of this order (whichever is the later) the Husband shall transfer to the Wife or into the name of a company nominated by the Wife 900,0000 shares in [VW] Limited and;
b.that the Wife shall be entitled to receive all dividends in those shares that are declared after 31 January 2002;
4.That the Wife shall retain free of all claims by the Husband the 102,486 shares and any dividends payable thereon in [VW] Limited presently owned by her.”
If the Wife’s contention be correct that the shares should have been brought into account at $.62 cent a share, the value of the Husband’s shareholding would have increased by more than $10 million dollars.
Prior to the making of the consent orders a letter was obtained from stockbrokers S Brokers (annexure 31 to the Wife’s affidavit sworn 27 November 2001). Their letter of 27 November 2001 is addressed to both parties. In that letter it is noted:
“You have asked [S Brokers] to give our view of the likely nett realisable value of your family interests in [VW] Limited. We understand that these interests comprise 27,643,254 ordinary shares. We understand that we have been asked to provide our view as we are one of the most active brokers in [VW] Limited trading.
- - -
In the last twelve months approximately 15.2 million shares in [VW] Limited have traded on the Australian Stock Exchange. In the previous twelve months approximately 13.6 million shares traded. Therefore the parcel of shares owned by the [Phillips] family interests represent approximately two years trading volume on the ASX.
If we were to sell a parcel of shares of this magnitude into the market we believe it would take a number of years to complete the sale and the price would end up well below $.30 cents.”
In the penultimate paragraph it is noted:
“- - -
In summary the subject parcel of shares is extremely large in the context of recent years trading volumes in [VW] Limited shares the sale of these shares would strip the company of one of its most important assets, namely its CEO. The market’s appetite for a much smaller line of [VW] shares was recently tested and no natural buyers were able to be found at a price of $.50 cents. Therefore, we believe that to sell 27.6 million shares we would need to offer the shares to our clients at a price of $.30 cents or less.”
Mr C in his letter annexed to the particulars filed on 30 June 2009 at paragraphs 81 to 8.7 gives the following opinion:
“[VW] Limited Shares
8.1The Husband held 27,643,254 shares in [VW] Limited ([VW]).
8.2The Wife held 102,478 shares in [VW].
8.3In a letter from Ms Philippa Power solicitor to Mr David Mitchell solicitor on 6 November 2001 Ms Power stated that the Husband’s holding of [VW] was discounted by approximately 50%:
“Because of the nature of the holding and the pivotal and crucial role of the Husband, as CEO, in the conduct of the business as carried on by [VW].”
8.4The Husband has control of [VW] given the number of shares he holds.
8.5The basis of value of shares involves the concept that there is a prudent, well informed and not over anxious purchaser and vendor. The basis of value does not contemplate a flooding of the market of the shares held by the Husband.
8.6In fact, the value of the shares are discounted for minority shareholders, where those shareholders lack control of the company.
8.7In my view, there are no grounds to discount the value of shares held by the Husband.”
Later in these reasons I propose to consider a number of decisions on the methodology to be adopted when valuing shares in a situation such as the present. For present purposes I am of the view it does not greatly matter whether the Wife adduces evidence from a chartered accountant or a stock broker on the issue of what value should have been attributed to the Husband’s shareholding.
Y Property
Mr C gives a detailed analysis of the various dealings involving this development in the period prior to and subsequent to 31 January 2002. He concludes at paragraph 7.17:
“In my opinion the conclusion in the financial agreement and the comments made by the Husband about the value of the [Y] property do not reflect the correct value of that land.”
He does not detail his methodology nor precisely how he arrives at this conclusion. I assume from the remainder of the contents of the letter he is of the view the property was undervalued but he does not indicate by how much or why. In relation to the Y land Senior Counsel for the Husband takes exception to an accountant calling into question the valuation of registered valuers CB Richard Ellis. He asks the rhetorical question:
“What expertise Mr [C] has to critique the CB Richard Ellis valuation is not stated.”
The G Land
CBRE (Richard Ellis) were engaged by the Wife to make observations in relation to the G property. On the final paragraph on page 2 of their report they assert:
“Based upon historical sales information, we consider an indicative assessment of the likely realisation of the property, as at 29 January 2002 to be in the range of $6,500,000 to $7,000,000. Sales information utilised in forming our assessment include but are not limited to the following: ---”
Thereafter they set out a series of sales.
The letter from CBRE (Richard Ellis) appears to have so many qualifications that its evidentiary value must seriously be brought into question. The letter commences:
“We refer to your recent correspondence requesting us to provide brief advice on the above property. We have been requested to provide the following:
·a brief overview of historical titles of the property;
·indicative assessment of the likely market realisation of the property, as at 29 January 2002.
Following a kerbside inspection our brief advice is as follows: - - -”
On the final page of the letter under the heading “Qualifications and Limitations” the following appears:
“This indicative assessment is not, and should not be construed to be, a representation as to the market value of the subject property, as defined in the API Practice Standards. A desk top assessment is merely an indicative assessment made without the benefit of an inspection of the subject property. If a formal valuation of the subject property is made based on an inspection it may vary significantly from the results of any desk top assessment. Clients should be aware that the desk top assessment methodology carries with it risks which entail a degree of likely variation greater than might be expected to be produced by a valuation.
In forming our retrospective opinion, we have undertaken relevant enquiries and investigations in respect to the various features of the property, including town planning, title details, environmental, location etc. Where possible we have endeavoured to verify this information from various sources. In the event that the information obtained is found to be incorrect, we reserve the right to revise our report and the advice upon these bases contained herein.
The subject property has not (sic) inspected by the valuer. We recommend that a formal valuation be undertaken for Court proceedings to appropriately assess the market value of the property.”
As previously quoted 2(a) and 2(b) of the orders of 5 May 2009 are in the following terms:
“- -
By 30 June 2009 the Wife is to file and serve full particulars as to what the Wife asserts was nett value of the property pool at the time the consent orders were entered into and how such calculation is arrived at. Such particulars to include:
a.details of each item of property and the value of same which the Wife says should have been taken into account;
b.to the extent the Wife asserts the value for an item of property is different to that set out in the consent orders and/or the Binding Financial Agreement the basis upon which the Wife says such value was not correct;- - -”
I find that the letter from CBRE (Richard Ellis) of 30 June 2009 does not meet the requirements of the particulars as ordered. The orders were originally made in December 2008. I note that the instructions given to the valuers were, “recent correspondence”. A valuation range has been given but the qualifications to the valuation are so numerous the report could have no evidentiary value. On this basis I propose to disregard the contents of the CBRE (Richard Ellis) letter.
At paragraph 3.2 of the written submissions by Senior Counsel for the Husband, Senior Counsel notes:
“32.One hesitates to speculate why the Wife would not have provided CBRE with the [L Valuers’] valuation and sought a critique of it.”
I accept the force of this submission.
N Land
The letter from S Valuers does not amount to a valuation at all and the view that I take is that it is not in compliance with the orders of 5 May 2009 for the Wife to give a specific value for the property and to provide the basis why the Wife says the property should be valued at a different valuation to that set out in the consent orders and the Binding Financial Agreement. I accept the force of the submission questioning why S Valuers were not provided with a copy of the valuation produced by the Husband’s valuers and asked to critique same.
Wife’s Allegation of Duress, To Found a Claim Pursuant To Section 79A and Section 90k
At paragraph 30 the Applicant summarises her position in the following terms:
“30.I am also of the view that [the husband’s] conduct leading up to the execution of the Binding Financial Agreement and consent orders was such that I felt as though I had no alternative but to consent to the property settlement on the terms proposed by [the husband].”
In Public Trustee v Gilbert [1991] FLC 92-211 the Full Court, Fogarty, Nygh and Wilczek JJ ruled (at pages 78 – 428):
“---
That for the purposes of a section 79A(1)(a):
“a miscarriage of justice can only occur by reason of a fact or event which occurs before or at the time of a making of the order which is sought to be set aside.””
I note in the Wife’s affidavit (paragraph 281 and subsequent) she makes reference to incidents post the date of the consent orders. I have not had regard to such evidence in relation to this aspect.
At paragraphs 188 and 191 of her affidavit the Wife deposes:
“188.After [the husband] and I resumed living together he again started to apply pressure and badger me to sign all necessary documents in relation to the property settlement.
191.By late October 2001 [the husband] had started to abuse me and demanded at every opportunity that I confirm the date I would be signing the documents.”
At paragraphs 249 and 254 the Applicant deposes:
“249.After I signed the contract to purchase the [B] unit I can recall [the husband] expressly saying to me that he would now not provide the funds I required to settle the [B] unit unless I agreed to the terms of his proposed property settlement.
254.By late January 2002 [the husband] was threatening and abusing me on an almost daily basis.”
I do not need to particularise any further the claims of the Wife that she was threatened and that a miscarriage of justice has arisen in that the consent order was signed under duress.
The Husband strenuously denies the Wife’s claims but that is not a matter that I am able to determine at this point in time. Suffice it to say the Wife’s allegations may be accepted by a Court in which event a Court could make a finding of duress. The issue would then remain whether the end result was still just and equitable.
The whole issue of whether duress had been established has never been an issue in the proceedings for summary dismissal and for dismissal on the grounds of abuse of process. The contention of the Husband has been the Wife has failed to adequately particularise how it is that the asset pool was understated or assets were not disclosed.
How Should the Shares in VW Be Valued?
From the terms of her affidavit and the cover sheet of the consent orders it appears the Wife was represented at the material time by a solicitor Mr David Mitchell. In her application before me she does not seek to adduce any evidence as to what advice she received in relation to the matters raised other than the solicitor informing her she should endeavour to withdraw from the unconditional contract she had signed for the B unit as the Husband may use her vulnerable position to force her to a settlement on his terms (paragraph 243).
Leaving aside the admissibility of such statements, a critical issue would be (regardless of any legal advice the Wife received) whether the Husband’s shareholding in VW should have been valued at $.25 cents as contended for by him or $.62 cents as now contended for by Mr C.
In the decision of Harrison v Harrison (1996) FLC 92-682 the Full Court, Ellis, Baker and Warnick JJ held:
“The value to be ascribed to shares in a family company must be a realistic one based upon the worth of the shares to the party himself or herself.”
In a subsequent case, Ramsay v Ramsay (1997) FLC 92-742 Warnick J set out various observations regarding the purpose and method of valuation in proceedings in this jurisdiction.
In a subsequent decision AJW v JMW (2002) FLC 93-103 handed down on 11 March 1998 Warnick J observed:
“1.The debate between the accountants was beset by a degree of confusion largely due to the terminology used and a failure to adapt definitions appropriately into the field of property division in family law.
2.There could be no doubt that the objective of the valuations should have been to asses the value of the shares to the Husband (owner) see Harrison v Harrison (1996) FLC 92-682 at p 83, 087. That was so whether there were “special benefits”, or not, though if there were special benefits, they must be valued in achieving the objective. However, the use of the term “value to the owner” in family law property cases should not be dependent upon the existence of special benefits but rather be as descriptive of the objective of the valuation exercise.”
I note that Counsel in that particular matter were Counsel appearing in the current proceedings.
Senior Counsel for the Husband has raised the issue that the letter from S Brokers was in the nature of a joint expert report. The Wife says in response that she was not consulted in any way about the obtaining of this letter, notwithstanding that the letter purports to be addressed to both parties.
The Wife was legally represented at the time but her case is that she was subjected to duress by the Husband which was exacerbated when she signed an unconditional contract for the B unit on the assurance of the Husband he would fund the settlement. She asserts he reneged on this agreement and would only fund the purchase if she signed the consent orders and the Binding Financial Agreement (Wife’s affidavit paragraphs 235 and 249).
In her affidavit at paragraphs 252 and 253 the Wife says:
“252.I was informed by my solicitor, Mr Mitchell, the cost of having formal valuations, reports and forensic accountant’s reports to determine the actual value of the matrimonial property would be substantial and would also take quite a considerable amount of time.
253.I could not afford to retain experts as I had no access to spare funds and I needed to settle the [B] unit in a very short period of time.”
Husband’s Understatement of Income
In paragraph 26 of the further and better particulars document Senior Counsel for the Wife asserts:
“26.The Husband represented to the Wife at or about the time of the execution of the Binding Financial Agreement and consent order that his taxable income was $296,400 when he knew such information to be false.”
I accept from a reading of the consent orders that the Husband had set out his income at $5,700 a week.
In paragraph 316.1 under the heading “[husband’s] income” the Wife asserts that the actual annual income for the tax year ending 30 June 2002 was $1,208,368.
It is not clear the basis upon which the Wife is able to give this evidence but having regard to the particular figure one can only assume that it comes from a combination of income tax returns or information otherwise emanating from the Husband or his legal advisors.
Because of the failure to give the basis for the Wife’s evidence at this point in time I do not propose to rely on this aspect as a misrepresentation made by the Husband.
Further Proceedings
In Lancer & Lancer [2008] FamCAFC 112 the Full Court, Bryant CJ, Warnick and Thackray JJ observed (paragraph 18):
“18.In addressing the question of whether or not to bifurcate the hearing of a section 79A application, a Judge is likely to examine the degree of connection between the ground and the other questions which might need to be addressed, namely whether there has been a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances and whether the order should be varied or set aside, if so, to what extent it ought to be varied or what order ought be made if any in lieu. That connection or degree of connection will vary from case to case.”
In the circumstances of this case with the paucity of evidence to support the allegations made by the Wife in so many areas I would consider it unreasonable at this point in time to allow the Wife’s section 79A application to proceed and be joined with a fresh hearing of all property settlement issues.
It is far better in my view to adopt the threshold approach in relation to the valuation of the VW Shares.
Conclusion
The Wife has failed to comply with the direction to provide a specific valuation of the real estate which she says has been undervalued.
Y Land
In relation to the letter from Mr C I note at 7.15 he purports to summarise paragraph R(k) of the Binding Financial Agreement.
“The Financial Agreement at subparagraph k at paragraph R suggests that the current value of the [Y] property is $4.5 M and that $2,951,500 is owed to the GIO. This suggests that there is equity of approximately $1.5 M to $1.6 M in this land.”
Subparagraph k of paragraph R of the Binding Financial Agreement is in the following terms:
“Land registered in the name of [V] Pty Ltd industrial land at [Y], being Lot 1 on …, Lot 2 on …, Lot 3 on …, Lot 402 on … and Lot 403 on ….
The cost of acquisition of the above was $5.3 M. We are instructed that the current value is approximately $4.5 M and $2,951,500 is owed to the GIO. The proprietor company incurs considerable holding costs and there are ongoing and costly legal disputes over approvals.”
I would have thought it was beyond argument that additional moneys expended as set out in the last sentence of this provision of the Binding Financial Agreement would of necessity have to be taken into account when valuing the land at the relevant date. At bottom line Mr C does not purport to say what the Y land is worth – indeed it is questionable whether he has the expertise to give such an opinion.
In the whole of the circumstances I propose to disregard the evidence of
Mr C in relation to the Y Land.
G Land
For reasons given earlier I do not propose to place any reliance on the letter from CBRE (Richard Ellis) of 29 June.
N Land
Similar comments apply in relation to the letter from S Valuers.
S Valuers do not purport to give a specific value for the land in question at the relevant date. This is not in compliance with paragraph 2 of the orders made on 5 May 2009.
At all times the Wife has asserted an undervaluation of various assets. Despite numerous opportunities to do so she has failed to specify the extent of the undervaluation or the basis for same as required by paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of the earlier orders.
In relation to the VW shares there may be merit in the Wife’s claim that she was forced by circumstances that had arisen to accept a value of $.25 cents per share for the Husband’s shareholding when the actual value was $.62 cents or some other figure greater than $.25 cents per share.
Subject to further submissions from Counsel I propose to conduct a discrete hearing on the threshold issue of the proper value to be applied to the VW shares.
Senior Counsel for the Husband in his written submissions at paragraph 6 noted:
“6.The Wife’s selective reference to some of the properties in the pool when the values of all properties in the pool were agreed will never be enough to enable her to succeed in this case. A telling example is the former home which was included in the pool at $4 M but [the real estate agent] placed its value at $3 M – in order to increase the disclosed pool over all, the Wife must first cover this $1 M over valuation.”
If the value of the VW shares is taken at $.62 cents as contended for by Mr C it would totally overshadow any aspect of overvaluing of other assets as claimed by the Husband. I do not propose to investigate this aspect further.
I certify that the preceding sixty-six (66) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Barry
Associate:
Date: 11 May 2010
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