Philip Barnes and Secretary, Department of Social Services
[2014] AATA 204
[2014] AATA 204
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number
2014/0438
Re
Philip Barnes
APPLICANT
And
Secretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT
Decision
Tribunal RM Creyke, Senior Member
Date 9 April 2014 Place Canberra The decision under review is set aside and varied.
....................[sgd]..............................
RM Creyke, Senior Member
Catchwords
SOCIAL SECURITY – Application for disability support pension barred by compensation preclusion period – Whether compensation preclusion period properly imposed – Whether there are special circumstances to shorten preclusion period
Legislation
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) sections 17, 1064, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1184K and Part 3.14
Cases
Angelakos v Secretary, Department of Education and Workplace Relations (2007) 100 ALD 9
Beadle v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 60 ALR 225
Dranichnikov v Centrelink (2003) 75 ALD 134Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Re Chamberlain and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2002] AATA 487
Re Secretary, Department of Families and Community Services and Lazarus (2003) 73 ALD 183Secondary Materials
Scheme for Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration, Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 1995, Second reading speech.
REASONS FOR DECISION
RM Creyke, Senior Member
Mr Philip Barnes suffered a compensable injury on 15 October 2001 for which he was subsequently paid lump sum compensation.
On 1 February 2013, the Department of Human Services advised Mr Barnes that he was subject to a compensation preclusion period for the period 2 February 2013 to 12 December 2014.
Mr Barnes lodged a claim for disability support pension on 1 August 2013 which was rejected due to the compensation preclusion period. The decision was upheld by an authorised review officer on 21 August 2013, and further affirmed on review on 21 November 2013 by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal.
On 21 January 2014 Mr Barnes appealed to the Tribunal. A hearing was held in Canberra by telephone on 26 March 2014.
Background
Mr Barnes, born 1952, suffered an injury on 15 October 2001. He had been employed as a truck driver – ranger by a New South Wales local council. He has not worked since and says he is not able to work again. That is confirmed in a report on 3 May 2012, by Dr Alan Searle, a consultant orthopaedic surgeon. Mr Barnes received a lump sum payment in respect of the injury from Allianz Insurance of $41,250 on 16 December 2003.
On 7 January 2013, Mr Barnes received another lump sum compensation payment of $125,000 for the injury.[1] Mr Barnes had been receiving periodical compensation payments from the date of the injury from Allianz Insurance until 1 February 2013. The second lump sum payment redeemed the entitlement to the periodic compensation payments. On 24 January 2013 Allianz Insurance sought a clearance request from Centrelink concerning the second payment. In total Mr Barnes had received lump sum payments for the injury of $166,250.00.
[1] Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) s 87EA(1).
On 1 February 2013 Centrelink wrote to Mr Barnes advising him that following receipt of the second lump sum payment, he had a compensation preclusion period from 2 February 2013 until 12 December 2014. He was advised that this meant he was not able to receive income support from Centrelink. Mr Barnes said he was told by an officer of Centrelink at Cessnock on 5 August 2013 that his compensation preclusion period ended in January 2014. He was advised during a telephone conversation with Centrelink on 19 August 2013 that this was incorrect and the end of the period was December 2014.
Despite that advice, on 1 August 2013, Mr Barnes lodged an application for disability support pension listing ‘right and left knee replacement, back, shoulder and blood pressure (high)’ as his medical conditions. The claim was rejected on 2 August 2013 on the ground that Mr Barnes was subject to a compensation preclusion period under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (Act), a decision upheld on review on 21 August 2013 by an authorised review officer, and on further review on 21 November 2013 by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal.
Mr Barnes claimed that his solicitor had never advised him that a preclusion period might be imposed before he accepted the settlement lump sum payment. He also claims that his circumstances have changed since his application was considered by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal. He referred in particular to his stroke and the diagnosis that he has diabetes.
Mr Barnes suffered a stroke in late December 2013 for which he was hospitalised for several days on 21 December 2013, and is on medication. The stroke has left him with hemiparesis, that is, weakness on the left side of his body. He also developed diabetes between 1 August 2013 when his general practitioner, Dr Gabb, completed his application for disability support pension form and February 2014 when Dr Gabb provided a letter confirming that Mr Barnes has been diagnosed with diabetes. Mr Barnes is on tablets for the condition.
Previously, in November 2011, Mr Barnes had knee replacement surgery for both knees, followed by manipulation of his knees under anaesthetic a month later. The surgery, although technically successful, has left Mr Barnes with allodynia and severe pain. Mr Barnes’s orthopaedic surgeon, Dr Searle, indicated Mr Barnes was suffering from chronic pain syndrome. He has difficulty walking and uses two walking sticks at times. He has attended physiotherapy for his knees and a shoulder condition. Mr Barnes has a lower back problem for which he claims he has had two failed back procedures.
A report of his orthopaedic surgeon, Dr Searle, dated 3 May 2012, states:
He is obviously unfit for all forms of gainful employment, and indeed is unfit for all sorts of physical activity of any sort. He has become quite depressed and treatment of his depression will be an important part of his overall management.
He has been left with continuous pain, worse on the left than the right knee. As Dr Searle’s report noted: ‘The pain is aggravated by prolonged standing, rising from a chair, and particularly trying to go up or down stairs. He cannot kneel or squat. The knees swell and they tend to give way’. Dr Searle’s recommendation was that Mr Barnes attend a pain management clinic for his chronic pain syndrome and also for his depression. He estimated that the cost of attendance at the clinic would be no less than $7,000.
In his disability support pension application Mr Barnes said that his conditions had left him with the following incapacities: ‘Walking long distance, sitting for long periods, standing for long periods, travelling long distances’. Following his stroke in December 2013, the hospital discharge report recommended Mr Barnes not drive himself for a month. At the hearing Mr Barnes said he is now reluctant to drive himself at all because of his injuries.
Mr Barnes also provided receipts to the Tribunal for March 2014 showing his increased medical costs since his diabetes and stroke. The extensive list of medication is for diabetes, high blood pressure, reflux oesophagitis or the nausea caused by some of the medication, peripheral artery disease, kidney disease, and blood clots. Mr Barnes’s payments for these medication amounted to $556.67 for that month. Although Mr Barnes had high blood pressure prior to his stroke, all the medications are relevant to either the diabetes or the stroke. Both conditions occurred after the decision under review was made. Mr Barnes’s evidence was that the prescriptions generally last more than a month.
Mr Barnes’s wife is in casual employment and earns, as her payslips between 30 December 2013 and 23 February 2014 indicate, between $285 and on occasions over $600 a week. Generally, however, her salary is around $400 a week. According to Mr Barnes his wife had to give up a full-time job and take a casual one in order to look after him.
The authorised review officer noted in ARO Notes dated 21 August 2013, that the $30,000.00 then in the bank and with 68 weeks of his compensation preclusion period to go, Mr Barnes would have had $441 a week to live on. The authorised review officer considered that on the evidence, Mr Barnes was not in hardship.
Following receipt of his lump sum payments Mr Barnes had upgraded the couple’s cars with second-hand vehicles as his existing vehicles needed replacement. He bought a Mitsubishi Triton 2009 for $12,000 and a Toyota Prado 2002, for $11,000. Mr Barnes said because of his hemiparesis, he needed an automatic vehicle. He also told the Social Security Appeals Tribunal that as his area was prone to flooding he needed reliable vehicles. In support of the ‘prone to flooding’ claim, Mr Barnes gave evidence to the Tribunal that his home had been flooded in February 2013 but fortunately the couple had only lost some personal documents and some furnishings.
As his savings were being used up, on 31 January 2014 Mr Barnes sold one of the two cars he had purchased for $7,900.00. He bought a replacement Ford utility 2000 for $3,100.00. There is a receipt for $920.00 for new tyres for one car paid on 31 January 2014 and an earlier expense for tyres for the other car of $600.00. Both cars need comprehensive insurance and registration which, for 2014, will be over $2000.00, of which $1560.08 has been paid.
At the hearing Mr Barnes explained that his property is a one hour drive from Gosford and about 35 minutes from Cessnock. His wife needs her car for her employment and to run errands every day of the week. In addition, his wife’s mother who is 90 lives at Port Macquarie, over three hours’ drive away. The mother is unwell and on occasions his wife has to drive to Port Macquarie to look after her. Mr Barnes said when his wife is not at home he would feel vulnerable if he were not able to drive to either Cessnock or Gosford. At the same time, given his financial circumstances, Mr Barnes told the Tribunal that he is contemplating selling one of the couple’s existing vehicles.
Not long after his last lump sum payment Mr Barnes also purchased a ride on motor mower for $2,499.00. Mr Barnes explained that he lives on a 38 acre property of which one and a half acres around the house is fenced. He needed the mower so he can continue to maintain this area. His physical disabilities means that he cannot manage to do with a push mower. He rents the property. The rental was $520 per fortnight in July 2013; in 2014, the rent was increased to $540 per fortnight, that is, $270.00 a week. Mr Barnes says his power bill is about $400 a quarter, that is, $31 a week, and his telephone account is about $300 every month or $75 a week.
Mr Barnes said he has an old horse on the property which has become a family pet. The horse had been abused and the couple care for it on their property. He had veterinary expenses for the horse in December 2013 totalling $1099.40 when the horse had colic, a condition from which horses can die. Mr Barnes also bought a mattress, for his back condition, for $950.00 on 2 April 2013, and on 30 March 2013 he purchased a bed for $1449.00. At the hearing he confirmed that he had made those purchases on medical advice. His orthopaedic specialist had told him that unless he bought a decent bed ‘you’ll be in chronic pain for your back’. The bed has provided his back with some relief.
Prior to the settlement in February 2013, Mr Barnes had borrowed money from the bank. He was repaying it on hardship terms because of his difficult financial circumstances at the time. In November 2013 Mr Barnes told the Social Security Appeals Tribunal that his debt to the bank was $22,000, that he had a credit card debt ($10,000), and owed about $45,000 to friends and family from whom he had borrowed money to tide him over following his injury. The amount he owed was about $77,000.
Mr Barnes’s said to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal that after the settlement he had paid back $25,000 to the National Australia Bank (NAB), $10,000 to the Greater Building Society Ltd, and $29,000 to family and friends. Following receipt of his lump sum he said he took the opportunity to pay off his debts. In addition he had spent about $28,000 for cars, and his rent to 24 July 2013 had been $6,000, totalling $98,000.00. He generally pays his rent in cash.
The bank statements for the couple indicate the significant decrease in their savings. Mr Barnes received a cheque for $125,000 by letter dated 25 February 2013. On 1 March 2013 the joint account contained some $110,000; by August 2013, the amount was about $30,000.00. The authorised review officer advised him that this was sufficient to live on until December 2014. By November 2013 Mr Barnes claimed to have only about $18,000.00 in the account. The bank statement for 13 February 2014 showed a balance as $6,970.61 which by 1 March 2014, had diminished to $1,733.45.
On 1 March 2013, Mr Barnes contacted Centrelink and said he has been living in hardship for the last four (now over five) years as his ‘income’ dropped from $900.00 per week to $300.00 per week until the date of the settlement. Mr Barnes has not worked for the last five years. Mr Barnes told Centrelink and more recently, the Tribunal, how anxious he is about the speed with which the couple’s available funds are diminishing. Indeed, they are almost depleted. He is anxious that they will not have enough money to survive until December 2014. Apart from the furniture, the mower, and the cars, Mr Barnes said the expenses were normal living expenses.
Legislation
The relevant legislation is the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth). Specific provisions relating to this matter are found in section 17, the section containing definitions for the compensation recovery provisions, and Part 3.14, Compensation Recovery, which covers compensation preclusion periods for people who have received compensation affecting income support payments. In addition, section 1064 contains rate calculators which are used for the purpose of the formula for working out the lump sum preclusion period.
Issues
The issues are:
·Whether Mr Barnes was subject to a compensation preclusion period from 2 February 2013 to 12 December 2014;
and
·If so, whether there were any special circumstances in Mr Barnes’s case to allow the shortening of the compensation preclusion period by disregarding all or part of the compensation payment made to Mr Barnes.
Consideration
Compensation preclusion period
Mr Barnes suffered an injury in 2001 for which he was compensated. The injury has prevented him from working. He was granted two lump sums of compensation, the first on 16 December 2003; the second on 7 January 2013.
The Act states that if ‘a person receives a lump sum compensation payment’ and subsequently claims a ‘compensation affected payment’, the compensation affected payment is ‘not payable to the person in relation to any day or days in the lump sum preclusion period’.[2]
[2] Act s 1169(1).
‘Compensation’ means ‘a payment under a scheme of insurance’ or ‘a payment (with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim for … a claim under … an insurance scheme’.[3] Mr Barnes had received a payment from Allianz Insurance which was a payment under an insurance scheme. He had also received a payment in settlement of his claim under the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) which was a payment in settlement of his claim under that Act.
[3] Act s 17(2)(b), (c).
Where a person receives two lump sum payments, and at least one of the payments is made ‘wholly or partly in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn’ the Act provides that the person is taken to have received a single payment equal to the sum of the two payments.[4] Mr Barnes’s payment of $41,250.00 from Allianz Insurance and the later payment of $125,000.00 must be aggregated for the purposes of working out the compensation preclusion period since at least the second payment was made in redemption of his periodic workers compensation payments.[5]
[4] Act s 1171(1).
[5] Act s 1171(1).
A ‘compensation affected payment’ includes the disability support pension.[6] Hence when Mr Barnes lodged his application for disability support pension it triggered the operation of section 1169 of the Act. How to work out what is the ‘lump sum preclusion period’ is set out in section 1170 of the Act. The Tribunal has accepted that the preclusion period began on 2 February 2013, being the day following the last day of periodic payments.[7]
[6] Act s 17(1)(a).
[7] Act s 1170(1).
The formula for determining the number of weeks of a lump sum preclusion period is set out in section 1171(4). The formula is the, where ‘compensation part of lump sum’ is 50 per cent of the total amount of his two compensation payments.[8] Applying the formula the total amount which Mr Barnes received for the injury he suffered was $166,250.00. Half of that amount is $83,125. That figure must be divided by the ‘income cut-out amount’. The ‘income cut-out amount’ is defined as ‘the amount worked out using the formula in subsection (8), as in force at the time when the compensation was received’, which in turn requires recourse to the rate calculators.[9]
[8] Act s 17(3).
[9] Act ss 17(1),(8), 1064.
The relevant income calculator amount at the time Mr Barnes received his compensation payment was $848.60. Applying that divisor, the number of weeks of the compensation preclusion period for Mr Barnes according to the formula is 97.95 or 98 weeks which, taken from 2 February 2013, brings an end date of 12 December 2014. Accordingly the Tribunal finds that the calculation of the compensation preclusion period is correct.
Special circumstances
That leaves for consideration the issue of whether there are special circumstances in Mr Barnes’s case which permit the Tribunal to waive some or all of the preclusion period by disregarding all or part of the compensation lump sum.[10] The Act provides that the Secretary may ‘treat the whole or part of a compensation payment as (a) not having been made; or (b) not liable to be made; if the Secretary thinks it is appropriate do so in the special circumstances of the case’.[11]
[10] Act s 1184K(1).
[11] Act s 1184K.
What amount to ‘special circumstances’ has been considered in numerous cases. In summary the principles are that there can be no ‘precise limits or precise rules’ in deciding what are special circumstances. ‘The matter is one for the [decision-maker] bearing in mind the purpose for which the power is given’.[12] To be special the circumstances must be ‘unusual, [or] uncommon’[13] and whether the circumstances meet those descriptions depends on the context in which they occur.[14]
[12] Beadle v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 60 ALR 225 at 228.
[13] Re Beadle v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 6 ALD 1 at 3; Re Secretary, Department of Families and Community Services and Lazarus (2003) 73 ALD 183; Angelakos v Secretary, Department of Education and Workplace Relations (2007) 100 ALD 9 at [33]; Dranichnikov v Centrelink (2003) 75 ALD 134.
[14] Re Beadle v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 6 ALD 1 at 3.
That context includes the purpose of the provisions which have been described as to: ‘…protect the social security system from ‘double dippers’ – that is, those who might receive social security payments, as well as compensation for the same period’.[15] The cases have emphasised that the circumstances need not be ‘exceptional’ but there must be something which sets the case apart from the usual or ordinary case.[16] The circumstances will only be special if the failure to exercise the Secretary’s discretion would ‘give rise relevantly to an unreasonable or unjust result’.[17]
[15] Social Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 1995, Second reading speech. This Bill introduced section 1171 of the Social Security Act 1991 in 1995.
[16] Re Chamberlain and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2002] AATA 487 at [14].See also Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 at 545 per Kiefel J.
[17] Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 at 543 quoting with approval the Tribunal’s decision in Re Groth andSecretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 37 ALD 797 at [41].
Mr Barnes claims he was not advised by his solicitor or by Allianz Insurance that if he accepted a lump sum payment instead of his periodic compensation payments he would be subject to a compensation preclusion period. However, he was aware from early February 2013 that a compensation preclusion period could be imposed as he was so advised by Centrelink. He contacted Centrelink on 8 February 2013 after receipt of that advice to have the situation explained. He appealed against that decision on 2 April 2013. So from the first quarter of 2013 he was aware that he was subject to a compensation preclusion period and could not expect to be eligible for an income support payment from Centrelink during the preclusion period. Mr Barnes received the $125,000 in settlement monies on 25 February 2013.
Mr Barnes said it was only fair in his eyes that once he had received his lump sum that he should pay back debts he had accrued while waiting for the settlement. He also considered he had been in hardship for over four years and it was understandable that he would spend some of the money when it was finally paid. To his credit he gave priority to repaying most of the debts he had accrued which depleted the settlement amount by about $64,000. The Tribunal did not have evidence of the reasons he accrued these debts other than his statement that following his injury his income reduced from $900 to $300 a week, and that he had legal costs associated with his claims.
Mr Barnes also spent $24,500 on the purchase of the two cars and equipping the cars with new tyres. If to that figure is added the registration and insurance costs for the vehicles, and some other smaller repairs, the figure of $28,000 for expenditure on his vehicles is roughly correct. He paid rent in advance to July 2013 of $6,000. That left in his account some $48,000 after payment of part of the debts, purchase of the cars and payment of rent to July 2013. In the first quarter of 2013, on medical advice, Mr Barnes paid $2,400 for the bed and mattress.
By August 2013, he still had $30,000 in the bank account. The decision of the authorised review officer in August 2013 was that it was likely, subject to the outcome of the review process, of his having to manage on that amount until December 2014. That decision confirmed the information he had received from Centrelink in February 2013. By November, the balance of the account had reduced to $18,000. The bank account shows that by March 2014 the amount was down to $1,733.41.
The Tribunal notes that Mr Barnes has made efforts to recoup some of his spent funds. He sold one of the two cars he purchased and obtained another one for considerably less money. The difference was about $5,000. At the hearing he has conceded he is prepared to sell one of the two cars he currently owns. That means he may have no means of transport should his wife be away or at work and he has to get to either Cessnock or Gosford in an emergency. The Tribunal accepts that given the couple live some distance from Cessnock and an hour from Gosford, that they need at least one car.
Mr Barnes still owes some $16,000 to family and friends. The couple’s rent alone is $270 per week, and they have daily petrol costs for Mr Barnes’s wife as she uses her car to get to work, for taking Mr Barnes to medical treatment, for household shopping, and on occasions to visit and support her mother. They pay $106 a week in combination for power and telephone, and $38 a week for registration and insurance for the two cars. These amounts alone, without petrol and food costs, are only just covered by the $400 a week on average earned by Mr Barnes’s wife. They have no means of repaying loans. They will be struggling to survive financially when their minimal savings of just over $1,700 in March, is used up, even if Mr Barnes sells one of their cars. He has not paid the ambulance costs for taking him to hospital when he had his stroke.
The additional cost of medication for his conditions suffered in 2013 is considerable. In March 2014 the medication cost was over $500. Mr Barnes said these would last longer than a month but he was not sure how often he needed to replace the prescriptions, nor was that indicated by the evidence before the Tribunal. The medications are for continuing conditions. Even if costs of this kind were incurred every two months, that would amount to some $2000 before the end of 2014, that is, about $60 a week. Although some of the medication is for high blood pressure from which he was suffering prior to his stroke, the Tribunal has inferred that this condition was likely to have contributed to his stroke and hence the full cost of the medication should be taken into account. This figure was not taken into account in estimating weekly expenses of the couple.
The Tribunal notes that ‘financial hardship’ is defined for the purposes of the exercise of the discretion under the Scheme for Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration[18] as: ‘Unable to provide food, accommodation, clothing, medical treatment or other necessities’. Although that description is not specifically designed for the Act, in the absence of any more specific guidance under the Act the description is adopted to assist with the discretionary decision faced by the Tribunal. The financial position of Mr Barnes once the last of the couple’s savings is used up and any amount he receives for the sale of a second car is consumed, will be that the couple is reliant solely on his wife’s income and that is insufficient to cover their basic needs including food, medicine and petrol. At that point they will be in financial hardship.
[18] >
Mr Barnes’s evidence indicated his position is causing him considerable distress. As he said at the hearing he has changed over the last four and a half years from being a manager (‘boss’) in the Council to now being a ‘shell’. His condition had led to a loss of dignity, he has not been able to work for the last four to five years, he no longer has long service leave, and he suffers from poor self-esteem leading to depression.
Dr Searle has confirmed that Mr Barnes’s knee conditions have reached maximum medical improvement, and that he is totally unable to work or to do most physical activities. Although he has had satisfactory knee replacement surgery Mr Barnes has been left with chronic pain and according to Dr Searle’s report in May 2012, he has ‘severe symptoms and signs and disabilities’, including depression. He has not been funded to undertake pain management treatment for these residual conditions and he cannot undertake that treatment since it would cost $7,000, which he cannot afford. That means he will continue to suffer chronic and at times severe pain, and to suffer at times from depression.
Since the decision under review in August 2013, Mr Barnes has been diagnosed with further medical conditions. Dr Searle reports that he was diagnosed with diabetes sometime between August 2013 and February 2014, for which he is on tablets, and in December 2013 he suffered a stroke which hospitalised him for several days. The stroke has left him with left hemiparesis, that is, some degree of muscular weakness on one side of his body which disables him further and contributes to his reluctance to drive. He said at the hearing that he has also been left with earaches and headaches.
These circumstances indicate to the Tribunal that Mr Barnes’s situation is now not the usual or normal situation. He is totally unable to work, he is in chronic pain, he has hemiparesis, he says his conditions now make it unsafe for him to drive and he is reluctant to do so. He is significantly depressed as Dr Searle indicated in his report in May 2012. He needs treatment which he cannot afford for his depression, which accordingly, is likely to continue. His medications do not, at this stage, include any anti-depressant. Mr Barnes was considerably upset by the processes at the Tribunal.
The context includes his living on a reasonably remote property which means he has to pay extra in petrol to get to medical appointments over one hour’s drive away. His hemiparesis and other physical and psychological difficulties mean he is no longer comfortable to drive and is dependent on his wife to take him to medical and other appointments. He has considerable debts and medical costs, his wife’s income does not cover their weekly petrol and food costs, nor all his medication expenses. Even with the sale of a car he will shortly have no savings and will again be forced to borrow money.
The Tribunal’s calculations are that the couple’s savings, even with the sale of the less reliable vehicle, will be exhausted in another four months. That calculation is based on Mr Barnes selling his Ford Falcon, leaving the couple with the more reliable car as their sole vehicle. At that stage the couple will again need to borrow to survive at a minimal level. His position has been worsened by the effects of his stroke, his diabetes and his increasing anxiety about his financial circumstances.
Mr Barnes’s circumstances are now out of the ordinary and it would be unfair and unreasonable to expect him to manage until December 2014. Although the Tribunal is aware that it has little evidence as to the reasons the couple incurred the debts they did over the period since Mr Barnes has been unable to work, it is satisfied that Mr Barnes’s current expenditures are not untoward. Accordingly the Tribunal finds that it would be fair and not unreasonable for the end date for the compensation preclusion period to be reduced to the date when it is likely, on the Tribunal’s calculations, that the couple’s savings will be exhausted, namely, 31 August 2014.
Mr Barnes has also been advised to reactivate his application for disability support pension so that the processes involved may take their course as soon as possible. The Secretary’s representative has offered to write Mr Barnes a letter outlining the complex details in his case to help expedite the reactivation of the disability support pension processes.
The decision under review is accordingly varied so that the compensation preclusion period ends on 31 August 2014.
I certify that the preceding 55 (fifty-five) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of RM Creyke, Senior Member. .......................[sgd]..................
Associate
9 April 2014
Date of hearing 26 March 2014 Applicant In person Advocate for the Respondent Freda Taah Solicitors for the Respondent Department of Human Services
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