Phelan and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)
[2019] AATA 554
•27 March 2019
Phelan and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2019] AATA 554 (27 March 2019)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2016/3445
Re:James Phelan
APPLICANT
AndSecretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
Date:27 March 2019
Place:Brisbane
(1)The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Social Services and Child Support Division) dated 8 June 2016 (Review Number 2016/B094361) is set aside.
(2)In substitution of that decision, there be a decision that:
(a)In respect of the Respondent’s decision made on 30 September 2015 to reduce the Applicant’s rate to $143.54 (which had effect for the period 17 September 2015 to 30 September 2015), that decision be set aside and substituted by a decision under s 79 of the Social Security (Administration Act) 1999 (Cth) to increase the Applicant’s rate to $271.14.
............................[SGD]............................................
Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – NEWSTART – RENTAL ALLOWANCE – Whether the Respondent gave the Applicant the required notice under the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) with respect to the change in Newstart allowance rates – whether the relevant notices were fatally defective because they did not identify the date of effect of the decision(s), did not specifically use the term ‘rate’ and did not tally up the various components that constituted the Applicant’s Newstart allowance – Decision set aside and substituted
LEGISLATION
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)
CASES
Austin and Anor v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [1999] FCA 938
Austin v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 92 FCR 138
Rigg v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2006] AATA 9
Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Walshe [2007] AATA 1861
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Rogers (2000) 104 FCR 272
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Rogers [2000] FCA 1447
REASONS FOR DECISIONSenior Member Theodore Tavoularis
27 March 2019
INTRODUCTION
This is an application primarily concerned with whether or not certain notice requirements contained in ss 109 (2) and (3) of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) (“SSAA”) were met by the Respondent in communicating changes in the rate of Newstart allowance payable to the Applicant.
There is no legal or factual divergence between the parties as to the Applicant’s entitlement to a rent allowance component of his Newstart allowance from 20 December 2014 onwards. The present contest has its genesis by virtue of an earlier decision of this Tribunal made on 8 June 2016[1], which had the effect of restoring the rent allowance component on 14 December 2015 following its cessation some 12 months earlier on 20 December 2014.
[1] Exhibit 6, section 37 T Documents, T 2, pages 3-7.
The Applicant initially challenged the Respondent’s cessation of a rental allowance component on 16 February 2016. In accordance with his extant rights of review, the date which was 13 weeks prior to 16 February 2016 was 17 November 2015. During the cessation period (20 December 2014 to 17 November 2015) the Respondent made seven rate change decisions,[2] which calculated the Applicant’s rate of Newstart allowance without reference to the rent allowance component to that entitlement.
[2] The material speaks of “8 Decisions” but the eighth decision is not a “note change decision” of the Respondent necessarily required by s 78 and 79 of the SSAA: see paragraphs [67] – [74] of these reasons.
Thus this Applicant, in essence, seeks to recover approximately 12 months of rent allowance on the basis of an asserted failure on the part of the Respondent to meet the notice requirements appearing in ss 109 (2) and (3) of the SSAA in any of its seven rate change decisions between 20 December 2014 and 17 November 2015.
For reasons that follow, I am of the view that the notice requirements incumbent on the Respondent pursuant to ss 109 (2) and (3) of the SSAA:
·Were met in four of those rate change decisions, specifically, decisions 1, 2, 3 and 5;
·Were not met in three of those rate change decisions, specifically, decisions 4, 6 and 7;
·It is immaterial whether or not the notice requirements were met for decisions 4 and 7 because the Applicant’s income receipts precluded any entitlement to rent allowance at the time of those decisions;
·The Respondent incorrectly calculated the rate in decision 6 because this decision did not include a component for rent allowance.
THE COMPETING CONTENTIONS ABOUT NOTICE
The Applicant contends that the Respondent failed to meet the notice requirements pursuant to ss 109 of the SSAA because (1) the notices do not itemise and then tally up subsidiary components of the Applicant’s total entitlement to Newstart allowance; (2) the notices do not identify the date of effect of the relevant decision; and (3) the notices do not contain any reference to the term “rate” despite those notices containing specific reference to individual items which are often deducted from a recipient’s periodic Newstart payments.
The Respondent’s riposte is that this approach is too simplistic and does not adequately take into account (1) the actual extent of any requirement for rigid adherence to notice requirements and (2) the quite narrow scope of derivative decisions mandated by the statutory regime that were actually made by the Respondent in arriving at an in globo figure or rate of Newstart allowance. According to the Respondent, when the statutory regime is correctly followed, it “becomes readily apparent” that effective and valid notice was provided for each of the seven relevant decisions that essentially constitute the contested arrears of rent allowance.
RELEVANT FACTS AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Both the factual background[3] and the statutory framework[4] are helpfully set out in the parties’ respective consolidated submissions. The facts in the instant case engage the legislative framework as follows:
[3] Exhibit 15, ‘Secretary’s Consolidated Submissions with annexures A & B, dated 24 April 2018’, pages 19-23.
[4] Exhibit 14, ‘Applicant’s Outline of Submissions with attachment A, dated 29 March 2018’, paragraphs [19] to [27].
·A recipient’s quantum of Newstart allowance is determined by the “rate” attributable to that recipient;
·The “rate” is calculated pursuant to the formula stipulated in the rate calculator appearing in s 1068 of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (‘SSA’);
·The “rate” comprises subsidiary components, such as:
oThe base rate;
oPharmaceutical allowance;
oEnergy supplement;
oRental allowance;
·Either legislatively or by agreement with the recipient, the following amounts are deducted from the periodic Newstart payments:
oChild support payments or arrears;
oDebt repayment;
oLump sum advance repayment;
oCourt fines;
·Thus, the determined rate of Newstart can, and often is, different from the actual quantum of periodic payments actually received by an Applicant;
·The Respondent is compelled to make a decision to either increase[5] or reduce[6] the rate of Newstart allowance where the Respondent is satisfied the rate being paid is less or more than the rate provided for by the social security law;
·Determinations as to the applicable rate are made via the operation of a computer program run by the Respondent. A determination made in this way is deemed to be a “rate change decision” of the Respondent;
·A recipient has rights of review if dissatisfied with a rate change decision. Initially, the recipient can request a review by the Respondent.[7] If unsuccessful or dissatisfied, a further review can be sought at the first tier of this Tribunal via its Social Services and Child Support Division.[8] If unsuccessful or dissatisfied, a further review can be sought from the present level of this Tribunal;[9]
·Sections 109 (2) and (3) of the SSAA curtail a recipient’s ability to recover any arrears of Newstart allowance by imposing a 13 week limitation date. Specifically, arrears cannot be recovered if such review was not sought within 13 weeks of the original decision;
·Section 109 (3) of the SSAA provides a singular exception to this 13 week limitation period. This exception arises where a disputing recipient satisfies a decision maker that he/she was “not given notice of the original decision”;
·Thus the ambit of the matter presently before the Tribunal is limited to a period commencing on the initial cessation of rental allowance on 20 December 2014 to a date 13 weeks prior to the date on which the Applicant first sought review from the Respondent on 16 February 2016, that date being 17 November 2015.
[5] Social Security (Administration Act) 1999 (Cth) s 78.
[6] Ibid, s 79.
[7] Ibid, s 126.
[8] Ibid, s 142.
[9] Ibid, s 179.
THE ISSUES BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
Rather uniquely, the issues in this matter evolved not only prior to the hearing, but during and after the hearing as well. At the hearing, the Applicant abandoned a previous request for an exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion pursuant to s 43 (6) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). Also at the hearing, the Applicant confined his case to the ventilation of two specific issues, they being (1) that the subject notices were fatally defective pursuant to s 109 of the SSAA because they did not stipulate the Applicant’s Newstart “rate” as a daily rate; and (2) that the subject notices were fatally defective pursuant to s 109 of the SSAA because each notice did not tally up each of the components making up the Newstart “rate” and specify, as a standalone figure, the total amount of the Applicant’s Newstart “rate”.
Following the hearing, directions were made for the parties to deliver supplementary submissions in respect of the two abovementioned issues asserting fatal defectiveness in the respective notices. Further ventilation of those issues in the supplementary submissions gave rise to a requirement that the parties reach agreement on what the relevant “decisions” setting the “rate” in each of the “notices” actually were.
This exercise spawned a requirement for additional evidence in the form of a statement from Andrew Champion,[10] who identified eight rate change decisions made during the relevant period (i.e. 20 December 2014 to 17 November 2015). The effect of Mr Champion’s evidence after the hearing was that the parties then reached substantial agreement on the relevant decisions for present purposes. A list of those relevant decisions appears in the Respondent’s consolidated submissions at Annexure “B”.[11] The final position of the parties is contained in their respective consolidated submissions. The Applicant’s submissions are dated 31 October 2017[12] and those of the Respondent are dated 24 April 2018.[13]
[10] Exhibit 13, ‘Statement of Andrew Champion with annexures A, B & C, dated 24 January 2018’.
[11] Exhibit 15, ‘Secretary’s Consolidated Submissions with annexures A & B, dated 24 April 2018’, page 24.
[12] Exhibit 14, ‘Applicant’s Outline of Submissions with attachment A, dated 29 March 2018’.
[13] Exhibit 15, ‘Secretary’s Consolidated Submissions with annexures A & B, dated 24 April 2018’.
When the parties committed the matter to the Tribunal for decision, there were three remaining issues. Each of those issues raised the central question of whether the relevant notices were fatally defective for the purposes of s 109 of the SSAA because, respectively, they:
(i)did not tally up the various abovementioned components of the Applicant’s Newstart “rate” and specify, as a standalone figure, the total amount of his Newstart “rate”;
(ii)did not specifically use the term “rate” in them; and
(iii)did not identify the date of effect of the relevant decisions.
SECTION 109 OF THE SSAA ACT
Given the critical relevance of this section to the determination of the issues, it is pertinent to quote ss 109 (1), (2) and (3) of the SSAA in full:
“109 Date of effect of favourable determination resulting from review
(1) If:
a. A decision (the original decision) is made in relation to a person’s social security payment; and
b. A notice is given to the person informing the person of the original decision; and
c. Within 13 weeks after the notice is given, the person applies to the Secretary under section 129, for review of the original decision; and
d. The favourable determination is made as a result of the application for review;
the favourable determination takes effect on the day on which the determination embodying the original decision took effect.
(2) If:
a. A decision (the original decision) is made in relation to a person’s social security payment; and
b. A notice is given to the person informing the person of the original decision; and
c. More than 13 weeks after the notice is given, the person applies to the Secretary, under section 129, for review of the original decision; and
d. The favourable determination is made as a result of the application for review;
The favourable determination takes effect on the day on which the application for review was made.
(3) If:
a. A decision (the original decision) is made in relation to a person’s social security payment; and
b. The person is not given notice of the original decision; and
c. The person applies to the Secretary under section 129, for review of the original decision; and
d. The favourable determination is made as a result of the application for review;
The favourable determination takes effect on the day on which the determination embodying the original decision took effect.”
The provisions of s 109 (2) of the SSAA are enlivened if it is found that the subject notices sufficiently informed the Applicant of the Respondent’s decisions in relation to his Newstart allowance from 20 December 2014 onwards. In that event, the Applicant would not be entitled to recover arrears of rental allowance for the period 20 December 2014 to 17 November 2015. If the subject notices did not sufficiently inform the Applicant about the Respondent’s decisions, then such a “favourable determination” will entitle the Applicant to recover arrears from 20 December 2014 to 17 November 2015.
The crux of this application is thus concerned with a determination as to what constitutes “informing [a person of a] decision”. The Respondent has helpfully provided a compelling analysis of the concept of how a recipient is “informed…of the original decision” for present purposes. It is clear the “decision” can only relate to those decisions deriving from ss 78 and 79 of the SSAA, concerned, as they are, with an increase or reduction in a given entitlement. The more critical component involves demonstrating the recipient has been adequately “informed” about the decision and, more particularly, that its nature and effect has been adequately brought within the recipient’s field of knowledge in the context of that recipient’s regular receipt of the benefit to which the decision refers.
The Respondent contends four principles become relevant in any proper analysis of whether a recipient has been so informed.
1. The essential things notice must communicate
To properly inform a recipient of a decision, a notice must communicate (a) the fact that a decision has been made and (b) the content of that decision. In Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Rogers,[14] Cooper J observed, for the purposes of adequate notice under a provision quite similar to s 109 of the SSAA, that at its core, “A notice is a notification, a making known, a communication of some matter from one person to another…” His Honour observed that in a given statutory context, “…The statute identifies the matter to be notified by the notice…” For present purposes, it follows that “…The matter to be communicated by the ‘notice’…is the making of a decision in relation to …” the Applicant’s Newstart allowance. Cooper J further observed that a matter is adequately communicated by the “notice” if it “…involves two elements: the fact that a decision has been made and the content of the decision…”[15]
[14] (2000) 104 FCR 272.
[15] Ibid at [31] and [33].
2. The notice must be intelligible
It is not necessary to augment intelligibility of a notice via a stipulation that it must contain reasons for the decision or that it otherwise contains other “sufficient information”. The notice need comprise “…no more than the means employed to communicate the decision [such as to make it] intelligible to the person to whom the notice is to be given so that the person is informed of the making of the decision and the content of it.”[16]
[16] Ibid at [35], cited in Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Walshe [2007] AATA 1861, paragraph [20].
The threshold of intelligibility for present purposes is determined by “…how the [notice] would be read by ordinary or reasonable persons within the group of persons to whom the information is directed.”[17] Applied to the present facts, the notices will be found to be intelligible if it is accepted that the Applicant, as an ordinary or reasonable person in the group to whom such a notice would be directed, would (1) understand that a decision had been made, and (2) the content of that decision.
[17] Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Walshe [2007] AATA 1861, paragraph [21].
3. Assessing whether a notice adequately communicates the making of a decision and its content
There are three components to this assessment. First, an objective test is to be applied. A recipient’s/Applicant’s subjective understanding of the notices is not the primary determinant. Rather, an objective test is applied on the basis of how the notice would be construed by an ordinary or reasonable person in the group to whom a notice of this type would be directed. At the hearing, there was a concession as to the lack of relevance of the Applicant’s subjective understanding of the notices he received. It was submitted on behalf of the Applicant that “…It’s a matter of looking at each decision and each purported notice of that decision to see if Mr Phelan was, in truth, given notice…”[18] As observed by President Downes and Senior Member Constance (as he then was),[19] in Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Walshe [2007] AATA 1861 (“Walshe”):
“It has not been suggested that Mr and Mrs Walshe were in fact unaware of the changes. However, we accept that the test is not subjective, but objective.”[20]
[18] Transcript of Proceedings, 28 August 2017, page 17, lines 2-4.
[19] Now Deputy President Constance.
[20] Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Walshe [2007] AATA 1861 [40].
The second element in assessing whether a notice adequately communicates the making of a decision and its content necessitates an examination of whether a person has received prior notices and will thus know what allowance he/she is receiving. As also observed by President Downes and Senior Member Constance (as he then was) in Walshe:
“…it is not necessary to ignore the fact that the pensioner will know what pension he or she has been receiving. Nor is it necessary to ignore the fact that, in many cases, the new rate will be a response to a change in circumstances notified by the pensioner. There is an air of unreality in hypothesising that a pensioner receives letters like the letter in question and is not aware that they involve a change in pension payments which might be subject to an application for review.”[21]
[my underlining]
[21] Ibid.
The third element in ascertaining whether a notice communicates the fact that a decision has been made and its content necessitates consideration of whether the notice accords with the fundamental purpose of s 109 of the SSAA, which “…must be to inform the pensioner whether he or she will receive further pension payments and what they will be. A further purpose will be to give notice of change.”[22]
[22] Ibid.
4. No requirement that the notice contain reasons for the decision
The fundamental purpose of s 109 of the SSAA is to give a recipient notice of a decision. “It does not require that notice of the reasons for the decision be provided.”[23] A notice is not defective or inadequate if it does not contain reasons for the decision or other sufficient information for the recipient to understand the main reason for the decision. As noted by Cooper J in Rogers:
“The subsections [of s 109 SSAA] make no reference to any requirement that the notice contain reasons or sufficient information for the recipient of the notice to understand the main reason for the decision and so be in a position to know whether or not to exercise the person’s right to seek a review. Nor, in my view, do any principles of procedural fairness require that such a requirement be read into the provisions of [s 109 SSAA].[24]
[23] Ibid at paragraph [19].
[24] Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Rogers [2000] FCA 1447, paragraph [33].
COMPARABLE NOTICE
In Walshe, the Tribunal considered seven notices or letters from the Respondent. For present purposes, the most similar notice or letter (for present purposes) comprised letter 5, which can be reproduced as follows:
“Your Age Pension
Regular payment from payday 23/11/2001
Age Pension $190.45
Plus pharmaceutical Allowance + $2.90
Total $193.35”
The observations and findings of President Downes and Senior Member Constance (as he then was) about this letter are pertinent for present purposes:
“...The letter does not contain information on its face stating that there has been a change either by way of increase or reduction. This is accordingly the least specific of all the letters before us. Nevertheless, in the hands of a pensioner who is regularly receiving a pension, the purport of the letter would be clear. The pensioner would know that these letters are not received every fortnight. He or she would know from that fact and the note on the reverse that the letter was giving notice of a decision. To be told that the payment ‘from’ 23 November 2001 is to be $193.35 is to be told that prior to that it was something else. It is to be noticed that, in terms, ss 78 and 79 require only the specification of the new rate. This letter provides adequate notice.”[25]
[25] Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Walshe [2007] AATA 1861, paragraph [35].
CONSIDERATION OF THE THREE RESIDUAL ISSUES
1. Whether the relevant notices were fatally defective for the purposes of s 109 of the SSAA because they did not tally up the various abovementioned components of the Applicant’s Newstart “rate” and specify, as a standalone figure, the total amount of his Newstart “rate”
The Applicant’s key contention in relation to this issue is that the notice was not in itemised form such that its components were individually listed and costed, with a resulting total expressed as a standalone figure readily discernible as the “rate” of Newstart payable to the Applicant. As I understood the contention, for a notice to be valid and effective, it was necessary for it to “…demonstrate that the ‘content’ of the ‘reviewable decision’ must be ‘brought clearly to the person’s attention’”.[26]
[26] Exhibit 14, Applicant’s Outline of Submissions, dated 29 March 2018, page 6, paragraph [34].
This contention is grounded upon two authorities. First, citing Drummond J in Austin v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (“Austin”),[27] it was propounded on behalf of the Applicant that a “notice” of a rate decision will only be effective if it communicates to the recipient that “a decision has been made to pay him or her Newstart allowance at a particular rate,” such rate to be the “amount arrived at by applying the rate calculator referred to in s 1068.”[28]
[27] (1999) 92 FCR 138.
[28] Exhibit 14, ‘Applicant’s Outline of Submissions, dated 29 March 2018’, page 5, paragraph [31].
The second authority on which the contention is grounded is summarised in the Applicant’s written submissions:
“32. Second, there is the decision of Cooper J in Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Rogers (2000) 104 FCR 272 (Rogers). His Honour said (at 284; my emphasis):
‘In my view, the matter to be communicated by the ‘notice’ … is the making of a decision in relation to a [payment] which is a reviewable decision…That involves two elements: the fact that a decision has been made and the content of the decision…’
33. His Honour’s reference to a “reviewable decision” is significant, because it is the “content” of that “reviewable decision” that must be notified to the relevant person. Cooper J in Rogers emphasised this point by saying (at 284; my emphasis):
‘A requirement that a person be given notice of something does not demand that the matter be brought home to the person’s understanding or knowledge; nor is it synonymous with knowledge…However, notice requires that the matter of which a person is to have notice must be brought clearly to the person’s attention…’”[29]
[29] Ibid, pages 5 and 6, paragraphs [32] and [33].
The difficulty with this contention is that the factual circumstances in Austin do not accord with those in this case. In Austin, the relevant notices only stipulated the total amount payable for the relevant period. Those notices did not stipulate any component parts of that payment or how the payment was calculated. As noted by the Respondent, this is relevant because the rate calculator in s 1068 of the SSA does not provide for any deductions as part of the calculation and formulation of the applicable “rate” for Newstart. In the absence of any such adjustments for applicable deductions, it thus becomes “…impossible to tell from any particular notation on the claim form what the amount actually refers to”.[30]
[30] Austin and Anor v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [1999] FCA 938, paragraph [42].
The notices in Austin contain a singular figure referable to a specific payment period. The Respondent’s resulting contention is thus correct: the problem with a notice expressed in this way is that it is patently impossible to (1) ascertain the appropriate “rate” of Newstart, and (2) isolate and define any applicable component parts to that singular figure. As observed by Drummond J in Austin, such a deficiency in a notice cannot be cured by an enquiry or investigation by the decision maker:
“The fact that by combing through the information in the Department’s own records the notation on a claim form may be found to contain the kind of information which a notice under [the s 109 SSAA equivalent] must contain, does not permit that notation to be characterised as a notice for the purposes of [the s 109 SSAA equivalent]. The respondent [the identical Respondent in this case] cannot be said to have made in such a notation a clear statement as to what is the rate at which Newstart Allowance is being paid to the recipient. The latter would need further information as to whether the amount so notified was the unadjusted rate of Newstart Allowance payable to him before he could act on the basis that the notation was a ‘notice’ sufficient for the purposes of [the s 109 SSAA equivalent].”
The difficulty of a singular figure in a communication dealt with by Drummond J in Austin is not apparent in the instant facts. In this matter, the notices do make reference to components that comprise each given payment. Accordingly, the following comments of Drummond J must be read in this light:
“…it is not correct in saying that advice that a particular amount is payable in respect of Newstart Allowance is necessarily advice of the rate at which that benefit is payable: that may or may not be the position. It will only be where the recipient is advised of payment of an amount that is the result of applying the rate calculator referred to in s 1068 to his circumstances, without adjustments not provided for by that calculator, that the advice will be capable of constituting “notice” within [the s 109 SSAA equivalent].”
Hence, reliance on the “impossibility” of determining a Newstart “rate” arising from a singular figure for a given payment period as faced by Drummond J in Austin has no application to the instant facts. As observed by the Respondent, the singular figure in Austin gave rise to an “…inability of an ordinary and reasonable person to understand the content of the decision on the face of the notice. That is not the problem in this case.”[31] As also observed by the Respondent (and with due respect to the submissions made on behalf of the Applicant) the Applicant’s reliance on the comments of Drummond J in Austin demonstrate the dangers of overly emphasising specific words in a decision without reading the decision as a whole.[32]
[31] Exhibit 15, Secretary’s Consolidated Submissions, dated 24 April 2018, page 9, paragraph [45].
[32] Ibid, paragraph [44].
The resulting finding must be that Austin does not stand for: (1) the proposition that a notice will be deemed ineffective merely because it did not “tally up” the subsidiary components of the Newstart rate and then specify, as a standalone figure, the total amount of that rate and (2) that such a “tallied up” notice is mandatory to satisfy the requirement that an ordinary and reasonable person must be able to discern that, firstly, a decision was made and, secondly, the content of that decision. There is no requirement stipulating that, to be valid, a notice must be expressed in a particular form, be it in an itemised or sub-totalled or “tallied” form.
To my mind, there is weight in the contention that an ordinary and reasonable person, in regular receipt of such notices, would surely appreciate that a given notice stipulated the “rate” by reference to those subsidiary components. It does not stand to reason that such a person could not comprehend the content of a decision because those components did not appear in “tallied up” form in the notice.
The Respondent directed the Tribunal to the decision in Rigg v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (“Rigg”).[33] The form of the relevant notice in Rigg was virtually identical to the notices in this case. The Tribunal noted that in relation to that notice: “Centrelink notified the applicant, by letter dated 2 October 2002, that, as from 7 October 2002, his total fortnightly net payment would be $415.20 ($429.40 plus pharmaceutical allowance of $5.80 less taxation deduction of $20.00) and that he had the right to request a review of the decision if he did not agree with it.” [34]
[33] [2006] AATA 9.
[34] Ibid, paragraph [19].
In significantly similar terms to the present notices, the notice in Rigg: (1) made specific reference to the subsidiary components of the Newstart rate, (2) made reference to deductions and (3) stipulated the net payment payable to the Applicant. The subsidiary components were not “tallied up”, nor did the notice specify the “rate” as a standalone figure. In Rigg, the Tribunal found that the subject notice was valid and effective for the purposes of s 109 of the SSAA. I therefore agree with the Respondent’s contention that “As a matter of consistency and comity, that decision ought to be followed.”[35]
[35] Exhibit 15, Secretary’s Consolidated Submissions, dated 24 April 2018, page 10, paragraph [53].
The fundamental difficulty with the Applicant’s position regarding this first issue is that it seeks to rely on a strictly formulaic approach to ascertain whether or not the form of a given notice does or does not meet the requirements of s 109 SSAA. Such an approach does not accord with the approach adopted in the authorities of Rogers, Walshe and Rigg. The Applicant’s reliance on Austin is misplaced due to the “impossible” difficulty confronted by Drummond J in that case arising from the expression of a singular figure for a given payment period, but nothing further.
The Applicant is entitled to ventilate a complaint about an apparent lack of clarity in the subject notices. However, such a contention is tempered by the reality that the notices provided sufficient information to enable an ordinary and reasonable person to understand (1) that a decision had been made and (2) the content of that decision. It occurs to me that the Applicant’s contentions on this issue are somehow predicated on a requirement that, to be valid, the form of the notices needed to either strictly or substantially follow the formulaic approach appearing in the s 1068 Rate Calculator and that any shortfall in following this formulaic methodology placed the validity of those notices in some measure of peril.
My finding is that the notices provided sufficient information such that the Applicant could ascertain what the Respondent had established as the relevant “rate” and, to the extent necessary, the notices otherwise met the statutory requirements of s 109 of the SSAA. As noted by the Respondent, “They were not required to do more.”[36]
2. Whether the relevant notices were fatally defective for the purposes of s 109 of the SSAA because they did not identify the date of effect of the relevant decisions
[36] Ibid, page 11, paragraph [57].
The Applicant asserts invalidity in the notices because they do not inform the Applicant of the date a rate change decision took effect. Such a contention fundamentally misconstrues the operative purpose and effect of the determination provisions appearing in ss 78 and 79 of the SSAA and ought not be accepted on the following grounds identified by the Respondent:
“(a) a determination which is made under ss 78 or 79 is a determination to the applicable ongoing Newstart ‘rate’ applicable to a person;
(b) a ss 78/79 determination does not…involve the Secretary making a decision as to the date of effect of the determination. That is a matter dealt with in Part 3, Div 9 (ss 107 to 122) of the SSAA (which deals with the date of effect of decisions by operation of law);
(c) as such, a ss 78/79 ‘decision’ is solely a decision to fix the rate of a person’s Newstart rate (without reference to the date of effect of that decision); and
(d) because of this,…the only notice requirement of the Secretary’s ‘decision’ is that it communicates that the rate of Newstart has been fixed at a particular figure; however, there is no requirement for the Secretary to stipulate the date from which changed rate took effect.”[37]
[37] Ibid, page 11, paragraph [59].
Accordingly, any contention that some of the notices “only” referred to what the Applicant’s payments would be from a particular date onwards, but did not specify that a change in the rate of Newstart had taken effect a short period of time prior to the date of a given notice, does not invalidate or jeopardise the effectiveness of that notice.
3. Whether the relevant notices were fatally defective for the purposes of s 109 of the SSAA because they did not specifically use the term “rate”
The Applicant’s contention is that, apart from the notices that specifically identified which of the figures appearing in them was the actual “rate” figure, the balance of the notices did not adequately inform the Applicant of the relevant decisions. In particular, the Applicant contends:
“50. The Respondent’s letter of 22 December 2014 does not specify the ‘daily rate’ of the Applicant’s ‘newstart allowance’ and so it fails to specify ‘the rate provided for by the social security law’. By failing to ‘specify’ the ‘rate provided for by social security law’, the letter fails to ‘specify’ the actual reviewable decision that was made under the social security law. Accordingly, the Applicant contends that the letter fails to give ‘notice’ of the reviewable decision (or decisions) made on about 20 December 2014 such that sub-s 109(3) of the Administration Act operates so as to allow full ‘arrears’.
51. The same contention applies to each of the letters issued by the Respondent between December 2014 and January 2016. That is, none of the letters issued by the Respondent specified the ‘daily rate’ and so none amounted to ‘notice’ of the relevant reviewable ‘decision’ for the purposes of sub-s 109(3) of the Administration Act.”[38]
[38] Exhibit 1, Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, page 10, paragraphs [50] and [51].
The abovementioned notice dated 22 December 2014 referred to in the Applicant’s contentions may be stated thus:
“22 December 2014
Your Newstart Allowance
Immediate payment 11/12/2014 to 24/12/2014 due on 23/12/2014 $518.97
Regular Payment from payment date 11/12/2014
Newstart Allowance $515.60
Plus Energy Supplement +$8.80
Less Debt Repayment -$87.46
Total $436.94”
The Applicant’s contention is that the notice is inadequate and invalid because a reader may construe the “Total” figure of $436.94 to be the “rate” of the Newstart allowance. This contention is difficult to sustain in circumstances where the notice clearly states that the “Newstart Allowance” figure is $515.60. It is also difficult to sustain in circumstances where the figure for the “Energy Supplement” has the word “Plus” in front of these two words and is stated as a “+” item and the figure for “Debt Repayment” has the word “Less” in front of those two words and is stated as a “-“ figure.
This contention ought to be rejected due to the four fatal problems identified by the Respondent:
(i)In Walshe the Tribunal considered near-identical notices, save and except for the reference to any deduction. The Tribunal found those notices to be sufficient for the purposes of (a) notifying the recipient that a decision had been made and (b) the content of that decision. I thus agree with the Respondent’s contention that use of the term “Regular Payment” is sufficiently indicative of the “rate” of Newstart regardless of whether the word “rate” appears on the face of the notice. The position cannot be otherwise when one reads the totality of the words and numbers commencing from the words “Regular Payment” and concluding with “$515.60”. In other words, the notice can only be telling the reader that “Your Regular Payment commencing from 11/12/2014 for Newstart Allowance is $515.60.” One is hard-pressed to import or infer any deficiency in the notice arising from the use of the words “Regular Payment” instead of the word “rate”;
(ii)It is difficult to ignore a contention that an ordinary and reasonable person in regular receipt of such notices would surely know that a “Debt Repayment” is not a component of that person’s “rate” of (in this case) Newstart allowance. The Respondent speaks of a recipient “presumed to have knowledge of the law (and here, the rate calculator)”, but I do not think such a qualification is required. It is trite to suggest that the reader of such a notice would somehow confuse the $87.46 figure attributable to “debt repayment” and specifically expressed as a deductible item to somehow constitute a part of that recipient’s “rate” of Newstart allowance. This becomes starkly apparent if one adopts a narrative-style approach to the words, figures and notations in the abovementioned notice dated 22 December 2014 from the words “Regular Payment” onwards. Expressed in such narrative form, the notice can surely only be saying this:
“Your regular payment commencing from payment date 11/12/2013 for Newstart Allowance is $515.60. To that figure, we have added $8.80 for ‘Energy Supplement’ and from this combined figure we have deducted the sum of $87.46 for ‘Debt Repayment’. This gives you a total payment of $436.94.”
(iii)Even where a lack of clarity or some measure of ambiguity is asserted in relation to a given notice, there is an air of unreality in assuming that an ordinary and reasonable person would not construe such a notice in a common-sense way and, instead, would construe it in a way consistent with the commission of error.
(iv)For reasons stated earlier, I have formed the view that for reasons of consistency and comity, the Tribunal’s decision in Rigg, dealing, as it did, with notices that were materially identical with those in the present case, should be followed. In Rigg, the notices were held to be valid. I make the same finding in the present case.
THE EIGHT (8) SEPARATE DECISIONS
Mr Andrew Champion has provided a statement[39] in these proceedings. At paragraph [19] of his statement, Mr Champion says:
“19. Looking at these documents, I can see that there have been eight rate change decisions made during the relevant period to which these documents relate. All decisions were made by the operation of a computer program contained in Department’s system and based on data contained in the system.”
[39] Exhibit 13, Statement of Andrew Champion, made on 24 January 2018.
In the immediately following paragraph, Mr Champion lists the eight relevant decisions. There seems to be consensus between the parties about the eight decisions.[40]
[40] See paragraph [35] of Exhibit 14, Applicant’s Outline of Submissions, dated 29 March 2018. See also paragraph [72] of Exhibit 15, Secretary’s Consolidated Submissions, dated 24 April 2018.
The Applicant summarises his position on each of the eight decisions thus:
“35. In summary, the Applicant submits as follows(by reference to the eight (8) decisions identified by Mr Champion in para 20 of his statement):
a)Decision #1 (effective 20 December 2014 onwards) – no “notice” was given and so arrears are payable.
b)Decision #2 (effective 20 March 2015 onwards) – “notice” is deemed to have been given and so no arrears are payable.
c)Decision #3 (effective 9 April 2015 onwards) – no “notice” was given and so arrears are payable.
d)Decision #4 (effective 3 to 16 September 2015) – no “notice” was given and so arrears are payable.
e)Decision #5 (effective 20 September 2015 onwards) – “notice” is deemed to have been given and so no arrears are payable.
f)Decision #6 (effective 17 to 30 September 2015) – no “notice” was given and so arrears are payable.
g)Decision #7 (effective 15 to 28 October 2015) – no “notice” was given and so arrears are payable.
h)Decision #8 (effective 14 December 2015) – review requested within 13 weeks, so arrears are payable (and it is irrelevant whether “notice” was given.”[41]
[41] Exhibit 14, Applicant’s Outline of Submissions, page 6, paragraph [35].
Decision #1 – Rate reduction decision (effective 20 December 2014)
This was the decision involving reduction of the Applicant’s rate of Newstart to $524.40 per fortnight as a result of removal of the rental allowance component from his rate. This decision took effect from 20 December 2014. Mr Champion notes the actual reduction in the rate “(…occurred on 22 December 2014; (b) had effect from 20 December 2014; and (c) occurred in consequence of the operation of a computer program.”[42] As also noted by Mr Champion, “the department’s computer systems are programmed such that if, after 28 days of a Newstart claim being accepted (with an unverified rent assistance component), the rent assistance component of the claim is removed if verification has not been supplied; …” Thus this change of rate decision that took effect on 20 December 2014 was a direct consequence of the Applicant not having filed his rental assistance claim by the relevant 28th day cut-off date.
[42] Exhibit 13, Statement of Andrew Champion, made on 24 January 2018, page 7, paragraph [22].
Two days after the change took effect (on 22 December 2014), the Applicant received the following notice:
“22 December 2014
Your Newstart Allowance
Immediate payment 11/12/2014 to 24/12/2014 due on 23/12/2014 $518.97
Regular Payment from payment date 11/12/2014
Newstart Allowance $515.60
Plus Energy Supplement +$8.80
Less Debt Repayment -$87.46
Total $436.94”
The Applicant propounds three contentions[43] that he says point to the ineffectiveness or inadequacy of the notice. First, the notice does not contain the word “rate”; second, the notice does not express the figure of $524.40 as a standalone figure; and third, the notice does not mention the date of 20 December 2014 which was the date the decision took effect.
[43] Exhibit 14, Applicant’s Outline of Submissions, page 7, paragraph [40].
I agree with the Respondent’s contention[44] that each of these three contentions propounded by the Applicant must be rejected. I repeat and rely on my findings in relation to the three issues before the Tribunal contained in paragraphs [26] to [45] of these reasons.
[44] Exhibit 15, Secretary’s Consolidated Submissions, page 14, paragraph [78].
As already discussed (and found), there is no requirement that a notice need contain any reference to the word “rate” to properly inform an ordinary and reasonable person of (a) the making of a relevant decision and (b) its content. Similarly, the reference to Debt Repayment in the notice cannot possibly mean, connote or imply that it did not adequately and effectively convey the relevant “rate” to the recipient. At the risk of repeating myself, nothing more than a basic level of cognition is required to differentiate between the concept of “Debt Repayment” and the other figures appearing on the face of the notice. Such a finding is augmented by the stark reality that (at the risk of repeating myself) the figure for “Debt Repayment” is expressed as “-$87.46”. It is also augmented by the reality to be gleaned from how the figure for “Energy Supplement” is depicted, that is, as “+$8.80”.
In my respectful view, it is bordering on the absurd to suggest that an ordinary and reasonable person would not be able to appreciate that the “rate” was equal to the figure appearing next to the words “Newstart Allowance”, that being, “$515.60” plus the figure for “Energy Supplement”, that being “+$8.80”, thus giving a total of $524.40. There can be no confusion that the figure for the energy supplement is a “plus” figure because that is exactly how it is expressed in the notice. Put simply, apart from the respective figures for “Newstart Allowance”, “Plus Energy Supplement” and “Less Debt Repayment”, there are no other figures that could either confuse or mislead a reader into reaching any figure for the “rate” other than $524.40.
The contention about the notice not containing reference to 20 December 2014 ought likewise to be rejected. I repeat and rely on my comments and findings appearing at paragraphs [39] and [40] of these reasons. The Applicant propounds the point as follows:
“42. But, it might be asked, how could one know merely from looking at the letter (and without reference to Mr Champion’s detailed explanations) that there had been a decision to reduce the rate to $524.40 per fortnight with effect from 20 December 2014?
…
45. Further, even if a reader of the letter could infer that a “rate” of $524.40 per fortnight had been determined, it is impossible for the reader to ascertain when that “rate” took effect.”[45]
[45] Exhibit 14, Applicant’s Outline of Submissions, pages 7 and 8, paragraphs [42] and [45].
The pivotal and critical point that fulsomely disposes of this contention is that, to be valid and effective, the notice does not have to disclose the date a change in the rate actually takes or took effect. As has already been explained earlier in these reasons,[46] such a requirement is not part of the administration purview of ss 78 or 79 of the SSAA. Those sections involve the Respondent making a decision to fix a person’s rate of Newstart. Neither of those sections involves the Respondent making a decision as to the date of effect of any such determination. The Respondent’s decision must only communicate that the rate of Newstart has been fixed at a particular figure. There is no requirement for that decision to stipulate the date on which such a change in the rate took effect.
[46] See paragraphs [40] and [41] of these reasons.
In any event, it is undeniable that the notice made the Applicant abundantly aware that his ongoing rate had changed. This position prevails whether or not the notice contained a date of operative effect. This is consistent with the requirements of ss 78 and 79 of the SSAA (and the authority of Austin), that the Respondent’s decision need only communicate that the rate of Newstart has been fixed at a particular figure.
Decision #2 – Rate increase decision (effective 20 March 2015 onwards)
As identified by Mr Champion, this decision was a consequence of an automatic CPI increase.[47] The Applicant concedes that by operation of ss 109(7) of the SSAA, he is deemed to have been given “notice” of this decision. The Applicant accordingly concedes that he cannot recover arrears in respect of this decision.[48]
[47] Exhibit 13, Statement of Andrew Champion, made on 24 January 2018, page 9, paragraph [26(a)].
[48] Exhibit 14, Applicant’s Outline of Submissions, page 9, paragraphs [49] and [50].
Decision #3 – Rate increase decision (effective 9 April 2015 onwards)
This decision involved an increase in the Applicant’s rate to $534.20, reflective of the addition of a pharmaceutical allowance to his rate.[49] The Applicant propounds the same three contentions in asserting that the notice was ineffective or inadequate, as were propounded in relation to Decision #1. Each of those three contentions ought to be rejected for the same reasons outlined at paragraphs [48] to [56] of these reasons.
[49] Exhibit 13, Statement of Andrew Champion, made on 24 January 2018, page 10, paragraph [27].
Decision #4 – Rate decrease decision (effective 3 September 2015 to 16 September 2015)
Mr Champion notes “…that during the fortnight commencing on 3 September 2015 Mr Phelan reported having earned income…which reduced his rate of Newstart Allowance to $NIL for the relevant period to which that income related (3 September 2015 to 16 September 2015).”[50] As also noted by Mr Champion, “The abovementioned rate reduction change: (a) occurred on 16 September 2015; and (b) took effect in relation to (and only in relation to) the period of 3 September 2015 to 16 September 2015).”[51]
[50] Ibid, page 11, paragraph [30].
[51] Ibid, paragraph [31].
There is a ready acceptance by the Respondent that no notice of this decision was given to the Applicant.[52] This concession is of no consequence because, given the amount of “affecting income” reported by the Applicant for the fortnight comprising 3 September 2015 to 16 September 2015, the Applicant’s rate was, for that period, reduced to $NIL. This was the only decision made for the period of this particular fortnight. The decision did not affect the Applicant’s ongoing rate.[53]
[52] Exhibit 15, Secretary’s Consolidated Submissions, page 16, paragraph [93].
[53] Exhibit 13, Statement of Andrew Champion, made on 24 January 2018, page 12, paragraph [34].
Decision #5 – Rate increase decision (effective 20 September 2015 onwards)
This decision derives from an automatic CPI increase.[54] The Applicant concedes that by operation of ss 109(7) of the SSAA, he is deemed to have been given “notice” of this decision. The Applicant accordingly concedes that he cannot recover arrears in respect of this decision.[55]
[54] Ibid, page 13, paragraph [36].
[55] Exhibit 14, Applicant’s Outline of Submissions, page 10, paragraphs [57] and [58].
Decision #6 – Rate decrease decision (effective 17 September 2015 to 30 September 2015)
Mr Champion notes that “…On 30 September 2015, Mr Phelan (again) reported income to a Departmental Officer based in Charters towers [sic] … the consequence of which was that (similarly to Decision #4) Mr Phelan’s rate was reduced back to $NIL with effect between 17 September 2015 and 30 September 2015…”[56]
[56] Exhibit 13, Statement of Andrew Champion, made on 24 January 2018, page 13, paragraph [37].
The net effect of the decision is that the rate reduction decision only applied to the fortnight comprising 17 September 2015 to 30 September 2015 and did not affect the Applicant’s ongoing rate of Newstart Allowance.
There is a ready concession by the Respondent that no notice of this decision was given to the Applicant. The consequential concession is that the Applicant is entitled to rent allowance for this two week period comprising 17 September 2015 to 30 September 2015.[57]
[57] Exhibit 15, Secretary’s Consolidated Submissions, page 16, paragraphs [100] and [101].
Decision #7 – Rate decrease decision (effective 15 October 2015 to 28 October 2015)
Mr Champion notes that on “28 October 2015, Mr Phelan (again) reported income to a departmental Officer based in Charters towers [sic]…the consequence of which was that (similarly to Decisions #4 and #6) Mr Phelan’s rate was reduced back to $NIL with effect between 15 October 2015 and 28 October 2015…The date the decision was made…was 28 October 2015.”[58]
[58] Exhibit 13, Statement of Andrew Champion, made on 24 January 2018, page 13, paragraph [40].
There is a ready acceptance by the Respondent that no notice of this decision was given to the Applicant.[59] This concession is of no consequence because, given the amount of income reported by the Applicant for the fortnight comprising 15 October 2015 to 28 October 2015, the Applicant’s rate was, for that period, reduced to $NIL. This was the only decision made for the period of this particular fortnight. The decision did not affect the Applicant’s ongoing rate and his Newstart Allowance was restored on 2 November 2015.[60]
[59] Exhibit 15, Secretary’s Consolidated Submissions, page 16, paragraph [104].
[60] Exhibit 13, Statement of Andrew Champion, made on 24 January 2018, page 14, paragraph [43(b)].
Decision #8 – Rate increase decision (effective 14 December 2015 onwards)
Mr Champion notes:
“44. There is one other rate change decision I can see which took place with effect from 14 December 2015 (to add Rent Assistance). However, I am told that this decision is immaterial (and does not need to be detailed in this statement) as it was challenged within the requisite notice period.”[61]
[61] Ibid, paragraph [44].
The Applicant contends that this comprised:
“…a rate increase decision…with effect from 14 December 2015…Regardless of whether or not the Applicant was given ‘notice’ of this decision, he requested review within 13 weeks of any such notice and so is entitled to arrears by operation of sub-s 109(1) of the Administration Act.”[62]
[62] Exhibit 14, Applicant’s Outline of Submissions, page 11, paragraph [65].
The Applicant’s contention that “This appears to be conceded by the Respondent” is, respectfully, misplaced. The “rate change decision” identified by Mr Champion as occurring on 14 December 2015 is attributable to the decision made on 8 June 2016 by this Tribunal via its Social Services and Child Support Division (“AAT1”):
“DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review, and in substitution, decides that Mr Phelan is to be paid arrears of rent assistance from 14 December 2015.”[63]
[63] Exhibit 6, s37 T Documents, T2, page 7.
Thus, the Respondent’s contention is correct: the “rate change decision” identified by Mr Champion that took place with effect from 14 December 2015 is not a “rate change decision” made by the Respondent. It arises as a consequence of the abovementioned decision at AAT1 level.
This contention is correct when one compares the notice for Decision #8 to the other most proximate rate increase decision, Decision #5.
The notice for Decision #5 is stated thus:
“29 September 2015
Your Newstart Allowance
Payment from 17/09/2015 to 30/09/2015 due on 01/10/2015 $475.52
Regular Payment from payment date 11/12/2014
Newstart Allowance $523.40
Plus Energy Supplement +$8.80
Plus Pharmaceutical Allowance +$6.20
Less Child Support Deduction -$31.28
Less Lump Sum Advance Repayment -$38.50
Less Court Fines -$20.00
Total $448.62”
The notice for Decision #8 is stated thus:
“12 December 2015
Your Newstart Allowance
Regular Payment from payment date 23/12/2015
Newstart Allowance $523.40
Plus Energy Supplement +$8.80
Plus Pharmaceutical Allowance +$6.20
Less Child Support Deduction -$18.99
Less Lump Sum Advance Repayment -$38.50
Less Court Fines -$20.00
Total $460.91”
It can be readily seen that across both notices, the Applicant’s “rate” for Newstart Allowance remained unchanged at $538.40.[64] Thus, there has been no “rate change decision” in accordance with the administrative purview of ss 78 or 79 of the SSAA. Further, consistent with the authority of Austin, the notice for Decision #8 clearly communicates that the rate of Newstart has been fixed at a particular figure, that figure comprising $538.40.
[64] Comprising Newstart Allowance in the sum of $523.40, plus Energy Supplement in the sum of $8.80, plus Pharmaceutical Allowance in the sum of $6.20, giving a total “rate” for Newstart Allowance of $538.40.
CONCLUSION
I find there is sufficient information before the Tribunal for the appropriate decision to be made here without any requirement for remittal of all or any aspect of the matter to the Chief Executive of Centrelink.
I accept the submissions of the Respondent and, as a consequence, note the following:
(a)There are only three decisions for which notice was not given to the Applicant, they being Decision 4, 6 and 7;
(b)As noted by Mr Champion, the rates applied by the Respondent for Decisions 4 and 7 were the correct rates,[65] and there is no requirement to alter those decisions;
(c)The Respondent concedes[66] that with Decision 6, the Applicant’s rate was incorrectly determined to be $143.54 (when it ought to have been, with rent allowance, determined to be $271.14[67]).
[65] The rates applied were “correct” because due to the amount of “affecting income” notified by the Applicant to the Respondent, the Applicant’s rate for the respective two fortnight periods was reduced to $NIL and he would thus have not received rent allowance in any event for those periods.
[66] Exhibit 15, Secretary’s Consolidated Submissions, page 17, paragraph [112(c)].
[67] Made up of $143.54 plus $127.60.
ORDERS
I make the resulting orders:
(1)The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Social Services and Child Support Division) dated 8 June 2016 (Review Number 2016/B094361) is set aside.
(2)In substitution of that decision, there be a decision that:
(a)In respect of the Respondent’s decision made on 30 September 2015 to reduce the Applicant’s rate to $143.54 (which had effect for the period 17 September 2015 to 30 September 2015), that decision be set aside and substituted by a decision under s 79 of the Social Security (Administration Act) 1999 (Cth) to increase the Applicant’s rate to $271.14.
I certify that the preceding 78 (seventy - eight) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
........................[SGD]................................................
Associate
Dated: 27 March 2019
Date of Hearing:
Telephone Directions Hearing:
Telephone Directions Hearing:
Telephone Directions Hearing:
28 August 2017
9 November 2017
13 February 2018
3 May 2018
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Matthew Black Solicitors for the Applicant: Legal Aid Queensland Advocate for the Respondent: Mr Benjamin McGlade Solicitors for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore
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