FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Pham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1946
Appeal from: Pham v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3272 File number: VID 8 of 2018 Judge: MIDDLETON J Date of judgment: 26 November 2018 Date of publication of reasons: 4 December 2018 Legislation: Migration Legislation Amendment Regulation 2012 (No 5) (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: Dang v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1426
Shrestha v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 22; [2018] HCA 35
Date of hearing: 26 November 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 35 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 8 of 2018 BETWEEN: NGOC TIEP PHAM
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MIDDLETON J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 NOVEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MIDDLETON J:
INTRODUCTION
On 26 November 2018 I made orders dismissing the appeal with costs. These are the reasons for those orders.
On 22 December 2017, the Federal Circuit Court (the ‘FCC’) dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (the ‘Tribunal’) to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the ‘Minister’) to refuse to grant the appellant a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (Subclass 801) visa (a ‘partner visa’).
The issues related to whether a report from a nurse, Mr Tung Le, met any of the relevant descriptions in a legislative instrument known as “IMMI 12/116”, and therefore whether the appellant’s visa application included a “non-judicially determined claim of family violence” within the meaning of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the ‘Regulations’).
The grounds of appeal set out in the appellant’s notice of appeal are:
The decision of the Federal Circuit Court is affected by jurisdictional error
Particulars
a.in that the Court has accepted that the statutory declaration prepared by clinical psychologist Mr. Kleynhans did meet the requirements of instrument IMMI 12/116.
b.The Court has also accepted that the tribunal was in error in relation to its conclusion in relation to the nurse's report.
c.That because of these findings the matter in these circumstances should have been remitted to the tribunal for reconsideration according to law.
d.The Court has further erred by not adjourning this case until the hearing of the appeal in the High Court in Shrestha had been concluded.
e.The Court has erred by concluding that the nurse's report as a matter of law was capable of meeting the requirements…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1946
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had presented evidence in accordance with reg 1.24, was therefore not satisfied that the application included a "non-judicially determined claim of family violence", and was therefore not satisfied that the appellant satisfied the criterion in cl 801.221 of Sch 2 to the Regulations. The court further held that the Tribunal was correct in determining that neither the psychologist nor the social worker had treated or counselled the appellant in the course of preparing the reports that were attached to the statutory declarations they made. The court held that for a statutory declaration by a psychologist or a social worker to meet the requirements of IMMI 12/116, the relationship between the applicant and the psychologist or social worker must have been essentially a therapeutic one.
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court held that it was entirely within the primary judge’s discretion to determine the application for review on the law as it stood at the time, rather than waiting for an indefinite period for the High Court to determine another case. Furthermore, the ultimate decision of the High Court in Shrestha v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection would not have assisted the appellant’s case or led to any different result.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had presented evidence in accordance with reg 1.24, was therefore not satisfied that the application included a “non-judicially determined claim of family violence”, and was therefore not satisfied that the appellant satisfied the criterion in cl 801.221 of Sch 2 to the Regulations.CONSIDERATION The central issue which is determinative of this appeal is whether the report from Mr Le and the statutory declaration from Mr Kleynhans met any of the descriptions in IMMI 12/116. If either of these documents did not, then the application did not include a “non-judicially determined claim of family violence”, and therefore the appellant cannot have been “taken” to have suffered family violence in order to satisfy the criterion in cl 801.221 of Sch 2 to the Regulations. Resolving that issue involves construing IMMI 12/116. In Dang v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1426 (‘Dang’), the Federal Circuit Court considered the proper construction of IMMI 12/116. In that case, the applicant had provided statutory declarations from a psychologist and a social worker. The Tribunal found that “the evidence does not indicate that [the psychologist] has treated Mr Dang”. Similarly, the Tribunal found that “the evidence does not indicate [the social worker] has provided counselling or assistance to Mr Dang”. The Court relevantly stated (in my view correctly) as follows as to the proper construction of IMMI 12/116:[29]In my opinion, the Tribunal was correct in determining that neither of those people had treated or counselled the Applicant in the course of preparing the reports that were attached to the statutory declarations they made. It is apparent that, in the case of a psychologist, the treatment of the alleged victim is required while performing the duties of a psychologist. If the evidentiary requirements were satisfied simply by a statutory declaration made by a registered psychologist, who is a non-treating psychologist, the words in relation to treatment would be otiose. The Tribunal was correct to conclude at [26] that:… for a statutory declaration by a psychologist or a social worker to meet the requirements of IMMI 12/116 the relationship between the Applicant and the psychologist or social worker must have been essentially a therapeutic one… [30]If that requirement was ignored, the statutory declaration could be provided by any psychologist who was provided a history by the Applicant. As the First Respondent submitted in the course of the hearing and by written submissions, the purpose of the regulation is that it must be made by a professional who has formed the requisite opinion in the course of providing professional services in relation to the visa Applicant, in circumstances where the genuineness or otherwise of the claim might be expected to be observable by that professional. Accordingly, the Court held as follows:It is apparent from the evidence that was provided by both of [the psychologist] and [the social worker] to the Tribunal, that neither of those persons were in a therapeutic relationship with the Applicant. The reasons of the Tribunal disclosed that Mr Clifopoulos saw the Applicant only once, at the behest of the Applicant’s lawyers, for the purpose of obtaining an “assessment” (CB 163, page 3 of the psychological report). In relation to Ms Podbury, the Tribunal held at [25]:… In the case of her statutory declaration the evidence does not indicate that she has provided counselling or assistance to Mr Dang. Mr Dang told the Tribunal that he saw her once for no more than three hours earlier in the month of the hearing. …Further, at [25] the Tribunal stated:… Asked by the Tribunal whether [the social worker] provided any counselling or assistance to him, Mr Dang paused before saying that they talked but that he could not remember.