Pham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1946

Appeal from: Pham v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3272
File number: VID 8 of 2018
Judge: MIDDLETON J
Date of judgment: 26 November 2018
Date of publication of reasons: 4 December 2018
Legislation:

Migration Legislation Amendment Regulation 2012 (No 5) (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Dang v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1426

Shrestha v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 22; [2018] HCA 35

Date of hearing: 26 November 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 8 of 2018
BETWEEN:

NGOC TIEP PHAM

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MIDDLETON J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MIDDLETON J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 26 November 2018 I made orders dismissing the appeal with costs.  These are the reasons for those orders.

  2. On 22 December 2017, the Federal Circuit Court (the ‘FCC’) dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (the ‘Tribunal’) to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the ‘Minister’) to refuse to grant the appellant a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (Subclass 801) visa (a ‘partner visa’).

  3. The issues related to whether a report from a nurse, Mr Tung Le, met any of the relevant descriptions in a legislative instrument known as “IMMI 12/116”, and therefore whether the appellant’s visa application included a “non-judicially determined claim of family violence” within the meaning of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the ‘Regulations’).

  4. The grounds of appeal set out in the appellant’s notice of appeal are:

    The decision of the Federal Circuit Court is affected by jurisdictional error

    Particulars

    a.in that the Court has accepted that the statutory declaration prepared by clinical psychologist Mr. Kleynhans did meet the requirements of instrument IMMI 12/116.

    b.The Court has also accepted that the tribunal was in error in relation to its conclusion in relation to the nurse's report.

    c.That because of these findings the matter in these circumstances should have been remitted to the tribunal for reconsideration according to law.

    d.The Court has further erred by not adjourning this case until the hearing of the appeal in the High Court in Shrestha had been concluded.

    e.The Court has erred by concluding that the nurse's report as a matter of law was capable of meeting the requirements…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1946
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Pham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, Pham, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court which had dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT). The central issue in the appeal was whether the report from Mr Le and the statutory declaration from Mr Kleynhans met any of the descriptions in IMMI 12/116, which is a regulation relating to the acceptance of evidence of family violence in a visa application. If either of these documents did not meet the description, then the appellant's application did not include a "non-judicially determined claim of family violence", and therefore he could not be taken to have suffered family violence in order to satisfy the criterion in cl 801.221 of Sch 2 to the Regulations.
The court held that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had presented evidence in accordance with reg 1.24, was therefore not satisfied that the application included a "non-judicially determined claim of family violence", and was therefore not satisfied that the appellant satisfied the criterion in cl 801.221 of Sch 2 to the Regulations. The court further held that the Tribunal was correct in determining that neither the psychologist nor the social worker had treated or counselled the appellant in the course of preparing the reports that were attached to the statutory declarations they made. The court held that for a statutory declaration by a psychologist or a social worker to meet the requirements of IMMI 12/116, the relationship between the applicant and the psychologist or social worker must have been essentially a therapeutic one.
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court held that it was entirely within the primary judge’s discretion to determine the application for review on the law as it stood at the time, rather than waiting for an indefinite period for the High Court to determine another case. Furthermore, the ultimate decision of the High Court in Shrestha v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection would not have assisted the appellant’s case or led to any different result.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The grounds of appeal set out in the appellant’s notice of appeal are:The decision of the Federal Circuit Court is affected by jurisdictional error Particularsa.in that the Court has accepted that the statutory declaration prepared by clinical psychologist Mr. Kleynhans did meet the requirements of instrument IMMI 12/116.b.The Court has also accepted that the tribunal was in error in relation to its conclusion in relation to the nurse's report.c.That because of these findings the matter in these circumstances should have been remitted to the tribunal for reconsideration according to law.d.The Court has further erred by not adjourning this case until the hearing of the appeal in the High Court in Shrestha had been concluded.e.The Court has erred by concluding that the nurse's report as a matter of law was capable of meeting the requirements of IMMI 12/116 and also by concluding it was a question that the court could determine regardless of whether it was a jurisdictional fact.BACKGROUNDVisa criteria The appellant made oral submissions before the Court at the hearing, but did not address the legal issue I am required to consider and which was considered by the FCC. The appellant was represented by solicitors and counsel before the FCC, but was unrepresented before the Court on this appeal. The appellant referred to the fact he was not properly advised by his lawyers as to the legal requirements, but this is not a matter which can impact the outcome of this appeal. One of the applicable “time of decision” criteria for a partner visa was that the applicant meets the requirements of subcll 801.221(2), (2A), (3), (4), (5), (6) or (8) of Sch 2 to the Regulations. Subclauses 801.221(2) and (2A) required, among other things, that the applicant was the ‘spouse’ or ‘de facto partner’ of the sponsoring partner. Other subclauses had different requirements. Relevantly, subcl 801.221(6) provided as follows:(1) An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:(a)the applicant is the holder of a Subclass 820 visa; and(b)the applicant would meet the requirements of subclause (2) or (2A) except that the relationship between the applicant and the sponsoring partner has ceased; and(c)either or both of the following circumstances applies:(i) either or both of the following:(A) the applicant; …has suffered family violence committed by the sponsoring partner;… In order for the sponsoring partner to be the “spouse” (reg 1.15A) or the “de facto partner” (reg 1.09A) of an applicant, the sponsoring partner and the applicant were required, relevantly: to have a mutual commitment to a shared life to the exclusion of others; to have a relationship that is genuine and continuing; and to live together or, alternatively, to not live separately and apart on a permanent basis. An applicant will have “suffered family violence” committed by the sponsoring partner in circumstances where they were “taken” (under reg 1.23) to have suffered family violence (reg 1.22). Such circumstances included where a court made a certain injunction, order or conviction (reg 1.23(2)-(7)). In certain circumstances, a person was taken to have suffered family violence without any such court order (reg 1.23(8)-(14)).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In addition, I make the following observations in relation to the notice of appeal:(1)With respect to particular (a), the proposition that Mr Kleynhans report met the relevant in IMMI 12/126 does not assist the appellant. In accordance with the Regulations, in order for the application to include a “non-judicially determined claim of family violence”, the applicant needed to provide two items of evidence from the list in Sch 1 to IMMI 12/116. (2)With respect to particular (b), because the question of whether the application included a “non-judicially determined claim of family violence”, the Tribunal’s own reasons for concluding that Mr Le’s report did not meet the relevant description in IMMI 12/116 is not determinative. The Court is obliged to consider the question for itself, informed correctly by the law, on the evidence before it. On that basis, the primary judge correctly concluded that Mr Le’s report did not meet the description in IMMI 12/116, and therefore the application did not include a “non-judicially determined claim of family violence”.(3)Particular (c) adds nothing to particular (b).(4)As to particular (d), it was entirely within the primary judge’s discretion to determine the application for review on the law (including the case law) as it stood at the time, rather than waiting for an indefinite period for the High Court to determine another case. Furthermore, the ultimate decision of the High Court in Shrestha v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 22; [2018] HCA 35, which the applicant asked the primary judge to wait for, would not have assisted the appellant’s case or led to any different result.CONCLUSION It follows that the appeal should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had presented evidence in accordance with reg 1.24, was therefore not satisfied that the application included a “non-judicially determined claim of family violence”, and was therefore not satisfied that the appellant satisfied the criterion in cl 801.221 of Sch 2 to the Regulations.CONSIDERATION The central issue which is determinative of this appeal is whether the report from Mr Le and the statutory declaration from Mr Kleynhans met any of the descriptions in IMMI 12/116. If either of these documents did not, then the application did not include a “non-judicially determined claim of family violence”, and therefore the appellant cannot have been “taken” to have suffered family violence in order to satisfy the criterion in cl 801.221 of Sch 2 to the Regulations. Resolving that issue involves construing IMMI 12/116. In Dang v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1426 (‘Dang’), the Federal Circuit Court considered the proper construction of IMMI 12/116. In that case, the applicant had provided statutory declarations from a psychologist and a social worker. The Tribunal found that “the evidence does not indicate that [the psychologist] has treated Mr Dang”. Similarly, the Tribunal found that “the evidence does not indicate [the social worker] has provided counselling or assistance to Mr Dang”. The Court relevantly stated (in my view correctly) as follows as to the proper construction of IMMI 12/116:[29]In my opinion, the Tribunal was correct in determining that neither of those people had treated or counselled the Applicant in the course of preparing the reports that were attached to the statutory declarations they made. It is apparent that, in the case of a psychologist, the treatment of the alleged victim is required while performing the duties of a psychologist. If the evidentiary requirements were satisfied simply by a statutory declaration made by a registered psychologist, who is a non-treating psychologist, the words in relation to treatment would be otiose. The Tribunal was correct to conclude at [26] that:… for a statutory declaration by a psychologist or a social worker to meet the requirements of IMMI 12/116 the relationship between the Applicant and the psychologist or social worker must have been essentially a therapeutic one… [30]If that requirement was ignored, the statutory declaration could be provided by any psychologist who was provided a history by the Applicant. As the First Respondent submitted in the course of the hearing and by written submissions, the purpose of the regulation is that it must be made by a professional who has formed the requisite opinion in the course of providing professional services in relation to the visa Applicant, in circumstances where the genuineness or otherwise of the claim might be expected to be observable by that professional. Accordingly, the Court held as follows:It is apparent from the evidence that was provided by both of [the psychologist] and [the social worker] to the Tribunal, that neither of those persons were in a therapeutic relationship with the Applicant. The reasons of the Tribunal disclosed that Mr Clifopoulos saw the Applicant only once, at the behest of the Applicant’s lawyers, for the purpose of obtaining an “assessment” (CB 163, page 3 of the psychological report). In relation to Ms Podbury, the Tribunal held at [25]:… In the case of her statutory declaration the evidence does not indicate that she has provided counselling or assistance to Mr Dang. Mr Dang told the Tribunal that he saw her once for no more than three hours earlier in the month of the hearing. …Further, at [25] the Tribunal stated:… Asked by the Tribunal whether [the social worker] provided any counselling or assistance to him, Mr Dang paused before saying that they talked but that he could not remember.