Pham v Minister for Immigration - [2013] FMCA 130

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PHAM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2013] FMCA 130

MIGRATION – Breach of statutory duty – procedural fairness – failure to comply with s.359AA – failure to comply with s.359A – illogical or unreasonable decision.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.359AA, 359A

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko – Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24.
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Al Shamry (2001) 110 FCR 27.
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
VAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471; [2004] FCAFC 123.
WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 276; [2002] FCAFC 266.

Applicant:

PHOUNG UYEN PHAM

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent:

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

BRG 215 of 2012

Judgment of:

Burnett FM

Hearing date:

5 June 2012

Date of Last Submission:

5 June 2012

Delivered at:

Brisbane

Delivered on:

27 February 2013

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr S Nguyen

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Southside Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondents:

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Clayton Utz

ORDERS

That the application filed on 5 March 2012 is dismissed.
That in default of application for any other orders, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $6,471.00.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 215 of 2012

PHOUNG UYEN PHAM

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

The applicant is the holder of a Partner (Temporary) Visa (Class UK) issued 28 December 2005. She sought the issue of a permanent visa being a Partner (Residence) Visa (Class BS). Generally for the grant of the permanent visa the visa applicant must demonstrate an ongoing genuine relationship of two years duration between that person and the sponsoring party.
Other criteria are also required to be established. However for the purpose of this application those matters are not relevant.
Here the circumstances of the applicant and her sponsor gave rise to suspicion. She was aged approximately 37 and the male sponsor was aged 28. They were both of Vietnamese ethnicity. In the course of considering the permanent visa application a site visit at their purported residence was conducted by a Departmental officer. The situation presented at the site visit indicated insufficient evidence of an ongoing relationship between the applicant and the sponsor resulting in the application being refused.
The applicant sought a review of the delegate’s decision. Upon review the Migration Review Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a Partner (Residence) Visa (Class BS).

Grounds of Application

In her application for judicial review the applicant contended that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error because:
“1. The Tribunal failed to accord the applicant’s (sic) procedural fairness by breaching its statutory duty, namely s.359AA of the Migration Act 1958;
2. The Tribunal failed to accord the applicant’s (sic) procedural fairness by breaching its statutory duty namely s.359A of the Migration Act 1958;
3. The Tribunal’s finding that the couple’s lack of mutual commitment based on the Sponsor’s overseas trip alone and the lack of holidays or weekend trips together was unreasonable and illogical.”

Ground one – Breach of Statutory Duty under s.359AA

The applicant contends the Tribunal failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness by breaching its statutory duty, namely s.359AA of the Migration Act 1958(Cth) (the Act).
Section 359AA of the Act relevantly provides:
“359AA Information and invitation given orally by Tribunal while applicant appearing
If an applicant is appearing before the Tribunal because of an invitation under section 360:
(a) the Tribunal may orally give to the applicant clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and
(b) if the Tribunal does so—the Tribunal must:
(i) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why the information is relevant to the review, and the consequences of the information being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and
(ii) orally invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information; and
(iii) advise the applicant that he or she may seek additional time to comment on or respond to the information; and
(iv) if the applicant seeks additional time to comment on or respond to the information—adjourn the review, if the Tribunal considers that the applicant reasonably needs additional time to comment on or respond to the information.
The applicant alleged a failure in three instances namely:
ii. First instance, regarding the adverse evidence provided by the Applicant’s father in law, during the home site visit made by the immigration officer, in 2009. That, the father in law initially denied having known the Applicant’s name. Further, the site officer’s report, which stated that there were no feminine touches in the Applicant’s alleged bed-room, and the failure by the father in law to provide personal documentation belonging to the applicant.
iii. Second Instance, regarding a possible adverse inference to be drawn by the Tribunal with respect to the social and financial aspects of the couple. In particular, the information provided by the couple at the Department Interview, in July 2009. Of more relevance is the evidence provided by the sponsor, stating that he did not see the applicant’s aunt because he did not get on with the aunty, and he found it difficult to visit the sister-in-law’s house in the Applicant’s company.
…
iv. Third instance, regarding the adverse information provided during the site visit by the father in law that the Applicant sometimes slept at her sister’s house and the adverse information provided by the sponsor (husband) that he “had” not driven the Applicant to see her sister. In addition, the evidence provided by the Sponsor that he travelled overseas three times in four years without the company of the Applicant.
In respect of each of those instances the applicant complains that the Tribunal did not evaluate each instance of the adverse information raised, the issues having being raised collectively. She contended the Tribunal only addressed part of the issues raised but not all of them. Furthermore she complains that although the Tribunal orally advised her of her right to comment on adverse information, explained its relevance and informed her of her right to request for additional time, at no time did the Tribunal put to her specific questions or inquire whether she wished to comment on any adverse information individually or collectively. Additionally, she complains that at no time did the Tribunal take any reasonable steps to ensure that she understood her rights and in particular the consequences of the information being relied upon. She complained that the Tribunal did not explain that it had discretion to adjourn the matter if in its opinion more time was required.
The first particular of complaint concerned:
a.   Adverse evidence provided by the applicant’s father in law during the home site visit made by the Immigration Officer in 2009;
b.   The Immigration Officer’s Report that there were no feminie touches in the applicant’s bedroom; and
c.   The failure by the father in law to provide personal documentation belonging to the applicant.
The applicant’s complaint is that each issue was not put individually to the applicant but that they were addressed collectively.
The transcripts of the proceedings were not placed before the Court. However, from a review of the Tribunal’s reasons it is apparent that each issue was considered individually. Consistent with s.359AA of the Act the Tribunal gave the applicant particulars of information it considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. Such notice was given in a manner provided by s.359AA (b).
At paragraph [25] of its reasons the Tribunal noted the evidence demonstrated a site visit was conducted on 21 April 2009 at 6.30pm. It noted the evidence was: “A male person answered the door and the applicant was asked for by name. The male person shook his head and said he did not know her.” The male person referred to was identified later in the reasons as the sponsor’s father, the applicant’s father in law. It was only after the Immigration Officer identified himself as an immigration officer that the sponsor’s father then advised the officer that the applicant was the sponsor’s wife and that she lived at the premises with the spouse.
The Tribunal noted the evidence of the Immigration Officer was that in a subsequent inspection of the house the Immigration Officer was shown a bedroom alleged to be occupied by the applicant and the sponsor but “No feminine items or personal items” were evident and upon the sponsor’s father being queried by the Immigration Officer that officer was then taken to another room which did have both female and male apparel. However it transpired this room was occupied by the sponsor’s father and his wife.
Finally the Tribunal observed that no formal documentation for the applicant could be produced at the time of the site visit.
At paragraph [38] of its reasons the Tribunal expressly referred to the site visit in the context of its obligations under s.359AA. In particular it identified the manner of initial response received addressing the Immigration Officer’s initial enquiries of the applicant’s occupancy; the absence of a feminine touch or paraphernalia in a room said to be occupied by the applicant; the subsequent passing off of another room as one being occupied by the applicant; and, the lack of personal documentation relevant to the applicant. The Tribunal noted those matters gave rise to a concern of the applicant’s credibility and the prospect of a finding that the applicant did not live with the sponsor.
The Tribunal also enquired of the applicant (at paragraph [41] of its reasons) whether she slept over at an aunt’s place as had been reported to the Immigration Officer by the sponsor’s father. The Tribunal expressed to the applicant its concern with this apparently inconsistent evidence. As the Tribunal noted this did appear to give rise to some confusion and it attempted to rephrase this issue on a number of occasions.
The Tribunal stated to the applicant that these matters would be a reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision and explained she could have time to respond.[1]
[1] Paragraph [43] of the Tribunal’s Reasons
At paragraph [47] of its reasons the Tribunal stated that following the Immigration Officer’s observation’s made during the visit to the house it concluded the applicant did not live in the sponsor’s house. Its views were fortified by the inconsistent evidence concerning overnight stays at her sister’s house.[2]
[2] Paragraph [75] of the Tribunal’s Reasons
In submissions for the applicant it was contended that at no time did the Tribunal put to the applicant specific questions as to whether she would wish to comment on any adverse information individually, or even collectively, and as such she was never cautioned in respect of it. Further it was contended that at no time did the Tribunal put to her specific questions as to whether she would wish to seek additional time to respond to any adverse information either individually or collectively. It was submitted that the Tribunal did not take any reasonable steps to ensure that the applicant understood her rights and in particular the consequences of the information being relied upon. Finally it was contended that the Tribunal failed to explain to the applicant that it had a discretion to adjourn the matter if, in its opinion, more time would be required by her.
In the absence of a transcript those contentions cannot be sustained. In this instance the face of the Tribunal record suggests that the process set out in s.359AA was followed. Accordingly in the absence of any material to demonstrate otherwise no breach of the obligations of procedural fairness imposed by s.359AA of the Act can be established and this ground is dismissed.

Ground Two – Denial of Procedural Fairness-Breach of s.359A of the Migration Act 1958.

The second ground contended for by the applicant is that the Tribunal failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness by breaching its statutory duty namely s.359A of the Migration Act 1958
Section 359A of the Act relevantly provides:
359A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Tribunal must:
(a ) Give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and
(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and
(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.
(2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:
(a) except where paragraph (b) applies—by one of the methods specified in section 379A; or
(b) if the applicant is in immigration detention—by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.
(3) The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 359AA.
(4) This section does not apply to information:
(a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or
(b) that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or
(ba) that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or
(c) that is non‑disclosable information.
The applicant contends that the Tribunal breached s.359A of the Migration Act 1958 by:
“ii. First instance, regarding the adverse evidence provided by the Applicant’s father in law, during the home site visit made by the immigration officer, in 2009. That, the father in law initially denied having known the Applicant’s name. Further, the site officer’s report, which stated that there were no feminine touches in the Applicant’s alleged bed-room, and the failure by the father in law to provide personal documentation belonging to the applicant.
iii. Second Instance, regarding a possible adverse inference to be drawn by the Tribunal with respect to the social and financial aspects of the couple. In particular, the information provided by the couple at the Department Interview, in July 2009. Of particular significance is the evidence provided by the sponsor, stating that he did not see the applicant’s aunt because he did not get on with the aunty, and he found it difficult to visit the sister-in-law’s house in the Applicant’s company.
iv. Third instance, regarding the adverse information provided during the site visit by the father in law that the Applicant sometimes slept at her sister’s house and the adverse information provided by the sponsor (husband) that he “had” not driven the Applicant to see her sister. In addition, evidence provided by the Sponsor that he travelled overseas three times in four years without the company of the applicant.”
She also contended that during the hearing that she gave evidence first whilst the sponsor remained outside the hearing room.[3] She stated that the sponsor was then called to and gave evidence to the Tribunal and in her presence. She contends that in all instances adverse information was elucidated by a person other than the applicant and in her absence.
[3] This submission at paragraph [50] of her written outline the applicant appears to be in error in that at no time was it contended that the applicant was excluded from the hearing.
The obligation imposed on the Tribunal by s.359A of the Act only extends to “information that the Tribunal considers to be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review.” In VAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 123 (12 May 2004) the Full Court (Finn, Merkel and Stone JJ) observed concerning “information”:
24    As to the first of these, there is now a considerable body of case law concerned with the compass of the term "information" in its s 424A(1)[4] setting. The following propositions emerge from it:
i.      the purpose of s 424A is to provide in part a statutory procedural analogue to the common law of procedural fairness... However the obligation imposed is not coextensive with that which might be imposed by the common law to avoid practical injustice…;
ii.     the word "information" in s 424A(1) has the same meaning as in s 424… and in this setting it refers to knowledge of relevant facts or circumstances communicated to or received by the Tribunal… irrespective of whether it is reliable or has a sound factual basis…;
iii.    the word does not encompass the Tribunal’s subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations… nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc…
(Citation’s omitted)
[4] Section 424A(1) is materially identical to s.359A
In his submissions Counsel for the applicant identified the following which he contended ought to have been put to the applicant pursuant to s.359A:
a)That the applicant’s father in law initially denied knowing the applicant’s name on a site visit by officers of the Department to the applicant’s purported residence;
b)Information from the site visit that there were no feminine touches in the applicant’s alleged bedroom;
c)That the applicant’s father in law did not provide personal documentation belonging to the applicant on the site visit;
d)Information provided by the applicant’s sponsor husband that he did not see the applicant’s aunt because he did not get along with her and he found it difficult to visit the sister in law’s home in the applicant’s presence;
e)Information from the applicant’s father in law that the applicant sometimes slept at her sisters house;
f)Information provided by the applicant’s Sponsor husband that he travelled overseas three times in four years without the applicant, and
g)That he did not drive the applicant to her sister’s house.
The respondent did not challenge the proposition that those matters constituted information for the purposes of s.359A. However the respondent did contend that the matters noted in subparagraphs (c) and (d) namely; the applicant father’s failure to provide personal documentation evidence at the site visit; the information provided by the applicant’s sponsor husband that he did not see the applicant’s aunt because he did not get along with her; and his statement that he found it difficult to visit his sister in law’s home in the applicant’s presence, were not material because they were not the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision within the meaning of s.359A(1) of the Act.

The Tribunal did not mention in its reasons for decision the applicant father’s failure to provide personal documentation evidence at the site visit as part of the general lack of documentary evidence proving that the applicant lived at the claimed spousal address. It was not a matter that specifically informed the Tribunal’s decision. Accordingly it was not subject to an obligation under s.359A as it was not “information” for the purposes of that section because it was merely material that addressed a gap or lack of detail or specificity. As was observed by the Full Court in WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 276 (Marshall, Weinberg and Jacobson JJ) At [26]:
26. In our opinion the word “information” in s.424A (1) does not encompass a failure to mention a matter to the RRT. As the Full Court observed in Win v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001)105 FCR 212 at 218 [20] “information” is used in the same sense in s.424 (1) at 424A (1). Section 424(1) provides that the RRT “may get any information that it considers relevant”. It is inappropriate to speak of the RRT “getting information” where the substance of that information is merely an observation that the appellant did not refer to a particular matter in this evidence. The fact that the appellant failed to refer to a particular matter constitutes nothing more than an aspect of the RRT’s reasoning concerning a deficiency in his evidence. That observation cannot meaningfully be described as “information”. Moreover, the appellant’s submission cannot be accepted as a matter of sound policy. To permit an applicant for review of a delegate’s decision to comment on each deficiency in his or her evidence, as viewed by the RRT, has the potential to allow a protracted and almost never ending process of review, a result plainly not intended by the legislature.
That matter must be considered against the mischief sought to be addressed by the legislation as was identified by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Al Shamry (2001) 110 FCR 27 where at [40] Merkel J observed:
40. An applicant may have no record of the information provided but, more importantly, may not be aware of its significance to the review ultimately to be conducted by the RRT. It is therefore understandable that the legislature would require that, in fairness, any adverse information provided prior to the review, the significance of which the applicant may be unaware, be disclosed to the applicant to enable him or her to respond to it. That approach has particular importance in the context of the inquisitorial and non adversarial nature of proceedings before the RRT.
At paragraph [41] Merkel J, continued,
“…The construction…I regard as correct gives effect to the beneficial purpose of s 424 A of affording an applicant with the opportunity to respondent to the gravamen or substance of any adverse information upon which the RRT purposes to act, the significance of which the applicant may be unaware.”
In its reasons at paragraph [76] the Tribunal’s concern was expressed as a general failure by the applicant to produce evidence connecting her with the alleged residential address of her husband. It was not that the applicant’s father in law did not provide personal documentation during the site visit that was in issue but rather a conclusion drawn from a gap or absence in evidence leading to a conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal after weighing the evidence by reference to those gaps.
The applicant’s concern about the Tribunal’s reference to her father in law’s failure to provide personal documentation at the site visit was plainly not germane to its decision and as such the absent material could not constitute information for the purpose of s.359A.
The second body of material the respondent contended this approach applied was the issue identified by the applicant at subparagraph d being the information provided by the applicant’s sponsor husband that he did not see the applicant’s aunt because he did not get along with her and he found it difficult to visit the sister in law’s home in the applicant’s presence
At paragraph [82] of the Tribunal’s decision the Tribunal found it a significant fact that the applicant and spouse did not appear to undertake joint activities, other than making the occasional visit to the Inala Shops. Of particular note by the Tribunal was the failure by the applicant to produce some supporting evidence from third party friends and acquaintances. The source of the real concern, noted by the Tribunal was the “lack of support or statutory declaration from any family particularly given (her) claims to be living with parents in law and (that she) often sees her sister and aunt.” It was not the matter of the applicant not seeing the sister and aunt per se that appeared to trouble the Tribunal. It follows that detail was not information for the purpose of s.359A.
The relevant information for the purpose of s.359A , if there was to be any, were the statutory declarations. However none were produced which left a gap in the evidence to be weighed in the final determination by the Tribunal.
In any event I agree that upon a reasonable reading of the Tribunal’s decision the Tribunal put to the applicant all that information which was the reason for or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. The matters complained of by the applicant were plainly not part of the reason for affirming the decision under review.
The remaining matters raised in this ground, namely subparagraphs a, b, c, f and g give no ground for complaint as the Tribunal put all information that it considered would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review to the applicant at the hearing before the Tribunal in accordance with s.359AA. In my view the applicant’s complaints do not demonstrate error on the Tribunal’s part and this ground is dismissed.

Ground Three – Unreasonable and Illogical

The applicant contends that the Tribunal’s finding of her and the sponsor’s lack of mutual commitment based on the sponsor’s overseas trip alone and the lack of holidays or weekend trips together was unreasonable and illogical. She contended that the sponsor travelled overseas three times in four years without her but the Tribunal dismissed the reasons she provided for not accompanying the sponsor. She contended that she was new to the country, parsimonious and nervous about travel. She contended that by reason of the numerous grammatical errors in the Tribunal’s judgment the reasons for its decision are unclear and not concise.
At paragraph [84] of its decision the Tribunal found:
84. The Tribunal has considered that the couple have been married since 2006 but it is particularly concerned that given the length of their relationship about the lack of documentary evidence concerning their relationship, joint household, joint activities, and social recognition. In addition the Tribunal is concerned that the site visit suggested the applicant did not live at the home and does not accept the explanations of the Applicant. Most telling was the Sponsor travelled overseas three times in four years to visit his family but without the Applicant. The Tribunal understands that there may be circumstances that a couple could not travel together for any number of reasons. However the Tribunal does not accept the explanations given by the couple in this regard as discussed above. Further, the Tribunal notes that while the applicant (sic) travelled overseas three times without the applicant, the couple also did not holiday together in Australia, even for a weekend or overnight. The Tribunal considers the lack of holiday time and joint activities undertaken with each other is not consistent with a committed relationship.
The applicant submitted that the Tribunal’s finding that the couple’s lack of mutual commitment based upon the sponsor’s overseas trips alone and the lack of holidays or weekend trips together was unreasonable and illogical.
The parties broadly agree on the applicable principles. They were most recently restated in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 where at paragraph [130] Crennan and Bell JJ observed:
130. In the context of the Tribunal's decision here, "illogicality" or "irrationality" sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact, it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is "clearly unjust" or "arbitrary" or "capricious" or "unreasonable" in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. The same applies in the case of an opinion that a mandated state of satisfaction has not been reached. Not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case.
In addition there was no disagreement between the parties that in considering any application care must be taken and “… a Court should proceed with caution when reviewing an administrative decision on the ground that it does not give proper weight to relevant factors, lest it exceed its supervisory role by reviewing the decision on its merits.”: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko – Wallsend Ltd (1986) 126 CLR 24 per Gibbs CJ at p 30 and Dawson J at page 71.
The basis for the Tribunal’s finding can be sourced in a number of parts of its decision. Respectfully, the applicant falls into error by focusing on only one aspect. The Tribunal at paragraph [84] indicated that for a number of reasons it considered the circumstances supported a conclusion that the parties didn’t demonstrate commitment to each other of which joint travel was only one. As noted at paragraph [87] in its reasons:
“87 The lack of evidence regarding the social aspects and recognition of the relationship, lack of future plans and common interests…”
were factors noted in addition to “the Sponsors three overseas holidays without the Applicant”. It was each of those matters which lead the Tribunal to the conclusion that there was a lack of mutual commitment between the applicant and sponsor.
The applicant does not challenge the other factors which themselves alone would, in my view, support the conclusion of a lack of mutual commitment. Respectfully, I do not accept the submission that a lack of mutual commitment was not logically open on the facts. It cannot, in my view, be characterised as one which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive at on the same evidence.
However, even if it was illogical and unreasonable it was only part of the reason in respect of a more comprehensive finding concerning the true state of the applicant’s spousal relationship. That finding was logically open on the evidence when regard was had to other matters including the matters apparent at the site visit, the attempts at deception and the relationship between the applicant and the sponsor’s relations.
In truth the applicant is unhappy with the Tribunal’s factual findings and seeks an impermissible merits review. This ground also fails.

Conclusion

The applicant seeks review of the Tribunal’s decision affirming a decision by the delegate to refuse a permanent visa. The applicant advanced these grounds:
a)Failure to comply with s.359AA;
b)Failure to comply with s.359A;
c)The decision was illogical or unreasonable.
She has failed to demonstrate her claim in respect of any matter.

Orders

That the application filed on 5 March 2012 is dismissed.
That in default of application for any other orders, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $6,471.00.

I certify that the preceding fifty (50) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Burnett FM

Date: 27 February 2013