Pham and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
[2005] AATA 554
•9 June 2005
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2005] AATA 554
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No V2004/447
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re VAN HUNG PHAM Applicant
And
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal The Hon C R Wright QC (Deputy President) Date9 June 2005
PlaceMelbourne
Decision The decision under review is affirmed. The deportation order issued on 1 May 2000 is confirmed. [Sgd The Hon C R Wright QC]
Deputy President
CATCHWORDS
IMMIGRATION - criminal deportation – armed robbery and assault - whether risk of recidivism - degree of deterrence to others - best interests of the child - hardship to de facto wife Australian citizen – deportation order affirmed.
Migration Act 1958 – ss200, 201, 499, 500
Re Chau and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) AATA 485
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 107 FCR 133
REASONS FOR DECISION
9 June 2005 The Hon C R Wright QC (Deputy President) The Decision Under Review
1. The applicant has applied for review of the respondent’s decision to deport him. This decision was made by the respondent’s delegate on 1 May 2000. The applicant was advised of the decision on 30 May 2000. By evading detention thereafter the applicant avoided service of the formal order until 23 March 2004. The applicant does not dispute that he falls within the terms of s201 of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) and is liable to deportation pursuant to s200 of the Act. However he contends that an exercise of discretion in accordance with the terms of the Minister’s Direction No 9, made pursuant to s499 of the Act should result in the deportation order being set aside. A review hearing took place in Melbourne on 15 and 23 February 2005.
2. On the basis of the material provided at the hearing, I find that the following events occurred.
Chronology of Relevant Events
o10 March 1972 The applicant was born in North Vietnam.
o1988 The applicant travelled to Hong Kong seeking refugee status.
o1988 – 1993 The applicant lived in detention in a refugee camp in Hong Kong. During this time he married a fellow refugee.
o1993 – 1994 The applicant lived in a refugee camp in the Philippines. Here he met Thi Thuy Hang Le.
o29 June 1995 The applicant entered Australia sponsored by his wife. He claims that his marriage was dissolved soon thereafter. No decree of dissolution has been produced. He commenced living in a de facto relationship with Thi Thuy Hang Le “soon after” his arrival in Australia.
o17 April 1997 Approximately 21 months after arriving in Australia the applicant and two other men committed an armed robbery during which a 67 year old man was severely assaulted and money was stolen from him. One offender was armed with a loaded pistol. The applicant was armed with a Ghurkha style knife with which he assaulted the victim by striking him with the handle.
o13 October 1997 The applicant pleaded guilty in the District Court of NSW to one count of robbery being armed in company and wounding contrary to s98 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
o13 February 1998 The applicant was sentenced to 5½ years imprisonment with a minimum term of 3 years, backdated to 17 April 1997 and expiring on 16 April 2000, at which date the applicant was to be released on parole for the balance of the sentence.
o22 June 1998 An officer of DIMA wrote to the applicant advising him he may be liable for deportation pursuant to s200 of the Migration Act 1958.
o2 August 1998 The applicant’s appeal against the severity of his sentence was dismissed by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal.
o18 January 2000 The applicant was interviewed at prison by DIMA officers with respect to his liability for deportation.
o16 April 2000 The applicant was released from prison on parole.
o1 May 2000 The Minister’s delegate signed a Deportation Order in respect of the applicant.
o25 May 2000 DIMA wrote to the applicant advising that a decision had been made as to his deportation and asking the applicant to contact the relevant officer.
o30 May 2000 The applicant was spoken to and advised by DIMA officers of the decision to deport him. He was requested to attend the DIMA office on 2 June 2000 to be detained. The applicant did not keep this appointment and was not detained.
oMay 2000 –
oFebruary 2003 The applicant remained at large and was living with Thi Thuy Hung Le who became pregnant to him early in 2003.
o22 February 2003 The applicant was arrested by New South Wales police on one charge of shoplifting and a charge of parole violation. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year, 3 months and 27 days in respect of parole violation and for 1 month (concurrent) in respect of “goods in custody reasonably suspected of being stolen”. He was incarcerated at Silverwater Prison.
o7 May 2003 The applicant escaped from custody during an escorted visit to hospital from the prison.
oMay 2003 - The applicant again remained at large.
February 2004
o27 October 2003 The applicant’s son Andrew was born.
o14 February 2004 The applicant was arrested by police at Sunshine in Victoria and charged with theft.
o15 March 2004 The applicant was convicted and sentenced to 4 months imprisonment for theft in the Victorian Magistrates Court.
o23 March 2004 The applicant was served in Port Philip Prison with the Deportation Order dated 1 May 2000.
o13 June 2004 The applicant was extradited from Victoria to NSW to be deal with in respect of his escape from custody and breach of parole.
o15 June 2004 The applicant was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for escaping from custody in the Sydney District Court. His release date is likely to be 14 June 2005.
Relevant legislation and Directions
3. Section 200 of the Act provides:
“The Minister may order the deportation of a non-citizen to whom this Division applies:
Section 201 of the Act relevantly provides:
“Where:
(a) a person who is a non-citizen has, either before or after the commencement of this section, been convicted in Australia of an offence;
(b) when the offence was committed the person was a non-citizen who:
(i) had been in Australia as a permanent resident:
(A) for a period of less than 10 years; or
(B) for periods that, when added together, total less than 10 years; or
(ii)…; and
(c) the offence is an offence for which the person was sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life or for a period of not less than one year;
section 200 applies to the person.”
4. Section 499 of the Act relevantly provides:
(1) “The Minister may give written directions to a person or body having functions or powers under this Act if the directions are about:
(a) the performance of those functions; or
(b) the exercise of those powers. (1)
…
(2)Subsection (1) does not empower the Minister to give directions that would be inconsistent with this Act or the regulations.
(2A) A person or body must comply with a direction under subsection (1).”
Section 500 of the Act relevantly provides:
“(1)Applications may be made to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of:
(a)decisions of the Minister under section 200 because of circumstances specified in section 201; or…”.
5. On 21 December 1998 the Minister made General Direction – Criminal Deportation – No 9 pursuant to s499 of the Act to provide guidance to decision-makers in respect of decisions made under ss200 and 201 of the Act.
In considering the decision under review, it is necessary to have regard to the Direction.
Paragraph 6 of the Direction states there are two primary considerations, being the expectations of the Australian community and the best interests of any child of the potential deportee.
Paragraph 7 of the Direction states that there will be other relevant considerations in individual cases, including the degree of hardship which may reasonably be expected to be suffered by the potential deportee and the degree of hardship to Australian citizens or permanent residents that would reasonably be expected to flow from deportation.
Paragraph 5 of the Direction states that decision-makers should have due regard to the importance placed by the Government on the two primary considerations, but should also adopt a balancing process which takes into account all relevant considerations.
The First Primary Consideration – Community Expectations
6. There are two aspects to the first primary consideration, being:
(a)the expectation that the community will be protected and not put at risk; and
(b)the expectation that non-citizens who commit/are convicted of crimes that are abhorrent to the Australian community will be removed from Australia.
Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Direction state the Government’s view about the protection of the community. Three factors set out in paragraph 10 as being relevant to an assessment of the level of risk to the community and the need for its protection, are:
(a) the seriousness and nature of the crime;
(b) the risk of recidivism; and
(c)the likelihood that deportation would be likely to prevent or discourage similar offences by other persons.
The Second Primary Consideration – The Best Interests of Children
7. Paragraph 16 of the Direction requires decision-makers to determine the best interests of any children under 18 years of age who are in a parent-child relationship with the potential deportee.
Other Considerations
8. Paragraph 21 of the Direction requires decision-makers to consider the degree of hardship to the potential deportee and his family (other than children).
Discussion
9. The first primary Consideration – Community Expectations
(a)Seriousness and nature of the crime
Within the provisions of paragraph 11 of the Direction, armed robbery, assault and any other forms of violence are consider to be “very serious”. The armed robbery committed by the applicant on 17 April 1997 was plainly very serious. He was then 25 years old and was not a “young offender” as that term is commonly understood. The following extracts from the remarks of the sentencing judge provide a clear picture of the circumstances of the offence:
“The facts of this matter are that at about ten past one in the morning of Thursday 17 April 1997 [the victim], who was sixty seven years of age at the time, was working in his business premises at … . He was preparing to close the store for the night and was the only person in the store. (p29)
[The first accomplice] then produced a .32 Browning pistol and demanded the money kept in the store. [The applicant] was armed with a Ghurkha style knife. The two prisoners then assaulted [the victim] with [the applicant] hitting him with the handle of the knife. (p29)
While [the first accomplice] and [the applicant] were assaulting [the victim] [the second accomplice] struck hi with two quick blows to the rear of the head with a bottle he took from the shelves. (p30)
[The first accomplice] and [the applicant] continued their assault upon [the victim] and during this time they removed a sum of money from his back pocket. (p30)
A search of the premises was made and police located a .32 calibre Browning brand pistol under a bucket in the rear toilet. On examination of the pistol it revealed it was loaded with five rounds in the magazine clip and one in the firing chamber. (p30)
Police also located a thirty eight centimetre long Ghurkha style knife under a newspaper on a set of stairs at the rear of the premises. (p30)
[The victim] was taken to Royal Prince Alfred Hospital where examination revealed he had sustained ten full thickness lacerations ranging from three centimetres to eight centimetres. These were mainly occipital and over the superior surface and associated with multiple bruises and bleeding. His torso and limbs had multiple early bruises, approximately eighteen, especially over his back. (p31)
This was a crime of violence and the community rightly expects the persons who commit such crimes should, in the interests of general deterrence, be compelled to undergo a period of imprisonment that will be of sufficient length to match the seriousness of the criminality involved. (p32)
One of the main purposes of punishment is to protect the public from the commission of such crimes by making it clear to the offenders and to other persons with similar impulses that if they yield to them they will meet with severe punishment. This cowardly attack upon an elderly man working alone in his shop in the early hours of the morning calls for stern punishment. (p32)
I find the prisoner willingly agreed to take part in this robbery, doing so whilst armed with a knife, something which I regard as an aggravating feature of this offence. When [the victim] refused to hand over any money to him and [the first accomplice] the prisoner joined in a vicious assault on an elderly man. (p35)”
The applicant says that he became addicted to alcohol and heroin whilst living in the refugee camps in Hong Kong and the Philippines as a consequence of trauma experienced in those camps. He says he experienced post-traumatic stress disorder. He claims that his involvement in the robbery was due in part to drug dependence and in part to his desire to get money to send to his father in hospital in Vietnam. The latter claim was not put to the sentencing judge and is not referred to in the comprehensive psychological report at Exhibit R1 pp78-82. I have grave doubts as to its veracity. The judge accepted that drug addiction may explain the applicant’s participation in the offence, but did not accept that it operated to mitigate the seriousness of the crime. I entirely agree with this assessment. In my opinion the crime committed by the applicant was an extremely grave and serious offence. In the terms of the Minister’s Direction it is properly regarded as “a crime abhorrent to the community”.
(b)Risk of recidivism
Since 30 May 2000 the applicant has committed further offences as listed in the Chronology at paragraph 2 of these reasons. He evaded detention by DIMA, breached his parole and committed further offences of dishonesty. Since 17 April 1997, 8 years ago, he has only been present in this country as an offender in custody or as a fugitive. He gave evidence at the Tribunal hearing on 15 February 2005 of circumstances which suggested that his moral culpability for the offences of dishonesty was not great. I am not confident that these explanations should be accepted, but if they are, they do not really suggest that there is no risk of recidivism. Rather they tend to show that if the applicant sees himself as being without funds and in need, he may resort to dishonest behaviour in future. He says he now understands that charitable sources may help in such circumstances. His counsel submits that he has shown remorse for past offending by pleading guilty, has made useful progress in prison, and is in a stable relationship with his de facto spouse who, incidentally, has indicated that she will not stand by him if he offends again. I entertain doubts about his claimed remorse. The robbery case against him was strong and he probably bowed to the inevitable. I think Thi Thuy Hang Le is genuine in her indicated intention, but the applicant has misled her as to his status and behaviour in the past and may well do so again. On the whole of the evidence I assess the applicant as posing a substantial risk of recidivism.
(c) Deterrence
Counsel for the applicant submits that this is not a “notorious” case and therefore general deterrence would not be served by deporting the applicant for a 7 year old crime. I disagree. Without repeating it I refer to what I said in Chau and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) AATA 485 @ paragraph 25. I am firmly of the view that a consistent approach by decision-makers upholding deportation in cases of serious crime is likely to become known within the migrant and refugee communities and serves as a deterrent to criminally inclined individuals. This does not mean that deportation is automatic in such cases. Individual discretionary issues may well exist, but in their absence, consideration of general deterrence is highly relevant.
(d) Conclusion
In my opinion the community expectation in this case would be that the applicant should be deported, subject only to hardship or other issues favourable to the applicant, including the best interests of his child, outweighing these considerations.
The Second Primary Consideration – The Best Interests of the Child
10. The applicant is the father of Andrew aged 1½ years. This fact was not conceded by the respondent but the evidence satisfies me that it is so. Andrew is an Australian citizen.
11. The applicant was taken into police custody in Victoria on 14 February 2004 when Andrew was only 3 months old. The applicant has been in custody ever since. Andrew has visited the applicant in gaol from time to time with his mother. The respondent submits that the applicant has not been in a position to develop a close relationship or any significant degree of emotional dependence with Andrew in these circumstances. This submission has been contradicted by the applicant and Thi Thuy Hang Le but I entertain considerable doubt as to their claims. The respondent also contends that as both the applicant and Thi Thuy Hang Le are of Vietnamese descent, Andrew would not face any language or cultural problems if he were to relocate to Vietnam with his mother. The applicant counters this proposition with the suggestion that both mother and child would lack access to medical opportunities and general support which are provided by the Australian welfare system and are available to a much lesser extent in Vietnam. There is no evidence to suggest that Andrew requires medical attention or other health services at the present time. Nonetheless the best interests of the child would probably be served if the applicant were to remain in Australia. If the applicant were to offend and be incarcerated again this opinion would have to be reviewed. (Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 107 FCR 133)
Other Considerations
(i) Hardship to Thi Thuy Hang Le
12. As already mentioned the applicant’s de facto spouse has threatened to abandon him if he commits further offences and, in this connexion it is of some significance that, although they commenced living as man and wife in 1995 (see Exhibit A2, paragraph 3), she met another man and married him while the applicant was serving his prison sentence for armed robbery. (See Transcript p58) That marriage lasted only 2 years and she and her husband were later divorced in 2003. Thi Thuy Hang Lee resumed a de facto relationship with the applicant in 2001. She says that they cohabited until 14 February 2004 when he was arrested in Victoria and they have present intentions to marry when he is released from custody. I find that their relationship is genuine, but there are plainly questions as to its long term durability. She says she has no living relatives in Australia or Vietnam. The applicant says he has no living relatives (apart from his de facto wife and child) – Exhibit A1, paragraph 21, but Exhibit R1, page 2 suggests he has a mother, father, sister and brothers and uncles and aunts in Vietnam. This is confirmed by his statement of 18 January 2000 – see Exhibit R1 @ p62, question 13. I find that the applicant’s parents and siblings are still alive and living in Vietnam and would probably provide a substantial family support structure for the applicant and Thi Thuy Hang Lee and Andrew if they were to return together to Vietnam.
13. Thi Thuy Hang Le says that she believes she would be unable to return to Vietnam as she left the country as a refugee. There is no evidence to support this conclusion. She is now an Australian citizen. She conceded in cross-examination that when she and the applicant resumed cohabitation in 2001 he told her that he may be deported. Less than 3 months after he was sentenced for shoplifting and parole violation on 22 February 2003, the applicant escaped from custody. He had been sentenced to just over 15 months imprisonment. He rejoined Thi Thuy Hang Le and they went to Melbourne. She claims he did not disclose that he had escaped illegally until after Andrew was born. If this is true, I think it must have been a case of “wilful blindness” on her part, not to realise that he was on the run before October 2003. She says she urged him to turn himself in to the authorities, but he didn’t wish to do so until Andrew had “grown up a bit”. While living together in Melbourne the applicant was doing casual work for cash and was not paying tax. Thi Thuy Hang Le was receiving a Newstart allowance until her child was born. Thereafter she received a sole parent benefit. I have read and take account of Dr Kaplan’s report of 1 March 2004 (Exhibit A4).
(ii) Hardship to Applicant
The applicant says that he suffered Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of his experiences in Hong Kong and the Philippines before coming to Australia. This is supported by a psychological report from the Department of Corrective Services dated 23 July 1998 (Exhibit R1, page 78 et seq). However that report is now nearly 7 years old, and, despite its value as an historical document, there is only a limited correlation between the diagnostic essentials of a DSM IV diagnosis of PTSD and the symptoms presented by the applicant to the examining psychologist. It is perhaps of significance that the examining psychologist said that the applicant displayed appropriate responses to questions, and emotional issues and his thought processes were ordered so it could be concluded he was not suffering any mood or thought disorder. The report of 27 July 1999 does not take the matter much further (Exhibit R1, pp46-47). The applicant’s main concern is that deportation will separate him from his de facto wife and child, but I do not regard this as inevitable. I have already discussed this issue. The applicant is also concerned that his repatriation to Vietnam would place him at risk of adverse discrimination by Vietnamese authorities in view of his conduct, both before he fled Vietnam and after he commenced living in the Hong Kong refugee camp. The Minister’s Direction makes it clear that Australia’s international obligations in such circumstances must be taken into account. The Direction contains the following statement:
“26. The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has an implicit non-refoullement obligation where as a necessary or foreseeable consequence of expulsion, the person would face a real risk of violation of his or her human rights, such as being subject to torture or the death penalty (no matter whether lawfully imposed). For further assistance on this point contact Legal Policy Section in Central Office.
27. The Convention against Torture (CAT) has an explicit prohibition against expulsion `where there are substantial grounds for believing the [the person] would be in danger of being subject to torture’. The prohibition is absolute: there is no balancing of other factors if deportation would amount to refoulement within the meaning of the CAT. For further assistance on this point, contact Legal Policy Section in Central Office.
28. In cases where issues of protection pursuant to the Convention and the Protocols Relating to the Status of Refugees (16) (the Refugees Convention) are raised, they must be given consideration by the Minister as part of the exercise of the discretion to deport.
29. The critical issue is whether the life or freedom of a person would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion pursuant to Article 33(1)(17) of the Refugees Convention. This issue must be determined at the time the deportation decision is made. It should be noted that prior recognition of refugee status, while relevant, does not determine this issue. In other words, international law allows for the possibility that the person’s refugee status may have ceased by the time deportation is considered.
30. If Article 33(1) does not apply to the person, there is no obligation on Australia to provide the person with protection under the Refugees Convention. If Article 33(1) applies, then the question is whether the person, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, is a danger to the community, in which case the person cannot claim the benefit of Article 33(1).
31. Notwithstanding International obligations, the deportation power must inherently remain a fundamental exercise of Australian sovereignty. The responsibility to determine who should be deported in the interests of the Australian community ultimately lies within the discretion of the responsible Minister.”
This issue was given attention by the original decision-maker in her assessment dated 7 March 2000. Her decision was informed by the material provided by the Onshore Protection Director dated 18 February 2000 (Exhibit R1, page 53 and following). The following passage from the Director’s advice is relevant.
“Protection related claims
Mr Pham was interviewed on 18 January 2000 in relation to his possible deportation.
Mr Pham claims that during World War II, his grandfather assisted the French army and that during the Vietnam War his father worked for the Americans. He claims that following the war, the authorities targeted his family. When he was 16, he claims the authorities destroyed the temple at the front of his house which his family used for praying. When the applicant tried to stop them, they arrested him and while he was in custody he escaped to Hong Kong.
His reaction to possible deportation as stated at interview is that he cannot return to Vietnam as he will be unable to find a job. He claims that this is because when he was in the refugee camps in Hong Kong he played a part in destroying the Vietnamese flag.
Assessment of Claims
Based on the available country information, the following is an assessment of whether Mr Pham’s life or freedom is threatened for Refugee Convention reasons were he to return to Vietnam.
Available country information indicates that returnees who have fled Vietnam have not been persecuted for their decision to flee. Therefore, it is assessed that Mr Pham would not be adversely treated in a manner amounting to persecution upon return to Vietnam because of his decision to flee. Country information indicates that large numbers of Vietnamese nationals who had left Vietnam have returned to Vietnam and the UNCHR through monitoring have not recorded any complaints of arrest, persecution or discrimination because of their decision to flee.
Mr Pham’s claims that the authorities targeted his family after World War II is not supported and outdated considering the current political stability in Vietnam. In addition, his claims of lack of person support in Vietnam are not persecutory or Convention related. There is no evidence to suggest that the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership or a particular social group or political opinion, if he were to be returned to Vietnam.
Other Conventions
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Australia is a party to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR has an implicit non-refoulement obligation where as a necessary or foreseeable consequence of expulsion, the person would face a real risk of violation of his or her human rights, such as being subjected to torture or the death penalty (no matter whether lawfully imposed). Australia is a party to the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR prohibiting capital punishment.
Advice was provided to CIS by DFAT on 27 May 1997 report (CX35266): Advice from a senior government official in Hanoi was that criminal deportees who are Vietnamese nationals have access to appropriate medical services, including during any period of imprisonment.
There is no evidence to suggest that Mr Pham would be subject to violation of his civil and political rights under the ICCPR.
It is therefore assessed that Australia would not be in breach of its international obligations under ICCPR if Mr Pham were returned to Vietnam.
The United Nations Convention Against Torture
Australia is also a party to the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) which has an explicit prohibition against expulsion where there are substantial grounds for believing [the person] would be in danger of being subject to torture. The prohibition is absolute: there is no balancing of other factors if deportation would amount to refoulement within the meaning of the CAT.
Based on the country information provided above, Mr Pham would not be likely to face torture by the authorities if he were returned to Vietnam. It is therefore assessed that Australia would not be in breach of its international obligations under CAT if Mr Pham were returned to Vietnam.
Conclusion
Mr Pham does not engage Australia’s protection obligation not to refoule him as a refugee under Article 33(1) of the Refugees Convention. Country information indicates Mr Pham’s life and/or freedom will not be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion upon his return to Vietnam. Therefore, we advise that we do not owe protection obligations to Mr Pham and add that Australia will not be in breach of its international obligations under the Refugees Convention by deporting Mr Pham.
It is further assessed that on return Mr Pham would not be subject to violation of his civil and political rights under the ICCPR and that he would not be subject to torture and does not come within the terms of the CAT.”
14. On the basis of this advice, which has not been contradicted or exposed as unreliable by other material, I am of the view that the applicant’s claims of probable persecution if returned to Vietnam are not supported and are without substance. There is no longer a real chance of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future (Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379).
Conclusion
15. My conclusion, weighing up the various issues which have been presented and taking account of the oral and documentary evidence received, is that the applicant’s deportation order was correctly and appropriately made. Mr Krohn, counsel for the applicant submitted that an application to review a deportation order is entitled to succeed unless the relevant decision-maker is satisfied that the national interest requires deportation. I am so satisfied. The deportation order is hereby confirmed.
I certify that the 15 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of The Hon C R Wright QC (Deputy President)
Signed: K L Miller (Administrative Assistant)
Date/s of Hearing 15 and 23 February 2005
Date of Decision 9 June 2005
Counsel for the Applicant Mr Anthony Krohn
Solicitor for the Applicant Koenig & Simons
Counsel for the Respondent Mr Anthony Fell
Solicitor for the Respondent Australian Government Solicitor
0
4
0