Petruk, E.M. v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy

Case

[1986] FCA 282

18 Jun 1986

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE FDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

)

)

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

)

No. G.75 of 1986

)

GENERAL DIVISION

1

BETWEEN:

ELIZABETH MARIA

PETRUK

Appellant

THE OFFICIAL TRUSTEE

IN BANKRUPTCY

Respondent

CORAM:

Sweeney, Wilcox and Burchett JJ.

m: 18 June 1986

M-TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SWEENEY J. The order of the Court is that the appeal be

dismissed with costs.

The Court's reasons for judgment will be

delivered by

my brother Burchett.

BURCHETT J.

This is an appeal from an order of Mr.

Justice Smithers made on 2 April,

1986, upon an application by

the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy as

trustee of the estate of

Andy Rolf Petruk, described in that application

as being

also

known as Andy Rolf Anthony

Bates, the bankrupt.

orders

:

'

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Petruk, the present appellant,

who

is

the wife of the bankrupt, for contempt

i

of Court, in that before the Court when

being examined before the Court pursuant

to section 81(6) of the Bankruptcy Act

1966 ("the Act" ) , on 7 May 1985, she

I

refused to answer the question:

"How

many windsurfers does your husband

own?"

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("the said question"), when directed by

;

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.

the Court

to do so.

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( 2 )

That

the

appellant

pay

the

trustee's

costs of his application.

Section 81(11) provides that:

"A person being examined

under this section shall answer all questions that the Court, the

Registrar or the magistrate puts

or allows to be put to him."

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The examination of the appellant was taking place before

Woodward J. on 7 May 1985, when she was asked the question

I have

indicated, directed by the Court to answer it, and refused to

do

so.

It is clear from the transcript that Woodward

J.

was at

pains to ensure that she understood her obligation under the

law,

!

c

and to give her every opportunity of compliance.

Mr. Justlce Smithers made orders (inter alia):

t

"(1) That

the said

respondent do stand

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committed to

Her

Majesty's

Prison

Pentridge or other appropriate

prison

for her said contempt for the period of

six months and the Court further orders

pursuant

to

rule

176(

3 )

of

the

Bankruptcy Rules that the warrant for

committal of the said respondent to

prison h e in the office of the

Registrar in Bankruptcy at Melbourne

until

4PM

on the 16th day of April

1986, and be not executed if before

4PM

on the 16th day of April 1986, the said

Elizabeth

Maria

Petruk

shall

have

caused to be filed in the said office

in this proceeding an undertaking in

writing signed by the said Elizabeth

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3 .

Maria Petruk

in

the

terms

of

the

undertaking set forth in the schedule

to this

order.. .

' I .

There were further orders, and in the schedule there was

contained an undertaking:

"I, ELIZABETH MARIA PETRUK, the person ordered

by the Federal Court

of Australia on the 2nd

day of April, 1986 to be committed to prison for contempt of that court on the 7th day of May 1985, hereby promise and undertake to the

court

that

upon

my further

examination

pursuant to Section

81 of the Bankruptcv Act

1966 I

will answer the question 'how many

windsurfers does your husband

own?'

if

the

said question shall be asked of me and that

upon my further examination pursuant to the

said

section

i (sic) will

answer

each

question that the

Court or a Registrar may

put to me

or allow to be put to me."

The

appellant, who appeared in person, had filed

a

Notice of Appeal which states

as grounds for the appeal:

"That the Orders and the Judgement made by Mr.

Justice Smithers in proceedings

No 397 of

t

1984 on 2 April 1986, be annulled as they are

illegal,

unconstitutional

violate

and

'i

principles of democracy."

The document also sought an order that the respondent pay the appellant's costs of this appeal.

Mrs. Petruk made statements, in the course of

her

argument, about the reasons for her leaving the court room,

to

which I shall refer later, during the hearing of the respondent's

application to Smithers

J.,

and thereafter remaining out of

court. We note that the transcript is not consistent with her

explanation. She told

us that she left

at the stage which was

4.

reached at the end of page 554 of the transcript. Immediately before that the transcript shows she had told the Judge:

“I intend to go

home now because

you have no

right to be here in this Court and the High

Court shall decide if you have the right or

you have not the right because what is going

on here in this Court, that the other party

can collect judges

-

they already had

you

once

and

they

got

beautiful

orders,

all

fraudulently achieved, because you just ignored everything which was brought before you. ”

The transcript shows that his Honour replied:

f

Well, Mrs. Petruk,

I have explained to

you

the fact that the fact that you

go away will

not stop the case.

The transcript contlnues:

MRS PETRUK:

Your Honour, it has to stop the

case because

you have no right to be here and

I shall be applying to the High Court about

whether you can continue or not.

HIS HONOUR:

Well, that is fair enough.

.

._

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MRS PETRUK:

If you do continue, your Honour,

you have no right to continue. It is just of

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doing some more damages and administer the

money they have already fraudulently made

away so there is nothing left. OK.

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And that is the stage at

which Mrs

Petruk told us she left the

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court room.

Mrs

Petruk complained that the Registrar limited the

appeal documents, and that he applied the Appeal Rules of this

Court. Of course, it is true that

he did both these things, but

he did not limit the documents

so as to exclude anything relevant

to the proceedings before Smithers

J.

5.

So far as the rules are concerned, this Court's original

jurisdiction is,

in

bankruptcy,

exercised

according

to

the

Bankruptcy Rules, but an appeal is, of course, not a proceeding in Bankruptcy but in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court,

and the rules

are the rules

of

this Court applicable to such

appeals.

A further complaint was that the name of the appellant

was incorrectly stated on earlier documents, though not in the

application before Smithers J. It was not disputed that she did

in fact refuse to answer the Court's question when appearing

before Aoodward J. Probably the main matter argued by the

appellant

was

that

Smithers

J.

had

no

power

to

hear

the

proceedings for contempt, because Jenkinson J. had partly dealt

with those proceedings during December

1985.

It appears there came before Jenkinson J.

applications

to punish for contempt

of court both Mr and also

Mrs Petruk. His

Honour dealt with the two matters separately, and made an order in respect of Mr Petruk. During intervals in the hearing of the

proceedings in respect

of

Mr Petruk, some evidence was taken

respecting the allegations against

Mrs

Petruk. However, after

giving judgment in

Mr Petruk's case, his Honour expressed the

view that it would

be better for the proceedings against

Mrs

Petruk to be recommenced before

a different judge.

After being listed

for mention on several occasions, the

matter was listed for hearing before Smithers

J. on 2 April 1986.

6.

On that day,

Mrs Petruk appeared and submitted

to Smithers J.

that

he

should not hear the matter. Before the hearing was

completed, she withdrew, and in the result his Honour found the

applicant's case proved, and made the order under appeal.

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, -

In view of the submissions made to us, particular

reference should be made to the fact

that the matter was listed

for mention before Jenkinson J.

on 3 February 1986 at 4.15PM.

His Honour on that occasion was apparently unable

to take the

!

matter, and after

a short interval, the matter was dealt with by

Keely J. who ordered that it be listed in a call-over list. In our view, nothing turns on the identity of the judge who dealt with the mention of the application. The real question is

whether Smithers

J. was disentitled to hear the matter because

of

what had occurred before Jenkinson

J.

in December. Clearly

he

was not.

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The application

had

not

been

heard

to

finality,

and

the

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power of the Court to deal with it had not been exhausted.

There had been no appeal, in the proceedings relating to Mrs

Petruk, against any order made by Jenkinson J.

1

The other matters argued can be dealt

with shortly. Mrs

Petruk conceded before us, as

I have already indicated, that she

had been directed to answer

a question about windsurfers owned by

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her

husband,

and

had

refused

to do so.

She claimed

to

be

!

justified by two considerations.

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I.

Firstly, she claimed that she had herself been denied

answers to questions she

had raised about the removal of property

from premises in Perth at

an

earlier date. One version of this

reason given to

us was:

“I did not answer the question because the

court refused to give the reason why (the

Official Receiver) had the stolen goods.“

Secondly, that is the second reason given was, that on

a

prior occasion

an error had occurred

in a transcript.

Plainly,

these

matters

afford

no

excuse

for

her

disobedience to a direction of the Court to answer the question.

Mrs Petruk also complained that the proceedings had been

brought in the name of the Official Trustee without nominating

the individual concerned, who was, she said,

a Mr Bursacott. Her

complaint in this regard was that

she

was

thus

denied

an

opportunity to question Mr Bursacott. However, he did not swear

Any affidavit tendered before Smithers J.,

nor was he called on

subpoena, nor so far as appears was this point taken below. It

is in any case without substance.

Mrs Petruk claimed that, in two respects, matters put

to

Smithers J. by counsel then appearing were inaccurate. It

is not

!

clear to us

whether this is in fact

so, but in any event the

:

statements were matters of quite immaterial detail.

The appellant pointed out that the application

for

committal for contempt was not personally served,

as required by

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8.

rule 176.

The evidence was

- and she conceded

-

that she

received the documents by special delivery post. It does not

appear whether there was

an order for substituted service, but it

is clear that she was

at

all times aware of the progress of the

matter, and participated both before Jenkinson

J. upon at least

the mention date (about which she complains in an argument which

I have mentioned earlier), and again, before Smithers

3.

The matter of service was not raised before Smithers and indeed the argument presented -

J.,

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that is, the argument that

-

was raised

- was based upon the pre-supposition that she had been

properly before Jenkinson

J.

If

there was any deficiency in

service, it was clearly waived.

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Finally, the appellant submitted that the application

was mala fide in that it was brought to obtain

an order for costs

to found a bankruptcy petition. There is no substance in this

d

submission.

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Because the appellant was unrepresented, we have dealt with her arguments, notwithstanding: firstly, her failure' to file proper appeal papers in accordance with the rules of this Court, which is the Court to which she has appealed; and

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secondly, that she has in fact signed

an undertaking in writing

as provided

for

in

the

order.

The precise

terms

of

the

undertaking which she has signed are

as follows:

"I, ELIZABETH MARIA PETRUK, the person ordered

by the Federal Court of Australia on the 2nd day of April, 1986 to be committed to prison

for contempt of that court on

the 7th

day of

May, 1985 hereby promise and

undertake to the

9.

S

court

that

upon

my

further

examination

pursuant to Section Si of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 I will answer the question ‘how manv

windsurfers does your husband

own?‘ if ti;”e

said question shall be asked of me and that

upon my further examination pursuant to the

said

section i (sic) will answer

each

question that the Court or

a Registrar may

put to me or allow

to be

put to me.”

The appeal should be dismissed

with costs.

I

certify that this and the

preceding eight (81 pages are

a true copy of the Reasons for

Judgment herein

of the Court.

Dated: 18 June 1986.

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