Petridis & Petridis (No 2)
[2022] FedCFamC1F 1036
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Petridis & Petridis (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 1036
File number: HBC 133 of 2018 Judgment of: MCGUIRE J Date of judgment: 22 December 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY- Application by wife for property settlement – Marriage of 29 years – Where wife made greater contributions during the marriage and post separation – Where the husband is bankrupt – Where the husband’s trustee in bankruptcy, the parties youngest son and various entities were parties to the proceedings - Allegations of wastage of assets and liabilities post separation by the husband - Allegations of Family Violence perpetrated by the husband – Kennon & Kennon considerations – Section 75(2) factors - Where it is just and equitable to adjust the parties net property interests as to 30 per cent to the husband and 70 per cent to the wife. Legislation: Bankruptcy and Family Law Legislation Amendment Act 2005 (Cth)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75(2), 79(1),(2), (4)(d)–(g)
Cases cited: Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia (2003) FLC 93-143
In the Marriage of Pritchard and Pritchard; Redwood Banner Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (Intervener) (1988) FLC 91-929
Kennon v Kennon (1997) 92-757
Kowaliw v Kowaliw (1981) FLC 92-092
R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248
Semmens & Commonwealth of Australia & Ors (1990) FLC 92-116
Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 98 Date of hearing: 26, 27 and 28 October 2022 Place: Hobart Solicitor for the Applicant: Litigant in Person Counsel for the First Respondent: Did not participate Counsel for the Second Respondent: Did not participate Counsel for the Third Respondent: Did not participate Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: Mr M Trezise Solicitor for the Fourth Respondent: Dobson Mitchell Allport Solicitor for the Fifth Respondent: Litigant in Person ORDERS
HBC 133 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS PETRIDIS
Applicant
AND: MR PETRIDIS
First Respondent
L PTY LTD
Second Respondent
M PTY LTD (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
order made by:
MCGUIRE J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 December 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The net property pool of the parties be distributed as to 70 per cent to the wife, Ms Petridis, and 30 per cent to Mr Tamson the Trustee in Bankruptcy for the first respondent husband, Mr Petridis, in accordance with these Orders.
2.Within 60 days from the date of these Orders the wife and the Trustee in Bankruptcy do all acts and things to sign all documents necessary to place the property at N Street, Suburb E in Tasmania (N Street) on the market for sale on the following terms and conditions:
(a)the listing price of the property at N Street shall be as agreed between the wife and the Trustee in Bankruptcy and if there is no agreement then the sale price shall be determined by a valuer nominated by the President of the Real Estate Institute of Tasmania at the joint cost of the wife and the Trustee in Bankruptcy;
(b)the property at N Street shall be listed for sale by private treaty with an agent to be agreed and failing agreement as determined by the President of the Real Estate Institute of Tasmania at the joint cost of the parties;
(c)the wife pay and indemnify the Trustee in Bankruptcy from payment of all liabilities falling due in relation to the property at N Street including but not limited to instalment mortgage repayments, rates, land tax, water charges and levies; and
(d)the parties are to accept and sign a contract for sale or any unconditional offer first received at or above the sale price or otherwise as agreed between the wife and the Trustee in Bankruptcy.
3.The proceeds of sale of the property at N Street be distributed as follows:
(a)to discharge the mortgage and any other encumbrances effecting the property;
(b)to pay all Real Estate Agent’s costs, commissions and expenses of the sale of the property;
(c)to pay any rates, land tax, water charges and levies outstanding in respect of the property;
(d)to pay the solicitor’s costs in relation to the sale of the property;
(e)to pay the costs of the valuer nominated by the President of the Real Estate Institute of Tasmania in relation to valuing the property;
(f)at the discretion of the husband’s Trustee in Bankruptcy to satisfy the outstanding creditors properly being creditors of the estate of the bankrupt husband but provided the Trustee first responsibly involves the wife and other respondents in bona fide settlement negotiations in respect of litigation before the Supreme Court of Tasmania in respect of the claims against the parties (and others) by Mr Y and Ms Y; and
(g)the remaining net proceeds shall be divided between the wife and the Trustee in Bankruptcy so as to effect a settlement of the net property of the parties pursuant to the Reasons herein as to 70 per cent to the wife and 30 per cent to the Trustee in Bankruptcy.
4.Within 60 days from the date of these Orders the Trustee in Bankruptcy transfer to the wife all his right, title, and interest if any, to the wife so that she retains the following:
(a)the equity in the family trust property situate at 2 H Street, Suburb E in Tasmania as held by L Pty Ltd as trustee for the Petridis Family Trust, together with:
(i)the mortgage … liability of $227,000 in favour of the Retirement Benefits Fund Board and indemnify the husband and the husband’s Trustee in Bankruptcy in respect of this liability: and
(ii)the existing share entitlements and beneficial interests in the property held by Mr F Petridis and Mr R Petridis.
(b)the land situate and known as Z Street, City AA, in Country BB;
(c)the property situate and known as CC Street, DD Region, in Country BB;
(d)any monies at banks, credit unions, savings accounts or investments in the sole name of the wife;
(e)all personalty and chattels in the possession or control of the wife as at the date of these Orders; and
(f)her superannuation entitlements with Superannuation Fund 1.
5.Contemporaneously with the transfer in Order 4 herein the wife transfer to the husband or, as appropriate, to his Trustee in Bankruptcy, all her right, title and interest, if any, in:
(a)any monies at banks, credit unions, savings accounts or investments in the sole name of the husband;
(b)all personalty and chattels in the possession or control of the husband as at the date of these Orders;
(c)the Motor Vehicle 1; and
(d)the Motor Vehicle 2.
6.Unless otherwise specified in these Orders:
(a)each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property and chattels of whatsoever nature and kind in the possession of such party as at the date of Order and that for this purpose bank accounts are deemed to be in the possession of the person whose name appears on the bank’s record thereof, insurance policies are deemed to be in the possession of the policy owner thereof and superannuation entitlements are deemed to be in the possession of the person who is named as the worker whose age or working future provides the conditions for payment out of such entitlements; and
(b)each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering or attached to any item of property, or any tax, levy, duty or charge arising out of the transfer of any property, to which that party is entitled pursuant to these Orders.
7.The fees and disbursements of the husband’s Trustee in Bankruptcy be met from the husband’s entitlement pursuant to these Orders noting in any event that the Trustee has participated in these proceedings.
8.The parties, or any of them, have liberty to apply in respect of the execution of these Orders or the non-compliance by either or both of the primary parties and where these Orders permit including but not limited to the “[Y]” litigation currently before the Supreme Court of Tasmania.
9.Pursuant to s 81 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the parties intend that these Orders shall as far as practicable finally determine the financial relationship between them and avoid further proceedings between them.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym of Petridis & Petridis (No 2) has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCGUIRE
APPLICATIONS
These are property proceedings where the wife, Ms Petridis, is the applicant. She seeks an order whereby 80 per cent of the net property pool, inclusive of her limited superannuation, be allocated to her. The wife relies on superior contributions during the course of a long marriage extending from 1984. She argues for recognition of post-separation contributions by her to the payment of debts and the maintenance of assets. She argues that her contributions during the marriage and post-separation have been made more onerous by reason of the violent and obstructive behaviour of the husband, Mr Petridis, with reference to the well-known decision of the Full Court in Kennon & Kennon.[1]
[1] (1997) FLC 92-757 (“Kennon”).
She also argues for a loading in her favour by reason of the husband’s obstructive behaviour in respect of finances and his “wastage” by reason of control of the finances but not in meeting debts and hence accruing interest and penalties which ultimately resulted in his bankruptcy and with reference to the decision of the Full Court in Kowaliw v Kowaliw.[2]
[2] (1981) FLC 92-092.
The wife does not specifically argue for any loading on account of the factors under s 79(4)(d) (g) although she does so implicitly where she is resigned to the sale of her long-standing and treasured former matrimonial home so that she may retain a commercial property of the parties in order to give her an income whereupon she will need to take up rental accommodation for herself, and where one of her two adult sons habitually continues to live with her in circumstances where the wife is 59 years of age and since 1984 has worked only in the family’s businesses and where she says that her computer skills are now stale and realistically she has no prospects in the workforce.
The husband is a bankrupt. He is “represented” in these proceedings by his Trustee in Bankruptcy, Mr Tamson, financial professional, a director at X Accountants, and a registered trustee in bankruptcy with over 30 years of experience. On behalf of the bankrupt husband, counsel for the Trustee argues for a 50/50 division of the net property pool after payment of the considerable creditors. The argument is that this was a long marriage extending from 1984 where both parties worked hard in their business in Suburb E, Tasmania and raised their now two adult children. Some consideration may be conceded to the wife’s post-separation contributions towards the debts but where counsel argues for some adjustment to the husband by reason of s 75(2) factors where the husband is 72 years of age, without overt employable skills, and reliant upon an old-age pension.
The Trustee presents a case whereby the remaining unsecured creditors of the parties can be satisfied by the sale of assets being primarily the former matrimonial home and that the Trustee’s accrued fees (estimated at $1.2 million) be satisfied out of the husband’s entitlement which would then leave some residue for the husband himself.
The parties historically have operated a business in Suburb E and for times in EE Town and Suburb FF. They operated through a family trust where the parties and their sons, Mr R Petridis and Mr F Petridis are beneficiaries. The Trust has an umbrella company, L Pty Ltd and the parties have also previously registered a company M Pty Ltd.
The parties son’, Mr F Petridis, has been joined as a party in these proceedings on application of the Trustee in Bankruptcy in circumstances where, without the consent of or consultation with the Trustee, and apparently on accounting advice, the wife allocated some 100 shares in the company M Pty Ltd to Mr F Petridis whereas previously the wife and the husband had held one share each. From 1998 the husband and the wife had been the only two directors with the bankrupt husband being automatically disqualified from acting as a director from the date of his bankruptcy.
Despite his prima facie interest in the company and hence its assets, it was clear that Mr F Petridis was supporting his mother and had no adverse interests to her. He conceded in final addresses that his position was that he would transfer his shareholdings (excepting two shares to be allocated to him and his brother) back to his mother thereby effectively claiming no benefit from the matrimonial property pool.
The two companies, L Pty Ltd and M Pty Ltd, were formally respondents to these proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Both parties are of Country BB origin. The husband has lived in Australia since his youth. He is now 72 years of age having been born in 1950. He apparently travelled to Country BB sometime in the early 1980s. He met the wife and they married in Country BB in early 1984. The wife was then 20 years of age.
The parties’ first son, Mr R Petridis, was born in 1984.
The parties moved to Australia in mid-1984.
The husband had been previously married. It is conceded that he then owned together with his former wife a property at H Street, City D. The husband and wife paid out the former wife’s half share in that property by a payment of $60,000.
In 1988 the wife inherited two properties in Country BB still evident in the property pool for the purposes of these proceedings.
The parties’ second son Mr F Petridis was born in 1991.
In 1991 the parties purchased land and built a home at N Street, Suburb E in Tasmania (‘the N Street property’). This remains the former matrimonial home and the residence for the wife and Mr R Petridis.
In 1998 the parties purchased 2 H Street, Suburb E with the title held by L Pty Ltd for the Petridis Family Trust.
In 1999 the parties purchased C Street, Suburb E held similarly by the Trust and being adjacent to H Street.
In 2009 the parties agreed with a Mr GG to build premises on 2 H Street, Suburb E. That premises and business remains operative. The wife has recently negotiated a further tenant for that the property. Mr GG is the husband’s brother-in-law.
In 2011/12 the family signed a lease for a property at HH Street Suburb FF from a Mr Y and Ms Y with the intention of running a business. The borrowers were Mr R Petridis and Mr F Petridis. The guarantors were the wife and the husband. The business is not continued. Rent remains unpaid and there are proceedings in the Supreme Court of Tasmania against the parties and their sons with the prima facie claim being E$860,000.
The parties separated and continued living under the one roof in 2013.
In mid-2015 the husband signed a loan agreement with Mr GG for a corpus of $275,997.07 plus interest. The wife says that she was not informed of the loan or its negotiations.
Between late 2015 and early 2016 the husband failed to make payments towards the N Street property.
In early 2016 the husband signed a personal guarantee with solicitor, Mr JJ. Mr JJ has lodged a proof of debt with the Trustee for approximately $118,000 inclusive of personal loans made to the husband and Mr R Petridis but where the husband is guarantor.
In early 2016 Mr F Petridis took a personal loan with ANZ Bank to contribute to the arrears on the 2 N Street, Suburb E property.
In early 2016 a Police Family Violence Order was issued against the husband in favour of the wife and the husband vacated the former matrimonial home at N Street, Suburb E on the same date.
In early 2016 the husband made what was a vexatious and malicious report to Tasmanian Health Service in respect of the wife’s mental health.
On 20 February 2018 the wife commenced these proceedings.
On 21 May 2018 Mr Tamson was appointed as trustee for the bankrupt estate of the husband.
On 3 July 2018 an order was made by consent for the sale of the properties at C Street and H Street.
There has, since 2019, been protracted litigation between the parties to these proceedings but where it is clear that the bankrupt husband has continued to aggravate the proceedings, the wife, his children, and the Bankrupt Trustee by his obstructive and threatening behaviour. The Bankrupt Trustee holds a Restraint Order against the bankrupt husband. The bankruptcy has been extended.
THE PARTIES AND THE EVIDENCE
The wife
The wife acted for herself in these proceedings. She had the benefit of only limited legal assistance prior to the trial. The Court provided the wife with detailed information as to the procedure in court and the relevant legal principles with an invitation to seek assistance from the Court at any time in respect of procedure.
The wife presented as articulate in the presentation of her case despite English not being her first language and her education having been limited. She was well prepared and able to cross-examine the witnesses efficiently and as to her understanding of the issues. Whilst understandably emotional at times, the wife was courteous at all times to the Court and to witnesses.
It was apparent, however, that the wife harboured an animosity, perhaps personally and professionally, towards the Bankrupt Trustee, Mr Tamson, but clearly due to her misunderstanding of his complex role in dealing with her former husband’s bankruptcy and their joint assets. The complexity of the estate, the obstructions by the husband, and the parallel matrimonial proceedings were such that the wife, perhaps understandably, did not fully appreciate the role of and the statutory limitations on the Bankrupt Trustees management of the estate. Nevertheless, I gleaned the wife to achieve some appreciation of Mr Tamson’s role and the difficulties that he had faced by reason of the trial of these proceedings.
The husband (the bankrupt)
For reasons best known to her, the wife the adduced evidence on affidavit from the husband where of course by reason of his bankruptcy, the husband himself has no standing in these proceedings. He had sworn an affidavit on 10 January 2022. I expect that this evidence was adduced at the insistence and demand of the husband himself who attended at court, often interrupting and at times asserting various rights which he did not have in the proceedings.
It was, however, enlightening as to the background of this marriage to observe the husband in the witness box. He presented, consistent with the wife’s affidavit and the evidence of the Trustee, as obtuse, arrogant, obstreperous and threatening. I am easily able to conclude that he is of violent disposition. Consistent with the affidavit material of his family, I am satisfied that he was a domineering, intimidating and violent personality in the family unit.
The husband conceded that the wife worked extremely hard during their relationship in the family business but volunteered that he himself did not work so hard and again consistent with the wife’s evidence.
The husband conceded that he was verbally violent during the marriage.
The husband’s responses in cross-examination by the Trustees’ counsel were threatening, abusive and aggressive clearly showing the difficulties endured by the Trustee in attempting to manage the bankrupt estate.
The Bankrupt Trustee
The Bankrupt Trustee provided an affidavit sworn 23 December 2021. It was comprehensive in its content as to his management of the bankrupt’s estate and the difficulties he has endured, primarily with the bankrupt himself, but also in dealing with the naïveté as to his role exhibited by the wife and Mr F Petridis.
I had the benefit of seeing and hearing the Bankrupt Trustee cross-examined. He presented as a professional well qualified in his role and who was calm and informed in his responses in cross-examination often to personal challenges by the wife from her lack of understanding of his role, his statutory limitations and obligations, and the obstructions presented to him by the husband.
I generally accept the evidence of the Bankrupt Trustee in respect of facts and where disputed between he and the other parties. His exposition of the bankrupt husband’s estate is clear and, in my view, accurate. I am satisfied that he has at all times acted professionally and in accordance with his statutory requirements of attending the bankrupt’s creditors whilst maximising any residue available to the bankrupt himself and whilst acknowledging at all times the wife’s claim under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’).
Mr F Petridis
Mr F Petridis is a professional with some three years’ experience in the commercial field. He conceded an ignorance as to the Act such demonstrated again by the naïveté of his challenges, both in the interlocutory stages and the Trial of this matter, towards the Trustee.
Nevertheless, in many ways, Mr F Petridis was an impressive and helpful witness. He was able to paint a picture of his childhood and family life highlighted by a dominating and violent father. Mr F Petridis gave evidence of being forced to sign commercial documents, even in his early adulthood, under threat and duress from his father. He gave evidence as to his mother’s overwhelming contribution towards the family business which again he observed to be within a climate of threatened violence from his father. Mr F Petridis understandably became emotional at times when giving this evidence and all the time whilst his father sat in the rear of the Court often as a vocal observer.
Generally, Mr F Petridis was an impressive witness clearly supportive of his mother and his brother but a young man who seems to have achieved professional qualifications and employment as a professional despite, rather than because of, his relationship with his abusive father.
Finally, and where there may have been some suggestions of complicity or even conspiracy by members of the Petridis family against the Trustee in Bankruptcy, and despite the wife adducing evidence from the bankrupt husband, I detected no such complicity. To the contrary, I am firmly of the view that the husband ruled this family unit, including his adult sons, by a regime of violence, duress and threats. His behaviour has continued towards his Trustee in Bankruptcy. Any apparent antagonism by the wife and/or Mr F Petridis towards the Trustee in bankruptcy is, in my view, by reason of their naïveté as to his role and their lack of understanding of the process of s 79 of the Act where it is quite clear, for instance, that the wife and Mr F Petridis held a view up until the Trial that they might be responsible for the Trustees own fees and disbursements which, of course, is not the case. Similarly, and perhaps even after the evidence, the wife and Mr F Petridis fail to understand that the Trustee is the bound by the concept of parri passu in respect of his dealings with unsecured creditors.
THE RELEVANT LAW
Section 79 of the Act provides the Court with power to alter the interests of the parties in property. “Property” includes assets and liabilities and amendments to the Act provide that “superannuation may be treated as property” although, usually not crystallised in the sense of a tangible asset. The discretion at s 79(1) is a broad one but limited by the statute itself where the section provides:
(1)In property settlement proceedings, the court may make such order as it considers appropriate:
(a)in the case of proceedings with respect to the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them—altering the interests of the parties to the marriage in the property; or
(b)in the case of proceedings with respect to the vested bankruptcy property in relation to a bankrupt party to the marriage—altering the interests of the bankruptcy trustee in the vested bankruptcy property;
…
The board discretion must, however, be within the statutory limitations. In R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong[3] the High Court observed:
…The judge called upon to decide proceedings of that kind is not entitled to do what has been described as “palm tree justice”. No doubt he is given a wide discretion, but he must exercise it in accordance with legal principles, including the principles which the Act itself lays down…
[3] (1976) 136 CLR 248 at 257.
The Court shall not, however, make an order under this section unless it is satisfied, in all of the circumstances, that it is just and equitable to do so (s 79(2)).[4]
[4] Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 (“Sandford”).
Prior to Stanford there had evolved a structured process for trial judges in strictly following a “four step approach”[5] where the Court would first determine the contents of the property pool and attribute value before moving to consider and give weight to the contributions by and on behalf of the parties to that pool. The Court would then consider whether there be any further adjustment to either of the parties on a consideration of the factors at s 79(4)(d)–(g) and with reference to any of the relevant matters set out s 75(2) of the Act and then sometimes known as the “needs factors”. Fourthly and finally, but arguably, the Court would then “stand back” and consider whether the proposed orders themselves emanating from the above process would provide justice and equity.
[5] Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia (2003) FLC 93-143.
The High Court in Stanford, however, returned emphasis to s 79(2) where a separate, independent and discrete determination need be made as to whether it be just and equitable in the circumstances to make any order altering the property interests of the parties. This consideration was not to be simply conflated with a consideration of contributions at s 79(4). The High Court assisted trial judges by setting out three fundamental propositions that should not be obscured:
37.First, it is necessary to begin consideration of whether it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order by identifying, according to ordinary common law and equitable principles, the existing (emphasis added) legal and equitable interests of the parties in the property. So much follows from the text of s 79(1)(a) itself, which refers to “altering the interests of the parties to the marriage in the property” (original emphasis). The question posed by s 79(2) is thus whether, having regard to those existing (emphasis added) interests, the court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order.
38.Second, although s 79 confers a broad power on a court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to make a property settlement order, it is not a power that is to be exercised according to an unguided judicial discretion. …
…
40.Third, whether making a property settlement order is “just and equitable” is not to be answered by beginning from the assumption that one or other party has the right to have the property of the parties divided between them or has the right to an interest in marital property which is fixed by reference to the various matters (including financial and other contributions) set out in s 79(4). The power to make a property settlement order must be exercised “in accordance with legal principles, including the principles which the Act itself lays down”. To conclude that making an order is “just and equitable” only because of and by reference to various matters in s 79(4), without a separate consideration of s 79(2), would be to conflate the statutory requirements and ignore the principles laid down by the Act.
If, after the discrete circumstantial consideration, the Court is of the view that it is just and equitable to consider altering the parties property interests then, and after determining the contents and value of the property pool, the Court should consider the contributions by and on behalf of the parties to the acquisition, improvement and maintenance of those contents of the pool. The Court is to allocate weight to those contributions which may be of a direct financial type, non-financial contributions, or contributions by way of homemaker and parent. Contributions on behalf of a party can also be taken into account.
The Court is also to identify and give weight to the considerations at s 79(4)(d)–(g) including the relevant factors at s 75(2) as to whether any further adjustment to either of the parties is just and equitable.
The entire process of consideration is permeated with the necessary understanding of justice and equity.
As in the case before me, the property of parties is often held through trusts and trustee companies and therefore the interests of third party beneficiaries can be a relevant considerations whilst a third party may not initiate proceedings, they may intervene by reason of a claimed interest in the property pool.[6]
[6] In the Marriage of Pritchard and Pritchard; Redwood Banner Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (Intervener) (1988) FLC 91-929; Semmens & Commonwealth of Australia & Ors (1990) FLC 92-116.
Following amendments to the Act in 2005[7] this Court exercises jurisdiction, including the altering of interests in the property of parties to a marriage, where a party to those property proceedings is or becomes a bankrupt. These amendments have particular significance for the non-bankrupt spouse and the Trustee in Bankruptcy in circumstances where there are s 79 property proceedings and serve to clarify both the rights of the bankrupt estate and the non-bankrupt spouse where s 79(11) of the Act provides that the Court must join the Bankruptcy Trustee as a party to the proceedings and where s 79(12) provides:
If a bankruptcy trustee is a party to property settlement proceedings, then, except with the leave of the court, the bankrupt party to the marriage is not entitled to make a submission to the court in connection with any vested bankruptcy property in relation to the bankrupt party.
[7] Bankruptcy and Family Law Legislation Amendment Act 2005 (Cth).
Leave under s 79(12) can be granted in only “exceptional circumstances”.
Given that the ordinary considerations pursuant to s 79(4) as set out above apply in proceedings involving a bankruptcy trustee and a non-bankrupt spouse, no priority is afforded to either the non-bankrupt spouse or the unsecured creditors.
THE PROPERTY POOL
There was much dispute between the parties prior to the Trial in respect of the property. Substantially, the contents of the property pool, including the majority of remaining liabilities, are easily identifiable and have attributed values. Real property at C Street and H Street has been sold to accommodate secured creditors. The issue between the parties, however, rests primarily with a lack of understanding by the wife and Mr F Petridis as to the process under s 79 of the Act where, importantly, the Court is generally to take the contents of the property pool and the values thereof as at the date of the Trial. Perhaps understandably, the wife and Mr F Petridis misunderstood this principle in circumstances where they argue that the bankrupt husband, had acted unilaterally and incurred “wastage” in respect of assets and liabilities post-separation and prior to the Trial. It was difficult, therefore, for them to understand that the Court is not dismissive of such behaviour by the bankrupt husband but rather considers such in respect of “contributions” and perhaps relevant at s 75(2)(o) of the Act.
Whilst there remain some issues in respect of the ongoing negotiations with creditors and hence the ultimate net value of the property pool is yet to be determined, the Court is able to identify that pool for the purposes of the s 79 process and can attend to any remaining variables by way of carefully constructed orders.
In determining the property pool the Court has had the benefit of the Bankrupt Trustee professionally isolating both the assets and the remaining creditors. As mentioned above, the Bankrupt Trustee’s dealing with the estate has been meticulous and professional and I generally accept his evidence in respect of the of the contents of the property pool and values which I find to constitute the following:
ASSETS 1. Balance proceeds of H Street and C Street (held in Dobson Mitchell trust account) $218,131.25 2. Amount invested with SS Investment for Court Appointed Trustee costs $141,367.71 3. Insurance claim proceeds – Missing items and property damage $33,880.72 4. N Street, Suburb E (former matrimonial home) (estimated equity) (to be sold) $2,108,184.05 5. Commercial property 2 H Street $2,518,166.60 6. Superannuation Fund 1 (wife) $118,260.77 7. Land at Z Street, City AA, Country BB (wife) $209,715.75 8. Property at CC Street, DD Region (Country BB) (wife) $153,170.17 9. Motor Vehicle 1 (husband) $1,000 10. Motor Vehicle 2 (bankrupt husband) $10,000 11. WMW Trust Monies (Dobson Mitchell Allport trust account) $1,800 TOTAL $5,513,677.02
LIABILITIES 1. KK Financial (bankrupt husband) $46,039.73 2. LL Pty Ltd (bankrupt husband as guarantor) $50,000.00 3. MM Investment Management Loan $227,000 (included in equity of 2 H Street, Suburb E) $0.00 4. N Street (bankrupt husband/wife) (included in equity calculation of 2 H Street, Suburb E) $0.00 5. Tas Water – H Street $7,830.72 6. Tas Water – H Street (post-bankruptcy) $4,867.08 7. Tas Water – C Street, Suburb E $5,848.44 8. Tas Water – 2 H Street, Suburb E $8,956.39 9. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (bankrupt husband), L Pty Ltd – GST $38,000.00 10. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (bankrupt/husband M Pty Ltd) $30,092.52 11. Mr Y and Ms Y E$240,000.00* 12. Mr NN, accountant $10,037.71 13. Mr JJ lawyer $118,498.10 14. Mr F Petridis – ANZ loan E$33,000.00 15. Trustee for Sale remuneration for taxation of costs $26,000.00 16. Dobson Mitchell Allport fees on pending taxation of costs $20,000.00 17. Court Appointed Trustee remuneration, costs etc (subject to taxation) $115,499.33 TOTAL $754,670.02
TOTAL NETT PROPERTY $4,759,007 COMMENTS ON PROPERTY POOL
The Court exercises its discretion to treat the property on a one–pool basis and, again for the benefit of the wife and Mr F Petridis, the date for determining the contents of the property pool and the values of those contents is at the date of the Trial.
The figure above for the anticipated value of N Street is net of the liabilities to LL Pty Ltd and other liabilities estimated at $7,017.76 and $13,851.11 attaching to that property. Relevantly, it is agreed that unfortunately the property at N Street being the former matrimonial home will need to be sold so as to accommodate creditors. It will therefore eventually achieve its own value and where the net proceeds of sale can be adjusted in accordance with the ultimate percentage distribution of the property pool pursuant to these Orders and Reasons.
The debt to Mr Y and Ms Y is included in these Reasons at “$240,000”. The wife, Mr F Petridis, Mr R Petridis, and the Bankrupt Trustee are all currently defendants to civil action in the Supreme Court of Tasmania by Mr Y and Ms Y claiming some E$850,000. The evidence before this Court is that, although the application has been adjourned sine die and the proceedings are consequently in a form of limbo, the applicants, Mr Y and Ms Y, may be willing to settle the proceedings for a payment of around $240,000. As such, and as put many times to the parties in these proceedings, such a settlement would be beneficial to the parties in these proceedings and ultimately to the remaining unsecured creditors of the bankrupt husband. As such, the Court to is able to craft an order which accommodates these negotiations whilst appreciating at all times the obligations of the bankrupt Trustee pari passu in respect of all of the unsecured creditors.
Similarly, the evidence of the wife was that the “[LL Pty Ltd] debt” prima facie at $277,000 may be capable of resolution on the same terms at $50,000 and confirmed as such during these Reasons being reserved. Obviously, however, if settlement of one or both of these liabilities is not achieved then the debt position of the matrimonial property pool increases significantly and the net value of the pool will need to be adjusted accordingly for percentage division.
The wife has emphasised during the course of the evidence that she has attended to many of the debts of the marriage, including unsecured creditors, since separation, since the bankruptcy, and in the lead up to this Trial. As such, debts to Tas Water and the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation will need to be agreed between the parties as of the current date and I emphasise that the figures above are taken from the material provided by the Bankrupt Trustee and where it is open to the wife to present evidence to the Trustee that she may have reduced those liabilities in recent days or weeks.
Included in the balance sheet above are provisions for taxation costs for the Bankrupt Trustee. Orders made previously by this Court provided for the Bankrupts Trustee, Mr Tamson, to also act as Trustee for Sale of the properties previously owned by the parties at H Street and C Street, Suburb E. It is important to understand his role as Trustee for Sale as distinct from his role as Trustee in Bankruptcy. His costs and disbursements are not yet agreed and subject to taxation. It is clear from the table above that the failure to agree the Trustee’s costs will simply result in further costs of taxation between the parties.
Consequently, and for the purposes of my consideration of s 79 of the Act, I find the net assets of the parties to have value of $4,759,007.
CONTRIBUTIONS
The relationship of the husband and the wife endured since 1984. The wife concedes that she had no wealth as at the date of the marriage having recently come out of her teenage years. The husband had been previously married and had an interest in the property at H Street. The parties soon after their marriage paid out the husband’s former wife with a payment of $60,000. Counsel for the Trustee properly concedes that, given the myriad of subsequent contributions and the length of this marriage, this initial contribution by the husband would achieve no significant weight.[8]
[8] Jabour & Jabour (2019) FLC 93-898.
During the course of the relationship the parties operated a business perhaps traditionally and consistent with many Country BB immigrants to this country who have worked long hours and with great efficiency with the ultimate aim of providing “a better life” for their children. Indeed the evidence of the wife is consistent with many years of such hard work. In her emotional final address she emphasised that she worked seven days a week. She never had a weekend off. She gave evidence of working at 1.00am on some mornings. She worked 12–16 hours each day. She continued to do this after the bankruptcy of the husband. Her efforts are perhaps best emphasised at [40] of her affidavit filed 10 January 2022 where she deposes without challenge:
40.In 1991, I worked in [the business] during all my pregnancy until the day that I gave birth to my son [Mr F Petridis]. I left from [the business] to go to the hospital to give birth. [The husband] dropped me off outside the hospital. The next day when I had the baby, [the husband] brought my other son [Mr R Petridis] who was 7 years old and for him to be in the hospital with me for the next 4 days as he said he could not look after him.
At paragraph [42]–[44] the wife deposes:
42.[The husband] clearly took advantage of my vulnerable situation of being in Australia with no family, of being a young age, with no formal education and speaking English as a second language. He manipulated me to think I could not do anything else other than hard labour and that he would solely manage the finances, money from […], payments and all the family property assets (whether in his name or not) through the entirety of the marriage.
43.The workload contribution between [the husband] and myself in the business to generate the income used to purchase the family assets was never equal. The hard labour and financial contributions made by me was at least 85%. Whilst [the husband] was physically present in the properties, he would come and go as he pleased, go home to sleep for hours, have a rest, have coffee’s (sic) with his friends for hours and not work most weekends. He was not involved with the hard labour side of the businesses. For example, I would lift heavy boxes […] whilst at the same time, [the husband] would be in the shop with his friends having coffees and socialise.
44.[The husband] did not let me have a day off to go shopping, have a social life or get out […] for any reason, to such an extent that I was locked up […] for years. He was forcing me to work extremely long hours and raise our son at the same time on my own, without any support, so that I could help him pay off his debts of the business and the property which was in his sole name.
The wife’s evidence in court further particularised the inequality of the labour contributions by the husband and wife to their businesses. The wife’s evidence in this regard was unchallenged.
The husband when cross-examined, candidly (and seemingly with some pride) conceded that he did not always work hard in the businesses but that the wife did work in accordance with her own evidence.
I accept the wife’s evidence as to the history of her contributions to the businesses and, in particular, that she worked longer hours and more productively than did the husband and ultimately for the joint benefit now shown in the value of the property pool.
The wife also claims that she was virtually the sole parent and homemaker consistent with the husband’s attitude generally. I accept her evidence in this regard and supported by the evidence of her son, Mr F Petridis. The demeanour of the husband in court as an entitled, violent and threatening individual in itself corroborates the wife’s claim in this respect. In her affidavit at [41] the wife deposes:
41.[The husband] did not look after the children even in exceptional circumstances such as me being in hospital and even with only 1 [small business]. I returned to work at [H Street] just 7 days after giving birth of my second son.
At [31] and [34] of her affidavit the wife says and unchallenged:
31.For years I was going to [the business] every morning at 7.00am with my son who was a baby and he stayed in a pram. I was looking after my son [Mr R Petridis] on my own whilst working full time and extra–long hours. I do not recall any other staff members […] helping at the time.
…
34.The amount of work and workload was exhausting as I was by myself and looking after my baby son as well at the same time. I was working overtime and the workload which I was performing was enough for at least 3 people.
The wife deposes at [66] and unchallenged that she was responsible and contributed to 100 per cent of all home duties and was also totally responsible for the upbringing of their sons, Mr R Petridis and Mr F Petridis. The wife deposes at [69]-[73] as follows:
69.[The husband] was an absent father that showed no interest in the upbringing or care of our sons.
70.He never cooked, cleaned or helped with any aspect of the home duties or the children’s daily needs or interests since the day they were born. [The husband] never involved himself with the boys (sic) sporting activities or any sort of school events.
71.After I finished work each day, I would go home and do all the cooking for [the husband] and our sons every single day throughout the entire marriage. I also took our sons to and from school, drove them to sporting events, prepared all their meals, supported them daily and cleaned the matrimonial house. I did all the ironing, washing, cooking and cleaning for the whole family. While I was doing all the housework or cooking every night, [the husband] would watch TV or rest.
72.[The husband] owned [Motor Vehicle 1] and [Motor Vehicle 2] during our marriage.
73.I have never owned a car in my name during the entirety of the marriage despite the extraordinary amount of hard work and hours I was working every single day. [The husband] did not allow me to buy a car and he insisted that I could drive his cars. After we separated, [the husband] took the keys to the cars away from me.
The wife also claims considerable contributions post separation of the parties. Relevantly, the husband remains an undischarged bankrupt. His contribution to the maintenance of the assets of the parties has been minimal to nil. To the contrary, he has been obstructive for both the wife and his Trustee in Bankruptcy and served only to add interest and penalties to certain debts. The wife, however, has contributed the income from 2 H Street, Suburb E to those debts.
After separation the wife continued to work full-time for extra-long hours in the parties’ businesses. She suffered the humiliation of the reading a City D Council advertisement giving notice of intended seizure and sale of her property. She cooperated in the sale of the properties to satisfy secured creditors. She has personally dealt with the creditors such as City D Council and the Land Tax Department in successful attempts to stave off seizure of assets. She has directed payments to creditors such as $22,000 to Tas Water. She has reduced the Australian Taxation Office debt. She has negotiated a favourable settlement with creditors such as “OO Company”. She dealt with mortgagees saving late payment interest. In so far as she can, given the position of the bankrupt’s Trustee, she has efficiently taken over the financial management of the parties’ assets. She has continued to negotiate favourable possible settlements with LL Pty Ltd and Mr Y and Ms Y. Significantly, she has negotiated a rise in the rental for the tenant at 2 H Street, Suburb E and, even more significantly, she has found a new tenant, PP Company, for that property adding considerably to the income from those properties which will, of course, eventually benefit the proven creditors of the bankrupt’s estate.
The wife claims, a further consideration for her contributions due to her enduring the violent, abusive and oppressive behaviour of the husband throughout the course of this lengthy marriage. The nexus to her contributions are best evidenced by the excerpts from her affidavit set out above. Again, I have had the dubious advantage of seeing and hearing the husband give evidence in this Court as well as his regular interventions from the back of the Court. I am aware that he is the recipient of restraint orders from the wife and his own Trustee in bankruptcy. He candidly admitted in the witness box (again with some apparent pride) that there may be as many as 10 other holders of restraint orders against him around City D. He is of a violent and threatening personality. I generally accept the evidence of Mr F Petridis that the husband would force the signature of the wife and his children on various commercial documents under threats of violence and that essentially this family lived for years in fear of the unpredictable violence of this man.
Lest the above does not to fully explain the violent demeanour of this man, the wife’s affidavit is replete with particulars some of which are worthy of incorporation in these Reasons where under the heading “[The husband’s] Family Violence Orders” the wife in her affidavit at [79] and following deposes:
79.I have suffered years of family violence, manipulation, verbal and financial abuse with [the husband] since coming to Australia in 1984. This has made completing my daily duties in the business and at home significantly more arduous and onerous as I have had to deal with the constant stress, fear and anxiety which he had forced upon me.
…
81.In [early] 2016, I approached [the husband] about unpaid invoice relating to my [business] at [RR Street], [Suburb TT]. This attempt to question the finances resulted in [the husband] throwing me on the steel bar on the side of my son’s bed and I fell unconscious and suffered severe bruising. The next day, I went to Tasmania Police and showed my bruises and reported the incident. Tasmania Police immediately issued [the husband] with a Police Family Violence Order.
…
83.In or around [early] 2017, I drove to the beach at [Suburb E] after I finished work and [the husband] stalked me until I stopped my car. While I was still in the car, [the husband] approached the car started hitting the bonnet of my car repeatedly with his fists and telling me to come out of the car and terrorise me demanding I get out of the car so “you will see what will happen to you”(emphasis added). He tried to unlock my car doors to get me out of the car. I was frightened for my life and called the Police from inside my car. Tasmania Police subsequently arrived at the scene and issued a further PFVO.
…
85.Since the making of the PFVO [the husband] has been arrested, charged and convicted of breaching the PFVO.
…
97.[In early] 2016, after [the husband] had thrown me on the steel bedframe unconscious, he called my doctor [Mr QQ] and the Mental Health Services of Tasmania claiming that I was suffering a mental illness and I needed immediate treatment or rehabilitation. He did this this as he attempted to make me seem mentally unwell just because I was querying the family's financial position and payment of invoices.
98.[The husband] attempted to make me believe I had mental health issues even whilst I was continuing to open and run the [business] at [RR Street] every single day […].
99.The stress and anxiety [the husband] was giving me was unbearable but I still carried on working and persisted despite severe adversity. I have always had the best interests of the properties in mind and knew I had to work very hard to maintain them.
…
103.As stated in the Tasmanian Health Service Report, [the husband] was attempting to create an impression of my incompetence, present me as mentally unstable, and induce unwarranted stress upon me. The Psychologist advised me to seek immediate legal advice and provided me with contact details of several lawyers.
…
111.Throughout our entire marriage, and especially after our separation, I have received numerous phone calls and voicemail messages from [the husband] abusing me with vulgar language which I do not wish to repeat, insulting me, and making life threatening statements such as:
“I am going to kill you… I mean it”.
“You will see what happens when I get in control again”.
(Original emphasis)
I am easily satisfied that the husband’s behaviour has been consistent throughout the relationship and the wife’s contributions have been made more arduous by reason of that behaviour and her fear of him. I am satisfied that he has forced the signature of commercial documents by way of duress and threat. In summary, I am satisfied that the wife’s contributions have been made more onerous and consistent with the principles in Kennon (supra)[9] where the majority stated:
Put shortly, our view is that where there is a course of violent conduct by one party towards the other during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a significant adverse impact upon that party’s contributions to the marriage, or, put the other way, to have made his or her contribution significantly more arduous than they ought to have been, that is a fact which a trial judge is entitled to take into account in assessing the parties’ respective contributions within s 79. We prefer this approach to the concept of “negative contributions” which is sometimes referred to in this discussion.
[9] At page 84,294.
Whilst I am easily persuaded in respect of the Kennon principles in respect of the wife, it remains that the husband has also made “negative contributions” to the property pool. As mentioned above, his behaviour has been obstructive. He has acted unilaterally in respect of the obtaining of loans. He has not honoured those loans. He has incurred costs in not taking up loans. Most prominently, is his behaviour in respect of his own Trustee in Bankruptcy and a specific example being the husband removing valuable chattels and fittings from the commercial property the subject of sale at H Street. The husband’s evidence in court as to the whereabouts of these chattels was typically entitled, unsatisfactory and littered with untruths. Where it followed that the Bankrupt Trustee, for instance, had to engage security for the business, change its locks and all at significant cost together with obtaining appropriate insurance, he should not be subject to the criticism targeted at him by the wife, Mr F Petridis and the bankrupt husband himself. Rather, the fault and the responsibility here lay fairly and squarely with the husband. His “negative contributions” to this property pool are of such significance that they should not be underestimated. The costs and disbursements of the Bankrupt Trustee, which I accept as reasonable in the circumstances, have been significantly increased by the actions of this husband. Where the wife and her son were both of the view that they might be responsible for the fees and disbursements of the Bankrupt Trustee, the view of the Court and the Trustee himself is that such fees and disbursements are the responsibility of the bankrupt husband by reason of the Bankrupt Trustee’s professional relationship with the bankrupt husband and if, clarification be needed, any necessary consideration under s 79 of the Act easily persuades me that the Bankrupt Trustee’s fees and disbursement should be met by the husband alone.
CONCLUSIONS - CONTRIBUTIONS
Given the length of this marriage, the consideration of the contributions here is unusual. Put simply, the contributions by the wife have been overwhelming and made under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. It is proper, in my view, to consider the contributions particularised above in a holistic manner (where I agree with the submissions of counsel for the Trustee) rather than try to allocate percentage points in respect of each contribution factor. Suffice for me to say that I find that the wife has worked harder in the businesses than has the husband. I find that she has made an almost total contribution to the homemaker and parenting roles in the marriage compounded by the fact that she also worked harder in the businesses. I find that she has been the subject of violence, force and threats and hence her contributions made more arduous. I find that her post separation contributions have been significant in attending to creditors and maintaining the assets of the parties such as they now are. To the contrary, I find that the husband has been obstructive in respect of the property pool to his own Trustee in Bankruptcy and served to incur further and increased debt being a “negative” contribution.
In all of those circumstances and from an holistic viewpoint, I am of the view that the wife should receive a loading of 25 per cent of the property pool to her in respect of those findings and taking into account the quantum of that property pool.
SECTION 75(2) FACTORS
It is true that the husband has little or no work prospects. He is essentially unemployable. He is a violent, aggressive and ignorant individual. It is likely that he will be reliant upon an old age pension and any residue from his entitlement after satisfaction of the creditors. Nevertheless, I have no real evidence as to his needs. He volunteered no information as to his residential arrangements and, in fact, was reluctant to do so. I expect that he has not re-partnered. I can only conclude that his needs are few and may be easily met from his pension and his entitlement under these orders after payment of the creditors and his trustees’ fees.
I note that his trustee’s fees must be met from his entitlement and that they realistically will amount to approximately $1.2 million.
The wife is 59 years of age. She is not entitled to an old age pension but must register with Centrelink for work. She presents as a physically and emotionally exhausted woman who has worked unusually long and hard hours since 1984. She has done so under the spectre of violence and abuse from her husband. She has single-handedly raised two fine sons of which she is understandably proud and who, to their great credit, offers some emotional support to her but are not in a position to considerably offer financial support. The wife says that her skills are minimal and any computer skills that she had are now stale. Realistically, she has little prospect of remunerative employment despite her considerable aptitude and capacity for long and hard work.
The wife concedes that she will lose her matrimonial home pursuant to these orders and so as to satisfy the bankrupt’s creditors. The impression I gleaned from the evidence is that her one place of respite was this home in which she has lived for some decades and in which she and Mr R Petridis still live and where she had one of the few pleasures in her life being with her children during the absences of their father. It is a tragedy that she will lose this home and be required to in all likelihood rent a property for the remainder of her life. She hopes, however, to retain the commercial properties at 2 H Street, Suburb E from which she will derive her income and financial support. She will be responsible for the considerable outgoings. Almost ironically, however, where counsel for the Trustee now points to the potential income from those properties, it is the wife herself who has recently obtained a new tenant for a portion of that property at $90,000 per annum and negotiated an increase on the existing tenant of $40,000 per annum. Counsel for the Trustee is correct in that, on its face, the wife will be in a superior financial position than will the husband. This, however, is only one factor to be taken into account under s 75(2) where the Court retains a broad discretion. Importantly, the husband could not expect to use s 75(2) of the Act to in some way “equalise” his financial position as against the wife in the circumstances of his contributions set out above where to do so would not, in my view, give justice and equity in an holistic sense. To the contrary, a consideration under s 75(2) at (g) “where the parties have separated or divorced, a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable” is a weighty consideration where the wife’s life expectancy is much longer than that of the husband.
In all those circumstances, and despite the potential gross income difference between the parties, there will be an adjustment to the husband of 2.5 per cent of the net consideration of all the relevant factors under s 75(2) of the Act.
CONCLUSION
Consequently, I am of the view that the wife should receive 70 per cent of the net property pool. Accepting the balance sheet set out above but noting the contingencies, that net pool has a value of $4,759,007 which at 70 per cent would give the wife an entitlement in dollar terms of $3,331,304.90.
The wife wishes to retain the following:
ASSETS VALUE Equity in 2 H Street, Suburb E $2,518,166.60 Superannuation Fund 1 $118,260.77 Land at Z Street, City AA (Country BB) $209,715.75 Property at CC Street, , DD Region (Country BB) $153,170.17 TOTAL $2,999,313.29
The wife is to retain $2,999,332.29 of the assets. She is entitled to receive 70 per cent of the property pool which is $3,331,304.90. Thus she is to receive a further $331,991.61 from the proceeds of sale of the N Street property.
The bankrupt husband (the Trustee) would be entitled therefore to 30 per cent of the value of the net property pool which I calculate to be $1,427,702.10.
The husband will be responsible for his trustee’s costs which are estimated at $1.2 million leaving residue of in excess of $200,000. It is assumed the husband will retain his Motor Vehicle 1 ($1,000) and his Motor Vehicle 2 ($10,000) thereby leaving him a lump sum to attend to what I have found to be minimal needs over and above his enjoyment of the old age pension.
I stress that these calculations are made on the understanding that the liabilities remain fluid. It will be for the wife and the Trustee to confer as to the actual amounts owing some creditors, such as Tas Water, where the wife says that she has made recent payments. The major differential however remains the “[Y]” debt where prima facie the claim is for $850,000 but is included here at $240,000 on the basis of the wife’s optimistic view as to settlement. If, however, the ultimate payment was to be $850,000 then the net value of the property pool would decrease by $610,000 to $4,149,007. The wife’s entitlement would then be $2,904,305 which would require a small cash adjustment from her if she were to retain the assets referenced at [92] of these Reasons. The husband’s entitlement or 30 per cent would be $1,244,702 which would, of course, leave a small residue after payment of his Trustee’s costs.
In all the circumstances and given the particular circumstances of this marriage, I am satisfied that such orders would be just and equitable.
I will give the parties liberty to apply in respect of the execution of these orders given the contingencies still existing in respect of the “[Y]” debts.
I certify that the preceding ninety-eight (98) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McGuire. Associate:
Dated: 22 December 2022
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
HBC 133 of 2018 Respondents
Fourth Respondent:
MR TAMSON AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MR PETRIDIS
Fifth Respondent:
MR F PETRIDIS
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