Peters and Ustinov

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PETERS & USTINOV

[2013] FamCA 361

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Best interests of the child – Whether the child should spend any time with or communicate with the father – Whether any time with the father should be in accordance with the child’s wishes – The child’s wishes having regard to his age, maturity and mental wellbeing

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286; (2007) 26 Fam LR 422; [2006] FamCA 1346

APPLICANT:

Ms Peters

RESPONDENT:

Mr Ustinov

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Ms Mahony

FILE NUMBER:

PAC

3670

2009

DATE DELIVERED:

8 May 2013

PLACE DELIVERED:

Parramatta

PLACE HEARD:

Parramatta

JUDGMENT OF:

Collier J

HEARING DATE:

29 and 30 April and 1 May 2013

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Ms Campbell

Legal Solutions

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Self-represented Litigant

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER

Ms Druitt

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER

Ms Mahony

Mahony Family Lawyers

Orders

That the Orders made in this Court on 27 July 2011 be and are hereby discharged.
That the child, B, shall spend time with and communicate with the father in accordance with the child’s wishes.
That the mother shall take all steps and do all things to facilitate the child spending time with or communicate with his father should the child express a wish to do so.
That the mother shall take the child to the Independent Children’s Lawyer at the earliest mutually convenient time for the purpose of the Independent Children’s Lawyer explaining the meaning and effect of these Orders to him.
That I dismiss all outstanding applications and cross-applications.
That I remove the matter from the Active Pending Cases List.
That all material produced on subpoena be returned.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Peters & Ustinov has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA

FILE NUMBER: PAC 3670 of 2009

Ms Peters

Applicant Mother

And

Mr Ustinov

Respondent Father

And

Independent Children’s Lawyer

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction & Background

This matter concerns the future of the parties’ youngest child, B (“the child”), who is aged 13 years and nine months.
In the hearing, the mother was represented by her solicitor, Ms Campbell, the father was unrepresented, and Ms Druitt of counsel appeared for the Independent Children’s Lawyer.
This matter has previously been the subject of two Judgments dealing with the issues of parental responsibility, where the child should live and the child’s time with the non-residential parent. Judgment was delivered on 3 June 2011 as to parental responsibility and where the child should live. On 27 July 2011, a Judgment was delivered as to the time the father should spend with the child. Those Judgments followed a hearing of some six days.
To my mind, therefore, I am concerned with the events which have occurred since the making of those Orders. Having said that, I am aware that very much of the time in the latest hearing before me was spent dealing with matters that very significantly pre-dated the handing down of the two Judgments and the Orders to which I have referred.
The proceedings before me, at present, do not seek to interfere with my Orders for the child to live with his mother. It is the mother’s case that the child was adversely affected by spending time with his father pursuant to the July 2011 Orders. It is her case that the child should see his father only in accordance with his (the child’s) wishes, and she proposes that orders be made to give effect to this.
Certainly, it appears to be her case that she should retain sole parental responsibility for the child, and it seems, by implication as much as anything else, that the mother seeks to discharge Order 4 made on 3 June 2011, which required the mother to inform the father before making decisions.
The father seeks to re-litigate the issue of parental responsibility. As I understand his position, he says that he must now have equal shared parental responsibility with the mother and, in his minute of proposed order, seeks that the Independent Children’s Lawyer be charged with giving certain explanations to the mother as to what the expressions sole parental responsibility and equal shared parental responsibility mean.
Further, he seeks orders for him to spend defined time with his son, and (of particular interest), if his son does not wish to attend or to see him, he seeks, in his proposed orders, that the child be brought to him so that the child can face-to-face explain to him why he has chosen not to attend.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer produced a minute of orders she proposed at the commencement of submissions. She proposes very much in line with the mother’s application, that the mother have sole parental responsibility and that the child see his father in accordance with the child’s wishes.
A brief background to this matter is as follows:-
·The father was born in 1955 and the mother in 1962.
·The parties married in 1990.
·They separated on a final basis on 27 August 2001 and were divorced in April 2003.
·There is presently one child the subject of these proceedings, to whom I have already made reference, and that is B, who was born in July 1999.
·The parties have an elder child, H, who was born in December 1993, and who is now an adult.

The parties’ documents

The document relied upon by the parties are as follows.
The mother relied upon the following documents:-
·Her Initiating Application filed on 5 November 2012 in what was then the Federal Magistrates Court at Town J.
·Her affidavit sworn 1 November 2012 and filed on 5 November 2012. Annexed to that affidavit was a report of Dr G dated 18 September 2012.
·Her affidavit sworn 21 November 2012 and e-filed 21 November 2012, which contained, as an annexure, another report of Dr G dated 13 November 2012.
·Her affidavit sworn 28 February 2013 and filed 28 February 2013.
·Her affidavit sworn 29 April 2013 and filed in Court at the commencement of the hearing on 29 April 2013.
·An affidavit of a solicitor, Justine Margaret O’Reilly, affirmed 28 February 2013 and filed 28 February 2013.
All of those documents, bar the first, were filed in this Court.
The father appeared to rely upon the following documents:-
·    His affidavit sworn 22 October 2012 and filed 23 October 2012;
·    His affidavit sworn 7 November 2012 and filed 8 November 2012;
·    His affidavit sworn 21 November 2012 and filed 21 November 2012; and
·    His affidavit sworn 4 February 2013 and e-filed 4 February 2013.
All those documents were filed in this Court.
As well as that material, there were some 10 exhibits in the matter, being documents exhibited by the parties, which form part of the evidence before me.

The hearing before me

I heard, in the hearing, evidence from Dr G, who was called first by agreement, then the mother and then the father.
The father cross-examined Dr G at considerable length. In his cross-examination, he sought to discredit her and to challenge her diagnosis of and prognosis for the child. I am satisfied that Dr G’s evidence, both in her reports to which I have already made reference, and in her oral evidence, was accurate and proper.
I also had the assistance of her notes, which became Exhibit ICL 1 before me. Her further evidence satisfied me that there has been a marked improvement in the child’s wellbeing. I am satisfied that Dr G’s diagnosis of the child was correct. He was obviously a young man in severe difficulties when first seen by Dr G, as set out in her first report.
It is clear, by the time of her second report of 13 November 2012, that his mental health and wellbeing had improved. Dr G puts this down to being relieved from spending time with his father. The father strenuously disputes this, and indicates that it is his submission that Dr G’s evidence is improper, that it constitutes some form of professional medical negligence. It was his subsequent evidence that he proposes to take some action in an appropriate court to deal with this.
Notwithstanding those matters put to me with some force by the father, I have come to the conclusion that Dr G’s evidence as to her first observations of the child and her subsequent observations, up to and including the evidence she gave before me at the commencement of the hearing, indicate that this is a young man who has been under enormous pressure caused largely by the dispute between his parents, and the fact that he has been required to do something which I am satisfied, as Dr G reports to me, he does not wish to do. I am satisfied that with the requirement that he spend regular time with his father removed, his condition has significantly improved.
The mother then gave her evidence, and the father conducted a vigorous and misguided cross-examination of her. He sought to deal with matters historical, for example, what I will refer to as his children remaining in Europe, and allegations of mistreatment of a horse. These matters were clearly dealt with and determined when the matter was heard before me for six days leading up to the delivery of my Judgments in June and July 2011.
However, the father’s focus on these matters, it seemed to me, was all-consuming. The matters that I have identified seemed to be the basis of all wrongdoing that had befallen him and his son. I formed the impression that the father believed that, if he could discredit these episodes then the whole of the case against him would fall away.
There is no doubt that these episodes were referred to by Dr G in her reports. They were put to her in her cross-examination.
I am satisfied that the father’s focus in this matter is not what is best for his son, despite his protestations. Rather, he saw this Court case as a forum to be able to deal with matters that have obviously caused him distress and concern for a large number of years, but which, at the time of the hearing, were historical in nature. His apparent fixation upon these events indicated to me that he has not moved past those episodes so as to be able to focus on the child’s needs at the present time.
Generally, I formed the impression that the mother gave her evidence in a straightforward manner. She appeared to be doing her best to understand the questions asked of her and to answer them. The father sought to establish that the mother had not provided material to him, as required by Orders of June 2011, when the child was not made available to him. Clearly, the mother was not forthcoming in this regard. I will return to this issue later in these Reasons for Judgment when I deal with the specific matters that I am required to deal with pursuant to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The father gave lengthy oral evidence, and this mainly dealt with the episodes of Europe and the horse. He was fixed in his view, whilst giving his evidence, that the medical evidence was incorrect, and he described it, on at least one occasion, as fraudulent, saying that he had taken, or would take, proceedings in the Supreme Court for professional negligence against at least Dr G.
I was concerned that, in the course of his evidence, the father refused to answer a question as to a method of contact or communication he had with his son. He gave evidence that orders were, in effect, unnecessary because he was able to communicate with the child as he chose. When it was asked of him to specifically explain how he would accomplish this, i.e., what was the method of such contact or communication, he refused to answer. I am unable to ascertain the reason for him refusing to so answer.
He also refused to disclose his income, claiming it was the subject of some form of commercial confidentiality. I found this answer difficult to understand and an answer that did him little credit.
Much of the father’s evidence was given to his protest that he was the only person protecting his son’s interests and needs. He appeared absolutely convinced that his behaviour had in no way contributed to his son’s difficulties at the present time, as I have said to the point of boredom, dismissing the medical evidence in its entirety.
I turn then to the law to be applied.

The law to be applied

Firstly, under section 60CC(2) of the Act, I am required to consider, as primary considerations, the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both parents, and the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm, being subjected to or exposed to abuse, neglect, or family violence. A balancing exercise is required in this regard.
These proceedings were clearly commenced after 7 June 2012, and thus amendments to the Act are effective so far as these proceedings are concerned. The phrase “meaningful relationship” has been the subject of a number of decisions by Judges as to what it precisely means. It is, of course, without definition within the Act. I am satisfied that it has a prospective meaning, that is, looking to the future, what is the nature of the relationship - and I will return to this when considering matters set out in section 60CC(3) of the Act - and what is the benefit to the child.
I record that I am satisfied that, from Dr G’s medical reports and her evidence that as to the child’s medical condition and wellbeing when interviewed, it could well be argued that that which the father has, in some form, imposed upon him, could amount to abuse as currently defined in the Act. Thus, the balancing exercise is clearly in play.
I turn to section 60CC(3) of the Act and the matters set out therein to endeavour to determine what, indeed, is in this child’s best interests. The first of the factors that I must consider is the views expressed by the child and matters underlying those views (subparagraph (a)). There is evidence of conflicting views expressed to Dr G and the mother on the one side and to the father on the other.
The father’s position is that his son tells him that he has told lies in the past and is now committed to continuing those lies. By implication, the father’s evidence is that his son is telling him that he does want to see him, and wants to see him in accordance with the present arrangement. That which has been said to Dr G and the mother is different. Clearly, the child has expressed to Dr G a wish that he be relieved from the requirement that he spend time with his father, other than in accordance with his own wishes.
The child makes it clear that he wants to see his father, but as he (the child) proposes. I am satisfied that the child wants to have a degree or element of control over his relationship with the father, and not be the subject of the father’s wishes and desires at all times.
The father says he wants to spend time with the child on specific and stipulated occasions. He says, as I have already mentioned, that this is what his son informs him that he (the child) wants. Further, the father suggests that the views alleged to have been expressed to Dr G are not his son’s views, but are either untruths or things said by his son, which he has been coerced to say. Alternatively, the father says that he has told his son to say whatever is required to please his mother and others.
The situation, I am satisfied, is that the father has placed enormous pressure upon the child to be aligned with his (the father’s) position. I am not able to decide whether the father is aware that he has done this or whether it has occurred without him being conscious of it.
I am satisfied that the child has difficulty in relating to his father and being with him. I am satisfied he has difficulty telling his father of his true feelings, and what he wishes for the future. I am satisfied that the father overwhelms the child, as he does with others, myself included, with his presentation.
I find that the child has expressed a view to Dr G, which does reflect what he wants, and that is to see his father on his own terms. I am further satisfied that the child is, at least, age-appropriately mature and, accordingly, his views in this matter are to be afforded significant weight.
I turn to the nature of the relationship of the child with each parent (subparagraph (b)). I am satisfied that the child has a secure relationship with his mother, in which he feels supported. He feels loved by his mother. His relationship with her must have been affected, to some extent, which I cannot determine, by the ongoing conflict between his parents.
I am satisfied that the child’s relationship with his father is one whereby he does love his father but, as I have said, is overwhelmed by his father’s personality, presentation and behaviour. On the evidence that I have, I accept that the father’s interaction with the child has caused the child stress, which was alleviated by the father’s time with the child being suspended.
I turn then to subsection (c), the extent to which each of the parties has sought to be involved in the child’s life, that is in decision-making, in spending time with and communicating with the child. The father, certainly, has taken every opportunity to be involved in his son’s life. He has sought to abide by the Orders made in July 2011 as to the time that he could spend with his son. He has done so, to my mind, with a real perseverance, which, subject to the other comments I have made, does him credit. The father has certainly sought to communicate with the child. As I have already mentioned, he has given evidence that he, in fact, has a means of doing this, but will not disclose what those means are.
The mother, I am satisfied, at least at the time the Orders were made in June and July 2011, was content that the father should have some time with the child. I am satisfied, however, that there have been events of late, which have convinced her that the father’s time with the child must be curtailed, and the existing Orders must be varied.
I take into account the extent to which each of the parents have fulfilled their obligation to maintain the child (subparagraph (ca)). The mother has had the care of the child at all times. The father provides very limited support, and has declined to make any disclosure of his income and financial affairs to enable any examination to be made or decision taken as to whether or not the amount that he is paying, which he concedes is very modest, is proper in all the circumstances.
I take into account subsection (d), that is, the likely effect of any change in the child’s circumstances. At present, the child is not seeing his father. The father’s proposal would require the child to see him on a regular and frequent basis. The father’s proposed orders would also require the child to confront his father and tell him why he did not want to see him, if that was the case. Having regard to the matters previously raised in these Reasons for Judgment, I am satisfied that such a regime, as the father proposes, would cause the child further distress and anxiety, and could possibly, over a period of time, cause the child clinical depression.
The practical difficulties and expense of spending time with a parent (subparagraph (e)), to my mind, are not of significance in this present matter.
The next of the matters to which I have regard is the capacity of each of the parents to provide for the child’s needs (subparagraph (f)). The mother has a proven capacity to provide for the child’s needs, at a practical level, such as food, clothing, shelter and education. She has also shown a capacity to recognise the boy’s emotional needs. I am satisfied that she acted in an appropriate manner in seeking help for her son’s distress, although I am satisfied, also, she could be the subject of criticism for not advising the father of what was occurring. Certainly, she did not see fit to involve the father in any of these medical appointments, and did not advise him adequately of what was happening.

Prior to ceasing the child’s time with the father, she was, indeed, seeking medical advice but not notifying the father. To some extent, I recognise that she had sole parental responsibility by virtue of the June 2011 Orders but, to my mind, having regard to the spirit, if not the letter, of those Orders, I believe there was a responsibility for her to notify him.
I have no doubt the father can provide for his son’s physical needs. I have no doubt that, when his son is with him, he takes real trouble to provide the boy with what he, the father, sees as being exciting and appropriate things for his son. However, I have no doubt that the father is totally unable to recognise his son’s emotional needs so as to adjust his, that is, the father’s behaviour and attitudes, where necessary.
I am concerned that the father cannot move past his belief that he has been unfairly or unjustly dealt with in the past in respect of, for example, the time in Europe and the horse incident. His thinking appears to be that his view as to what should happen in any set of circumstances, and particularly in the present situation, so far as the child is concerned, is the only view that can be considered, and it must be given effect to.
As to the attitudes of the parents to the child and parenthood (subparagraph (i)), I have no doubt that the father loves the child deeply. The difficulty I perceive is that he is unable to separate his own needs from those of his son. As I have said, what he believes is best for his son must, by definition, be best. The father is using these proceedings to demonstrate that he is correct in all matters that he asserts, and that he is in no way responsible for any difficulties that his son experiences. This attitude fails to recognise that his son has needs separate from his.
The mother does not escape criticism under this section. She did not inform the father of the fact she had taken the child to mental health professionals. Further, I am concerned as to the timing of her doing this, and the timing involved in her bringing her application in the Federal Magistrates Court (as it then was). I am left with the uncomfortable belief that her application was, in some way, a reaction to the father’s application that he be permitted to take the child to Europe, an application which I dealt with and dismissed on 12 December 2012.
I am also left troubled by her explanation that the proceedings were commenced in the Town J Federal Magistrates Court, rather than this Court, because of a Legal Aid issue. Having said that, I accept that there may well have been a condition placed by the Legal Aid Commission as to whether the matter was to be brought in the Federal Magistrates Court or the Family Court, but I am not satisfied at her explanation that it had to be Town J Federal Magistrates Court.
Under the amendments, I am left to consider whether the father’s actions could be seen to constitute family violence (subparagraph (j)), as defined in section 4(1) of the Act, these being the amended definitions imported by the 2012 amendments. I am satisfied that his behaviour has been clearly controlling and, of course, under the amendments, that can, of itself, constitute apprehended domestic violence.
I cannot predict with any certainty any course of action that I could take, and any orders that I might make, that might eliminate, or at least reduce, the likelihood of further proceedings being instituted between these parties (subparagraph (l)).
I turn then to the issue of parental responsibility. As I say, the father seeks to re-agitate this issue. Orders conferring sole responsibility on the mother were made on 3 June 2011. It seems to me that both the mother’s legal representative and the Independent Children’s Lawyer agreed that I should revisit this matter.
The Act makes it clear that there is a presumption in favour of equal shared parental responsibility (see section 61DA). For what it is worth, I have found that presumption previously not to apply or to be rebutted, but I propose to look at the matter afresh. The presumption is not to apply if there has been family violence. I have said that I have found the father’s conduct to be controlling and, thus, now within the definition of family violence. That, to my mind, would be sufficient to have the presumption not apply.
However, if I am wrong in that, then subsection (4) says that the presumption may be rebutted by the evidence. I am satisfied on the evidence that I have heard that, if this be humanly possible, the position between these parties is worse now than it was in 2011. The concept of requiring these parties to cooperatively and communally deal with each other, and reach joint decisions is one that I find to be entirely impossible.
The father and mother in this case, I am satisfied, have very little capacity to communicate so as to reach a collaborative decision. To require that they do so, by an order of this Court, would, to my mind, do neither of them a service. In particular, it would cause distress for the child, because he would know that he was fairly and squarely in the middle of what his parents were endeavouring to decide, as between themselves, for him. I am, thus, comfortably satisfied, from the evidence that I have heard, that the presumption is rebutted. I will return to the issue of parental responsibility later in these Reasons for Judgment.
I must then look to section 65DAA of the Act, which tells me what I must consider if I do not follow the legislative pathway of finding that equal shared parental responsibility is to be awarded. I am satisfied that, pursuant to the decision of the Full Court in Goode & Goode[1], that I am required, in the best interests of the child, to consider whether there should be equal time or significant and substantial time.
[1] (2006) FLC 93-286; (2007) 26 Fam LR 422; [2006] FamCA 1346
Neither party seeks equal time. The father seeks a regime of time, which would be considered, in my view, to be substantial and significant time. The mother seeks that there be no specific order as to time, but rather that the order I should make is that time be in accordance with the child’s wishes, therefore as the child so requests from time to time.

Discussion

I have considered afresh the issue of parental responsibility. I have come to the conclusion that, as I have said, to order these parents to have equal shared parental responsibility would be to create a situation that could never produce cogent and cooperative decisions in respect to the subject child. To impose upon these parties the need to communicate and negotiate an agreed position is to expect the impossible.
The father, as I have said, has clearly showed that it is his opinion or view that must prevail, and that no other point of view is acceptable. Were he and the mother to have equality in decision-making, there would be no possibility or prospect of a compromise or consultative process, but rather there would be an unwavering requirement by the father that his view, and no other point of view, should take effect. I am satisfied that he would ignore any point of view that did not accord with his own
I have come to the conclusion, therefore, that, having regard to the welfare of this child, there is no benefit to the child in allocating equal shared parental responsibility to his parents. I have come to the conclusion that the existing Orders conferring sole parental responsibility upon the mother ought not be altered or affected.
However, my Orders of June 2011 require that the mother advise the father of proposals and secure from the father his views, by email, before making a final decision. Both the mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer, as I have said, by implication or omission, seem to be seeking to discharge this Order.
I am of the view that the father should retain the benefit of this Order. That means that the mother must advise the father of what she proposes to do. Thus, the father is, at least, kept informed and abreast of matters involving his son. The mother, as I have said, did not obey the spirit, if not the letter of this Order, when medical assistance was sought for the subject child.
Therefore, my Orders that the mother have sole parental responsibility, but that she shall be required to inform the father, will continue to have effect.
It is conceded that the child should live with his mother. That is not in issue in these proceedings. I must, however, decide what time the father should have with the child. Equal time is not sought and, I might say, nor could it have ever been seen to have been appropriate in these circumstances.
The father contends for a regime whereby he sees the child on alternate weekends and during the holidays. Particularly, it is part of his application that, if the child does not wish to accompany him on any occasion, the child should be brought to him to explain to him, face-to-face, the reason for his (the child’s) decision.
I am satisfied that it is not the fact of seeing his father, simpliciter, that causes this child the difficulties I have endeavoured to identify, and which have been dealt with particularly by Dr G.. I have endeavoured to ascertain, therefore, what is the situation. I have satisfied myself that it is the requirement that the child see his father in a closely prescribed and regulated situation, which is beyond his control, that causes this child concern. I can confidently anticipate that, if he were to see his father in accordance with his own wishes, the difficulties that he has experienced will be greatly ameliorated.
As I have said, the father particularly seeks an order that if the child does not wish to spend time with him, he (the child) shall be brought to him to explain the reasons for that. I can think of no course of action more likely to place pressure on the child and cause him substantial discomfort and anxiety. This, in turn, must detrimentally affect his mental wellbeing.
Whilst the father’s proposals are said by him to be made in an attempt to protect his son in some way, I am satisfied that that proposal, particularly, must have an opposite effect and result. The father sees no comfort in a situation where he is to see his son in accordance with his son’s wishes.
For the child to see his father as a matter of compulsion, I am satisfied, is not in his best interests, based on the entirety of the evidence that is before me. I am aware of what might appear to be the seriousness of the situation whereby a parent is refused orders for time with his or her child. However, in this case, that is not the actual situation. The orders that I consider appropriate, for the best interests of this child are that the child shall see his father, but it will be in accordance with this young man’s wishes. He is very close to 14 years of age. He is appropriately age mature, and clearly he has been the subject of a very significant amount of pressure, at least since Orders were made in July 2011.
I will not make orders that this child see his father on specified occasions, and I will not make any order that requires this child to explain why he has reached the decision he has to his father. I do propose, however, to require the mother to assist and facilitate the child in the event that he wishes to either spend time with or communicate with his father. The effect of that order will be that the mother would not and should not try and dissuade the child from seeing his father, and, indeed, that the mother should encourage the child if the child expresses any wish to see his father, and finally, that she should do all practical things, such as making contact with the father by email or SMS to notify him of the child’s wishes to see him so that arrangements can be put in place to give effect to the child’s wishes.
I propose, therefore, that my Orders of 3 June 2011 remain in force, and the mother will thus retain sole parental responsibility, subject to the order for information, and the mother will continue to have the child live with her. I will discharge my Orders of 27 July 2011 and, in lieu thereof, I will order that the child spend time with and communicate with his father in accordance with his (the child’s) wishes. I will order that the mother facilitate such time or communication in the event that the child’s wishes are that he spend time with or communicate with his father. I have expressed, in these Reasons for Judgment, what that means, so far as I am concerned, in respect of the mother’s responsibility in such a situation.
I believe that it is appropriate, in this case, that the child should have today’s orders explained to him by the Independent Children’s Lawyer, and I propose to make an order to that effect.
The orders that I then make are as set out at the forefront of these Reasons for Judgment.

I certify that the preceding seventy-seven (77) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Collier delivered on 8 May 2013.

Legal Associate:

Date: 24 May 2013

[2013] FamCA 361

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Family Law

Evidence

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Procedural Fairness