Peter W Masters and Department of Natural Resources

[2001] QLAC 31

[2001] QLAC 31

 

IN THE LAND APPEAL COURT HELD AT BRISBANE

Re:     Appeal against a decision of the Land Court – Determination of Unimproved Value –

Local Government – BCC-Toombul (AV98-683)

BETWEEN

Peter W Masters AND

Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources

Appellant

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - MR RP SCOTT

Delivered at Brisbane this Eleventh day of May 2000

This is an appeal by Mr Masters against the decision of the Land Court dismissing an appeal made under the provisions of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 in which the Court at first instance affirmed the valuation of the Chief Executive for land owned by the appellant in the amount of $285,000.

The land, the subject of these proceedings, is located at 35 Lewis Street, Clayfield, and comprises an area of 2.459 ha which was vacant at 1 October 1997, the relevant date for the purpose of the statutory valuation. The relevant land  has frontages to Jackson, Milman and Kemble Streets, Clayfield.

Mr Masters has appealed the decision of the Land Court on the grounds: "The decision is based upon incorrect interpretation of verbal evidence and excludes due consideration of my written evidence". These grounds of appeal were enlarged upon in submission, in which Mr Masters submitted that the evidence placed before the learned Member below favoured a conclusion that the relevant land did not, at the relevant date for valuation purposes, enjoy satisfactory access.

In his reasons the learned Member found that the subject land "has poor access generally, but access is available from Kemble Street, via Fitzroy Street and also Jackson Street." Further, he found on the evidence that a single residence could be erected on the subject land. It followed that the land could be valued as a single residential site; the use upon which the Chief Executive had based the valuation appealed against.

2

There is evidence in the record to which we were taken during the hearing of the appeal, which supports the findings of fact by the learned Member. Evidence, which might be said to lead to a conclusion in favour of the appellant, is both modest and is not such that it contradicts the findings of fact made at first instance.

I conclude that the determination of the learned Member at first instance should not be disturbed. In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed.

MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT