[2014] AATA 497
Division VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION File Number
2013/1004
Re
Peter Sweet
APPLICANT
And
Repatriation Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Mr R G Kenny, Senior Member
Date 18 July 2014 Place Brisbane The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes its decision that the applicant is entitled to be paid the special rate of pension under s 24 of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) with effect from 7 March 2012.
............................Sgd............................................
Mr R G Kenny, Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS – Benefits and entitlements – Disability pension payable at 100% of general rate – Application for increase in pension – Eligibility for special rate of pension – Remunerative work – Incapacity from war-caused conditions sufficient to prevent applicant undertaking remunerative work for more than 8 hours per week – Applicant prevented from undertaking remunerative work due solely to accepted disabilities – Special rate payable from date of claim for increase in pension – Decision under review set aside
LEGISLATION
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) ss 5Q, 15, 19, 23, 24, 25, 28, 120(4), 157
CASES
Flentjar v Repatriation Commission (1997) 26 AAR 93; (1997) 48 ALD 1
Martin and Repatriation Commission (2001) 68 ALD 397
Repatriation Commission v Alexander (2003) 75 ALD 329
Repatriation Commission v Hendy (2002) 76 ALD 47
Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327
Willis v Repatriation Commission (2012) 202 FCR 323; [2012] FCA 399
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mr R G Kenny, Senior Member
18 July 2014
BACKGROUND
On 7 March 2012, at the age of 64 years, Peter Sweet (“the applicant”) applied, under
s 15 of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (“the Act”), to the Repatriation Commission (“the respondent”) for an increase in the rate of disability pension paid to him. This was in respect of the following conditions which the respondent had accepted as being related to his service in the Australia Regular Army (“the army”): intervertebral disc lesion, bilateral sensorineural hearing loss with tinnitus, posttraumatic stress disorder, alcohol abuse, erectile dysfunction, acquired cataracts in both eyes, bilateral osteoarthritis of knees, gastro-oesophageal reflux disease, solar keratosis and colon adenoma. Currently, he is paid pension at 100% of the general rate. The respondent rejected the claim on 20 March 2012 and the Veterans’ Review Board (“the Board”) affirmed that decision on 21 February 2013. The applicant sought further review by this Tribunal on 6 March 2013.
ISSUES AND LEGISLATION
The
standard of proof applicable to assessment of pension is set out in s 120(4) of the Act, which requires that matters be determined to the decision-maker’s reasonable satisfaction. This imports the civil standard of proof so that matters must be determined on the balance of probabilities.[1] The procedure to be followed is set out in s 19 of the Act. It requires the rate of pension to be determined during the “assessment period” which is defined as meaning the period starting on the application day, in this case
7 March 2012, and ending when the application is determined.[2]
[1]
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal considered the various components of the applicant's work history and the extent of his incapacity due to war-caused conditions. It found that the applicant had worked as a builders' labourer, union organiser, and instructor, among other roles. Despite his posttraumatic stress disorder and other medical issues, the Tribunal determined that the applicant's capacity to work more than eight hours per week was not consistently impaired. The Tribunal relied on the applicant's employment history and his ability to work 18 hours per week in 2004, as well as medical evidence from 2002 and 2003 indicating he could work more than eight hours per week. Consequently, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant met the requirements of section 24(1)(b) of the Act from the date of the 2005 medical report.
The Tribunal set aside the decision under review and determined that the applicant was entitled to the special rate of pension under section 24 of the Act, effective from 7 March 2012. This decision was based on the applicant meeting the statutory criteria for the special rate of pension, despite arguments from the Repatriation Commission that he did not satisfy the requirements.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Williams submitted that the requirements of s 24 of the Act were not met and that the decision under review ought be affirmed. He also submitted that the applicant did not satisfy the terms of s 23 of the Act which relate to the intermediate rate of pension CONSIDERATION I am satisfied that the concessions by Mr Williams in respect of ss 24(1)(aa), (ab) and (a) of the Act have been properly made. I am also satisfied that such is the case in relation to s 24(1)(b) of the Act but not until some time after he ceased working for HPL. That employment was not consistent with the medical evidence in 2002 and 2003 of Dr Finegan and Dr Lotz that the applicant was unable to work more than eight hours per week at that time. At HPL, the applicant demonstrated an actual capacity to do so by completing 18 hours of work per week for 10 weeks in 2004. There was no evidence that the applicant was not performing to a standard required by his employer with HPL and, though he may have been considering retiring from that job because of his knee and posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms, he did not do so. I am satisfied that s 24(1)(b) of the Act is met with effect from the date of Dr Gibson’s report in 2005. This was reinforced by the report of Dr Yeung in 2013. The application of s 24(1)(c) of the Act involves a consideration of what the applicant would probably have done in the assessment period in the absence of his accepted disabilities.[6] The Federal Court has said that a proper consideration of s 24(1)(c) of the Act requires responses to the following questions:[7]1. What was the relevant “remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking” within the meaning of s 24(1)(c) of the Act?2. Is the veteran, by reason of war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, prevented from continuing to undertake that work?3. If the answer to question 2 is yes, is the war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, the only factor or factors preventing [the veteran] from continuing to undertake that work?4. If the answers to questions 2 and 3 are, in each case, yes, is the veteran, by reason of being prevented from continuing to undertake that work, suffering a loss of salary, wages or earnings on his own account that he would not be suffering if he were free of that incapacity?[6] See Repatriation Commission v Hendy (2002) 76 ALD 47 at 54. [7] See Flentjar v Repatriation Commission (1997) 26 AAR 93; (1997) 48 ALD 1 at 4-5. Consideration must also be given to s 24(2)(a) of the Act, which operates in conjunction with the fourth of those questions.First question For the first of those questions, the term “remunerative work” is broadly defined in s 5Q(1) of the Act as including “any remunerative activity”.[8] The applicant worked on construction sites in various capacities. He held rigging, dogging and scaffolding licences. However, he described himself on several occasions as a labourer and I am satisfied that labourer comprises one component of his remunerative work. I am also satisfied that that the term labourer is broad enough to embrace the less intensive factory hand-work he undertook with HPL. Other components of his remunerative work are constituted by his role as a union official and his instructional role with construction workers and employers in the construction industry. Second question[8] See also s 28 of the Act.