Peter Sweet and Repatriation Commission
[2014] AATA 497
[2014] AATA 497
Division VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION File Number
2013/1004
Re
Peter Sweet
APPLICANT
And
Repatriation Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Mr R G Kenny, Senior Member
Date 18 July 2014 Place Brisbane The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes its decision that the applicant is entitled to be paid the special rate of pension under s 24 of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) with effect from 7 March 2012.
............................Sgd............................................
Mr R G Kenny, Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS – Benefits and entitlements – Disability pension payable at 100% of general rate – Application for increase in pension – Eligibility for special rate of pension – Remunerative work – Incapacity from war-caused conditions sufficient to prevent applicant undertaking remunerative work for more than 8 hours per week – Applicant prevented from undertaking remunerative work due solely to accepted disabilities – Special rate payable from date of claim for increase in pension – Decision under review set aside
LEGISLATION
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) ss 5Q, 15, 19, 23, 24, 25, 28, 120(4), 157
CASES
Flentjar v Repatriation Commission (1997) 26 AAR 93; (1997) 48 ALD 1
Martin and Repatriation Commission (2001) 68 ALD 397
Repatriation Commission v Alexander (2003) 75 ALD 329
Repatriation Commission v Hendy (2002) 76 ALD 47
Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327
Willis v Repatriation Commission (2012) 202 FCR 323; [2012] FCA 399
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mr R G Kenny, Senior Member
18 July 2014
BACKGROUND
On 7 March 2012, at the age of 64 years, Peter Sweet (“the applicant”) applied, under
s 15 of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (“the Act”), to the Repatriation Commission (“the respondent”) for an increase in the rate of disability pension paid to him. This was in respect of the following conditions which the respondent had accepted as being related to his service in the Australia Regular Army (“the army”): intervertebral disc lesion, bilateral sensorineural hearing loss with tinnitus, posttraumatic stress disorder, alcohol abuse, erectile dysfunction, acquired cataracts in both eyes, bilateral osteoarthritis of knees, gastro-oesophageal reflux disease, solar keratosis and colon adenoma. Currently, he is paid pension at 100% of the general rate. The respondent rejected the claim on 20 March 2012 and the Veterans’ Review Board (“the Board”) affirmed that decision on 21 February 2013. The applicant sought further review by this Tribunal on 6 March 2013.
ISSUES AND LEGISLATION
The
standard of proof applicable to assessment of pension is set out in s 120(4) of the Act, which requires that matters be determined to the decision-maker’s reasonable satisfaction. This imports the civil standard of proof so that matters must be determined on the balance of probabilities.[1] The procedure to be followed is set out in s 19 of the Act. It requires the rate of pension to be determined during the “assessment period” which is defined as meaning the period starting on the application day, in this case
7 March 2012, and ending when the application is determined.[2]
[1] Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327 at 335 per Beaumont J.
[2] See ss 19(5C)(a) and 19(9) of the Act.
It is not disputed that the general rate of pension payable to the applicant was correctly assessed at 100% of the general rate. The issue raised by the applicant is whether he meets the criteria for payment of an earnings-related rate of pension under s 24 of the Act (the special rate) and, if so, the date of effect of the higher rate of pension.
For the special rate of pension, the matters that need to be determined are whether or not the applicant meets the requirements of ss 24(1)(aa), (aab), (a)(i), (b) and (c) of the Act. These read:
(1) This section applies to a veteran if
(aa) the veteran has made a claim under section 14 for a pension, or an application under section 15 for an increase in the rate of the pension that he or she is receiving; and
(aab) the veteran had not yet turned 65 when the claim or application was made; and
(a) either:
(i) the degree of incapacity of the veteran from war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, is determined under section 21A to be at least 70% or has been so determined by a determination that is in force; or
…
(b) the veteran is totally and permanently incapacitated, that is to say, the veteran’s incapacity from war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, is of such a nature as, of itself alone, to render the veteran incapable of undertaking remunerative work for periods aggregating more than 8 hours per week; and
(c) the veteran is, by reason of incapacity from that war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, alone, prevented from continuing to undertake remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking and is, by reason thereof, suffering a loss of salary or wages, or of earnings on his or her own account, that the veteran would not be suffering if the veteran were free of that incapacity; and
(d) section 25 does not apply to the veteran
EVIDENCE
On 9 November 2005, the applicant completed an Employment Report in which he listed his special work qualifications as scaffolder’s licence, dogman’s licence and rigger’s licence. He described his usual type of employment as “builders’ labourer”. He gave his work history, after completing national service in 1971, as:
Time Employer Work 1971-Jan 1972 McMaster Construction labourer Jan 1972-1978 Kitchener Plastering labourer 1978-1979 South Coast Dairy labourer 1979-1984 McMaster Construction labourer 1984-1986 Theiss, Watkin, White labourer 1986-May 1989 Podgor Formwork labourer May 1989-1995 Builders’ Labourers Federation union organiser 1995-Feb 2003 Construction Skills Training Centre training officer 1999-Feb 2003 Seconded to: Building Construction
Industry Training Fundtraineeship officer
The applicant’s evidence was that he was employed by the Builders’ Labourers Federation (“BLF”) from May 1989 until February 2003. This was as a union organiser until 1995 and then as an instructor for the Construction Skills Training Centre (“CSTC”) which was a branch of the BLF. CSTC paid his wages from monies received from the BLF. In 1999, he was seconded to the Building Construction Industry Training Fund (Queensland) (“BCITF”) for three days per week but continued with the CSTC on the other days. This arrangement resulted from the BCITF providing funding to CSTC for his position. This continued until February 2003 when his position was terminated. He successfully took unfair dismissal proceedings against the CSTC in the Industrial Commission. As a result, he received an undisclosed sum and the terms of settlement remained confidential. However, he said that there was no clause in the agreement excluding him from working for the BLF subsequently. He said that the problems he had at CSTC were related to disputes with management and were associated with his posttraumatic stress disorder. He was on sick leave because of that condition, stress and behaviour problems for three months before returning to work on 28 February 2003 when his position was terminated.
As a union organiser, the applicant’s role was to “police the award” by speaking with union delegates at particular work sites where problems had arisen. With CSTC, his role was to train workers in basic industry skills such as rigging, scaffolding, dogging, and the use of explosive power tools, forklifts and project safety. With BCITF, the applicant dealt with employers in the industry promoting funding for apprenticeships and traineeships for builders and labourers.
In 2004, the applicant was employed by Half Price Lattice (“HPL”) in assembling the company’s products. In his evidence to the Board,[3] the applicant said that he had attended the HPL factory to enquire about HPL’s products for his own purposes, noticed that they were very busy and asked if HPL need any additional workers. The reply was that HPL did need workers and so began the applicant’s engagement. He was employed for 10 weeks from February to April 2004 on a casual basis for three days per week at
six hours per day. He found that this caused him to experience pain in his knees and he also clashed with the manager at times. The business relocated due to increasing rental costs and this brought his employment to an end after ten weeks. His evidence was that he was about to advise his employer that, because of his knee pain, he could not continue with the work when the relocation of the factory was announced.
[3] See exhibit 2, page 7.
In his evidence in the Board proceedings,[4] the applicant said that, after working for the lattice company, he sought work in the construction industry. He was unsuccessful and the reasons he gave for this were health problems associated with gallstones from which he “suffered badly” and the effects of his knee conditions for which he underwent bilateral replacement surgery. He also said that his unfair dismissal claim limited his employment options and said that “when you join the union as a union organiser after
six months you will not get another job”. In addition, he described a downturn in the industry at that time.
[4] Supra.
In his evidence to the Tribunal, the applicant agreed that he had given that evidence before the Board but denied that his experience as a union officer counted against him in finding work with potential employers after 2004 because, in past union negotiations with employers, he had adopted a strategy of consultation rather than confrontation. He agreed that his gallstones impacted on him after 2004 but that this was resolved with
keyhole surgery from which he quickly recovered. In his evidence, he said that he has not worked since the lattice factory work although he has attempted to find employment as a warehouse assistant in a plumbing store, as a training officer for crane companies and as a project safety officer. He also said that he felt “out of [his] depth” with the jobs he had applied for because of his lack of paperwork and computer skills and because there were other better qualified applicants. He ceased looking for work in 2005 when he was seeing Dr John Gibson, a psychiatrist at Greenslopes Hospital.
In his statement, dated 18 June 2012, the applicant wrote that his work had been in unskilled “hands-on” positions, that he was computer illiterate and that he would be unsuited to office work, even in the construction industry. He again described himself as a labourer and that, when he had finished working, he was involved in treatment and rehabilitation at Greenslopes Hospital in relation to his posttraumatic stress disorder and depression.
Mr G R Shannon
Mr Shannon completed a statement on 13 June 2003. He was the general manager of BCITF (Queensland). He wrote that the applicant was employed by BCITF for four years on a part-time basis of three days per week as Coordinator (Traineeships). The applicant’s principal duties were to liaise actively with employers in the industry promoting to them the benefits of employing trainees in the building and construction industry. Mr Shannon wrote that, for the first two years, the applicant performed his duties to expectations and achieved the results expected but that, thereafter, his performance gradually deteriorated. He noted that he was, at times, aggressive and, at times, lethargic with an overall attitude of indifference. On speaking to the applicant about this, the applicant advised that he was having some health problems and they agreed that he would relinquish his position in February 2003.
Medical evidence
Dr Neal Finegan is the applicant’s treating doctor. In a report, dated 20 November 2002, he wrote that the applicant was unable to work at all and that he was “probably unlikely to benefit from vocational assessment/rehab, given age/condition/alcohol”. In a clinical note, dated 20 March 2003, Dr Finegan described the applicant as having “retired from work” and as applying for a disability pension for posttraumatic stress disorder.
Dr Trevor Lotz, psychiatrist, first saw the applicant in 2002 when he was on sick leave because of his posttraumatic stress disorder. In a report, dated 18 November 2002,
Dr Lotz certified him unfit for work until January 2003. In an attachment to that report, Dr Lotz noted that the applicant had recently been on extended sick leave due to his symptoms. In an undated report, provided to the respondent on 5 December 2005,[5]
Dr Lotz wrote that he had seen the applicant for the final time in January 2004 and he wrote that there had been no significant deterioration in his condition. Prior to that, he had attended sessions with Dr Lotz on an average of once per month. In an attachment to the undated report, dated 30 November 2005, Dr Lotz wrote that the applicant was distressed at times and that he was “preoccupied often with memories”.
[5] An attachment to the report completed by Dr Lotz was dated 30 November 2005.
Dr John Gibson, psychiatrist, completed a report on 20 September 2005. His opinion was that the applicant was unfit for more than eight hours of work per week because of his posttraumatic stress disorder. He referred to the applicant’s work history and noted that he had ceased work in January 2003 and that this was preceded by three months of sick leave. Dr Gibson understood that the applicant’s posttraumatic stress disorder was the principal reason for leaving the workforce. Dr Gibson did not refer to the applicant’s work with HPL.
Dr Elsa Yeung, psychiatrist, saw the applicant on 21 May 2013 and completed a report on 27 May 2013. Dr Yeung gave a summary of events experienced by the applicant during his army service, of his family circumstances and of his work history. She concluded that the applicant continued to suffer from the symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder and that he also suffered from episodic depressive disorder. Her opinion was that his accepted disabilities incapacitated him to the extent that he was unable to undertake remunerative work for more than eight hours per week in a position for which he was qualified and noted that this would be as a labourer. She wrote:
He still presents with acute symptoms of PTSD. With those symptoms, it is impossible for anyone to return to work sustainably for more than eight hours per week. He has poor concentration, anger outbursts, issues with interpersonal relationships which causes a lot of conflict and poor motivation. He has also experienced episodic depression throughout the years which his wife indicated occur three to four times per year. During those times he would become more withdrawn and also present with suicidal ideation. Although currently he does not present with a clinical depression, the PTSD symptoms alone are enough to prevent him from working.
In relation to his employment, Dr Yeung referred to the applicant’s last work as being in a lattice-making factory for 10 weeks. She recorded that the applicant told her that the job finished “mainly due to relocation of the factory” but she also noted that the applicant “did not tolerate the boss well”.
SUBMISSIONS
Ms Ann Frizelle, for the applicant, submitted that the applicant is unable to work for more than 8 hours per week and has ceased work solely because of his accepted disabilities. She referred to the veteran’s work as a scaffolder and rigger with the CSTC until 2003 which ended due to clashes with management as a consequence of his posttraumatic stress disorder. Ms Frizelle submitted that the type of work which the applicant was undertaking was not as a labourer but that which reflected the various licences he had as a rigger, a dogger and a scaffolder while he was engaged in the construction industry. She submitted that, in 2002, he was advised that he could not work but that, nonetheless, he attempted to seek employment and was successful in that he was employed by HPL for a period of 10 weeks which ended because of knee pain and, again, clashes with management related to his posttraumatic stress disorder. She submitted that, until 2005, he genuinely continued to seek further work but was unsuccessful. Accordingly, she submitted, the terms of s 24(2)(b) of the Act were applicable to the applicant who had clearly suffered a financial loss as a result of his absence from the workforce. Ms Frizelle submitted that the applicant ought be paid the special rate of pension from the date of his application for increase in pension.
Mr Bruce Williams, for the respondent, conceded that the applicant met the requirements of ss 24(1)(aa), (aab), and (a) of the Act. He was also prepared to concede that s 24(1)(b) of the Act was satisfied.
Mr Williams submitted that the relevant “remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking” within the meaning of s 24(1)(c) of the Act was spread over the types of work in which he had engaged since leaving the army. He noted that the applicant had licences for rigging, dogging and scaffolding but also that he continuously described himself as a labourer. Mr Williams noted that the applicant also had union organisational duties on construction sites and some instructional duties. He noted that the applicant denied having any office-type skills and familiarity with computers. Mr Williams also noted the absence of evidence of the nature of the duties carried out by the applicant with HPL. However, he submitted that, with no office-type skills, it was most likely that the applicant was assisting in the making of wooden lattice sections.
In relation to the cessation of his work positions, Mr Williams submitted that this was not solely due to the applicant’s accepted disabilities. He conceded that the applicant’s posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms were solely relevant to the cessation of his work with CTSC and BCITF. This related to his union organisational work and his instructional work. He submitted that the applicant ceased his labouring work because he transferred his duties within the BLF to those required by CTSC and BCITF and that a contributing factor to his not being able to reengage in that form of work was the adverse view taken by potential employers because of his history of involvement with union matters. Mr Williams also noted the applicant’s evidence that, when he was seeing work after his HPL position ended, there was a downturn in the construction industry at that time. In relation to the applicant’s work with HPL, Mr Williams submitted that the relocation of the business contributed to his decision to cease that work.
Mr Williams also submitted that the reference in s 24(2)(b) of the Act to genuinely seeking work was not met by actually achieving a work position. Accordingly, he submitted, the applicant was unable to rely on the HPL position as an example of his genuinely seeking work in the operation of that provision.
Mr Williams submitted that the requirements of s 24 of the Act were not met and that the decision under review ought be affirmed. He also submitted that the applicant did not satisfy the terms of s 23 of the Act which relate to the intermediate rate of pension
CONSIDERATION
I am satisfied that the concessions by Mr Williams in respect of ss 24(1)(aa), (ab) and (a) of the Act have been properly made. I am also satisfied that such is the case in relation to s 24(1)(b) of the Act but not until some time after he ceased working for HPL.
That employment was not consistent with the medical evidence in 2002 and 2003 of
Dr Finegan and Dr Lotz that the applicant was unable to work more than eight hours per week at that time. At HPL, the applicant demonstrated an actual capacity to do so by completing 18 hours of work per week for 10 weeks in 2004. There was no evidence that the applicant was not performing to a standard required by his employer with HPL and, though he may have been considering retiring from that job because of his knee and posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms, he did not do so. I am satisfied that s 24(1)(b) of the Act is met with effect from the date of Dr Gibson’s report in 2005. This was reinforced by the report of Dr Yeung in 2013.
The application of s 24(1)(c) of the Act involves a consideration of what the applicant would probably have done in the assessment period in the absence of his accepted disabilities.[6] The Federal Court has said that a proper consideration of s 24(1)(c) of the Act requires responses to the following questions:[7]
1. What was the relevant “remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking” within the meaning of s 24(1)(c) of the Act?
2. Is the veteran, by reason of war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, prevented from continuing to undertake that work?
3. If the answer to question 2 is yes, is the war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, the only factor or factors preventing [the veteran] from continuing to undertake that work?
4. If the answers to questions 2 and 3 are, in each case, yes, is the veteran, by reason of being prevented from continuing to undertake that work, suffering a loss of salary, wages or earnings on his own account that he would not be suffering if he were free of that incapacity?
[6] See Repatriation Commission v Hendy (2002) 76 ALD 47 at 54.
[7] See Flentjar v Repatriation Commission (1997) 26 AAR 93; (1997) 48 ALD 1 at 4-5.
Consideration must also be given to s 24(2)(a) of the Act, which operates in conjunction with the fourth of those questions.
First question
For the first of those questions, the term “remunerative work” is broadly defined in
s 5Q(1) of the Act as including “any remunerative activity”.[8] The applicant worked on construction sites in various capacities. He held rigging, dogging and scaffolding licences. However, he described himself on several occasions as a labourer and I am satisfied that labourer comprises one component of his remunerative work. I am also satisfied that that the term labourer is broad enough to embrace the less intensive factory hand-work he undertook with HPL. Other components of his remunerative work are constituted by his role as a union official and his instructional role with construction workers and employers in the construction industry.
Second question
[8] See also s 28 of the Act.
For the second question, I am satisfied that the applicant’s accepted disabilities prevent him from continuing to undertake that remunerative work during the assessment period.
Third question
The third of the questions noted above raises what is referred to as the “alone test” in the first part of s 24(1)(c) of the Act. In Willis v Repatriation Commission,[9], Bromberg J said: [10]
[23] The question raised by the “alone test” is not whether, on its own, the war- caused incapacity prevents the veteran’s continued employment. The question is whether apart from the war-caused incapacity, there is another factor or factors which prevent employment. The existence of other factors which prevent the veteran from working has a disqualifying result for an application for a pension at the special rate. The war-related incapacity must be the lone factor which prevents continued employment. That is what is meant by “alone”.
[24] Another way of re-stating that proposition, which more closely focuses upon the language of s 24(1)(c), is that the alone test requires that the war-caused incapacity is the reason, rather than merely a reason, for the veteran’s inability to engage in the remunerative work which the veteran had previously done. If there is another reason which, independently of the war-caused reason, is preventing the veteran from working, the inability of the veteran to engage in remunerative work is not “by reason” of the war-caused incapacity “alone”.
[9] (2012) 202 FCR 323; [2012] FCA 399.
[10] Supra at 329.
There must be no other factor, apart from the applicant’s accepted disabilities, which would impact upon his capacity to undertake the relevant remunerative work at the start of, or during, the assessment period. Such a factor may be associated with a wide variety of considerations, such as incapacity from a non-service-related medical condition, the effects of age, relocation to a locality distant from work opportunities or the impact of the length of time out of the workforce. Such factors, individually or in combination with each other or with accepted disabilities, may serve to prevent a person from continuing to undertake relevant remunerative work.[11] In the event that they would have contributed to preventing the applicant from doing so in the assessment period, s 24 of the Act will not be satisfied.
[11] See Repatriation Commission v Hendy (2002) 76 ALD 47 at 54-55; and Repatriation Commission v Alexander (2003) 75 ALD 329 at 334 per Spender J.
The applicant’s employment as a construction worker from 1971 until 1989 with various employers came to an end when he became a union organiser with the BLF. From 1995 to 2003, he was employed by CSTC as a training officer. During that period, from 1999, he shared his weekly work allocation between CSTC as a training officer and BCITF as a traineeship officer. In both of those cases, his employment was under the umbrella of the BLF. His evidence was that he was dismissed because of disagreements with management which he attributed to his posttraumatic stress disorder. That basis for ceasing work with CSTC is supported by the evidence of Mr Shannon and also by
Dr Finegan and Dr Lotz who noted that the applicant was on extended sick leave in late 2002. His evidence also was that he was not precluded from seeking that training or traineeship work by the terms of his wrongful dismissal agreement and that his work history as a union organiser would not prevent him from getting work in the construction industry. The applicant’s evidence was that he was about to advise his employer at HPL that he was unable to continue with the job when the relocation of the business was announced.
In material particulars, the applicant’s evidence was not challenged. That was the case with his reasons for leaving CSTC, for ceasing work with HPL and also the impact of his union work on future employment in the construction industry. In the Board hearing, the applicant referred to such an impact but, in evidence before the Tribunal, he said that it was common for that to occur but not to him because of the conciliatory manner in which he had conducted his dealings with employers when he was a union official. I also note Mr Shannon’s evidence that his work with BCITF over a period of four years was liaising actively with employers in the construction industry to promote apprenticeships and traineeships. Dr Gibson in 2005 and Dr Yeung in 2013 concluded that the applicant was unable to work because of his accepted disabilities.
I am satisfied that the “alone test” is not met in relation to the applicant’s “hands on” work as a builders’ labourer. At the start of the assessment period, he was aged 64 years and had not undertaken that form of work since 1989. I am satisfied that his age and the length of time away from that type of work would contribute to his not being engaged in such work in the assessment period. I am satisfied that the relocation of the HPL business played some part in the cessation of his work with HPL although I accept his evidence that he was experiencing some problems with his knees at that time.
The situation is different in relation to the less physically demanding work that the applicant undertook with the BLF. This was when he was with CSTC and BCITF. On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that the applicant has been prevented by his incapacity from his accepted disabilities alone from continuing to undertake that work and from doing so as at the start of and during the assessment period. While this comprises only part of his remunerative work, it was a significant part spanning some 14 years and is relevant even though it was not his last work.[12]
[12] See Martin and Repatriation Commission (2001) 68 ALD 397
The third of the questions listed above is also answered in the affirmative.
The fourth question
This aspect of the operation of s 24 of the Act was not disputed. Since his BLF work, the applicant received a sum by way of settlement of his unfair dismissal claim. The amount he received is not known and I am satisfied that any such amount did not constitute “salary or wages” or “earnings on his… own account” as those terms are used in
s 24(1)(c) of the Act. Despite the wages he received while working for HPL, this was for a short period and I am satisfied that the absence of wages because of his dismissal from the BLF places the applicant in the position where he has suffered a loss of salary or wages, or of earnings on his own account. I have noted the terms of s 24(2)(a) of the Act which reads:
(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(c):
(a) a veteran who is incapacitated from war‑caused injury or war‑caused disease, or both, shall not be taken to be suffering a loss of salary or wages, or of earnings on his or her own account, by reason of that incapacity if:
(i) the veteran has ceased to engage in remunerative work for reasons other than his or her incapacity from that war‑caused injury or war‑caused disease, or both; or
(ii) the veteran is incapacitated, or prevented, from engaging in remunerative work for some other reason; and
The relevant remunerative work in this matter is not that which the applicant undertook with HPL. Rather, it is his work under the umbrella of the BLF. I am satisfied that he ceased that work because of his accepted disabilities and, accordingly, s 24(2)(a) of the Act has no application. As the requirements of s 24(1)(c) of the Act are met, there is no need to consider the application of s 24(2)(b) of the Act.
The fourth question noted above is also answered in the affirmative.
It is not in dispute that s 25 of the Act has no application in this matter. It follows that the applicant meets the requirements of s 24 of the Act and that the special rate of pension is payable to him under that provision with effect from the date of his claim: 7 March 2012. It follows that a determination under s 23 of the Act is not required.
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes its decision that the applicant is entitled to be paid the special rate of pension under s 24 of the Act with effect from 7 March 2012.[13]
[13] Date of effect set in accordance with s 157 of the Act.
I certify that the preceding 40 (forty) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of
Mr R G Kenny, Senior Member..............................Sgd..........................................
Associate
Dated 18 July 2014
Dates of hearing 2 September 2013 & 25 June 2014 Counsel for the Applicant Ms Ann Frizelle Solicitors for the Applicant Fedorov Family Lawyers Solicitors for the Respondent Bruce Williams, Department of Veterans' Affairs
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