Peter Mills Holding P/L v Gold Coast City Council
[2001] QPEC 37
•1/06/2001
PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT OF
QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Peter Mills Holding P/L v Gold Coast City Council & Anor
[2001] QPE 037PARTIES: PETER MILLS PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT PTY
LTD
Appellant
v
GOLD COAST CITY COUNCIL
Respondent
and
GEOFFREY RUSSELL & ORS
Respondents by ElectionFILE NO: 63 of 1997 DIVISION: Planning and Environment PROCEEDING: Submitter appeal ORIGINATING Southport COURT: DELIVERED ON: 1 June 2001 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 14 and 15 May 2001 JUDGE: Judge Quirk ORDER: Appeal allowed CATCHWORDS: COUNSEL: Mr W.Cochrane for the appellant
Mr J Haydon for the respondent
Mr C McGrath for the respndents by election
Mr G Russell appeared on his own behalfSOLICITORS: O’Keefe Mahoney Bennett for the appellant
Corrs Chambers Westgarth for the respondent
Spains Solicitors for the respondents by election
Mr G Russell appeared on his own behalf
This appeal was lodged against the respondent’s refusal of an application (made in
May of 1997) for the rezoning of land in the Gilston area from the Future Urban to
the Residential A Zone.
The land has frontage to Gilston Road and occupies an area of 5.224 hectares. In
comparison to other parcels in this area which have been the subject of
development applications, it is not large.
The proposal before the Court indicates an intended reconfiguration of the land into
forty-two residential allotments ranging in size from 610 to 1124 square metres.
Approximately 21 per cent of the site is to be used for park and public open space
including an area resulting from a 20 metre setback from Gilston Road. Internal
roads are to include a through road connecting Gilston Road to probable
development of the area to the east.
Although the respondent Council initially refused the application, negotiations have
led to a compromise. The Council is now not opposed to the rezoning going ahead
on the basis of a conditional approval the form of which is found in a draft order
placed before the Court in section 5 of Exhibit 1 (at page 12).
A number of submitters had elected to be joined as respondents to the appeal and
appeared at the hearing. Mr Russell conducted his own case and the others were
represented by counsel. The respondents by election were not prepared to accept
the proposed conditional approval and raised a number of matters which they asked
the Court to consider.
By the end of the day the matters really in dispute had resolved themselves into two
issues which were;
(1) Whether the approval would lead to unreasonable interference with the flow path of a natural watercourse that crossed the subject land; (2) Whether the conditions of approval sought adequate contribution to the costs of roadworks external to the site.
The first of these matters was one about which Mr Russell (who lives in an
attractive park residential setting on the opposite side of Gilston Road) is
particularly concerned. The watercourse in question crosses Gilston Road from the
subject land by way of a culvert and then flows in an uncontrolled manner across
Mr Russell’s property. Mr Russell told me that, at times of heavy rainfall, a
considerable body of water flows across his land.
The draft order makes reference to a drawing number SK 138B which includes an
indicative subdivisional layout. The drawing also shows contours which identify,
in a general way, the path of the watercourse with which we are concerned. There
is no doubt that, if the subdivision was to follow this indicative plan, parts of some
of the proposed allotments and roadways would intrude upon the existing
watercourse and two dams presently on the site would have to go. The respondents
by election expressed concern that development in that form might adversely
impact upon the role which the existing watercourse plays in the areas stormwater
regime.
It has to be appreciated however that the draft order does not “set in stone” the form
of subdivision that will ultimately occur. The real consequence of the order will be
the amendment of the transitional planning scheme to include the subject land in the Residential A Zone. Future reconfiguration of the land will require a further
application.
It is true that Proposed Condition 4 (provides)
“Any application to reconfigure the land to be rezoned to the
Residential A Zone is to provide the following elements:
(a)
the design is to incorporate appropriate provision for the designation and management of the overland flow path indicatively identified on Plan 99024/1 and dated 6th April 2000”.
Condition 10 must also be noted and it provides:
“The appellant shall submit to Council prior to commencement of any works on the lands, detailed management plans addressing the following:
...
(c) stormwater management; and (d) hydraulic characteristics
Such plans must be prepared by appropriately qualified professional persons and be approved by the Chief Executive Officer or delegate prior to the commencement of any works on the lands. The terms of such plan must be complied with by the appellant.”
The practical result of this is that, prior to any subdivision works taking place, it
will need to be demonstrated that adequate attention has been given to stormwater
management and (importantly in the context of this appeal) that satisfactory flow
rates of stormwater will occur at the point where stormwater leaves the subject land.
In the course of the hearing I had the benefit of evidence from the appellant’s
consulting civil engineer, Mr Lees who was confident that appropriate engineering
design and treatment of stormwater flow was achievable and this evidence was not
seriously contradicted. The appellant’s town planning consultant Mr Bell also dealt
with the matter.
Having considered this evidence I am satisfied that these concerns should not stand
in the way of a rezoning approval at this point. I am also satisfied that such an
approval should not (as was advocated by the respondents by election) be burdened
with a condition that there will be no works carried out within the existing flow
path of the watercourse.
The second matter raised by the respondents by election related to the adequacy of
the contribution to external roadworks sought by Proposed Condition 15. The
respondent by elections’ point was that an inadequate contribution to these works
would constitute an unfair impost upon the city’s ratepayers.
In respect of this issue the appellant called evidence from Mr Olsen who, in a
detailed and carefully explained consideration of the matter offered the opinion
that:
“The contributions to external road upgrading as agreed between the developer and Council are reasonable and, based on our analysis, would seem to favour the Council”.
The attack by the respondents by election upon this view relied upon evidence
from Mr Brameld, an experienced traffic engineering consultant, who appeared in
response to a subpoena. Council has, on a number of occasions in the past,
consulted Mr Brameld although he did not have any direct involvement in this
matter. It emerged that Mr Brameld had been asked to consider the costs that
might be involved in necessary improvements to Gilston Road but from a much
wider perspective which took into account future residential development of
substantially larger parcels in the general area.
The consequential costs estimates made and contribution rates established by Mr
Brameld involved work well beyond what would be called for in respect of this
proposal and were not really helpful in considering the reasonableness of the
contribution in this matter. In the end result it seemed to me that Mr Brameld was
very reluctant to condemn as inadequate the contribution referred to in the Draft
Order.
On the whole of the evidence I accept the views of Mr Olsen and would not
interfere with the contribution rate that has been accepted by both the appellant and
the elected planning authority.
At one point some reservations were expressed about the adequacy of the buffer
along Gilston Road. However this was not a matter that was pursued with any real
vigour and the appropriateness of the proposal in this respect was supported by the
evidence of the landscape architect Catherine Brouwer which was not seriously
challenged.
On the whole of the evidence I am satisfied that the onus for showing that the
application is one which should be approved has been discharged and the appeal
must accordingly be allowed.
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