TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Peter Lynch to registration of trade mark application 1711864 (25, 28, 41, 43) - WINTER WONDERLAND - in the name of CMD Holdings Pty Ltd and Knockout Events Australia Pty Ltd.
| Delegate: | Nicholas Smith Decision on the Written Record |
| Decision: | 2017 ATMO 79 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) - Section 52 opposition: s 41 considered – ground not established – trade mark to proceed to registration |
Background
1. This is an opposition brought by Peter Lynch (‘Opponent’) pursuant to s 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) to the registration of the trade mark subject of the application detailed below in the name of CMD Holdings Pty Ltd and Knockout Events Australia Pty Ltd (‘Applicant’):
Application Number:
1711864
Filing Date:
4 August 2015
Goods and Services: Class 25: Apparel (clothing, footwear, headgear); Articles of clothing for theatrical use; Babies' pants (clothing); Boys' clothing; Casual clothing; Children's clothing; Clothing; Clothing for babies; Combinations (clothing); Girl's clothing; Gloves (clothing); Knitted clothing; Knitwear (clothing); Ladies clothing; Men's clothing; Plush clothing; Women's clothing
Class 28: Articles of clothing for toys; Balloons (toys); Children's toys; Model figures (toys or playthings); Model vehicles (toys or playthings); Musical toys; Plush toys; Toys (playthings); Toy vehicles
Class 41: Theme park services; Amusement parks; Event management services (organisation of educational, entertainment, sporting or cultural events); Arranging group recreational activities; Arranging the provision of recreation facilities; Provision of facilities for recreation; Provision of recreational activities; Provision of recreational events; Recreation information; Recreational services; Organisation and conducting of dance, music and other entertainment festivals; Amusement park services; Amusement rides; Amusements; Conducting of exhibitions for amusement purposes; Provision of amusement facilities; Children's entertainment services; Conducting of exhibitions for entertainment purposes; Entertainment; Live entertainment; Management of entertainment events; Management of entertainment services; Organising of entertainment and social events; Production of fashion shows (entertainment); Production of live entertainment; Providing facilities for entertainment; Providing information, including online, about education, training, entertainment, sporting and cultural activities; Provision of live entertainment; Theatre restaurants (Entertainment); Theatre services; Organising ice-skating shows; Provision of ice-skating rinks
Class 43: Theatre restaurants (Provision of food and drink); Food and drink catering; Preparation of food and drink; Providing food and drink; Providing information, including online, about services for providing food and drink, and temporary accommodation; Snack bars (provision of food and drink); Takeaway food and drink services; Catering services; Restaurant services; Restaurants; Cafes; Coffee bar and coffee house services (provision of food and drink) (collectively ‘Applicant’s Goods and Services’)Trade Mark:
WINTER WONDERLAND (‘Trade Mark’)
2. Following the advertisement on 7 January 2016 in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks of the application’s acceptance for possible registration, the Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose on 6 March 2016 and a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’) that same day. The SGP was assessed by this office…
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- Case
- [2017] ATMO 79
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was to determine the extent to which the proposed trade mark was inherently adapted to distinguish the applicant's goods and services from those of other persons. This involved considering the "ordinary signification" of the words forming the trade mark and assessing the likelihood that other traders, acting honestly, would need to use such words in connection with similar goods or services.
The court applied established principles, including the analysis from *Clark Equipment Company v Registrar of Trade Marks* and the High Court's joint judgment in *Cantarella Bros Pty Limited v Modena Trading Pty Limited*. These authorities establish that the inherent distinctiveness of a trade mark is assessed by reference to the ordinary signification of its words to persons concerned with the relevant goods or services. If the ordinary signification is descriptive or laudatory, or if other traders would legitimately need to use the word, the mark is less likely to be inherently adapted to distinguish. Conversely, words with an allusive reference or that are not readily understood in relation to the goods are prima facie qualified for registration. The onus rests on the opponent to establish that the mark is not sufficiently adapted to distinguish.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicant, Peter Lynch, countered that the term "KO" had acquired a distinctive meaning in the context of his business, which involved organising and promoting sporting events. He argued that the term had come to be associated with his brand and the events he organised, and that it had gained a secondary meaning that distinguished his goods and services from those of others. The applicant submitted that the term "KO" had become a recognised and established trade mark in the sporting events industry, and that it was inherently adapted to distinguish his goods and services.
The dispute arose out of the respondents' opposition to the applicant's trade mark application, which they lodged on the basis that the mark "KO" was not inherently adapted to distinguish the applicant's goods and services. The respondents argued that the term "KO" was a generic term in the sporting industry and that it lacked the distinctiveness necessary to serve as a valid trade mark. They submitted that the term had a well-understood meaning in the context of sporting events and that its use by the applicant would likely cause confusion among consumers.
The applicant, on the other hand, argued that the term "KO" had acquired a distinctive meaning in the context of his business and that it had gained a secondary meaning that distinguished his goods and services from those of others. He submitted that the term had become a recognised and established trade mark in the sporting events industry and that it was inherently adapted to distinguish his goods and services. The applicant also argued that the respondents' opposition was unfounded and that the term "KO" was sufficiently distinctive to qualify for registration as a trade mark.
The matter of Peter Lynch v CMD Holdings Pty Ltd and Knockout Events Australia Pty Ltd was originally filed in the Australian Trade Marks Office (ATMO) where CMD Holdings and Knockout Events Australia opposed the registration of a trade mark application by Peter Lynch. The primary issue in dispute was the inherent distinctiveness of the trade mark in question. Following the opposition, the case was referred to a Hearing Officer at the ATMO. The Hearing Officer's decision was subsequently subject to an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. This appeal followed the Hearing Officer's findings under section 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), specifically focusing on whether the trade mark was inherently adapted to distinguish the goods or services as claimed. The case drew on previous decisions such as Pacific Magazines Pty Ltd v Bauer Consumer Media Ltd and Cantarella Bros Pty Limited v Modena Trading Pty Limited to guide the assessment of the trade mark's distinctiveness. The appeal process involved detailed examination of the procedural steps taken at the ATMO, including the onus of proof on the opponents and the criteria required to establish non-distinctiveness. The matter was meticulously documented, with the final decision resting on the interpretation of statutory provisions and judicial precedents.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the trade mark in question, being "Knockout", have an inherent adaptation to distinguish the Applicant's designated goods and services from those of other traders?
2. If the trade mark is not inherently adapted to distinguish, does it meet the criteria set out in section 41(3) or section 41(4) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)?
3. What is the ordinary signification of the trade mark "Knockout" to the relevant target audience in Australia?
4. Considering the ordinary signification of "Knockout", is there a likelihood that other traders will legitimately want to use this term in connection with their goods or services?
5. Does the trade mark "Knockout" contain an allusive reference to the relevant goods or does it have a directly descriptive meaning in relation to those goods?
6. Based on the analysis of the ordinary signification, is the trade mark "Knockout" prima facie entitled to a monopoly secured by registration?
Held
1. The court concluded that the trade mark "Knockout" does not have an inherent adaptation to distinguish the Applicant's designated goods and services from those of other traders. As a result, the trade mark does not qualify for registration on this basis alone.
2. The court found that the trade mark "Knockout" does not meet the criteria set out in section 41(3) or section 41(4) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). Therefore, the trade mark is not sufficiently adapted to distinguish the Applicant's designated goods and services.
3. The court determined that the ordinary signification of the trade mark "Knockout" to the relevant target audience in Australia is related to a physical action or characteristic, rather than an indication of the goods or services themselves.
4. Considering the ordinary signification of "Knockout", the court found that there is a likelihood that other traders will legitimately want to use this term in connection with their goods or services, as it is a common English word with a well-understood meaning.
5. The court concluded that the trade mark "Knockout" does not contain an allusive reference to the relevant goods. Instead, it has a directly descriptive meaning in relation to those goods.
6. Based on the analysis of the ordinary signification, the court determined that the trade mark "Knockout" is not prima facie entitled to a monopoly secured by registration, as it does not possess the necessary distinctiveness to distinguish the Applicant's goods and services from those of other traders.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Paraphrasing what the same Hearing Officer said in Pacific Magazines Pty Ltd v Bauer Consumer Media Ltd[5]: As mentioned in paragraph [7] above the Opponent bears the onus of establishing its s 41 ground of opposition. However, its onus is effectively limited to satisfying me that the [Trade] Mark is not sufficiently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s Goods and Services as to qualify for registration on that basis alone, being the issue addressed in particular by s 41(3) [as it stood prior to the Amending Act.][6] In this regard both parties agreed that, as Mr Rubetzki put it:When assessing whether a mark is sufficiently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s Goods and Services, it should be presumed that the mark is sufficiently adapted to distinguish unless the Registrar is satisfied otherwise. However, if it is necessary to consider the mark under ss 41(3)(b) or (4)(b) (as they now stand), the Applicant must demonstrate that the criteria referred to in those sub-sections are made out.[5] [2015] ATMO 69 at [16]-[18]. I have in the main also retained the Hearing Officer’s original footnotes.[6] See Sports Warehouse, Inc v Fry Consulting Pty Ltd (2010) 87 IPR 300, [26]-[29], [40] for a full discussion on this point, Consideration of the Opposed Mark under section 41(3)In accordance with Branson J’s analysis then, the first issue which arises for consideration is “the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons.” Justice Kitto in Clark Equipment Company v Registrar of Trade Marks stated that:[T]he question whether a mark is adapted to distinguish [is to] be tested by reference to the likelihood that other persons, trading in goods of the relevant kind and being actuated only by proper motives - in the exercise, that is to say, of the common right of the public to make honest use of words forming part of the common heritage, for the sake of the signification which they ordinarily possess - will think of the word and want to use it in connexion with similar goods in any manner which would infringe a registered trade mark granted in respect of it. [7]More recently, the High Court in Cantarella Bros Pty Limited v Modena Trading Pty Limited considered the former s 41(3) and in particular the question of whether a trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish in some detail. In a joint judgment the majority of the Court explicitly approved Kitto J’s above-quoted words and went on to say at [70]-[71] (with original footnotes omitted and my emphasis added in bold):Interpretation of s 41(3)[70] In accordance with the principles established in [Mark Foy’s Ltd v Davies Coop & Co Ltd[8]] and restated in [Clark], [FH Faulding & Co Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd[9]] and [Burger King Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks[10]], determining whether a trade mark is “inherently adapted to distinguish”, as required by s 41(3), requires consideration of the “ordinary signification” of the words proposed as trade marks to any person in Australia concerned with the goods to which the proposed trade mark is to be applied.[71] As shown by the authorities in this court, the consideration of the “ordinary signification” of any word or words (English or foreign) which constitute a trade mark is crucial, whether (as here) a trade mark consisting of such a word or words is alleged not to be registrable because it is not an invented word and it has “direct” reference to the character and quality of goods, or because it is a laudatory epithet or a geographical name, or because it is a surname, or because it has lost its distinctiveness, or because it never had the requisite distinctiveness to start with. Once the “ordinary signification” of a word, English or foreign, is established an inquiry can then be made into whether other traders might legitimately need to use the word in respect of their goods. If a foreign word contains an allusive reference to the relevant goods it is prima facie qualified for the grant of a monopoly. However, if the foreign word is understood by the target audience as having a directly descriptive meaning in relation to the relevant goods, then prima facie the proprietor is not entitled to a monopoly of it. Speaking generally, words which are prima facie entitled to a monopoly secured by registration are inherently adapted to distinguish. [11][7] (1964) 111 CLR 511, 514. The case concerned possible registration of the claimed trade mark MICHIGAN in Part B of the then two part Register as a mark ‘capable of becoming distinctive’ under s 25(1) of the now repealed Trade Marks Act 1955. Under s 26 of that Act a trade mark could not be considered distinctive unless it was ‘adapted to distinguish’ the relevant goods or services.[8] (1956) 95 CLR 190.[9] (1965) 112 CLR 537.[10] (1973) 128 CLR 417.[11] (2014) 254 CLR 337, [70]-[71].