Peter Leslie Challen v Golder Associates Pty Ltd

[2013] HCASL 20

PETER LESLIE CHALLEN

v

GOLDER ASSOCIATES PTY LTD

[2013] HCASL 20
B72/2012

1. The applicant is a solicitor.  The respondent was his client.  Between 5 July 2006 and 9 December 2010, the applicant rendered 27 bills in accordance with agreements covering the period.  The respondent sought assessment of the bills, which was governed by the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Q) ("the Act"), part of uniform State and Territory legislation. Section 333 provided that an interim bill may be assessed at the time of the final bill. Section 335 provided that a costs application must be made within 12 months after the bill was given to the client. The respondent's application for assessment was made within 12 months of the last of the bills, but more than 12 months after many of the previous bills.

2. In the District Court of Queensland, the respondent obtained orders for the assessment of the 27 bills.  The applicant had argued that all the bills were interim bills.  Samios DCJ held that the bills delivered together last in time were final bills and that all the bills could be assessed, including those delivered more than 12 months before the respondent's application.

3. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal on the basis that, apart from the last three bills, the respondent was out of time in seeking assessment. He contended that ss 333 and 335 of the Act did not operate to permit an interim bill to be assessed more than 12 months after it was delivered. In the alternative he contended that each bill was the final bill. On 9 November 2012, the Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Fraser JA and Mullins J) dismissed the appeal in relevant part. It construed the Act to allow an interim bill to be assessed within 12 months of the final bill. In that construction, the Court of Appeal agreed with first instance decisions of the District Courts of Queensland and of New South Wales but disagreed with a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria.

4. The applicant now contends that the Court of Appeal erred in its construction of the Act and in its characterisation of the bills as interim or final. To the extent that any question of principle might be raised concerning the construction of the Act or the meaning of "final bill", the decision of the Court of Appeal is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant a grant of special leave.

5. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

S.M. Kiefel
13 March 2013 S.J. Gageler