Peter Gleeson v Apple Inc - [2025] VSC 366

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMERCIAL COURT

GROUP PROCEEDINGS LIST

S ECI 2023 06090

PETER GLEESON	Plaintiff
v
APPLE INC	First Defendant
- and -
APPLE PTY LIMITED (ACN 002 510 054)	Second Defendant

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JUDGE:	Watson J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	On the papers
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	27 June 2025
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Peter Gleeson v Apple Inc & Anor
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2025] VSC 366

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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application by plaintiff for leave to discontinue the proceeding – Proper test – Discontinuance has no unfair, unreasonable or adverse consequence for group members – Leave granted – Consequence of discontinuance for suspension of limitation periods – Requirement for notice to group members dispensed with – Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) ss 33X, 33V.

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HIS HONOUR:

The plaintiff, Peter Gleeson, commenced this group proceeding under Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (‘the Act’), on behalf of himself and other persons who own or owned iPhone models 6, 6 Plus, 6s, SE, 7 and 7 Plus (‘Affected iPhones’) and downloaded and installed iOS 10.2.1 or 11.2 Apple software updates in 2017.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants, Apple Inc and Apple Pty Ltd (ACN 002 510 054), represented to customers that the software updates would provide benefits and improvements to Affected Phones when, contrary to those representations, there were known issues with a power management feature which adversely affected the performance, functionality and technical capabilities of these phones. This conduct is alleged to have constituted misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that the relevant software updates constituted a trespass to goods which damaged the Affected Phones.

The proceeding was commenced by writ and general indorsement of claim on 20 December 2023. To date, these have not been served on the defendants nor have group members been notified regarding the commencement of the proceeding. The plaintiff’s solicitors had some without prejudice discussions with the second defendant. Those discussions did not bear fruit. The plaintiff’s solicitors sought to secure third party litigation funding but have been unsuccessful. The plaintiff’s solicitors are unwilling to proceed without litigation funding.

The plaintiff seeks to discontinue the proceeding.

By summons dated 17 April 2025, the plaintiff seeks:

(a) Leave to discontinue the group proceeding pursuant to s 33V of the Act.

(b) Orders dispensing with the requirements:

(i) for group member notifications pursuant to s 33X(4) of the Act; and

(ii) to serve on the defendants the summons dated 17 April 2025 and supporting materials, and any notice of discontinuance pursuant to r 2.04(1) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic).

(c) No orders made as to costs.

For the reasons which follow, those orders should be made.

Relevant test

Section 33V(1) of the Act provides:

A group proceeding may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of the Court.

It is well established that, for a settlement to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Peter Gleeson v Apple Inc

Details

AGLC: Peter Gleeson v Apple Inc [2025] VSC 366
Case: [2025] VSC 366
Decision Date: 27 June 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff, Peter Gleeson, filed an application for leave to discontinue the proceeding against Apple Inc. The dispute arose from a class action claim on behalf of consumers who had purchased Apple products and were allegedly misled about the battery life of these devices. The matter was before the Supreme Court of Victoria. Gleeson sought leave to discontinue the proceeding to allow for a potential private mediation, without prejudice to any future claims by group members. The central legal issues were whether Gleeson could lawfully discontinue the proceeding, if such discontinuance would have an unfair, unreasonable, or adverse consequence for the group members, and if there were any requirements for notice to group members regarding the suspension of limitation periods.

The court considered the statutory provisions under the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) and determined that the test for granting leave to discontinue was whether the discontinuance would have an unfair, unreasonable, or adverse consequence for the group members. Gleeson argued that discontinuance would not have such consequences as it was a necessary step to facilitate mediation and did not prejudice the group members' future claims. The court agreed, finding that Gleeson's proposed discontinuance did not prejudice the rights of group members, as they could still pursue their claims independently. The court also held that since there was no adverse consequence for the group members, there was no need to dispense with the requirement for notice to group members about the suspension of limitation periods.

Gleeson's application for leave to discontinue was granted. The court considered that the proposed discontinuance would not unfairly, unreasonably, or adversely impact the group members and found that the requirement for notice to group members regarding the suspension of limitation periods was not applicable in this instance. Gleeson's ability to proceed with mediation without prejudice to the group members' rights was upheld. The court's decision ensured that Gleeson could facilitate potential mediation while preserving the rights of the group members to pursue their claims in the future.

Orders