PETCHLER & DUNKLE

[2017] FamCA 207

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PETCHLER & DUNKLE [2017] FamCA 207

FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where the mother did not attend the final trial – Where the mother’s lawyers informed the court of her refusal to participate – Where the orders sought by the father and Independent Children’s Lawyer must have been reasonably contemplated by the mother – Decided the finalisation of proceedings should not be delayed merely because the mother failed to appear

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – With whom the children live – Where the children have important relationships with both parents – Where the father is not an optimum parent, but at least the child welfare authority considers the children are safe in his care and he has the superior capacity to meet the children’s needs – Where the mother admits she was told by the child welfare authority the children were “thriving” in the father’s care – Where the father realises stability for the children is now vitally important – Where the mother willingly cohabited with a man she knew was being prosecuted for sexual offences against other children and that man probably sexually abused one, if not both, of the children – Order the children live with the father

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – With whom the children spend time – Where interim orders provided for the children to visit the mother several times a week – Where the mother previously indicated an intention to withdraw from the children’s lives – Where the father can decide if, when, and how the children spend time or communicate with the mother as an incident of his exclusive parental responsibility for them – No order as to time spent with the mother

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 4, 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61B, 61DA, 64B, 65D 65DAA, 65DAC, 65DAE

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172
Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1

APPLICANT: Mr Petchler

RESPONDENT: Ms Dunkle

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Foat Roberts Lawyers

FILE NUMBER: NCC 1996 of 2016

DATE DELIVERED: 7 April 2017

PLACE DELIVERED: Newcastle

PLACE HEARD: Newcastle

JUDGMENT OF: Austin J

HEARING DATE: 13 March 2017

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Brady

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Hunter Family Law Centre

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Williams

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Jennifer Blundell & Associates

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mrs Kearney

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Foat Roberts Lawyers

Orders

1. All former orders relating to the children B and C, both born on … 2010, are discharged.

2. The father shall have sole parental responsibility for the children.

3. The children shall live with the father.

4. The father is restrained from causing or allowing the children:

   (a)To be left in the sole care of either his son Mr D or his niece’s foster child known as “E”; and

   (b)To see or remain in the presence of firearms.

5. The mother is restrained from causing or allowing the children to be left in the sole care of either of her sons, Mr F and Mr G.

6. The parties are restrained from causing or allowing the children:

   (a)To be or remain in the presence of any person that appears to be intoxicated;

   (b)To be or remain in the presence or hearing of another person denigrating either of the parties; and

   (c)To be administered with physical discipline. 

7. Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B of the Family Law Act, particulars of the obligations that these orders create, particulars of the consequences that may follow contravention of these orders, and details of assistance to comply with these orders are set out in the attached Fact Sheet, which forms part of these orders.

8. The Independent Children’s Lawyer is discharged upon the expiration of any applicable appeal period.

9. Any and all other outstanding applications are dismissed.

Notation

(A)These orders intentionally make no specific provision for the children to spend time or communicate with the mother, which decisions will be made by the father as an incident of his sole parental responsibility for the children.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Petchler & Dunkle has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT NEWCASTLE

FILE NUMBER: NCC 1996 of 2016

Mr Petchler

Applicant

And

Ms Dunkle

Respondent

And

Independent Children’s Lawyer

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The applicant father and respondent mother were in dispute about the parenting orders that should be made for their twin sons under Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).

2. The mother participated in the proceedings until just before final trial. For reasons known only to her, she refused to attend the final trial. The mother’s lawyers appeared and informed the Court of her refusal to participate, which was difficult to understand, because the evidence upon which she wished to rely was filed and served and her lawyers were ready to conduct her case. In the circumstances, the mother’s lawyers sought and were granted leave to withdraw from the proceedings.

3. No adjournment of the trial was sought by either the father or Independent Children’s Lawyer and so it proceeded, because the mother was not thereby denied procedural fairness. The orders sought by the father and Independent Children’s Lawyer fell well within the ambit of those previously proposed and must therefore have been reasonably contemplated by the mother as a possible outcome. Her decision to withdraw from participation in the trial was her choice and the finalisation of the proceedings should not have been delayed merely because she declined to appear (see Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at 182-186, 189-191; Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1 at 4).

Short history

1. The children have endured an interrupted childhood thus far.

2. They were born in 2010 and are now nearly seven years of age. There have been 31 reports made to the NSW Department of Family and Community Services (“the Department”) about their welfare.[1]

   [1] Magellan Report, page 3

3. The father saw the children in the days following their birth, but then had little or nothing to do with them until after December 2011, when the mother surrendered the children and the Department took them under an interim care order made in the Children’s Court of NSW. The father offered to take the children, subject to confirmation of his paternity, but notwithstanding such confirmation, the children only spent some supervised time with him as the Department did not consider him to be a viable option for their permanent placement. The children were restored to the mother’s care in July 2012.[2]

   [2] Magellan Report, pages 3-4; Family Report, paras 7-9

4. After the mother resumed her role of primary carer, the children spent some time with the father intermittently for about six months, but he then again disappeared from their lives until December 2014, when the parties voluntarily implemented a regular regime of alternate weekend contact.[3]

   [3] Family Report, paras 10-11

5. In October 2015, the mother surrendered the children to the father, though they disagreed over whether his care of them was intended to be permanent or only a temporary solution.[4] In any event, the children later returned to the mother’s primary care, but then regularly spent time with the father.[5]

   [4] Magellan Report page 4; Family Report, para 12

   [5] Father’s affidavit, paras 15, 16, 27

6. In March 2016 the mother re-commenced a relationship with Mr H, whom she had known for some years. In early June 2016, one of the children disclosed his sexual abuse by Mr H, which was reported to and investigated by the Department. Mr H’s sexual abuse of at least one of the boys was substantiated and, as a consequence, he was charged with sexual assault and remanded in custody.[6] It is unknown whether his prosecution is complete and, if so, the result.[7]

   [6] Magellan Report, pages 5-6; Family Report, paras 15-18

   [7] Father’s affidavit, para 33

7. During the course of that investigation in June 2016, the Department concluded the children’s interests would be better served living with the father and so the parties negotiated a regime to that effect, subject to the children visiting the mother several times each week.[8]

   [8] Family Report, paras 20-21; Father’s affidavit, paras 23-24, 31-32

8. During a visit in late July 2016, the mother retained the children because of an allegation the father’s adult son from a former relationship (“Mr D”) physically abused one or both boys. The allegation was reported to and investigated by the Department, but was not substantiated. The father commenced these proceedings, apparently on the Department’s recommendation, whilst the allegation was being investigated.[9]

   [9] Magellan Report, page 7; Family Report, para 22

9. In August 2016, interim parenting orders were made, with the parties’ consent, for the children to live with the father and to spend time with the mother for one day each week.[10]

   [10] Orders made on 10 August 2016

10. In October 2016, more interim orders were made, with the parties’ consent, providing for the children to live with the father and to spend time with the mother several times each week.[11]

    [11] Orders made on 10 October 2016

Proposals and evidence

1. The father proposed the orders set out in his Initiating Application, filed on 3 August 2016.

2. The Independent Children’s Lawyer concurred the father should have sole parental responsibility for the children and they should live with him. However, instead of making orders specifying the children’s future visits with the mother, as the father contemplated as an option, the Independent Children’s Lawyer advocated for no orders to be made, thereby leaving decisions about the nature of the children’s interaction with the mother to the father’s discretion as an incident of his parental responsibility for them.

3. The Independent Children’s Lawyer also proposed the perpetuation of several interim injunctions binding the parties,[12] to which the father confirmed he was willing to submit.

   [12] Orders 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 made on 10 October 2016

4. The father relied upon his affidavit filed on 7 February 2017. He was not required for cross-examination by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.

5. The father and Independent Children’s Lawyer also relied upon the Magellan Report dated 14 September 2016, furnished to the Court by the Department, and the Family Report dated 15 November 2016. The Family Consultant was not required for cross-examination by either the father or Independent Children’s Lawyer.

6. Given the mother’s decision to withdraw from the proceedings, her past proposals for the children and the evidence contained within the affidavits she filed were not taken into account.

Legal principles

1. Orders in respect of children are made under Part VII of the Act, where the meaning of a “parenting order” is defined (s 64B).

2. When invited to make a parenting order, the Court is enjoined to bear in mind both the objects of the legislation and the principles which underpin those objects (s 60B) in determining the nature of the parenting orders which ought be made (s 65D).

3. When making parenting orders the Court is mandated to regard the child’s best interests as the paramount consideration (ss 60CA, 65AA). The Act specifies the criteria which must be considered in arriving at a conclusion as to what is in the child’s best interests (s 60CC).

4. The Act imports a rebuttable presumption that a child’s best interests are served by an order allocating equal shared parental responsibility for the child to the parents (s 61DA). Parental responsibility is defined to encompass all duties, powers, responsibilities and authority conferred by law upon parents (s 61B). The legislation dictates the manner in which shared parental responsibility is to be exercised in respect of decisions relating to “major long-term issues” concerning the child (s 65DAC), being matters such as education, religion, culture, health, name, and changed living arrangements (s 4), and also in respect of decisions which do not relate to such significant issues (s 65DAE).

5. The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility does not apply in certain circumstances, including in instances of child abuse and family violence (s 61DA(2)), and the presumption may be rebutted if the Court is satisfied it would not be in the child’s best interests for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility (s 61DA(4)). The presumption says nothing about the amount of time the child should live or spend with each parent, but the manner in which parental responsibility for the child is allocated by the Court may bear on that issue.

6. In the event an order is made allocating equal shared parental responsibility to the child’s parents, the Court is then obliged to consider both the advisability and practicability of the child living for equal time with both parents, or alternatively, living primarily with one and spending substantial and significant time with the other (s 65DAA). If parental responsibility for the child is allocated in some other way, then the exercise of the Court’s discretion about the child’s care arrangements is at large, though the discretion must still be exercised in the context of the child’s best interests being the paramount consideration.

Children’s best interests

Primary considerations (s 60CC(2))

1. Although the children did not experience close relationships with the father until relatively recently, the Family Consultant found the children to be “emotionally and behaviourally settled” with him. She considered his care of them was “stable and predictable”,[13] which is undoubtedly the kind of care they now need in view of their past instability. The children’s relationships with the father are important as they do, and should continue to, derive benefit from them. The father acknowledged he did not sustain consistent relationships with the children in the past, but he realises stability for them is now vitally important.[14]

   [13] Family Report, para 110

   [14] Family Report, para 51

2. The children also have important relationships with the mother. The father knows the children love her and want to spend more time with her.[15] Historically, she was their primary carer, but the Family Consultant considered their disrupted development caused their psychological attachments with the mother to be ambivalent or insecure,[16] so her past primary care of them is less significant in the determination of their future.

   [15] Family Report, paras 51, 57, 88, 90

   [16] Family Report, para 108

3. During her discussion with the Family Consultant, the mother alleged the father sent her a text message in September 2016 threatening to kill the children if she did not desist from further contest of this litigation, which text she could produce as evidence.[17] She made the same allegation to the Department.[18] Understandably, the Family Consultant opined that, if the mother did not verify the allegation in the manner she asserted she could, it would raise even more concern about her psychological stability.[19] It hardly need be observed that fabricating allegations against another parent of threatened murder is reprehensible and is evidence of the culprit’s obliquity and unreliability. Significantly, by reason of her withdrawal from the proceedings, the mother failed to adduce any evidence of her receipt of any message from the father to verify the very serious allegation she made against him. If she had such evidence, it is almost inconceivable she would not have produced it.

   [17] Family Report, para 72

   [18] Magellan Report, page 7

   [19] Family Report, para 113

4. The father denied he sent any such message to her[20] and, confusingly, the mother inconsistently renounced any suggestion the children were at risk of harm at his hands.[21] Her position was irreconcilable.

   [20] Magellan Report, page 8; Family Report, para 55; Father’s affidavit, para 70

   [21] Family Report, para 73

5. Instead, the mother alleged the children were at risk of harm from Mr D, who lives with the father.[22] Mr D does have a history of unstable mental health and some illicit drug use, but the father denied he was violent or abusive, either generally or towards the children.[23] The allegation made by the mother to the Department about Mr D’s physical abuse of one or both children was not substantiated.[24] As the Family Consultant tritely observed, even if Mr D suffers from “mental illness”, his mere presence in the father’s household does not of itself constitute a risk of harm to the children.[25] The injunction proposed by the Independent Children’s Lawyer, to which the father acceded, restraining him from leaving the children in the unsupervised care of Mr D, is sufficient assurance of their welfare.

   [22] Family Report, paras 4, 35, 73; Father’s affidavit, para 59

   [23] Family Report, paras 43-44

   [24] Magellan Report, page 7

   [25] Family Report, para 115

6. The father told the Family Consultant of his fear for the children’s safety in the mother’s care.[26] His fear may be genuine, but there was insufficient evidence to establish the children are at appreciable risk of harm through their subjection to physical abuse in the mother’s care. There was no evidence of them suffering any harm over the months they have spent unsupervised time with her. The children, or at least one of them, were probably sexually abused by Mr H, but the mother admits the abuse actually occurred and she is now astute to keep the children away from Mr H. There was no evidence the children are at risk of sexual abuse by anyone else.

   [26] Family Report, para 56

7. The only evidence which actively engages s 60CC(2) of the Act relates to the risk of the children’s harm due to their neglect by the mother. The Department took the children from her in December 2011. That decision was based on several considerations, but the mother’s lack of parenting skill and her neglect of the children was one principal reason.[27] Although the children were returned to her under the Department’s supervision in July 2012, the Department’s interest in the children was again piqued in June 2016, when it was reported the mother was not “dressing or feeding the boys appropriately” and the children’s school attendance was unsatisfactory. The mother admitted the children did not attend school regularly in 2015, which hindered their education,[28] but that problem apparently extended into 2016.[29] Although those reports did not result in the children’s removal from the mother, their removal eventuated shortly afterwards when the reports of their sexual abuse by Mr H were established.[30]

   [27] Magellan Report, pages 3-4

   [28] Family Report, para 71

   [29] Father’s affidavit, paras 36-38

   [30] Magellan Report, pages 2, 5

8. The father complained to the Family Consultant in October 2016 that the mother had not, and still did not, feed and bathe the children adequately when in her care and she was not diligent about exchange of the children’s homework.[31] That evidence was not contradicted.

   [31] Family Report, paras 33, 52

9. The evidence of the mother’s neglect of the children was not strong enough to warrant the cessation of their visits with her, or the imposition of supervision, but it was a consideration that would influence decisions about the frequency and duration of the children’s interaction with her.

Additional considerations (s 60CC(3))

1. Clearly, the outcome of this litigation entails critical comparison of the parties’ parenting capacities. While the father is not an optimum parent, at least the Department considers the children are safe in his care and he has a superior capacity to meet their needs.[32] In fact, the mother admitted she was told by Departmental staff that the children are “thriving” in his care.[33]

   [32] Family Report, para 24

   [33] Family Report, para 94

1. The Department reported that conclusion directly to the Court in the following terms:[34]

   [The children] look well fed and always present well [in the father’s care].

   …

   The current assessment of the boys in [the father’s] care has been that he is appropriate, the boys appear to be thriving in the consistent environment in which this household provides. [The father] has made significant changes to his life to be able to provide care for the boys. He has relocated his housing to be closer to the boy’s schooling, he has continued to support the boys with attending sexual assault counselling through [organisation name], the boys’ attendance at school has improved significantly and [the father] is encouraging an ongoing relationship between [the mother] and the boys [sic].

   [34] Magellan Report, page 8

2. The evidence still left room for argument about the father’s commitment to promotion of the children’s relationships with the mother, since both children believe he does not want them to spend any more time with her,[35] but he has otherwise improved his parenting performance. His past attitude towards his parenting responsibility was demonstrably lax, principally by reason of his lack of commitment to regular contact with the children, even when the mother sought his help,[36] but his attitude has been immeasurably improved over the last couple of years. He denies any illicit drug use[37] and the mother told the Family Consultant of her belief the father ceased use of illicit drugs in 2014.[38] While the father was ordered to submit to urinalysis by interim orders, nobody required him to do so before his consultation with the Family Consultant.[39] Since then, his drug screens have been negative.[40]

   [35] Family Report, para 90

   [36] Family Report, paras 47, 51, 69

   [37] Father’s affidavit, para 71

   [38] Family Report, para 74

   [39] Family Report, para 34

   [40] Father’s affidavit, para 73

3. By comparison, the mother’s inferior parenting capacity and lack of insight is proven by several aspects of the evidence related to the children’s sexual abuse, her lack of commitment to the children, her illicit drug use, and her unstable mental health.

4. In 2016, the mother willingly cohabited with Mr H and allowed him to occasionally have the unsupervised care of the children, even though she knew he was then being prosecuted for sexual offences against other children. In fact, she provided him with some form of “letter of support” to use in those proceedings, confirming his reliable child care.[41] Within only months, if not weeks, Mr H sexually abused one, and perhaps both, of the children. The sexual abuse was substantiated and the mother does not doubt it occurred. Her exposure of the children to the risk of such abuse was gravely reckless. Her fatuous dismissal of the concern shared by the father and Family Consultant that she wantonly placed the children at risk of harm was proof enough of her lack of insight.[42]

   [41] Magellan Report, pages 5-6; Family Report, paras 25, 28

   [42] Family Report, paras 28, 104

5. According to the father, within the last few months, the mother sent text messages to him asserting she would drop out of the children’s lives and inviting him to inform them she was deceased.[43] The evidence was not contradicted and is therefore probably correct. Obviously, the mother could not be prioritising the children’s interests above her own if such text messages are representative of her feelings and views, since she must know the children love her and wish to spend time with her.

   [43] Family Report, para 56; Father’s affidavit, para 39

6. The distortion of the mother’s feelings and views might be explained by her illicit drug use and unstable psychological health. Her admission of heavy illicit drug use was integral to the Department’s decision to take the children from her in December 2011 and her alleged continuing illicit drug use was, at least inferentially, part of the reason why the Department investigated her parenting capacity in August 2014 and later recommended in June 2016 that the father commence these proceedings to obtain the children’s residence.[44] The mother told the Family Consultant she is now abstinent from illicit drug use,[45] for which she had the corroboration of two negative drug screens,[46] but the Family Consultant cautiously noted that her rehabilitative efforts were “relatively superficial”.[47]

   [44] Magellan Report, pages 2, 3, 5; Family Report, para 64

   [45] Family Report, paras 62-63

   [46] Family Report, para 34

   [47] Family Report, para 107

7. As for the mother’s emotional health, the Department believes she has suffered from “long term, poorly managed depression”, for which she admitted she has regularly taken anti-depressant medication for nearly 20 years. She was also hospitalised for suicide attempts, most recently in mid-2016.[48]

   [48] Family Report, paras 65-66

8. The mother denied her long-term use of illicit drugs adversely affected her parenting capacity,[49] and further, denied the children would have known she was not coping with them,[50] which caused the Family Consultant to observe:[51]

   The mother’s long standing substance abuse and poor mental health is of particular concern in this matter. These issues have undoubtedly compromised the mother’s parenting and protective capacities; yet it is extremely concerning that the mother continues to deny that these issues have had any adverse impacts on the children or on her parenting capacity for them [sic].

   [49] Family Report, para 64

   [50] Family Report, paras 67, 70

   [51] Family Report, para 105

9. The mother apparently entertains the paranoid belief that the Department is biased against her, though there is no apparent objective basis for her belief. She alleged the Department fabricated, or at least embellished, reports about her past unsatisfactory care for the children because the Departmental staff “hate [her]”.[52] Perhaps it is just easier for the mother to lay blame for her predicament at the feet of others, but if she genuinely believes some conspiracy exists to thwart her parental ambition then she lacks any capacity for introspection or discernible improvement in her parenting performance.

   [52] Family Report, paras 70, 75

10. The mother’s hands seem completely full caring for her adult son from a prior relationship, as he has developmental delay, anxiety, and other disorders. The mother does not believe he will ever be able to live independently of her.[53]

    [53] Family Report, paras 5, 35, 68

11. The parties live within relatively close proximity of each other, so the exchange of the children between them would not present any significant impediment.[54]

    [54] Family Report, para 35

Conclusions and orders

1. The father and Independent Children’s Lawyer both proposed that he have exclusive parental responsibility for the children, which outcome the Family Consultant supported because of the parties’ dysfunctional relationship.[55]

   [55] Family Report, paras 116-117

2. The parties have not shared in the exercise of parental responsibility for the children in the past. For example, the mother changed the children’s school enrolments without consulting the father.[56] The parties have also been unable to consistently protect the children from their conflict, particularly at changeovers.[57] The evidence establishes the allocation of equal shared parental responsibility to the parties would not be in the children’s best interests and the presumption of that outcome is therefore rebutted (s 61DA(4)).

   [56] Family Report, para 53

   [57] Family Report, para 58

3. In the absence of an order for the parties to have equal shared parental responsibility, s 65DAA of the Act is not engaged. The care arrangements for the children are at large, though still guided by the paramountcy principle.

4. The children should live with the father, since the mother did not participate to contest their residence with him. Axiomatically, the father should also have exclusive parental responsibility for the children. The real question is what prescriptive arrangement, if any, should be embedded in the orders to govern the children’s future interaction with the mother.

5. The interim orders made in October 2016, which provide for the children to visit the mother several times each week, have apparently worked reasonably well. However, that is unlikely to be a viable arrangement for the remainder of the children’s minority. The father does not now believe the current regime is “working for the children”.[58] As they age and mature, their visits with the mother should be longer, but less frequent. The Court should baulk at the permanent imposition of a regime that is unlikely to suit the family’s needs for any more than the short term.

   [58] Father’s affidavit, para 6

6. The mother’s refusal to participate in the proceedings and confirm her intention about future interaction with the children was also cause for concern, since she told the father in the past she intended to withdraw from the children’s lives. With her intention in an apparent state of flux, it would be inapposite to regulate the children’s future interaction with her upon the assumption of her continuing involvement in their lives, but without evidence to underpin the assumption.

7. The Independent Children’s Lawyer expressly proposed that no specific order be made regulating the children’s expenditure of time with the mother. None will be made. The father will decide if, when, and how the children spend time or communicate with the mother as an incident of his exclusive parental responsibility for them. If the mother is dissatisfied with his decisions, the onus will be on her to initiate further litigation to obtain different orders. In that process she will need to explain why she declined to participate at trial, why different orders should be made, and what such orders should be.

8. The father left it to the Court to determine the nature of the children’s future interaction with the mother,[59] but he informed the Family Consultant he wanted re-assurance about her abstinence from illicit drug use and her psychiatric assessment.[60] The mother did provide two negative drug screens during the litigation and it is difficult to see what definitive result the father expects from her psychiatric assessment. No misfortune has befallen the children in their short, regular visits with her over the last nine months, regardless of whether she has some form of psychological or psychiatric affliction. The father should be careful not to use such concerns as a ruse to deny the children any interaction with the mother at all.

   [59] Initiating Application filed 3/8/16, Order 3

   [60] Family Report, para 36

9. The injunctions sought by the Independent Children’s Lawyer against both parties are made, though in an amended form. The father did not object and they are sensible. The injunction precluding use of “illicit substances” within certain periods is omitted,[61] because it is unlawful for illicit substances to be used by the parties at any time. Although the father denied exposing the children to firearms,[62] he submitted to the injunction about it.

   [61] Order 1.4(b) made on 10 October 2016

   [62] Father’s affidavit, para 78

10. The orders set out at the commencement of these reasons reflect the children’s best interests on the evidence currently available.

I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Austin delivered on 7 April 2017.

Associate: 

Date:  7 April 2017