Pertsinidis v Aust Central Credit Union Ltd No. Scciv-01-294

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PERTSINIDIS & ANOR v AUSTRALIAN CENTRAL CREDIT UNION LTD

[2001] SASC 244

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Williams and Martin JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ:          I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons of Williams J.  I agree that the appeal should be allowed and that the Court should make the orders proposed by Williams J.

  2. In deference to the carefully reasoned decision of the District Court Judge, I propose to state briefly the basis upon which I agree with the orders proposed. I will not repeat the circumstances giving rise to the issues argued on appeal, except to the extent necessary to do so to express my own view. All of the relevant matters are to be found in the reasons of Williams J.

    The first action

  3. The Australian Central Central Union Limited (“ACCU”) sued the Pertsinidis in the Supreme Court for possession of premises, relying on a mortgage given by the Pertsinidis  to ACCU to secure a loan made under a written loan agreement. ACCU asserted that the Pertsinidis were in default under the loan agreement.  ACCU made no claim to recover money due under the loan agreement.

  4. The Pertsinidis filed a defence in which they denied default, relying on the meaning of the loan agreement. ACCU contended for a different meaning of the loan agreement.

  5. The issue between the parties was, in effect, whether the loan agreement entitled the Pertsinidis to repay the loan over 20 years, and whether ACCU was entitled to vary the term of the loan. For example, if the interest rate payable was reduced by ACCU, could ACCU decline to reduce the amount of the monthly repayment, thus shortening the term of the loan?

  6. To support their contention as to the meaning of the loan agreement, the Pertsinidis relied on extrinsic evidence, including representations allegedly made by an employee of ACCU, before the Pertsinidis entered into the loan agreement.

  7. The Pertsinidis counter-claimed that if the loan agreement had the meaning for which ACCU contended, and the Pertsinidis were in default, then the representations by the employee of ACCU were such as to entitle them to rectification of the loan agreement to make it reflect their understanding of its effect.

  8. Their counterclaim was that the representations by the employee of ACCU constituted misleading and deceptive conduct contrary to s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (“the TPA”) and contrary to s 56(1) of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA) (“the FTA”). Hereafter I will confine my attention, by and large, to the claim under the TPA.

  9. The counterclaim did not state how the entitlement to the remedy of rectification arose. I assume that the Pertsinidis intended to rely on s 87(1A) and s 87(2) of the TPA. As Williams J points out, by virtue of s 87(1C) of the TPA, relief could be granted under s 87(1A) and s 87(2) even though no other proceedings for relief under Part VI of the TPA were on foot.

  10. In…

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Details
Case
[2001] SASC 244
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal before the court involves a dispute between the Pertsinidis and the Aust Central Credit Union. The case centres on whether the Credit Union is permitted to maintain a counterclaim in a subsequent legal action, based on allegations of misleading conduct, which were initially raised but not pursued in a prior proceeding. The current action seeks damages under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA), following a forced sale of the mortgaged premises that resulted in a shortfall. The earlier action had resulted in the Credit Union obtaining possession of the premises to facilitate a sale. The court was required to decide if the Credit Union could legally bring a counterclaim based on allegations that were not adjudicated in the previous action.

The legal issue at the core of this appeal was whether the defendants, having raised but not pursued certain allegations in a prior proceeding, were nonetheless entitled to maintain those same allegations as a counterclaim in a subsequent action. This issue necessitated an examination of the procedural history of the case, specifically the extent to which the parties had abandoned or confined the dispute, and whether this affected their ability to raise those issues again in a later action. The court also had to consider the principles governing the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in the context of interpreting contractual terms and the implications of these principles for the admissibility of factual allegations not pursued in prior proceedings.

In determining the appeal, the court found that the defendants had indeed abandoned their counterclaim in the earlier proceeding. However, they had abandoned it only after the Master had intimated that he would not consider extrinsic evidence. The court concluded that since the factual dispute had been withdrawn from adjudication, either party should be at liberty to raise that factual dispute again. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal and made the orders proposed by Williams J, thereby permitting the Credit Union to maintain their counterclaim based on the allegations of misleading conduct.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MARTIN J
It is true that in the present case the Pertsinidis abandoned their counterclaim before the Master intimated that he would not have regard to the extrinsic evidence. But the Pertsinidis abandoned their claim on the facts only after the Master had made that intimation. So, even if my earlier reasoning is wrong, it seems to me that the parties having justifiably withdrawn the factual dispute from adjudication, either party should now be at liberty to raise that factual dispute again.Conclusion For those reasons I would allow the appeal, and make the orders proposed by Williams J.WILLIAMS J:1 The Determination of a Preliminary Point This is an appeal by the defendants from a decision of a District Court Judge upon a preliminary point raised at trial. The question at issue is whether in this action, the defendants are entitled to maintain a counterclaim based upon allegations of fact which the defendants raised but did not pursue in earlier proceedings. The defendants’ counter claim contains the same allegations of misleading conduct which gave rise to their defence and counterclaim in the earlier proceedings between the same parties. In the first action the defendants sought an order for variation (or rectification) of contract under s 87(2)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) whereas in the second action they seek damages under s 82. (Alternative claims are raised under the corresponding provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA). Both actions arise out of the alleged default by Mr and Mrs Pertsinidis in repaying monies lent to them by the Australian Central Credit Union upon the security of a mortgage over real estate. In the first action, the Credit Union sought (and obtained) possession of the mortgaged premises in order to facilitate a sale. In the present action the Credit Union is seeking to recover the balance of the debt after the forced sale of the premises produced a shortfall. The Credit Union is entitled to bring these successive actions by virtue of the provisions of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) and the Rules of Court. The summons for ejectment in the first action was issued on 3 April 1997 and the defence and counterclaim was filed on 11 December 1997. The second action was commenced on 7 May 1999 and the defence and counterclaim was filed on 17 June 1999. Although the defendants took their allegations to trial in the first action, their complaint was never the subject of an adjudication by reason of the way in which the defendants then chose to confine the dispute by abandoning their counterclaim. Eventually, the Court was only required to construe the loan agreement and for this purpose had available to it oral evidence as to the matrix of facts as pleaded. However, the allegations of misleading conduct were never discharged from the record; the Court construed the agreement without relying upon the extrinsic evidence. By his reasons dated 22 December 2000, the District Court Judge held that the defendants were not entitled to maintain their counterclaim in this action. An order with respect to the preliminary point was entered on 19 January 2001 and a consequential order in favour of the plaintiff in respect of its monetary claim in this action was entered on 1 March 2001. A composite notice of appeal in respect of each order has been filed but the court is now only directly concerned with the order disposing of the preliminary point. The reasoning of the District Court Judge led him also to strike out a paragraph in the defence but that aspect of the order of 19 January 2001 is not the subject of complaint in the grounds of appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MARTIN J