Perry Properties Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (Rd) - [2010] NSWADTAP 6

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Appeal Panel - Internal

CITATION: Perry Properties Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (RD) [2010] NSWADTAP 6

PARTIES:
APPELLANT
Perry Properties Pty Ltd
RESPONDENT
Chief Commissioner of State Revenue

FILE NUMBER: 099013

HEARING DATES: 4 September 2009

DATE OF DECISION:
5 February 2010

BEFORE: Needham J SC - Deputy President; Hirschhorn M - Judicial Member; Bennett C - Non-Judicial Member

CATCHWORDS: Land Tax – low cost accommodation – meaning of “accommodation” – extension to the merits – meaning of “room”.

DECISION UNDER APPEAL: Perry Properties Pty Ltd v. Chief Commissioner of State Revenue

LEGISLATION CITED: Land Tax Management Act 1956
Revenue Ruling no LT 78
Revenue Ruling no LT 79
State Revenue Legislation (Further Amendment) Act 1994

REPRESENTATION:
APPELLANT
P Singleton, Barrister
RESPONDENT
AH Rider, Barrister (instructed by State Crown Solicitors)

ORDERS: 1.Grant leave to extend appeal to the merits of the decision
2.Appeal allowed
3.Matter remitted to Tribunal for determination of issue of compliance with threshold requirements of Guideline LT78.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1 Perry Properties Pty Ltd (“the appellant”) is a company which owns a property at Glebe. That property was purchased on 27 January 2006 and the appellant operates a business there known as “Roof Top Travellers’ Lodge”.

2 On 21 September 2007 the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue forwarded a Notice of Assessment for Land Tax to the appellant in respect of the 2007 tax year.

3 The appellant sought to apply for an exemption pursuant to s 10Q(1) of the Land Tax Management Act 1956 (“the Act”) which provides an exemption from land tax for low-cost accommodation. That section provides:-

4 “10Q Low cost accommodation—exemption/reduction

5 The “guidelines” referred to in sub-s 10Q(2) are constituted by Revenue Ruling no LT 78, which was issued by the Office of State Revenue in relation to the relevant land tax year. It provides:-

“Guidelines Approved by the Treasurer

3. The approved guidelines for the 2007 tax year are as follows:
(i) land that is used as the site of a boarding-house will be entitled to an exemption from land tax for the 2007 tax year where, during the year ended 31 December 2006, in respect of at least 80% of the accommodation available to boarding house residents:

(a) occupation was by long term residents (a long term resident is considered to be a person who resided at a boarding-house for 3 consecutive months or for any periods totalling 3 months); and
(b) where full board and lodging was provided, the maximum tariff charged was no more than:
$269 per week for single accommodation or
$450 per week for married or shared accommodation
or where less than full board and lodging was provided, was not more than:
$180 per week for single accommodation
$300 per week for family or shared accommodation

(ii) where the requirements of paragraph 3(i)(a) above could not be met, land used and occupied primarily for a boarding house may still qualify for exemption provided:

(a) at least 80% of the accommodation that was actually occupied was occupied by long term residents; and
(b) at least 80% of the accommodation available to boarding-house residents was either occupied or was available for occupation at tariffs within the limits shown in paragraph 3(i)

(iii) where less than 80% of the accommodation available to boarding house residents was occupied by long term residents, owners seeking an exemption must provide an explanation of the reasons that this requirement was not met and such circumstances will be considered on a case-by-case basis;
(iv) The owner must provide a statutory declaration stating that, in respect of at least 80% of the accommodation available to boarding house residents, the tariff for full board and lodging during the whole of 2007, will not exceed:

$277 per week for single accommodation or
$463 per week for family or shared accommodation

or where less than full board and lodging is provided, the tariff will not exceed:

$185 per week for single accommodation or
$309 per week for family or shared accommodation.”

6 The tariffs quoted do not include GST.

7 The appellant appeals from the decision of Judicial Member Hole handed down on 5 March 2009. In its Notice of Appeal, the appellant identifies four questions of law. Each of those four questions either identifies what it says are errors of law, or asks the ultimate question, which is, did the Tribunal err in holding that the appellant was not entitled to the exemption? The particular grounds identified were whether:-

a)the correct construction of cl 3(i) of the Revenue Ruling LT78, particularly as to the term “accommodation” and its variants “single accommodation” or “family or shared accommodation”, b)and whether “accommodation” was synonymous with “room”; and the question whether the accommodation generally consisted of rooms with two double bunks meant that the bunks were not “accommodation” within the meaning of the ruling, even if occupied by separate lodgers.

8 It was further contended that there should be an extension to the merits of the decision, so that the “Appeal Panel (could) dispose of the proceedings to finality”. More will be said on that issue below.

9 The decision of the learned Tribunal Member cites the facts in a generally unexceptional way. It sets out the tenor of the appellant’s business as follows (pars [10]-[12]):-

10 Mr Perry’s evidence was explicitly accepted by the learned Tribunal Member, and she described him as a “straightforward, honest” witness.

11 After detailing the legislative landscape, and summarising the submissions of each party, the learned Judicial Member made a number of observations about the facts and the law. These can be summarised as follows:-

12 The final paragraph of the decision, paragraph [34], provides as follows:-

“34 The applicant provides low cost accommodation at a budget rate and assists the community with this provision. The structuring of the division of the accommodation does not satisfy the ordinary meaning of “single accommodation” as it is referred to in Revenue Ruling LT78.”

The Submissions on Appeal – appellant

13 The appellant submitted, that the appellant satisfied the Tribunal in every respect of its eligibility for the exemption, except for the construction of the word “accommodation” and its effect on the total tariff charged for the room comprising four bunk beds.

14 Accordingly, the submission for the appellant was that the “ordinary meaning” of the word “accommodation” is “a residential facility or a residential service”, and that the term was a flexible concept. It submitted that the learned Tribunal member read it in a special, narrow meaning instead of giving it its ordinary meaning.

15 It is submitted that the word “accommodation” had to be read in the context of the Guideline, and that in doing so, regard had to be had for the exemption being available where “at least 80 per cent of the accommodation available to boarding house residents is $180 per week for single accommodation, or $300 per week for family or shared accommodation”. The submission continued to argue that the word “accommodation” in the guideline did not mean “room”.

16 The appellant pointed to s 11 of the Interpretation Act to submit that the meaning of “accommodation” in the Guidelines had the same meaning as it had in s 10Q. Further, the word has a fixed meaning in the statutory context, so that the word “accommodation” meant the same thing in various contexts in the substantive legislation and in the Guidelines.

17 As to the construction point, the appellant says that when the purpose of s 10Q is properly understood, the learned Tribunal member’s construction of “accommodation” to mean “room” is shown to be incorrect. It is put on behalf of the appellant that s 10Q, while it covers boarding houses, is not confined to boarding houses, being directed at “all forms of low-cost accommodation”. The construction given the word “accommodation” by the learned Tribunal member, it is submitted, would undermine the statutory purpose by, for example, excluding a dormitory-style hostel catering for people in bunks in one room, each charged a low sum per night by, say, a charity. Accommodation is more, it is submitted, than just a room – it “encompasses many forms of living arrangements”.

18 The appellant submitted that the questions to be answered were:-

19 The appellant said that each of these questions need to be answered affirmatively for the exemption to apply.

20 Around 80% of the beds provided at the appellant’s premises were supplied to single people, who were given the use of a single designated bed and locker. The tariff for this was $112.50 per week. The balance of the 20% were rooms which were licensed to groups of four, who could decide amongst themselves who had the right to use the particular beds.

21 The learned Tribunal member’s construction of “accommodation” as a “room” meant that the tariff charged per room was more than the $180 per week prescribed.

22 The appellant also submitted that the learned Tribunal member fell into error in considering whether or not the room may have been divided into four “virtual” rooms by way of the bunk beds. In doing so, the learned Tribunal member accepted that a curtain or partition may have that effect, but held that a horizontal partition by way of a bunk bed would not have that effect. It is submitted that in so finding, the physical structure of the bunk beds were ignored and that if vertical partitioning such as curtains or walls could divide rooms, so could horizontal structures.

23 It was submitted that by reason of the short oral evidence taken at the Appeal Panel hearing (by which Mr Perry, the principal of the appellant, gave evidence as to the physical layout of the room and the ability to use the top bunk without discommoding the occupant of the lower) , the Appeal Panel should find that the bunk bed setup of the rooms comprised a “virtual room” consisting of the space of the bunks and that the cost for each bunk should be the cost taken into account for the exemption, not the cost of the room with the four beds.

24 It was submitted that the need for the extension to the merits of the appeal was required by reason of the learned Tribunal Member raising in the decision the concept of “virtual rooms” and that by extending the appeal to the merits the Appeal Panel would be able to deal with the issue of the physical layout of the bunk beds and the ability of the occupant of the upper bunk to access the sleeping space without discommoding the occupant of the lower bunk.

Submissions on appeal – the Respondent

25 The respondent relies upon the well-established onus of proof in revenue matters, to the effect that a taxpayer needs to prove its case that an assessment is excessive, usually with regard to facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the taxpayer (see McCauley v. FTC 88 ATC 4605 at 4613). The respondent submitted that the appellant failed to discharge its onus of proof, both before the Tribunal below and before the Appeal Panel.

26 As to the substance of the appeal, and as a threshold matter, the respondent submitted that as the Guideline defined “boarding house” as one which meant premises which are used in the course of conducting a business of letting rooms to boarders or lodgers” (see para 4(1) of the Guideline). As the business of the respondent was the letting or licensing of single beds and lockers, rather than “rooms”, the land did not fall within the definition of “boarding house” and thus neither s 10Q nor the Ruling applied to the land.

27 The respondent further submitted that a proper analysis of the available data suggested that, rather than 80% of the lettings being to “long term residents” as required by paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Guideline, less than 80% and in fact only 62% of the accommodation (in the sense of beds, as contended for by the appellant) was occupied by “long term residents”. The respondent suggested that other interpretations of the “80% test” resulted similarly in failures to meet the 80% test (see paragraphs 12-19 of the respondent’s submissions).

28 The respondent, in essence, has brought the issue of the analysis of the Occupancy Records by way of a de facto notice of contention; ie, an assertion that the original decision should be confirmed on grounds other than those which appeared in the decision below. The decision was made by the learned Tribunal member on the basis of the definition of “accommodation” and not on the actual analysis of the Occupancy Records; the respondent says that either the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that the Occupancy Records do not establish that the Lodge is a boarding house, but also that if the appellant succeeds on the “accommodation” definition issue(s) the appeal should be dismissed on that basis or alternatively remitted to the Tribunal below for consideration on that ground.

29 Accordingly, it is not an agreed position that, as postulated by the appellant, the appellant needs only to overturn the learned Tribunal Member’s definition of “accommodation” in order to succeed on the appeal.

30 In relation to the term “accommodation”, the respondent submits that the meaning of the word is evidenced from the context in which it is used in both s 10Q and the Guideline. Section 10Q refers to “land” that is used and occupied primarily for “lost cost accommodation” (subs-s 10Q(1)) and land that is used as the site of a “boarding house”. The Guideline defines “boarding house” as a business which lets “rooms” to boarders or lodgers. The Macquarie Online Dictionary defines “lodging” as being (inter alia) “ a room or rooms hired for residence in another’s house”.

31 The respondent submits that the Tribunal member was correct in determining that the term “accommodation” referred to a “room”. As the appellant was not letting “rooms” in the usual sense of the word, but rather a bed and a locker and the use of common facilities, it was not, by definition, a “boarding house”. The respondent pointed further to the differentiation in the Act and the Guideline of “single accommodation” and “family or shared accommodation” – again, terms which have no statutory definition. It is submitted that the usual ordinary meaning of those terms is to equate “accommodation” with “room”. For example, it is submitted that “single” accommodation refers to a room in which only one person lives, and “family or shared accommodation” refers to a room where people live together.

32 As to the second issue, and the theoretical division of the room into “virtual” rooms, the respondent submitted that the usual meaning of a “room” is a “self-contained space within defined physical boundaries comprising four walls, a ceiling and a floor” (see Macquarie Online Dictionary) and not the open-sided space between a top and a bottom bunk.

33 Accordingly, the respondent submits that the appeal should be dismissed on the basis that the land was not exempt under s 10Q.

Appellant’s submissions in reply

34 The appellant submits in reply that the definition of “boarding house” in the Guideline cannot govern the interpretation of s 10Q; rather, the opposite process should take place. Section 10Q does not mention “boarding houses”, rather, it refers to “land” in the context of “low cost accommodation” and the process of determining the true definition of “accommodation” cannot be assisted by that section. Further, the ordinary meaning of “boarder” or “lodger” cannot assist the Appeal Panel in determining what is the meaning of “accommodation”.

35 Further, it is submitted in reply that the learned Tribunal Member found that the property was a “boarding house” (in paragraph [1] of the decision below) and that the appellant is entitled to rely on that finding. It is pointed out that while “lodgings” is part of “accommodation”, the two terms are not synonymous and accommodation can comprise matters which are not lodgings.

36 Finally, the appellant points to alternative definitions, including the Compact Oxford Dictionary Online definition of “accommodation” as “a room, building or space where someone may live or stay”.

37 In relation to the question of whether the Roof Top Travellers’ Lodge is indeed a “boarding house” with respect to the 80% rule, the appellant submits in reply that that matter was determined by the learned Tribunal Member in determining that the Lodge was indeed a “boarding house” and that the analysis undertaken in the submissions on behalf of the respondent is irrelevant given that the Tribunal accepted Mr Perry’s evidence as to the occupation of the rooms at the property.

Consideration

38 It appears to us appropriate that the appeal be extended to the merits given the fact that if the appellant succeeds, the evidence given by Mr Perry before the Appeal Panel would be useful in determining the Appeal. Accordingly, leave is granted to extend the appeal to the merits of the decision.

39 As to the substantive grounds, it is clear that the primary reference point is the statutory provision in which the contested word “accommodation” appears. That statutory provision is s 10Q of the Act, and the context in which the word “accommodation” appears is that of “low cost accommodation”.

40 Moving then to the guidelines referred to in s 10Q, being Revenue Ruling N LT 78, it can be seen that “land used and occupied primarily as a boarding house” may be exempted from, or subject to reduced land tax, if “guidelines ... are met”. “Boarding house” is defined in par 4 of the Ruling, essentially as being premises which:-

Liquor Act

Residential Tenancies Act

41 It is not enough to be a “boarding house” within the definition of par 4 in order to obtain the exemption from or reduction in land tax. In order to do so, the particular provisions of par 3 must be met. These are the provisions relied upon by the respondent which deal with occupancy by long-term residents at particular tariffs.

42 Those guidelines for the relevant tax year require that the provisions in par 3(a) of the Ruling be met. The respondent is correct in saying that in order to be successful, the appellant must prove that “single accommodation” includes a bunk, locker, and right to use the common conveniences supplied, but also that the various formulations of the “80% rule” have been met.

43 Accordingly, the reference by the learned Tribunal Member in paragraph [1] that the property “is now operated as a boarding house” does not assist the appellant in the way contended for; the finding merely refers, in our view, to a compliance with paragraph 4 of the Guideline and is not a finding that the Lodge is a boarding house which otherwise satisfies all the conditions for an exemption or reduction of land tax.

44 The learned Tribunal Member dealt with the Occupancy Reports in paragraph [16] of the reasons for decision. In that paragraph it was said:

“16 The applicant’s representative drew attention to the occupancy report attached to Mr Perry’s statement which disclosed the occupancy of 38 rooms. Attention was drawn to the weekly tariffs charged per person and the occupancy of particular persons over the prescribed period of “3 months” set out in clause 3(1)(a) of Revenue Ruling LT78”.

45 The learned Tribunal Member dealt with the contention by the appellant that the Occupancy Reports supported its case in paragraph [18] and with the respondent’s contention that they could not be so relied upon in paragraphs [23]-[24]. However, she did not go on to determine this, as disclosed in the part of the reasons for decisions entitled “Reasons”, given that the learned Tribunal Member found that the term “accommodation” was equated with “room” in the relevant statutory provision and Guideline and therefore the respective tariffs for “single accommodation” or “family or shared accommodation” were greater than the limit for the “low cost accommodation” exemption or reduction from land tax.

46 It follows that the issue of whether the learned Tribunal Member was in error in her determination of the meaning of the word “accommodation” may or may not determine this appeal in toto. We shall now move to consider the meaning of the word.

47 Very little authority – in fact, none – was provided to assist the Appeal Panel on the meaning of the word “accommodation” in this context. Accordingly, it falls to the Appeal Panel to determine the general meaning of the word. Dictionary meanings – some tending to support one side of the argument, and some tending to support the other – are referred to above in the sections dealing with the submissions from either side.

48 In favour of the learned Tribunal Member’s finding that “accommodation” is to be equated with “room”, the definition of “boarding house” in the Guideline requires that it be in the business of “letting rooms to lodgers”.

49 The exemption from land tax provided for in s 10Q is not, however, for “rooms”, but for “low cost accommodation”. The obvious purpose of such an exemption (or reduction) is to enable low cost accommodation to continue to be provided by granting an exemption from what may be a large amount of land tax (considering that some boarding houses, such as the property in question, are in relatively high-value areas of the State and may thus have a high land value). In effect, it provides a reduction in cost to the operator of the boarding house and furthers the statutory aim of assisting low-income persons to have secure accommodation within the community.

50 The learned Tribunal Member, after examining the historical basis of the “single” or “shared” (formerly “married or de facto”) status under the Social Security Act 1947, determined that “The definition of “accommodation appears to refer to a “room”” (par [29]). It appears that the equation of “accommodation” with “room” originates in the learned Tribunal Member’s reasoning derives from the cognate term “single accommodation” and “family and shared accommodation” and the submission from the respondent that “single accommodation” refers to a place where one person lives alone. On that basis, the four-bunk room could only be “single accommodation” if one person resided in it without other persons in other bunks sharing it.

51 It seems to us that this is an unduly restrictive interpretation of the word “accommodation” in the context of the provision of low-cost housing. There is no policy reason given in support of the contention that “accommodation” equals “room” in this context. The interpretation that “accommodation” means simply “a place to stay or live” . The Oxford English Dictionary definition appears to capture this concept, in defining “accommodation” as “a room, building, or space where someone may live or stay”. The Macquarie Dictionary gives a meaning of “lodging, or food and lodging” and defines “lodging” as “accommodation in a house, especially in rooms for hire”.

52 Nothing in the dictionary definitions, nor in the statutory provisions themselves, indicates a limitation in the word “accommodation” which requires that it be defined as “room”. It is entirely conceivable that low cost accommodation could be provided in a dormitory setting, or in bunks as currently proposed.

53 Further, an amendment was made to Section 10Q of the Act in 1994 (by State Revenue Legislation (Further Amendment) Act 1994) that specifically broadened the exemption in Section 10Q from land used and occupied as a boarding house for persons with low incomes to all forms of low cost accommodation, subject to the Treasurer’s guidelines being met. Section 10Q (as originally introduced into the Act in 1989 (by Land Tax Management (Amendment) Act 1989) applied specifically to boarding houses which were defined in the Act as including “rooming houses, serviced rooms and flatettes and furnished or unfurnished rooms (with or without resident managers)” but did not include premises in respect of which a hotelier’s licence was in force.

54 The explanatory note to the 1994 amendments expresses a clear intention that Section 10Q was being amended to extend the exemption to all forms of low cost accommodation subject to the Treasurer’s guidelines being met. The relevant Second reading speech in respect of the relevant bill stated the following:

The current land tax exemption for boarding houses providing low-cost accommodation will be extended to all forms of low-cost accommodation subject to approved guidelines being met. The current guidelines relating to boarding houses will continue largely unchanged. New guidelines will be formulated relating to other forms of low-cost accommodation, although similar tariff limits to those specified in the boarding house guidelines will apply.

55 Accordingly, we are of the view that the learned Tribunal Member erred in finding that “the definition of accommodation appears to refer to a room”.

56 That, however, does not dispose of the appeal. The respondent indicates that should the finding as to the word “accommodation” be reached as above, then the appeal should be determined on the basis of the analysis of the Occupancy Records and a determination made as to whether the 80% threshold was reached at any time.

57 This question was referred to, but not determined by, the learned Tribunal Member, doubtless because the interpretation given to the word “accommodation” in the reasons for decision below disposed of the application for review and made the determination of this issue unnecessary.

58 While the Appeal Panel has had before it the Occupancy Records, it seems to us that the parties should be given the opportunity to argue this matter fully before the learned Tribunal Member and, if thought appropriate, to call further evidence on the “80% threshold”. Given the factual nature of the question of the length and nature of the various occupancies, and the time-span over which those occupancies are to be determined, in addition to the different light to be cast upon it in the light of the definition of “accommodation”, it seems to the Appeal Panel that the better course is for the question of compliance with the various formulations in the Guideline be remitted to the learned Tribunal Member for determination.

59 Accordingly, the matter is remitted to Judicial Member Hole for determination of the application for review in accordance with the foregoing reasons for decision.

Further Issue – Extension to the merits

60 It is noted that the Guideline refers to “boarding houses”. Section 10Q requires not only that the accommodation for which the exemption is sought is “low cost accommodation” but that the occupation of that accommodation be in accordance with the Guidelines. It appears that, in respect of the 2007 land tax year, there were two Guidelines in existence, being that constituted by Revenue Ruling LT 78 (as referred to above) and another constituted by Revenue Ruling LT 79. The Guideline in LT78 is one which applies to boarding houses, which incorporates a requirement that the business of the boarding house is the letting of “rooms”. The Guideline in LT79 is one that applies to low-cost accommodation (that accommodation not being licensed premises or a boarding-house). The term “boarding-house” is not defined in the Guideline in LT79.

61 The question then arises as to whether the Guideline in LT78 covers the present form of low cost accommodation, being lodge-style accommodation with the provision of bunks rather than individual rooms. Further, if the Guideline in LT 78 does not apply, does the Guideline in LT 79 effectively provide a “catch-all” for the requirements that need to be satisfied in relation to all other forms of low cost accommodation?

62 The questions arises in the following context - if there is an absence of a guideline in respect of a particular form of low-cost accommodation, can the Chief Commissioner (or the Tribunal standing in his shoes) be properly “satisfied” as required in Section 10Q(1)(c)?

63 It is noted that the appellant has been granted leave to extend this appeal to the merits in relation to the question of whether a top-level bunk can be a “room” for the purpose of treating a lodge with bunk beds, which are let independently of each other, as a “boarding house”.

64 We are of the view that there is no need to make a determination on that question, because the appellant is indeed in the business of letting “rooms”. The evidence is that a proportion of the occupants took a whole room and sorted out amongst themselves who was to sleep in which bunk. The fact that some of the rooms let out by the appellant were let out simultaneously to four separate occupiers does not, in our view, detract from that proposition.

65 However, were it necessary to determine the question, it is our view that such an interpretation can indeed be given to the word “room” in cl 4 of the Guideline in LT78. The evidence from Mr Perry was that the top and lower bunks were, in effect, separated from each other and that the persons occupying them could do so without significant disturbance to the other occupant of the bunk.

66 Accordingly, it does not seem to the Appeal Panel that there is a lacuna in the statutory/Guideline area which would exclude this particular property and nor would it be necessary to apply in this case the Guideline in LT79.

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Citations

Perry Properties Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (Rd) [2010] NSWADTAP 6

Most Recent Citation

Nugent v City of Bayswater [2017] WASC 25

Cases Citing This Decision

3

Perry Properties Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (Rd) [2012] NSWADTAP 13

Perry Properties Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (Rd) [2011] NSWADTAP 1

Nugent v City of Bayswater [2017] WASC 25

Cases Cited

0

Statutory Material Cited

4

CITATION:	Perry Properties Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (RD) [2010] NSWADTAP 6
PARTIES:	APPELLANT Perry Properties Pty Ltd RESPONDENT Chief Commissioner of State Revenue
FILE NUMBER:	099013
HEARING DATES:	4 September 2009
DATE OF DECISION:	5 February 2010
BEFORE:	Needham J SC - Deputy President; Hirschhorn M - Judicial Member; Bennett C - Non-Judicial Member
CATCHWORDS:	Land Tax – low cost accommodation – meaning of “accommodation” – extension to the merits – meaning of “room”.
DECISION UNDER APPEAL:	Perry Properties Pty Ltd v. Chief Commissioner of State Revenue
LEGISLATION CITED:	Land Tax Management Act 1956 Revenue Ruling no LT 78 Revenue Ruling no LT 79 State Revenue Legislation (Further Amendment) Act 1994
REPRESENTATION:	APPELLANT P Singleton, Barrister RESPONDENT AH Rider, Barrister (instructed by State Crown Solicitors)
ORDERS:	1.Grant leave to extend appeal to the merits of the decision 2.Appeal allowed 3.Matter remitted to Tribunal for determination of issue of compliance with threshold requirements of Guideline LT78.