Perry and Go Marine Group Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2021] AATA 830 (9 April 2021)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2019/4042, 2020/2940
Re:David Perry
APPLICANT
Go Marine Group Pty LtdAnd
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President J Sosso
Date:9 April 2021
Place:Brisbane
The reviewable decisions are affirmed.
..............................[SGD]...............................
Deputy President J Sosso
Catchwords
COMPENSATION – osteoarthritis – aggravation of osteoarthritis – condition contributed to by employment – material degree test – pre-existing condition – obesity – decision affirmed
Legislation
Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth)
Cases
Bailey v Broadsword Marine Contractors Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 219; (2017) 257 FCR 549
Comcare v Sahu-Khan [2007] FCA 15
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President J Sosso
9 April 2021
INTRODUCTION
Mr David Perry (the Applicant) seeks a review of two reviewable decisions of Go Marine Group Pty Ltd (the Respondent) made pursuant to the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (the Act) concerning the Applicant’s left knee. Those reviewable decisions are:
(a)a reviewable decision of 8 April 2020 (2020/2940) affirming a deemed determination made on or about 20 January 2020 – Exhibit 2 T5 p. 15, which disallowed a claim for incapacity for work, medical and related expenses in relation to aggravation of arthritis of the left knee. The decision was made in relation to an incident which occurred in November/December 2010, and will be referred to as “the paint tins incident”; and
(b)a reviewable decision of 31 May 2019 (2019/4042) affirming a deemed determination made on or about December 2017 – Exhibit 1 T44 p. 128, which disallowed the Applicant’s claim for incapacity for work, medical and related expenses in relation to arthritis of the left knee. This decision was made in relation to an incident which occurred in May 2010, and will be referred to as “the grate incident”.
The Applicant was born in 1965 and at the time of the Hearing was aged 55 years – Exhibit 1 T7 p. 18. From approximately 1986 the Applicant was employed as an integrated rating in the marine industry, which was essentially a labouring job – Exhibit 1 T27 p. 53, T28 p. 67. The Applicant left high school at 14 years of age and subsequently worked in various jobs involving manual labour – Exhibit 1 T28 p. 67.
From the evidence before the Tribunal, it would appear that the Applicant was in the employ of the Respondent from 1 July 2008 until 7 December 2010 – Exhibit 5 R3 p. 20 para 3.2.
In 1995 the Applicant was employed by ASP Ship Management and was working on the boat “CSL Innovator” which transported sugar from Australia to Indonesia. On 8 March 1995, whilst working on the ship, the Applicant slipped on a wet surface and injured his right knee – Exhibit 5 R5 p. 59.
The Applicant was examined and subsequently operated on by Dr Greg Gillett, Orthopaedic Surgeon. In his report of 11 April 1995 (the day of the operation), Dr Gillett wrote to the Applicant’s treating General…
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- Case
- [2021] AATA 830
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before Deputy J Sosso P was to determine whether the applicant's employment contributed in a "material degree" to his current left knee condition, specifically osteoarthritis. This required the court to assess the causal link between the applicant's work activities and the aggravation of his pre-existing knee pathology, considering factors such as a previous injury and obesity.
The court's reasoning was heavily influenced by the medical evidence presented by both parties, particularly the reports of Dr Steadman and Dr Dane Andersen. Deputy J Sosso P applied the interpretation of "material degree" as an "evaluative threshold" requiring a substantial or considerable contribution, rather than a de minimis one. The court found that the weight of the medical evidence did not establish that the applicant's employment had materially contributed to his current left knee condition, despite acknowledging the applicant's submissions regarding a workplace injury in May 2010 and subsequent aggravation in November 2010.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the applicant's employment had not materially contributed to his current left knee condition. Accordingly, the reviewable decisions were affirmed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The term “material degree” was helpfully explained by the Finn J in Comcare v Sahu-Khan [2007] FCA 15 as follows:“13. The modern approach to statutory interpretation, as is now well accepted, attributes a greater significance to context and legislative purpose than previously was the case: see CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, at 408. That approach, in my respectful view, was adopted unexceptionably by French and Stone JJ in Canute in their treatment of the legislative history of the definition of "disease" in the SRC Act. I agree with what their Honours have said and, in particular, in their conclusion that the inclusion of the word "material" imposes an "evaluative threshold" below which a causal connection may be disregarded.14. What is problematic is identifying where that threshold lies. Treloar’s case set its own threshold of sorts for satisfying the 1971 Act’s "contributing factor" requirement. It would, for example, exclude a de minimis contribution or one which did not influence the course of events. But once an employment was found to be a contributing factor to the condition in question, it did not matter whether the contribution was of any particular size or degree: Treloar, at 329. It has not been uncommon for courts, in dealing with statutes requiring such a contribution to be found, to describe that contribution as "material": see eg Repatriation Commission v Bendy [1989] FCA 170; (1989) 10 AAR 323 at 325. That usage is not how the term "material" in the phrase "in a material degree" is used in the SRC Act. The legislative history of this definition makes this plain. 15. There are, in my view, obvious hazards in allowing finely nuanced differences in dictionary definitions to contrive the answer to this question, given as I have noted, that the word "material" in this context had its legislative meaning set in part by the qualification it imposed on the nature of the contribution required to be demonstrated before the provisions of the SRC Act were engaged. This said I consider that one of the meanings of the word "materially" in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary probably captures the essence of what the legislature was conveying. That meaning is – "4. In a material degree; substantially, considerably."An example given of this usage is that of contributing "materially to the funds required" for a purpose. This usage probably comes closer to what Davies J in Bendy described (at 325) as the "loose sense" of the definition of "material" in the Macquarie dictionary "namely, ‘of substantial import or much consequence’ [rather than the] legal sense of ‘pertinent’ or ‘likely to influence’".16. Bearing in mind that the course of statutory construction is often not aided by substituting for the word used in an enactment, another word which is not so used, probably the best that can ultimately be said is that the s 4 definition: (i) requires a stronger causal relationship between the employment and the ailment, etc suffered than that exacted by the 1971 Act;(ii) "in a material degree" requires an evaluation of all relevant contributing factors for the purpose of asking whether the employee’s employment did or did not contribute materially to the suffering of the ailment, etc, in question ("the threshold evaluation");(iii) whether this will be so in a given case will be a matter of fact and degree.”CONSIDERATIONContentions of the Parties