Perry and Go Marine Group Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2023] AATA 4214 (20 December 2023)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s):2022/8396
Re:David Perry
APPLICANT
Go Marine Group Pty LtdAnd
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member R Bellamy
Date:20 December 2023
Place:Brisbane
The reviewable decision is affirmed.
.............................[SGD]...............................
Senior Member R Bellamy
Catchwords
COMPENSATION – aggravation of pre-existing degenerative condition –– whether temporary or ongoing aggravation – material degree test – whether employer liable for preinjury sustained in other employment – pre-existing condition – decision affirmed
Legislation
Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
Cases
R v Perry [2011] QCA 236
Woodhouse v Comcare (2021) 285 FCR 14
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member R Bellamy
20 December 2023
INTRODUCTION
Mr David Perry is 57 years old. He was educated to year eight and spent his entire working life on ships. He also worked as a union official between 1998 and 2007. This application concerns an injury to Mr Perry’s right knee that occurred in 2010. His right knee was first injured at work in 1995. After two operations and a period of rest, he returned to his duties, however he developed osteoarthritis in that knee. In 2010, while working for the Respondent employer, Mr Perry again injured his right knee at work. I will refer to this injury as “the 2010 injury”. There was also an injury to his left knee in 2010 but that is not relevant to this application. The contentious issue in this application is whether the 2010 injury caused only a temporary aggravation of the underlying osteoarthritis, as the Respondent contends, or whether it had an ongoing impact as Mr Perry contends.
The Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (“the Act”) provides for rehabilitation and workers’ compensation for seafarers and certain other persons. Subsection 26(1) relevantly provides that if an employee suffers an injury that results in incapacity for work or impairment, compensation is payable for that injury. “Injury” is broadly defined but it must arise out of, or in the course of, employment.
Section 8 of the Act provides that an incapacity for work is an incapacity suffered by an employee as a result of an injury, being:
(a) an incapacity to engage in any work; or
(b) an incapacity to engage in work as an employee at the same rank or level at which he or she was engaged immediately before the injury happened.
Section 28 provides for, among other things, compensation for the cost of medical treatment for an injury.
Section 31 of the Act effectively provides that where an employee is incapacitated for work as a result of an injury, compensation is payable to for the period of incapacity. For the first 45 weeks, compensation is payable in an amount equal to the employee’s normal weekly earnings (minus earnings in suitable employment) and thereafter, compensation is payable in an amount equal to a prescribed portion of their normal weekly earnings.
Mr Perry made…
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- Case
- [2023] AATA 4214
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether Mr Perry's right knee condition constituted an "injury" as defined by the relevant legislation, and specifically, whether the 2010 incident caused ongoing incapacity or materially aggravated a pre-existing degenerative condition. The court was required to determine if the employment contributed to the ailment in a material degree and whether that contribution continued to be a factor in Mr Perry's ongoing condition.
Senior Member Bellamy considered the medical evidence, including reports from orthopaedic surgeons Dr Greg Gillett and Dr Cameron Cooke, and Professor Steadman. The court noted that Mr Perry had a pre-existing degenerative condition in his right knee, which had been surgically treated following an incident in 1995. The 2010 incident involved soft tissue damage. The court applied the definition of "injury" under the Act, which includes an aggravation of a physical injury that arose out of, or in the course of, employment, and that an aggravation of a pre-existing condition could be considered a "disease" if contributed to in a material degree by employment. Drawing on the principles from *Woodhouse v Comcare*, the court emphasised that for liability to continue, the ailment must remain an "injury" and owe its existence to the material contribution of employment, not merely factors unconnected to it.
Ultimately, the court was not satisfied that the 2010 injury materially contributed to Mr Perry's ongoing right knee condition in June 2012 or thereafter. While acknowledging that the 2010 incident caused temporary soft tissue damage, the court found that it did not accelerate the progression of the underlying degenerative condition. Consequently, the reviewable decision was affirmed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
According to Mr Perry, he has not been employed since the injury because he is no longer fit to work at sea and he had not been able to secure alternative employment. He said that prior to the injury his right knee was in manageable shape and he could work. He described the injury as a watershed moment where his knee took a turn for the worse, he has not been able to work since, and his knee has never been the same since. He was unwilling to accept that he was overweight and that his weight could be a contributing factor to the condition of his right knee. At times, he accepted that his current condition was a consequence of the 1995 incident. CONSIDERATION As stated above, Mr Perry’s entitlement to lost wages for any period after 1 June 2012 depends on him being unable to work in that period due to an injury arising out of, or in the course of, his employment. Under section 3 of the act “Injury” is defined to mean:(a) a disease; or(b) an injury; or (c) an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee being an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment. To find in Mr Perry’s favour, I would have to find that the 2010 injury itself caused ongoing incapacity or that the 2010 injury aggravated the pre-existing osteoarthritis. An aggravation of the pre-existing condition would suffice because the definition of “disease” includes an “ailment or an aggravation that was contributed to in a material degree by the employee's employment”. “Ailment” is defined to mean “any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition (whether of sudden onset or gradual development)”. The pre-existing condition, as it is described by Professor Steadman, meets the definition of “ailment” and an aggravation of it meets the definition of “disease”. The case of Woodhouse v Comcare (2021) 285 FCR 14 concerned liability under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (“SRC Act”). In that case, the Full Court of the Federal Court said, in relation to the equivalent section in the SRC Act: “Section 14 only imposes liability on Comcare where, amongst other things, the ailment in respect of which the claim is made remains an “injury”. In the case of an ailment said to constitute an “injury” on the basis that it is a “disease”, the ailment must be one which continues to owe its existence to the contribution to, in a material degree, the employee’s employment. (For the avoidance of doubt, this does not require causation in the sense of a “but for” test: Comcare v Canute [2005] FCAFC 262; (2005) 148 FCR 232 [67]). In those unusual cases, such as the present, where the disease persists but only by reason of factors unconnected to the contribution of the employment, Comcare’s liability will have ceased. Conversely, the applicant’s preferred construction should be rejected. Comcare has no liability under s 14 in relation to an ailment, the continued existence of which can no longer be said to have the necessary causal connection to the employee’s employment. The mere fact that the ailment suffered may once have had the necessary connection is irrelevant. Even where the ailment continues unabated, if it ceases to have the characteristic of being one which was relevantly contributed to by the employee’s employment, Comcare’s liability ceases.[20] (Underlining added)[20] [89]-[90].