Perpetual Limited v Rocco Costa & Santina Costa

Link copied
Case Copied 21 min read
CITATION: Perpetual Limited v Rocco Costa & Santina Costa [2007] NSWSC 1093
HEARING DATE(S): 26/9/07, 27/9/07, 28/9/07, 2/10/07
 
JUDGMENT DATE : 

2 October 2007
JUDGMENT OF: Bell J at 1
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 2 October 2007
DECISION: Verdict and judgment for the defendants
CATCHWORDS: No case application - r 29.10 of the UCPR - loan advance paid to third party - no direction to pay - whether inference of actual/implied/ostensible authority open
LEGISLATION CITED: Real Property Act 1900
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
CASES CITED: Hunt v Watkins [2000] NSWCA 299; 49 NSWLR 508
Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Tsai [2004] NSWSC 745
Prince v Clark (1823) 107 ER 70
PARTIES: Perpetual Limited ACN 000 431 827 (Plaintiff)
Rocco Costa (Defendant)
Santina Costa (Defendant)
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 14036/06
COUNSEL: R Francois (Plaintiff)
J Whittle SC / B Burke (Defendants)
SOLICITORS: Clayton Utz (Plaintiff)
Populaw Legal Services (Defendants)

      IN THE SUPREME COURT
      OF NEW SOUTH WALES
      COMMON LAW DIVISION
      POSSESSION LIST

      BELL J

      Tuesday 2 October 2007

      14036/06 PERPETUAL LIMITED v ROCCO COSTA & ANOR

      JUDGMENT

1 HER HONOUR: The defendants move for judgment pursuant to r 29.10 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules on the ground that on the evidence given a judgment for the plaintiff could not be supported.

2 The parties are agreed that the principles to be applied in dealing with the application are as stated in Hunt v Watkins [2000] NSWCA 299; 49 NSWLR 508. Stein JA (with whose judgment the other member of the Court concurred) held that the "jury test" is to be applied: a judgment by direction should be given in favour of an opposite party if the evidence adduced is such that a verdict by a jury in favour of the beginning party would if challenged necessarily be set aside.

3 By statement of claim filed on 16 August 2006, the plaintiff claims an order for possession of certain land being the whole of the land comprised in Certificate of Title, Folio Identifier 1/543860 and being Lot 1 in Deposited Plan 543860 together with the premises erected thereon known as 183B Alt Street, Haberfield (the property) and judgment for the principal sum of $700,000.00.

4 The plaintiff pleads its case as follows. By mortgage dated 18 June 2002 and registered on 14 February 2006 (bearing registered number 8728926F) the defendants mortgaged the property to the plaintiff upon the terms and conditions that are contained in registered memorandum 2477234. By a contract dated 18 June 2002 between the plaintiff as lender and the defendants as borrowers, the plaintiff agreed to advance moneys to the defendants and on or about 21 June 2002 advanced the sum of $700,000 (the principal sum) to the defendants.

5 The plaintiff particularises its claim as follows (paragraph 5):

          The monies were advanced by payment at the direction of the defendants as follows:
          Settlement Fee $50.00
          Lenders Mortgage Insurance Fee $3,475.05
          Land Titles Office $60.00
          Owen Hodge Lawyers $93.80
          Office of State Revenue $2,741.00
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Perpetual Limited v Rocco Costa & Santina Costa and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2007] NSWSC 1093
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case between Perpetual Limited and Rocco Costa and Santina Costa involved a legal dispute concerning a loan advance paid to a third party. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The central issue before the court was whether an inference of actual, implied, or ostensible authority could be drawn in relation to the payment of the loan advance to the third party. The court had to determine whether the bank could hold the defendants liable for the loan advance due to an agency relationship between them and the third party.

The legal issues revolved around the interpretation of agency law principles and the circumstances under which a bank may be justified in inferring actual, implied, or ostensible authority in relation to the loan advance. The court considered whether there was any evidence to support such an inference and the extent to which the defendants could be held accountable for the actions of the third party. The bank argued that the defendants had provided instructions or created an impression that the third party was authorised to receive the loan advance on their behalf.

In its reasoning, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to infer any form of agency authority between the defendants and the third party in relation to the loan advance. The court found that the bank had not established the necessary connection between the defendants and the third party that would warrant holding the defendants liable for the loan advance. The court emphasised the importance of clear instructions and the need for evidence to support an inference of agency authority. The court concluded that the bank's claim against the defendants was unsuccessful, and they were not liable for the loan advance paid to the third party. The court dismissed the case, and no further orders were made.

Background

Background to the litigation

Perpetual Limited, a financial institution, brought an action against Rocco Costa and Santina Costa. The dispute arose from a loan advance made by Perpetual Limited to a third party, which the plaintiffs claimed was improperly disbursed. The loan was intended to be made to the defendants, Rocco and Santina Costa, but was mistakenly paid to a third party. The plaintiffs sought to recover the funds from the defendants, arguing that the defendants were liable for the repayment of the loan due to their connection with the third party. The court had to determine whether the defendants could be held liable based on any form of authority — actual, implied, or ostensible — that the third party might have had to receive the loan on behalf of the defendants.

The matter came before the court under a no case application pursuant to rule 29.10 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR). This application was brought by the defendants, Rocco and Santina Costa, who sought to have the proceedings against them dismissed on the basis that there was no evidence to support the plaintiff's claim. The court considered the evidence presented by the plaintiff, including the loan documents and any communications that could suggest the defendants' involvement or authorisation of the loan disbursement. The court also examined whether there were any indications of actual, implied, or ostensible authority that could bind the defendants to the loan repayment.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether there was actual authority on the part of the defendants for the third party to receive the loan advance.
2. Whether there was implied authority for the third party to act on behalf of the defendants in receiving the loan.
3. Whether there was ostensible authority that could bind the defendants to the repayment of the loan advanced to the third party.

Held
1. The court held that there was no actual authority on the part of the defendants for the third party to receive the loan advance.
2. The court held that there was no implied authority for the third party to act on behalf of the defendants in receiving the loan.
3. The court held that there was no ostensible authority that could bind the defendants to the repayment of the loan advanced to the third party.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In considering whether there was actual authority for the third party to receive the loan on behalf of the defendants, the court examined the evidence to determine if there was any express grant of authority. The court found that no such authority was given by the defendants to the third party to act on their behalf in this matter. There was no evidence of a written or oral agreement, or any other form of express direction that would establish the third party's authority to receive the loan.

In addressing the issue of implied authority, the court reviewed the relationship between the defendants and the third party, as well as the circumstances surrounding the loan transaction. The court considered whether the defendants' conduct or the nature of the transaction could imply the third party's authority to act on their behalf. The court concluded that there was no basis for implying such authority, as there was no established pattern of conduct or prior dealings that would support this inference.

Regarding ostensible authority, the court examined whether the defendants' conduct led the third party to reasonably believe that the third party had the authority to receive the loan. The court noted that there was no evidence of any representation or conduct by the defendants that would have created such an impression. Therefore, the court held that there was no ostensible authority that could bind the defendants to the repayment of the loan advanced to the third party. The binding legal principle, or ratio decidendi, established by this decision is that for a third party to have authority to bind another party to a loan repayment, there must be actual, implied, or ostensible authority, and none of these were present in this case. The court did not depart from or distinguish any prior authority in reaching this conclusion.