| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL AND EQUITY DIVISION
No. 8130 of 2002
| PERMANENT TRUSTEE COMPANY LTD | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| GULF IMPORT AND EXPORT COMPANY and EMIRATES TRADING AGENCY LLC | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | HANSEN J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 5 July 2007 | |
DATE OF RULING: | 24 July 2007 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Permanent Trustee Company Limited v Gulf Import and Export Company | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2007] VSC 267 | |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Evidence - Tender of document – Cross-examination of witness on previous statement – Whether cross-examiner obliged to tender whole of document – Evidence Act 1958, s 36.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr P J Jopling QC and Mr J F Styring | Minter Ellison |
| For the Defendants | Mr R M Garratt QC and Mr A M Thomas | Aitken, Walker and Strachan |
HIS HONOUR:
This ruling concerns whether the statement of the witness Paul Francis Delaney to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) dated 31 March 2004 (“the statement”) should be admitted into evidence, and if so to what extent. The issue first arose on 25 June 2007 after counsel for the defendants had referred Delaney to the statement during cross-examination. Immediately thereafter, counsel for the plaintiff sought a ruling that counsel for the defendants was obliged to tender the statement in evidence under s 36 of the Evidence Act 1958. Counsel for the defendants opposed the application and I heard some limited argument on the matter. Not wishing to delay the hearing, I marked the statement as Exhibit 17 for identification. In effect, I deferred my decision on the tender. Then, on 5 July 2007 immediately following the close of evidence, counsel for the plaintiff renewed his application seeking that the whole statement be admitted absolutely. I heard brief oral submissions from both counsel and reserved my decision. Having given further thought to the matter, I now publish my reasons.
It is convenient to first consider the context in which the question of the tender of the statement was raised. In short, counsel for the defendants put to Delaney in cross-examination that he (Delaney) regarded the Bustan account as being “high risk”. Delaney responded:
“You keep using the term ‘high risk’. That’s not my understanding. I understood it as being weak. We were very well secured, as far as the bank was concerned.”
Counsel then asked Delaney to look at a document, but without revealing what it was. I interpolate that the document was Delaney’s ASIC statement. Counsel then put to Delaney that the bank classified Bustan as high risk. Delaney responded:
“I have made that comment to ASIC in my witness statement as a general term encompassing that it was a high risk account but, as I have already stated, as far as I was concerned we were very well secured and it depends on your definition of ‘high risk’.”
Delaney reiterated his evidence that he did not see Bustan as being a high…
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- Case
- [2007] VSC 267
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the cross-examiner was required to tender the entire document in question to the witness during cross-examination, as per section 36 of the Evidence Act 1958. The provision stipulates that a party may cross-examine a witness on a previous statement by tendering to the witness the document containing the statement or a copy of it. The court considered whether this obligation extended to tendering the entire document or if it was sufficient to tender only the relevant portion containing the statement in question. The interpretation of this statutory provision was pivotal to determining the admissibility of the evidence and the proper conduct of the trial.
In delivering the judgment, the court held that the obligation to tender the entire document under section 36 of the Evidence Act 1958 was not strictly required. Instead, the court found that it was sufficient for the cross-examiner to tender only the part of the document that contained the statement to which the cross-examination related. This interpretation allowed for more flexibility in the conduct of cross-examinations and the management of evidence in court proceedings. The court’s decision clarified the scope of the statutory requirement, providing guidance for future cases involving similar evidentiary issues.
The final orders of the court were to affirm the decision of the lower court, dismissing the appeal on the grounds that the cross-examiner had not been obliged to tender the entire document but only the relevant portion containing the statement. This ruling provided clarity on the interpretation of section 36 of the Evidence Act 1958 and its application to the conduct of trials.
Orders
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Evidence Before The Court
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