Re: LYLE JOHN PERKINS
And: WILLIAM JOHN CUTHILL, KENNETH VINCENT LOUGHNAN, DESMOND JOHN LOVELOCK and
AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
No. VG 67 of 1981
Administrative law
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Keely J.
CATCHWORDS
Administrative law - appeal against dismissal by Disciplinary Appeal Board of appeal against demotion under Telecommunications Act - nature of statutory power conferred by s.61(1) of Act - application for judicial review - effect of Queensland Act that "conviction . . . deemed not to be a conviction" - board mistaken as to offences of which convicted - having regard to "nature" of offences - meaning of "nature"
Rules of natural justice - board "asking itself the wrong question" - board deciding on a basis never put to it and failing to give applicant opportunity to disabuse them - board failing to take into account relevant considerations - board acting on irrelevant considerations - Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 s.5, s.15(1) - Telecommunications Act 1975 s.61(1), s.61(2)(a), s.62(8) - Offenders Probation and Parole Act 1959 (Queensland) s.8, s.19
HEARING
MELBOURNE
#DATE 2:7:1981
ORDER
1. The decision of the Disciplinary Appeal Board, given on 12 March 1981, is quashed with effect from and including the date on which it was made.
2. The fourth respondent, the Australian Telecommunications Commission, is directed to arrange for a disciplinary appeal board under s.63 of the Telecommunications Act 1975, constituted by a different chairman and different members from the first, second and third respondents, to hear and determine the applicant's appeal from the decision by the delegate of the Australian Telecommunications Commission, dated 9 December 1980.
3. It is declared that the decision of the said delegate has not taken effect and does not take effect unless the applicant's appeal therefrom lapses or is withdrawn or a differently constituted disciplinary appeal board confirms, either with or without a variation, that decision.
4. The fourth respondent is directed to pay to the applicant an amount, after proper allowance for income tax, equal to the difference between -
(a) the salary he would have received as a Senior Technical Officer Grade 3; and
(b) the salary he has in fact received as a Senior Technical Officer Grade 1,
in respect of each pay day from 12 March 1981 to the first pay day when his salary as a Senior Technical Officer Grade 3 is restored.
5. Liberty to apply is reserved to each party.
6. The fourth respondent is directed to pay the costs of the applicant which, in default of agreement, shall be taxed.
JUDGE1
This is an application to the court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (the Judicial Review Act) by Lyle John Perkins (the applicant) for an order of review in respect of a decision of a Disciplinary Appeal Board (the board) constituted under s.63 of the Telecommunications Act 1975 (the Telecommunications Act). The first, second and third respondents are the chairman and members of the board. The applicant is…
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- AGLC
- Perkins, Lyle John v Cuthill, William John & Ors [1981] FCA 92
- Case
- [1981] FCA 92
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was the interpretation of section 61(1) of the Telecommunications Act and the meaning of "nature" in the context of the offences for which the applicant had been convicted. The court was required to determine whether the Board had correctly applied the law in dismissing the applicant's appeal, and whether the Board's determination of the effect of the Queensland Act was correct. The court also had to consider the effect of the Board's mistaken understanding of the nature of the offences on the outcome of the appeal.
The court found that the Board had erred in its consideration of the nature of the offences of which the applicant had been convicted. The court held that the Board had misunderstood the effect of the Queensland Act, and that this error had led to an incorrect determination of the nature of the offences. The court quashed the decision of the Disciplinary Appeal Board and directed the Australian Telecommunications Commission to arrange for a differently constituted disciplinary appeal board to hear and determine the applicant's appeal. The court also declared that the decision of the delegate had not taken effect and would not take effect unless the applicant's appeal lapsed or was withdrawn, or a differently constituted disciplinary appeal board confirmed the decision. The court further directed the Commission to pay the applicant an amount equal to the difference between the salary he would have received as a Senior Technical Officer Grade 3 and the salary he had in fact received as a Senior Technical Officer Grade 1, for each pay day from 12 March 1981 to the first pay day when his salary as a Senior Technical Officer Grade 3 was restored. The court also reserved liberty to apply to each party and directed the Commission to pay the applicant's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of the Disciplinary Appeal Board, given on 12 March 1981, is quashed with effect from and including the date on which it was made.
2. The fourth respondent, the Australian Telecommunications Commission, is directed to arrange for a disciplinary appeal board under s.63 of the Telecommunications Act 1975, constituted by a different chairman and different members from the first, second and third respondents, to hear and determine the applicant's appeal from the decision by the delegate of the Australian Telecommunications Commission, dated 9 December 1980.
3. It is declared that the decision of the said delegate has not taken effect and does not take effect unless the applicant's appeal therefrom lapses or is withdrawn or a differently constituted disciplinary appeal board confirms, either with or without a variation, that decision.
4. The fourth respondent is directed to pay to the applicant an amount, after proper allowance for income tax, equal to the difference between -
(a) the salary he would have received as a Senior Technical Officer Grade 3; and
(b) the salary he has in fact received as a Senior Technical Officer Grade 1,
in respect of each pay day from 12 March 1981 to the first pay day when his salary as a Senior Technical Officer Grade 3 is restored.
5. Liberty to apply is reserved to each party.
6. The fourth respondent is directed to pay the costs of the applicant which, in default of agreement, shall be taxed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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