FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Perera v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2014] FCA 182
Citation: Perera v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2014] FCA 182 Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Perera v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCCA 1227 Parties: GAYAN DHANANJAYA PERERA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: VID 880 of 2013 Judge: BROMBERG J Date of judgment: 6 March 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether leave to appeal should be granted in relation to the refusal of the primary judge to set aside the summary dismissal of an application for judicial review – whether any error in primary judge’s determination that no arguable case was raised by the application for judicial review – application dismissed. Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 16.05(2), 44.05 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66(2), 347(1)(b)(i), Pt 5 Div 5, 359A, 359A(1), 494B, 494B(5), 494C, 494C(4), 494C(4)(a), 494C(5), 494D, 494D(1), 494D(2)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) r 4.10(1)(a)Cases cited: Perera v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCCA 1227
Perera v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1417
Dai v Michael Roberts Strata Management Services Ltd [2000] FCA 680
Decor Corp v Dart Industries (1991) 33 FCR 397Date of hearing: 29 November 2013 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Anger Solicitor for the Applicant: Goz Chambers Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr L Brown Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 880 of 2013
BETWEEN: GAYAN DHANANJAYA PERERA
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 MARCH 2014
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 880 of 2013
BETWEEN: GAYAN DHANANJAYA PERERA
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMBERG J
DATE:
6 MARCH 2014
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 27 August 2013, the applicant (“Mr Perera”) filed a purported notice of appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia published as Perera v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCCA 1227. By that judgment, the primary judge dismissed Mr Perera’s application to reinstate his originating application for judicial review by the Federal Circuit Court of a decision of the second respondent, the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).
On 23 October 2013, the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“the Minister”), filed a notice of objection to competency claiming…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 182
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues were whether the primary judge erred in finding that Mr Perera's application for judicial review did not raise an arguable case, specifically regarding the calculation of the time limit for lodging the application for review and whether the Tribunal had denied Mr Perera natural justice by not sufficiently notifying him of the potential basis for an adverse decision. The court considered whether the primary judge's decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and whether refusing leave to appeal would result in substantial injustice.
The court found that the primary judge's conclusion regarding Mr Perera's s 359A ground was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration, as the Tribunal had provided Mr Perera with clear particulars of the basis for its preliminary view that the application for review was not lodged within the prescribed time. Furthermore, the court held that even if s 359A were engaged, the Tribunal had given Mr Perera sufficient particulars to discharge any potential obligation under the Act or at common law to afford him procedural fairness. The court also found that the primary judge's conclusion regarding the time calculation was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration as it was based on an incorrect interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions.
Accordingly, the court dismissed Mr Perera's application for leave to appeal, and Mr Perera was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The test for the grant of leave to appeal was set out in Dai v Michael Roberts Strata Management Services Ltd [2000] FCA 680 at [8] (Beaumont, Whitlam and Lehane JJ), citing Decor Corp v Dart Industries (1991) 33 FCR 397. It is: (1) whether, in all the circumstances, the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on appeal; and (2) whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision at first instance to be wrong.CONSIDERATIONGround (ii) Dealing with Mr Perera’s s 359A ground first, I am not satisfied that the primary judge’s conclusion that Mr Perera’s application lacked an arguable case in this respect is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant, in all the circumstances, it being reconsidered on appeal. Section 359A sits within Pt 5 Div 5 of the Act which is headed “Conduct of Review”. Section 359A(1) is in the following terms:(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Tribunal must:(a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and(b)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it. I accept the Minister’s contention that as the Tribunal did not go beyond considering whether it had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision and did not undertake a review of the decision, s 359A of the Act was not engaged. Even if s 359A were engaged, the Tribunal gave Mr Perera sufficient particulars to discharge any potential obligation under s 359A of the Act or any obligation at common law to afford Mr Perera procedural fairness. In particular, the Tribunal gave particulars of the basis upon which it had formed its preliminary view that Mr Perera’s application for review was not lodged within the prescribed time. The Tribunal identified the time limit and identified the date from which it considered time began to run. It did that by reference to the date upon which Mr Perera’s authorised recipient was emailed the refusal decision. There was no need for the Tribunal to give the name, address and email address of Mr Perera’s authorised recipient, being the alleged failure to particularise upon which Mr Perera here relies. Ground (i) The matters asserted by Mr Perera in ground (i) were not raised before the primary judge and were not dealt with in her Honour’s reasons. However, the Minister did not raise any objection to ground (i) and instead contended that it is based on an incorrect interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. Had ground (i) been properly raised and rejected by the primary judge as not raising an arguable case, such a conclusion would not be attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal.