FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Perera v Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] FCA 896
Citation: Perera v Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] FCA 896 Appeal from: Perera v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] AATA 180 Parties: SUSIL PERERA v DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS File number: VID 214 of 2011 Judge: NORTH J Date of judgment: 1 August 2011 Date of hearing: 1 August 2011 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 16 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms P Heffernan of the Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 214 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: SUSIL PERERA
ApplicantAND: DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 AUGUST 2011
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 214 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: SUSIL PERERA
ApplicantAND: DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE:
1 AUGUST 2011
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Before the Court is an appeal brought by the applicant, Ms Susil Perera, against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 17 February 2011. The appeal relies upon s 44 of Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) which permits an appeal only on a question of law.
The respondent, the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, filed a notice of motion on 15 June 2011 seeking an order under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) that the appeal be dismissed on the basis that Ms Perera has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.
THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL
The question before the Tribunal was whether Ms Perera had been paid the correct amount of Family Tax Benefit in the financial years 2004/2005 to 2008/2009, both inclusive. The Tribunal determined several questions under the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth) (the Act).
The Act makes the payment of the Family Tax Benefit, Part A and Part B, dependent on the concept of adjusted taxable income. Adjusted taxable income is defined in cl 2 of Sch 3 of the Act as follows:
(1)For the purposes of this Act and subject to subclause (2), an individual's adjusted taxable income for a particular income year is the sum of the following amounts (income components):
(a)the individual's taxable income for that year;
(b)the individual's adjusted fringe benefits total for that year;
(c)the…
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- AGLC
- Perera v Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] FCA 896
- Case
- [2011] FCA 896
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Court examined the legal issues raised by Ms Perera in her appeal against the Tribunal's decision. The court considered whether the Tribunal's interpretation of the legislation was correct and if the appeal had any reasonable prospect of success. Ms Perera argued that the net rental property loss should be deducted from the adjusted taxable income, which contradicted the Act. She also claimed that the Disability Support Pension and the Parenting Payment should not be included in the calculation of adjusted taxable income, which was also incorrect according to the Act. The court found that the only questions of law emerging from Ms Perera's submissions were untenable and could not succeed.
The Federal Court concluded that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success because the only questions of law that emerged from Ms Perera's submissions were untenable and contradicted the relevant legislation. The court found that Ms Perera's interpretation of the Act was incorrect, and her arguments were based on misunderstandings of the legislation. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered Ms Perera to pay the respondent's costs of the application. This decision reinforced the importance of correctly interpreting legislation and the consequences of submitting untenable arguments in court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As it seemed very unlikely that Ms Perera would be able to improve on the formulation of her notice of appeal, and as the issues of law which she raised orally at the directions hearing seemed dubious, the respondent was invited to make an application for summary judgment under s 31A(2) of the FCA Act, if it was so advised, on the basis that Ms Perera’s oral articulation of the questions of law should be taken as if included in a notice of appeal.CONSIDERATION UNDER S 31A(2) The notice of appeal does not comply with O 53 r 3(2) of the Federal Court Rules: Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] FCAFC 232; (2003) 76 ALD 321 at [17]-[18]. This would be an independent ground upon which to dismiss the proceeding under s 31A(2) of the FCA Act. However, a further ground is that the only questions of law which emerge from the written and oral submissions made by Ms Perera are untenable. First, Ms Perera argued that cl 2(1)(d), Sch 3 of the Act requires the net rental property loss to be deducted from the amount of the adjusted taxable income. This is expressly contradicted by the opening words of the subclause which provides for the items, including net rental property loss, to be added together to reach the adjusted taxable income. Next, Ms Perera said that the Disability Support Pension does not fall within cl 2(1)(e), Sch 3 of the Act because it is exempt income. That is a description which comes from other legislation. Ms Perera said that that description applies in the ascertainment of the adjusted taxable income. However, this is contradicted by cl 7(a), Sch 3 of the Act which expressly provides for the Disability Support Pension to be a tax-free pension for the purposes of Sch 3 of the Act. Finally, Ms Perera said that a Parenting Payment is exempt income, again, by reference to other legislation. But such legislation has no effect on the definition of adjusted taxable income in Sch 3 of the Act. A Parenting Payment is taxable income within the meaning of cl 2(1)(a), Sch 3 of the Act. Consequently, so far as one can extract from the lengthy submissions and other documents of Ms Perera, the only potential questions of law which emerge are ones which cannot succeed. It follows that the proceeding will be dismissed on the basis that Ms Perera has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the appeal.