Perananthasivam v Telstra Corporation Limited [2007] FCA 1584
LEAVE TO APPEAL – Federal Magistrates Court strikes out part of disability discrimination claim and refuses to remove solicitors from acting for respondent – whether applicant would suffer substantial injustice if leave to appeal were refused
SIVANADIAN PERANANTHASIVAM v TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
NSD 1695 of 2007
SACKVILLE J 16 OCTOBER 2007 SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1695 OF 2007
BETWEEN:
SIVANADIAN PERANANTHASIVAM Applicant
AND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED Respondent
JUDGE:
SACKVILLE J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 OCTOBER 2007
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal against Judgment No 1, Judgment No 2 and Judgment No 3 (as those terms are defined herein) be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay Telstra’s costs of the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1695 OF 2007
BETWEEN:
SIVANADIAN PERANANTHASIVAM Applicant
AND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED Respondent
JUDGE:
SACKVILLE J
DATE:
16 OCTOBER 2007
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
APPLICATIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
The applicant is a former employee of the respondent (‘Telstra’). Telstra terminated the applicant’s employment as a Bid Manager on 19 August 2005. The current application to this Court forms part of a series of disputes between the applicant and Telstra arising out of the termination of the applicant’s employment and the events leading to that termination.
The applicant, who is unrepresented, seeks leave to appeal from a judgment given by Driver FM on 2 August 2007: Perananthasivam v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2007] FMCA 1261 (‘Judgment No 1’). In that judgment, his Honour dismissed an application by the applicant to remove Deacons, a firm of solicitors, from representing Telstra in proceedings pending before the Federal Magistrates Court.
Although there is only one application for leave to appeal formally before me, it is clear from the applicant’s written submissions that he also seeks leave to appeal from two other judgments given by the learned Magistrate. The second of the three judgments was also given on 2 August 2007: Perananthasivam v Telstra Corporation Ltd (No 2) [2007] FMCA 1274 (‘Judgment No2’). In that judgment, his Honour ordered that the application filed by the applicant on 18 April 2007 be struck out:
‘except insofar as it asserts indirect disability discrimination in relation to the performance improvement programme [in] which the applicant was required…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Perananthasivam v Telstra Corporation Limited involved the applicant, who was previously employed by Telstra, challenging the legality of his termination and subsequent denial of worker's compensation benefits. The applicant alleged that he was subjected to bullying and discrimination, resulting in an adjustment disorder that led to his termination. Telstra defended the termination and compensation denial, asserting the applicant's actions justified the outcome. The case was heard across multiple forums, including the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and the Federal Magistrates Court.
The legal issues centred around whether the applicant's termination was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable, and if Telstra's denial of worker's compensation was lawful. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the applicant's claim of disability discrimination against Telstra was valid and whether the law firm representing Telstra should be restrained from continuing to act for Telstra due to potential conflicts of interest.
The Federal Magistrate found that the investigation conducted by the law firm, Deacons, was not independent as suggested but was commissioned by Telstra. Despite the term "independent," Deacons acted on behalf of Telstra to investigate and report findings, which did not warrant restraining them from acting in the subsequent proceedings. The Magistrate also dismissed the applicant's claims regarding the termination and worker's compensation, ruling that the applicant's termination was justified, and there was no unlawful discrimination. The court ordered the applicant to pay Telstra's costs for the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal against Judgment No 1, Judgment No 2 and Judgment No 3 (as those terms are defined herein) be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay Telstra’s costs of the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
The third of the three judgments was delivered on 10 August 2007: Perananthasivam v Telstra Corporation Ltd (No 3) [2007] FMCA 1378 (‘Judgment No 3’). In that judgment, his Honour ordered the applicant to pay Telstra’s costs and disbursements of the summary dismissal application, fixed in the amount of $10,000.BACKGROUND The history of the various disputes between the applicant and Telstra is complicated. The following is a truncated account:(i)The applicant was employed by Telstra from 1988 to 19 August 2004. He was appointed as a Bid Manager in 1999.(ii).The applicant claimed that he had been the victim of bullying at Telstra over a period of time.(iii)On 9 February 2004, the applicant met with two Telstra managers. The applicant claimed that, at this meeting, he was subjected to abusive and offensive language. In consequence, so he claimed, he became distressed and was immediately forced to take sick leave. He remained on sick leave until 3 May 2004.(iv)In March 2004 the applicant was diagnosed as having an ‘adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood acute’. He lodged a worker’s compensation claim with Telstra on 16 March 2004. The claim attributed his disorder to the events of 9 February 2004.(v)At some time in March 2004, Telstra engaged a firm of solicitors, Deacons, to conduct what was described as an ‘independent investigation’ into the incident of 9 February 2004. On 18 March 2004, Deacons wrote to the applicant in the following terms:‘We have been retained by [Telstra] to conduct an independent investigation into your complaint concerning your treatment in an incident that is said to have occurred on 9 February 2004.The investigation will be undertaken primarily by way of interviewing relevant persons, being you, the managers named by you as being involved in the incident … and any witnesses to the incident. In this regard, we would be grateful for the opportunity to meet with you as soon as possible …Once we have considered the relevant evidence we will prepare our report to Telstra on our conclusions and recommendations as to the appropriate course to be adopted as a consequence of the outcome of our investigation. You will be notified of the outcome of our investigation as soon as possible’.(vi)On 16 April 2004, Deacons submitted its final report to Telstra. The report was headed:‘Report of Independent Investigation Commissioned by Telstra … into a Complaint Made by [the applicant]’The report identified the ‘contact’ persons at Telstra to be Mr Noakes and Ms Woodward. The report found that the Telstra managers, in substance, had used the words attributed to them by the applicant, there being only minor inconsistencies between the applicant’s account and that of the managers. However, it also found that the words were used in the context of a meeting at which the managers believed the applicant to be acting inappropriately.(vii)On 2 July 2004, Telstra rejected the applicant’s worker’s compensation claim. The claim was reconsidered, but again rejected on 19 August 2004.(viii)In or about July 2004, Telstra requested the applicant to participate in a performance improvement program (‘PIP’). He declined to do so, expressing the view that the PIP was a device for squeezing out employees. (ix) On 19 August 2004, the applicant’s employment with Telstra was terminated. (x)On 3 September 2004, the applicant applied to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (‘AIRC’) for relief under s 170CE(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘WR Act’), on the ground that Telstra’s termination of his employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. The application was heard by the AIRC from 28 February 2005 to 2 March 2005. At the hearing, the applicant represented himself. Telstra was represented by counsel, who was instructed by Ms Woodward of Deacons. A total of six witnesses, including the applicant, gave sworn evidence and a large number of exhibits was tendered as evidence in the proceedings.(xi)The AIRC handed down its decision on 15 June 2005. It found that the termination of the applicant’s employment was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable. The AIRC noted that the applicant had objected to Deacons appearing for Telstra on the ground that the authors of the report might have gained privileged information about him in the course of investigating the incident that had occurred on 9 February 2004. The AIRC ruled that no privileged information had been obtained and that it had not been improper for Deacons to represent Telstra.(xii)On 29 August 2005, the Full Bench of the AIRC refused the applicant leave to appeal from the decision dismissing his claim against Telstra.(xiii)The applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’) for review of the decision to deny him worker’s compensation benefits. The hearing took place in December 2005 and April 2006. The applicant was unrepresented in these proceedings. Telstra was represented, but not by Deacons.(xiv)The AAT handed down its decision on 1 June 2006. The AAT noted that it had not been in dispute that on 9 February 2004 the Telstra managers had used the language attributed to them by the applicant. The AAT also found that the applicant had suffered an ‘injury’ as a consequence of the incident on that day, in that he suffered an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and ‘depressed mood acute’ as diagnosed by the treating psychiatrist. The AAT further found that the applicant became incapacitated for work as a consequence of the incident and was entitled to compensation for incapacity during the period 9 February 2004 until 3 May 2004, when he returned to work with Telstra.(xiv)On 5 October 2006, the applicant made a complaint to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (‘HREOC’) on the ground that he had been subjected to discrimination by Telstra by reason of a disability.(xv)On 21 March 2007, HREOC advised the applicant that it had terminated his complaint pursuant to s 46PH(1)(b) of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (‘HREOC Act’) on the ground that the complaint had been lodged more than twelve months after the alleged unlawful discrimination had taken place. HREOC also noted that the applicant had withdrawn allegations of victimisation that he had made in the original complaint.(xvi)On 18 April 2007, the applicant filed an application in the Federal Court seeking relief in respect of unlawful discrimination by Telstra against him. The applicant claimed that Telstra had:‘unlawfully discriminated against the Applicant on grounds of disability while the Applicant was an employee of [Telstra], in contravention of section 5 (direct discrimination) and/or section 6 (indirect discrimination) and section 15 (discrimination in employment) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)’.The application identified the source of the Court’s jurisdiction as s 46PO of the HREOC Act.(xvii)The proceedings were transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court by order of Buchanan J, on 18 May 2007.(xviii)Telstra filed an application in the Federal Magistrates Court on 26 June 2007, seeking an order pursuant to r 13.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (‘FMCR’), dismissing the application. Telstra claimed that the application disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was frivolous or vexatious or was an abuse of the process of the Court.(xix)On 25 July 2007, the applicant filed an application in the Federal Magistrates Court seeking an order, among others, removing Deacons from representing Telstra in the proceedings.(xx)The Federal Magistrate delivered judgments on the application by Telstra and the applicant respectively, on 2 August 2007. His Honour delivered a further judgment on costs on 10 August 2007.DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 (CTH)
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
SACKVILLE J
Section 15 deals with ‘Discrimination in employment’. Section 15(2) provides as follows:‘(2)It is unlawful for an employer or a person acting or purporting to act on behalf of an employer to discriminate against an employee on the ground of the employee’s disability or a disability of any of that employee’s associates:(a)in the terms or conditions of employment that the employer affords the employee; or(b)by denying the employee access, or limiting the employee’s access, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training, or to any other benefits associated with employment; or(c)by dismissing the employee; or(d)by subjecting the employee to any other detriment’.THE JUDGMENTSJudgment No 1 The learned Federal Magistrate dealt first with the application to remove Deacons as the solicitors acting for Telstra in the proceedings. His Honour noted that the applicant’s essential complaint was that Deacons had conducted the investigation relating to the incident that occurred on 9 February 2004. He also noted that Deacons had acted for Telstra in the AIRC proceedings, but not in relation to the applicant’s worker’s compensation claim determined by the AAT. His Honour found that at no stage had Deacons acted for the applicant. There was therefore no basis for restraining Deacons from acting on behalf of Telstra by reason of any breach of a fiduciary duty owed by Deacons to the applicant. His Honour also found that the applicant had not presented any documents to Deacons in connection with the investigation that had continued to be confidential. It followed that the only issue was whether the Court:‘should restrain Deacons from acting for Telstra in accordance with general principles of the interests of the administration of justice and pursuant to a general power in the Court to control legal practitioners as officers of the Court’. The Federal Magistrate was not satisfied that the circumstances of the case called for an order of the kind sought by the application. His Honour observed that:‘The reference to an “independent” investigation is an odd and probably unfortunate one. Because Deacons had been engaged by Telstra to inquire and report to it, the investigation was not independent in any sense that has significance to me. What was probably meant was that the solicitors would interview relevant persons and draw factual conclusions themselves and that that task would not be undertaken by Telstra management. In the event, a report was prepared which set out the allegations and the response to the allegations and made factual findings. No recommendations appear in the report. The report, while being made to Telstra, was disclosed to the applicant’. His Honour stated his conclusions as follows:‘In my view, while the description of the investigation as “independent” was probably unfortunate and may have [led] the applicant to a misapprehension of the investigation process, there is nothing in the fact of the investigation or the conduct of the investigation by Deacons which justifies an order restraining them from now acting for Telstra in the present proceedings. The solicitors were, on behalf of Telstra, simply finding facts and reporting them. The interests of the administration of justice [do not] require those solicitors to be restrained from acting for their client in this subsequent proceeding which has only a remote link to that inquiry and report’.