Pepper v Registrar of Firearms
[2016] SADC 38
•15 April 2016
DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
PEPPER v REGISTRAR OF FIREARMS
[2016] SADC 38
Judgment of His Honour Judge Tilmouth
15 April 2016
FIRE, EXPLOSIVES AND FIREARMS - FIREARMS - OTHER MATTERS
Decision of the Registrar of Firearms issuing a firearms prohibition order against the appellant, upheld on the merits.
Firearms Act 1977 (SA) s 5(1a), s 10C, s 5(11)(ca), s 5(13), s 10B(1), s 10B(1)(a)(ii), s 10B(2), s 17(3)(a)(ia), s 20(1)(c)(i), s 26C(4)(a); Marksman Training Systems Pty Ltd v Registrar of Firearms [2014] SADC 159; Johnson v Registrar of Firearms (2001) 79 SASR 353; Gabriel v Lenthall [1930] SASR 318; Jan v Fingleton (1983) 32 SASR 379; District Court Act 1991 (SA) s42E(3), s 42G(2); Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32(3); Firearms Regulations 2008 (SA) reg 5(A); Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 13(1); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 s 32; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 22; District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42E(3), referred to.
R v Marafioti (2014) 118 SASR 511, applied.
PEPPER v REGISTRAR OF FIREARMS
[2016] SADC 38Introduction
There is before the court an appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Firearms issuing a firearms prohibition order against the appellant, Mr Pepper. These reasons proceed to analyse the submissions made in this court and to explain why the appeal must fail.
The grounds of the appeal embodied in a Second Notice of Appeal filed on 9 December 2015, entail allegations that the Registrar (by his Delegate), took into account irrelevant considerations, and failed to take into account relevant considerations. There was also an attack on the validity of the delegation by the Commissioner of Police, to a Mr Fisher, an Inspector attached to the Firearms Branch of the South Australia Police (SAPOL).[1] This latter ground was abandoned during the course of the appeal: see Marksman Training Systems Pty Ltd v Registrar of Firearms.[2]
[1] Exhibit MJF1.
[2] [2014] SADC 159 [52]-]59].
Procedural Context
The right of appeal is conferred by s 26C(1)(c) of the Firearms Act 1977 (SA). The Firearms Act is otherwise silent as to mechanism governing such appeals. Accordingly the procedure and powers of disposition of such appeals are governed by Division 2 of the District Court Act 1991 (SA), sitting in its Administrative and Disciplinary Division.
Statutory Context
The power to make a firearms prohibition order is confined by virtue of s 10B(1) of the Firearms Act, first introduced in 2008, as follows:[3]
[3] Section 11 Firearms (Firearms Prohibition Orders) Amendment Act 2008 (SA), effective from 27 November 2005.
10B—Firearms prohibition order issued by Registrar
(1)The Registrar may issue a firearms prohibition order against a person if satisfied that—
(a)—
(i)possession of a firearm by the person would be likely to result in undue danger to life or property; or
(ii)the person is not a fit and proper person to possess a firearm; and
(b)it is in the public interest to prohibit the person from possessing and using a firearm.
It can be seen that the avenues for making such orders are twofold, either under the rubric of ‘undue danger to life or property’, or when a person is unfit to possess a firearm. The Delegate determined matters according to the latter option. There is no attack on the conclusion that prohibition was in the public interest, if the antecedent findings of unfitness were sustained.
Both limbs are qualified by the further requirement that it be in the ‘public interest’ to prohibit the person concerned from possessing and using a firearm. The making of a firearms prohibition order is not dependent upon the person to whom it applies holding a firearms licence, but of course in many cases that may well be the case. It is not however the situation with respect to the appellant.
Once made, a firearms prohibition order has the effect of suspending any firearms licence the person may hold, prohibiting the person to whom it applies from acquiring or possessing firearms, and requires the person to surrender all firearms owned by that person, under heavy criminal sanction. The consequences to both the restriction of personal liberty and in penal terms are therefore quite marked: s 10(c) Firearms Act.
For the purposes of the ‘unfitness’ limb of s 10B(1)(a)(ii), s 5(13) of the Firearms Act further provides:
In deciding whether a person is a fit and proper person to have possession of a firearm or ammunition or to hold or have possession of a licence for the purposes of this Act, regard may be had to the reputation, honesty and integrity of the person and of people with whom the person associates.
During the Second Reading Speech introducing the amendments, the Minister for Police said this of the Bill:[4]
… the government pledged to introduce new laws to curb motorcycle gang violence. The Firearms (Firearms Prohibition Orders) Amendment Bill 2008 gives effect to that pledge. The bill strengthens the powers of police to combat firearms related violence by introducing firearms prohibition orders, giving police the ability to ban persons with a known propensity for violence, or persons who associate with such persons, from possessing or accessing firearms. Although primarily aimed at targeting motorcycle gangs and their associates, firearms prohibition orders can also be applied to any person who has a known history of serious crime or violence, or who has been identified by a medical professional as being a risk to themselves or others because of a health condition.
…
It is in consideration of this that the focus should be on the behaviour of persons rather than on the firearm itself. This is combined with a view that firearms ownership and possession is a privilege, not a right, and that the ultimate determination of the exercise of the privilege is vested in the state. It is intended to concentrate police efforts on reducing the level of firearms related crime and taking pre-emptive action on the potential for that to occur, while maintaining an appropriate level of cooperative legislation within the legitimate firearms using community.
The legislation had long since been interpreted as ensuring the safety of the public: Johnson v Registrar of Firearms.[5]
[4] Legislative Council, Wednesday 5 March 2008, p 2055-2056, portions of which were quoted by the Delegate, Exhibit MJF4, p 27.
[5] (2001) 79 SASR 353, [16].
Reasons of the Delegate
The ‘Notice of Reasons’ of the Delegate dated 17 April 2015, were served on Mr Pepper on 16 June 2015, from which date they take effect: s 10B(2) of the Firearms Act.[6] The appeal instituted on 14 July 2015 was therefore within the 28 days for instituting an appeal, as prescribed by s 26C(4)(a) thereof.
[6] Exhibit MJF3.
The Delegate issued the firearms prohibition order upon being satisfied Mr Pepper was not a fit and proper person to possess a firearm and that it was in the public interest to prohibit him from possessing and using a firearm.[7] In reaching that conclusion, the Delegate considered the criminal history and convictions of Mr Pepper were ‘for offences involving acts of violence, dishonesty, drugs, traffic and offences against the Firearms Act’, and that he was a member of the ‘Descendants Motorcycle Club (MC)’, based on the materials disclosed in paragraphs 1-4 of his reasons.[8]
[7] Exhibit MJF4, p 28.
[8] Exhibit MJF4, pp 19-27.
The Delegate then turned his attention to questions of the public interest in paragraphs 5, before making the order.[9] With respect to the latter consideration, the Delegate concluded:[10]
5.7In forming a view about where the balance of the public interest lies I have had regard in particular to the contents of the statement received from the State Intelligence Branch concerning the nature of OMCGs, and in particular the Descendants MC. I consider that these factors outweigh the impact on you individually as a result of the imposition of a Firearms Prohibition Order being considered against you, including the consequences set out in the Firearms Act at Section 10C, Section 32 and elsewhere in the Act.
[9] Exhibit MJF4, pp 19, 21, 22 and 27.
[10] Exhibit MJF4, p 28, para 5.7.
With this overview of the decision, it is now possible to consider the respective grounds of appeal, in a slightly different order than as argued by Mr Robertson QC for Mr Pepper.
Grounds of Appeal
Ground 2.2 taking into account irrelevant considerations
The first complaint under the rubric of this ground is that the Delegate impermissibly considered a declaration of the Officer-In-Charge of the State Intelligence Branch of SAPOL Superintendant Goodwin. This contained detailed information with respect to the characteristics of outlaw motorcycle clubs, and which outlined certain police intelligence with respect to some 27 alleged members of the Descendants MC, including Mr Pepper himself.[11] With respect to Mr Pepper specifically, the declaration summarised a number of prior offences and nominated him, as well as two brothers, as current members.[12] The Delegate expressly referred to this material in identifying Mr Pepper as a member of the Descendants MC. He nominated two specific occasions in 2011 when clothing identified him as such a member and once in 2012 when he admitted to membership.[13]
[11] Exhibit MJF6, p 31-63.
[12] Exhibit MJF6, pp50-51, 54, 55, 56-57, 58.
[13] Exhibit MJF4, p21, paras 3.1-3.2.3.
The gist of the first complaint is that this material did not ‘specifically concern the activities’ of the Descendants MC, and was therefore irrelevant.[14] Superintendent Goodwin was from 2004-2006 the Officer in Charge of a Task Force in SAPOL responsible for policing Outlaw Motorcycle Club gangs in South Australia. He is presently Officer in Charge of the State Intelligence Branch. The opinions he expresses in the Declaration were garnered from ‘Policing experience which includes numerous investigations into (Outlaw Motorcycle Club) activities, and networking in partnership with both national and international law enforcement agencies’.[15] The generic material collated in the earlier parts of the Declaration apply to the characteristics of all such Clubs in South Australia, of which the Descendants is one. The bulk of the Declaration deals specifically with the Descendants MC.[16] There is accordingly no substance in this complaint.
[14] Appellant’s written submission, para 14.
[15] Exhibit MJF6, p 33.
[16] Exhibit MJF6, pp 36-63.
A second aspect of ground 2.2 is to the effect that only one extract from SAPOL records relates specifically to Mr Pepper, only one of his previous convictions related to firearms offences, and that the Delegate failed to identify the particular offences upon which he fastened for the purpose of weighing the gravity of the offending.[17] It is true enough that there was only one Firearms offence, the failure to store ammunition in a locked container in 2005, for which Mr Pepper was fined $150.[18] This offence involved three unused shotgun shells and 35 unused .38 bullets found in the centre console of his vehicle.[19] This sentence was extremely light by current sentencing standards.
[17] Appellant’s written submissions, paras 26.3, 26.4 and 30.
[18] Exhibit MJF4, p 20 para 2.4.
[19] Exhibit MJF41, p 129.
On the other hand Mr Pepper had antecedent convictions or findings of guilt for offences, summarised in this way by Superintendent Goodwin:[20]
[20] Exhibit MJF6, pp 50-51.
Traffic Controlled Drug 28/9/12
Cultivate cannabis for supply, Possess prescribed equipment 26/4/12
Cultivate cannabis, Possess prescribed equipment 9/12/10
Drive Unregistered, Duty to Hold Licence 26/11/10
Drive under disqualification 10/9/10
Possess cocaine and derivative 29/6/10
Failure to store ammunition 12/4/06
Fail to comply with Bond, Non-Aggravated Serious Criminal Trespass, Larceny 8/6/05
Possessing amphetamine 23/5/05
Produce Cannabis, Possess Cannabis 3/3/05
Fail to drive within marked lane, Fail to truly answer, Disobey learner’s permit, No ‘L’ plates 10/12/04
Non-Aggravated Serious Criminal Trespass, Larceny 6/10/04
Drive unlicensed 23/2/04
Drive unlicensed 28/10/03
Drive unlicensed, Fail to truly answer 11/9/03
Receiving, Fail to comply with bond x 2, Assault police, resist arrest 2/5/03
Fail to comply with Bail Agreements x 2, Aggravated Serious Criminal Trespass, Larceny 14/8/02
The Delegate expressly referred to a number of specific offences involving drugs, committed between 18 March 2003 and 25 November 2010, the last attracting a lengthy term of imprisonment.[21] Reference was further made to offences involving dishonesty, being a breaking and entry and theft on 22 February 2002, and a trespass and theft committed on 6 October 2004.[22] It follows that the decision-maker did in fact nominate specific offences supporting his conclusions.
[21] Exhibit MJF4, pp 19-20, paras 2.1, 2.3 and 2.5-2.6 and Exhibit MJF34.
[22] Exhibit MJF4, p 20, para 2.7.
As to offences of violence, Superintendent Goodwin referred to the following incidents:
16/08/02Matthew Aaron PEPPER grabbed a police officer in a tight headlock, refusing to let go, as the police officer was in the process of arresting another person. PEPPER was dragged off of the victim by two other officers. He then fought police as he was being placed under arrest.
Outcome: Convicted of Assault Police, Resist Police.
15/04/03Matthew PEPPER and co-accused were at the Tea Tree Plaza Shopping Centre, North East Road, MODBURY and fought with the victim. PEPPER and the co-accused obtained a knife, similar to a small meat cleaver from PEPPER’S car. PEPPER hit the victim’s right knee with the flat of the blade and then as the victim bent over to run away PEPPER struck the victim again hitting him in the middle of the back with the knife. The victim eventually collapsed and was assisted by onlookers. The victim required surgery at the Royal Adelaide Hospital to repair severed muscles and a chipped spinal cord. PEPPER was arrested for wounding with intent to grievous bodily harm.
Outcome:Acquitted.
26/02/10Matthew PEPPER and co-accused were in Hindley St, Adelaide when they threatened the victim. The victim was led away and elbowed in the face by one of the accused causing his nose to bleed and him to fall on the ground concussed. The victim’s sunglasses and money from his wallet valued at less than $300 were stolen. The victim suffered a possible broken nose. PEPPER was arrested for committing theft using force (aggravated).
Outcome:Dismissed want of prosecution.
The first of these incidents was plainly relevant to the question of violence on the part of Mr Pepper. The second can be ignored as he was acquitted of it. Although the third was dismissed for want of prosecution, the Delegate duly noted ‘that the victim … returned to Queensland … and … was in fear of reprisals so did not wish for the matter to proceed’.[23] This conclusion is consistent with police intelligence that ‘some of the incidents … involving Descendants MC members … are dismissed or withdrawn on occasions due to the reluctance of victims and witnesses to testify against OMCG members or associates’.[24] There was also reference to a charge of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm in April 2003, for which Mr Pepper was ultimately acquitted.[25] Putting the acquittals aside, there remained ample material to support the conclusion that Mr Pepper had a disposition towards violence and the adequate identification of the occasions in question by the Delegate.
[23] Exhibit MJF4, p 25, para 4.2.14.
[24] Exhibit MJF4, p 26, para 4.3.
[25] Exhibit MJF4, p 24, para 4.2.9.
The Delegate next proceeded to summarise the criminal offending profile of members of the Descendants.[26] He employed this material in the following way:[27]
5.6As a member of the Descendants MC you associate with people who have shown a propensity to possess and use firearms. Descendants MC members have been involved in numerous violent incidents. Many of these incidents occurred in public and exposed members of the public to physical harm. Such acts threaten public safety.
[26] Exhibit MJF4, pp 21-22.
[27] Exhibit MJF4, p 28.
In this reference the Delegate plainly had in mind the public interest, based on intelligence systematically gathered and known facts relating to the Descendants MC, as he was entitled to. The complaint that this material did not ‘specifically concern the activities of the Descendants Motorcycle Club’, and that he failed to identify specific occasions of ‘association’ other than by ‘impermissible collective association’ is dealt with later.[28]
[28] Appellant’s written submission para 28.
The three offences of serious criminal trespass referred to by the Delegate (reproduced above) were potentially serious, however they were committed when Mr Pepper was a child. All resulted in good behaviour bonds and Community Service.[29] The offences of assaulting police and resisting arrest were equally committed when he was a child, but must have been reasonably serious because suspended detention of two months was imposed. The most serious offence committed by Mr Pepper was for trafficking in 216 g (88g pure) of methylamphetamine or potentially $100,000 worth, in November 2010, contrary to s 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA).[30] He was sentenced to imprisonment for three years and 11 months with a non-parole period of 20 months, effective from 28 September 2012.[31]
[29] Exhibit MJF29, p 94.
[30] Exhibit MJF4, p19, para 2.1.
[31] Exhibit MJF4, pp 106-116.
There is a criticism by the appellant that the Delegate selectively quoted from a portion of the sentencing remarks adverse to him, whilst failing to consider favourable passages, indicating references for instance to his mitigating medical and physical history, the steps taken towards rehabilitation and personal testimonials laid before the sentencing court. The passage from the remarks were contained at the very end of the sentencing process, specifically in the context of the issue of suspension. It was:[32]
Against these personal matters I must weigh the undoubted seriousness of the offending and the need to impose a sentence that will have a deterrent effect on other persons, albeit a reduced one given the circumstances here.
In my view, the offending here was too serious and I cannot find good reason in the circumstances to suspend the prison term I have imposed. Both the head sentence and the non-parole period will commence from today.
[32] Exhibit MJF34, p19, para 2.1, Exhibit MJF34, pp 115-116, Nicholson J.
The fact of the matter is that the Delegate was required to accord weight to this offence according to the tenor of the sentencing Judge’s remarks. The passage quoted was the most convenient means of drawing together in one succinct passage, the gist of the sentence. Whilst the Delegate did not refer expressly to a few favourable considerations, he might well have referred to others adverse to Mr Pepper, such as for instance ‘I am not at all confident now you have been full and frank with the court’ and ‘you have a not insignificant prior criminal record’.[33]
[33] Exhibit MJF34, pp 108-112.
The objective seriousness of the trafficking offence, involving as it did so much methylamphetamine together with the notorious indicia or tools of dealing, including four mobile phones, cash of $3,700, plastic deal bags and a set of scales, were plainly of appreciable relevance to the inquiries into whether he was ‘fit and proper’. Still further an offence against s 32 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act, is a ‘prescribed offence’ by dint of reg 5A of the Firearms Regulations 2008 (SA) for the purposes of s 5(11)(ca) of the Firearms Act, so that by this offence alone the Delegate was entitled to consider Mr Pepper ‘not to be a fit and proper person to have possession of a firearm … or to hold or have possession’ of a firearms licence. Considered in its proper context and in light of the entire circumstances, there is therefore no substance in this criticism that the reference to the sentencing remarks were unbalanced or unfavourably selective.
The second submission under cover of ground 2.2, was the impermissible reference by the Delegate to a research paper authored and published by the Australian Institute of Criminology entitled ‘Firearm, Trafficking and Serious and Organised Gangs 2012’.[34] It was submitted this material relies on statistics unrelated to the Descendants MC ‘in general or the appellant in particular’.[35]
[34] Exhibit MFJ4, para 5.4.
[35] Appellant’s written submission para 29.
In considering those complaints it must be borne in mind that Parliament nominated the Commissioner of Police as the Registrar of Firearms for sound reasons, so as to centralise the regulation and the control of firearms within the one repository and because of the experience and expertise SAPOL holds in firearms: Marksman Training Systems Pty Ltd v The Registrar of Firearms.[36] It appears the Commissioner invariably delegates his responsibility under the Firearms Act to senior members of the Firearms Branch in SAPOL, because of their expertise and experience, and because no doubt of the heavy burden of other duties and responsibilities. Members of the Firearms Branch so delegated, are inherently likely through their experience on the job – and probably even from past experience on the beat as was the case with Superintendent Goodwin – to have gained the very kind of knowledge and understanding as that contained in Superintendent Goodwin’s statement, and in the research paper.
[36] [2014] SADC 150, [38].
As such it was only right as a matter of fairness and in accord with the principles of natural justice, that the Delegate apprise an affected party of the considerations likely to be exercising his mind. There is no fault in referring to this kind of material, still less of disclosure by way of background information. In any case the brief reference to the paper is a benign one, one adding nothing of substance to what the Delegate already knew from the other material:[37]
The Australian Institute of Criminology conducts national research as part of the Research and Public Policy Series. The report titled Firearm trafficking and serious and organised crime gangs (2012, pg.40) concluded that ‘OMCG are involved in a variety of illicit markets, including the stockpiling and trafficking of illicit firearms.
Considered in that way the Delegate did not engage in taking into account irrelevant considerations.
[37] Exhibit MJF4, p 27, para 5.4.
Ground 2.2 – failure to identify association
The specific issue of association is a different matter. There is more to the point that the Delegate failed to identify the precise basis underpinning the conclusion of ‘association’. It has been seen there are a few discrete unchallenged occasions of association with other Descendants MC members in April and November 2011, and in January 2012.
Mr Pepper was sighted wearing pre-membership or nominee colours on 22 February 2009 and last sighted wearing full colours on 29 January 2012.[38] The Delegate’s reasons appear to suggest the mere membership of the club was sufficient of itself to be conclusive of association, best captured in this passage of his reasons:[39]
As a member of the Descendants MC you associate with people who have shown a propensity to possess and use firearms. Descendants MC members have been involved in numerous violent incidents. Many of these incidents occurred in public and exposed members of the public to physical harm. Such acts threaten public safety.
[38] Exhibit MJF6, p 50.
[39] Exhibit MJF4, p28, para 5.6.
The submission of Mr Robertson SC was effectively that the meaning of ‘people with whom the person associates’ contained in s 5(13) of the Firearms Act, requires proof of specific occasions of keeping company together, or accompanying each other, consistent with the grammatical meaning of ‘associates’. With respect to his succinct and focussed submission, this contention rather serves to elevate proof of association with the more exacting concept of ‘consorting’. Consorting, an offence in this State under s 13(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA), requires proof of habitual association ‘as opposed to merely a casual meeting … by frequent acts of association …’: Gabriel v Lenthall,[40] Jan v Fingleton.[41]
[40] [1930] SASR 318, 323.
[41] (1983) 32 SASR 379, 381 and 385-386.
The expression ‘associates’ in the Firearms Act, stands to be construed purposefully in the legislative context in which it occurs, a context that serves to curb and prevent, as well as pre-empt the unregulated possession and use of unlawful firearms: R v Marafioti.[42] By employing the less demanding ambient verb ‘associates’, Parliament must have necessarily intended something less demanding than exacting proof of specific associations with specific persons on specific occasions, and that it must have intended a more ambulatory meaning so as to be effective in achieving the purposes and to promote the objects of the legislation: s 22 Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA).
[42] (2014) 118 SASR 511, [23]-[25].
There may well have been sufficient material to support the conclusion of association on a more demanding test, but there were other considerations relevant to this question. Apart from the few occasions of proven ‘contact’ between Mr Pepper and other members of the Descendants MC, two other members of the Club are in fact his brothers, making it inherently likely he would associate with them. Furthermore members of the Descendants MC are required to meet regularly behind closed doors. The failure to attend such meetings may result in disciplinary action including the imposition of penalties involving loss of voting privileges and membership rights. The clubroom situated in Dry Creek, is registered in the name of three members. An adjoining property is registered in the name of two of those three, as well as three others, one a brother of Mr Pepper. Members are further required to attend Club functions, particularly motorbike runs.[43]
[43] Exhibit MJF6, p 41.
Despite the limited temporal proof of association, the conclusion of association inheres in the very nature and structure of Descendants MC. The specific arrangements mandating attendance at meetings leads to the inevitable inference that Mr Pepper must regularly associate with other members of the Descendants MC. This aspect of the appeal must therefore fail.
Ground 2.1 - Misconstruction of legislative provisions
A final ground of appeal advanced by the appellant relates to what was claimed to be an error in the construction of that part of ‘fit and proper person’ limb of s 10B of the Firearms Act, in as much as the statutory extension contained in s 5(13) thereof, permits the Delegate to have regard to ‘the reputation, honesty and integrity of the person and of people with whom the person associates’. This aspect of character criteria has nothing to do with the expression ‘close associates’ defined in s 5 of the Firearms Act, which picks up s 5(1a) thereof, so as to deem ‘two persons are close associates if … one is a relative of the other’. This latter definition is expressly confined to applications for dealers licences and to applications to cancel, vary or suspend existing licences: ss 17(3)(a)(ia) and 20(1)(c)(i) of the Firearms Act, respectively.
The further contention is that ‘people with whom the person associates’ means natural persons and not organisations such as the Descendants MC. Accordingly the error of construction is said to be that the Delegate improperly treated the Club as ‘a collective person’, by taking ‘collective, honesty, integrity and reputation … into account’.[44] This is not however what the Delegate did. The material underpinning the reasons abundantly demonstrates that known members of the Descendants MC were for the most part undeniably not of good character.[45] Once satisfactory findings are made – as they were – that Mr Pepper was a member of the Club and he associated with those members, it is inescapable that he inevitably kept the company of persons not of good repute, honesty or integrity. This aspect of ground 2.1 therefore fails.
[44] Appellant’s written submission pp 18-21.
[45] Exhibit MJF2, pp 56, paras 3.3-10, 4.2-4.4.
Conclusion and Orders
For the above reasons the attack on the findings of the Delegate of the Registrar of Firearms imposing a firearms prohibition order against the appellant on 17 April 2015, must be dismissed. No error is demonstrated in the failure to take into account relevant considerations, to take into account irrelevant considerations, or by misconstruing the statutory context.
There being no ‘cogent reasons’ to interfere, the appeal is therefore dismissed: s 42E(3) District Court Act 1991 (SA). The parties are entitled to be heard on the question of costs bearing in mind that ‘no order for costs is to be made unless the Court considers such an order to be necessary in the interests of justice’: s 42G(2) District Court Act.
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