Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Pepper Finance Corporation Limited v Wichman [2019] NSWSC 1009 Hearing dates: 7 August 2019 Date of orders: 07 August 2019 Decision date: 07 August 2019 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Rothman J Decision: (1) the motion is dismissed.
(2) the applicant shall pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the motion as agreed or assessed.Catchwords: PROCEDURE – Civil – Motion to stay and/or set aside default judgment and execution of a writ of possession – principles – “common law rights” – single judge does not render the Court any less effective in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court – motion dismissed Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (UK)
Royal Charter of Justice 1824
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW)
Third Royal Charter of Justice 1824
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)Cases Cited: Bird and Free (1994) 126 ALR 475; FCA 891
Re Jarman ex parte Cook (No 1) (1997) 188 CLR 595; HCA 13Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Warren Ronald Wichman (Applicant)
Pepper Finance Corporation Limited (Respondent)Representation: Solicitor:
Self-represented:
Richard Lewin (Respondent)
Warren Ronald Wichman (Applicant)
File Number(s): 2018/227089
EX TEMPORE Judgment
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HIS HONOUR: Before the Court is a motion, on the face of which, it seems, the applicant seeks to set aside default judgment and/or the decision of the Registrar and to stay the writ of possession for eviction dated 21 February 2019.
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The applicant has filed three affidavits which have been read by the Court, notwithstanding that they are in a form that, as an affidavit, would be objectionable, but they have been taken in some regards as submissions which the applicant seems to rely upon in most regards.
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The formal terms of the motion before the Court dated 5 August 2019 are in the following terms - prayers for the following relief are:
To challenge or appeal the jurisdiction of a man called Christopher Bradford acting as Registrar on 14 June 2019 along with his orders and dismissal of motion;
That the Court stay the writ of possession eviction dated 8 August 2019;
Move a motion to have the Court vacated, default judgment and writ of possession notice to evict; and
Seeking leave to abridge time for service of the motion.
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I do not deal with the last matter.
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The issues raised before the Registrar and before this Court relate, amongst other things, to the jurisdiction of the Court and what Mr Warren Ronald Wichman refers to as, and I quote "common law rights" and the requirement to be sworn to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (UK).
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As I understand it, amongst other things, even though not formally put or precisely put in these terms, the applicant on the motion disputes the jurisdiction of the Registrar to make the orders that were made and disputes the Court as presently constituted making orders.
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It is not absolutely clear how the Court as…
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- Case
- [2019] NSWSC 1009
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue for the Court to determine was whether the principles of common law, which provide a defendant with certain rights, could be invoked in this case to set aside a default judgment. The Court had to consider the appropriate circumstances in which a single judge could exercise their discretion to stay or set aside a default judgment and whether the Court's effectiveness in exercising its jurisdiction was compromised by the fact that the matter was before a single judge.
The Court held that the principles of common law, which provide a defendant with certain rights, were not limited to situations where a matter was before a full bench. The Court found that a single judge did not render the Court any less effective in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court further held that, in the circumstances of this case, there were no grounds for the defendant to set aside the default judgment or to stay the execution of the writ of possession. The Court dismissed the defendant's motion to stay and/or set aside the default judgment and the execution of the writ of possession.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an application by Wichman to set aside a default judgment and to stay the execution of a writ of possession. Prior to this application, Pepper had obtained a default judgment against Wichman for unpaid debts and secured a writ of possession for property held by Wichman. Wichman filed an application to set aside the default judgment and stay the execution of the writ of possession on the basis that Pepper had breached their contractual agreement. The application was heard by a single judge, who considered whether the principles of "common law rights" and the effectiveness of the court's jurisdiction applied in this case.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the single judge's decision does not render the Court any less effective in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. Whether the principles of "common law rights" apply to permit the setting aside of the default judgment and the staying of the execution of the writ of possession.
Held
1. The court concluded that the single judge's decision does not render the Court any less effective in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. The court dismissed the application to set aside the default judgment and to stay the execution of the writ of possession, finding that the principles of "common law rights" did not apply in this case.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Pepper Finance Corporation Limited v Wichman, the court examined the application to set aside a default judgment and to stay the execution of a writ of possession. The court considered whether the principles of "common law rights" applied to permit such actions and whether the single judge's decision compromised the effectiveness of the Court. The court held that the single judge's decision did not render the Court any less effective in exercising its jurisdiction. The court dismissed the application on the basis that the principles of "common law rights" did not apply to the facts of this case. The court distinguished the present case from prior authority where common law rights were successfully invoked, emphasising that the circumstances of each case must be carefully considered. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that in cases involving default judgments and writs of possession, the application of "common law rights" must be carefully evaluated in the context of the specific facts and circumstances, and the single judge's jurisdiction does not inherently reduce the effectiveness of the Court.