Penski and Kocher

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PENSKI & KOCHER

[2013] FamCA 255

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Sole parental responsibility - Husband wanted a division of responsibilities and the wife wanted sole responsibility – No communication and many arguments – Parent who provides the predominant base should have all major long-term responsibilities – Presumption rebutted.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

APPLICANT:

Ms Penski

RESPONDENT:

Mr Kocher

FILE NUMBER:

DGC

2330

2010

DATE DELIVERED:

17 April 2013

PLACE DELIVERED:

Melbourne

PLACE HEARD:

Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF:

Cronin J

HEARING DATE:

26 March 2013

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Mr Sweeney

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Hayes & Associates

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Ms Nikou SC with Mr Mort

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Nicholes Family Lawyers

Orders

That the Wife have sole parental responsibility for the child of the marriage R born … March 2008.
That pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Penski & Kocher (No. 2) has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: DGC 2330 of 2010

Ms Penski

Applicant

And

Mr Kocher

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Mr Kocher, (“the husband”) and Ms Penski, (“the wife”) have one child R, (“the child”) who has just turned five years of age.
The discrete issues for determination in these reasons concern the child both directly and indirectly. They are:
(a)Should there be an order for the wife to have sole parental responsibility or should those responsibilities be divided between the husband and wife? It will be evident therefore that neither party seeks equal shared parental responsibility;
(b)Where should the exchange point be for the child between his parents?
(c)Should the child’s time with the husband commence on Thursday before Easter from school or kindergarten in one year or at 5 pm and should it be extended to Easter Tuesday rather than concluding on the Monday afternoon?
(d)Should the child’s time with the husband conclude at the end of school holidays with the resumption of school or on the afternoon before school returns?
(e)Should there be limitations upon the husband telephoning the child?
(f)Should the husband be permitted to have someone present at handovers?
Simple though these six issues appear, the underlying dislike, mistrust and probable parallel parenting of the child by the husband and wife is palpable. Having said that, to their credit, significant issues were resolved by the husband and wife including agreeing to final property orders in an environment where that mistrust spilled over with accusations of non-disclosure, the provision of misleading material and general evasiveness.
Each parent was represented by experienced counsel and when the issues set out above could not be compromised, each counsel asked me to determine them on the basis of their submissions but in the light of the untested and controversial evidence each had filed. There are clearly difficulties with such an approach bearing in mind Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 but as that was the parties’ wish, I have approached the task with the child's best interests in mind.

Background

Both parties are 40 years of age. They married each other in 2007. The child was born in March 2008.
The husband and wife separated under the one roof in October 2009 and physically separated in the following March. The wife then applied for an intervention order and only weeks later, by the husband applying for one. On 23 September 2010, the family violence proceedings were compromised by the parties entering into mutual undertakings as to their behaviour. Despite that, a further application for an intervention order was sought by the husband and on 25 January 2011, the wife consented to an order being made against her noting that was made without admission. It was the wife's explanation that she was badly advised. Be that as it may, the order was made.
On 21 December 2011, proceedings having been issued in the Federal Magistrates Court, O'Sullivan FM made interim parenting orders. The precise details of those orders do not matter but on any view, the wife was recognised as the predominant parent and the husband was to spend time with the child. Those orders have continued until now.

Evidence

Limited though the issues may be, these determinations must be made on the evidence according to law. The evidence giving rise to those determinations comes from three sources. Two of them are the parties themselves and the third is psychologist Mr B. Mr B was ordered by the Court in 2012 to undertake a family assessment and provide a report. The evidence of Mr B provides a more objective opinion that the parties themselves have given about what is needed for the child. Importantly, his evidence was not challenged.
I am conscious also of avoiding taking the tentative views of Mr B as clear opinion just because he has repeated a view expressed by the party which may or may not be evidence.
For my purposes, the parties’ evidence can be summarised simply as I shall now set out and to the extent I can draw any conclusion or make any finding of fact, I have done so. I am also conscious that the affidavit material may not necessarily have been admitted into evidence had the whole trial proceeded. Indeed, both parties’ evidence is replete with assertion, comment and opinion much of which was largely irrelevant and unhelpful. I stress the importance of lawyers ensuring that they do not simply take on the subjective mantle of their clients.

The evidence summarised

The wife

The wife alleged that she had been a victim of family violence. She gave an example of the husband pulling her hair and that his verbal and physical aggression was intimidating and frightening. She reverted to comment about the husband's attitude being one of emotional domination and control and the husband having no regard or respect for her relating to her decisions about the child. This was a common theme in her affidavit and it was hard to detect exactly what she meant particularly as none of her evidence was tested nor were the various parts struck out.
The wife gave an incident of the husband taking the garage remote-control and the telephone handset to prevent her from removing the child from the home and then driving away. All of this was occurring around the time of separation and she spoke of the argument that occurred in which the husband demanded that she leave the home with the child.
In March 2010 she said she asked the husband to consider whether she and the child could stay longer but he would not agree. She said he made threats to kill himself and that he would leave notes saying bad things about her.
The evidence to which the wife pointed was directed towards the Court making an order for sole parental responsibility. The husband had an entirely different view about what occurred up until separation and I shall refer to his evidence below. Needless to say, I am not in a position to make any findings. However, when I turn to the evidence of Mr B below, it will be seen that he took the view that the conflict was palpable between the parties. Just who was to blame and whether it was one particular party, is not something about which I can make any specific finding.
Almost as if it was a mantra, the wife regularly said she was not able to consult with the husband about long-term decisions concerning the child and that any orders for joint parenting would be unworkable. She said she could not communicate with him and there was no prospect of agreement.
The wife referred to the intervention order proceedings and even after those, she thought that the husband's behaviour particularly in relation to the child, made any form of communication and agreement impossible.
She complained that the husband had followed her and inappropriately remained at the preschool and that in her view, the intervention order to which she conceded, was being used as a tool.
The wife referred to an endeavour to resolve matters at a roundtable conference with lawyers and even a mediation all of which were unsuccessful. This again was used to point to the fact that there was no prospect of agreement with the husband relating to the child. She said that requests for things to occur at changeovers of the child were ignored and that the husband filmed her at these handovers even at the police station. There is little doubt that that did indeed occur although to Mr B, the husband said that he had stopped doing it.
The wife said the she and the husband had different attitudes and values towards education. Just exactly what that meant, I am uncertain. She referred back in time to when the husband was said to have degraded her regarding the qualifications that she had obtained whilst he did not have any. She pointed to the argument that the parties had about which school the child was to attend and the fact that they could not reach agreement. They could not even agree according to the wife, upon a deferment of the child starting school.
The wife referred to the fact that she is a trained healthcare worker and I presumed that somehow, that qualified her to make the decisions relating to the child’s health more so than the husband. She said that rather than discuss issues with her, he called a nurse telephone line. According to the wife, this gave rise to different approaches to medical and health issues, lack of concern about particular injuries and the provision of different forms of medication and treatment.
The wife descended into some detail about the impact of all of this on the child but I give that little weight having regard to the evidence of Mr B below. Such was the state of the relationship between the parties that notes were put into the child's bag and he became the messenger.
The relationship of the parties was so bad that an intermediary was required. In respect of changeover of the child, a variety of options including police stations, a contact centre and a child’s education centre were canvassed. Even in the police station, filming took place and no doubt, frustrated police officers had to assist / sort out the parties’ disputes.
In a litany of complaints from October 2010 onwards, the wife set out the chronology of events at handovers. She complained of comments by the husband about her being selfish and using him for his money all of which apparently occurred in the presence of the child. She said he referred to her as a golddigger.
The parties even disagreed upon the toilet training issues and how to handle them.
Prior to separation, according to the wife, the husband spent most of his waking hours in his office monitoring the Australian sharemarket and even installed locks on his room. She said consequentially, she was solely responsible for the child's medical needs and attendances of immunisations, healthcare visits and the like. As will be seen from the evidence of the husband below, all of that is disputed. One telling factor however is in the evidence of Mr B that the child cringes when there is an argument between his parents in his presence. I can find that it is likely that this child has been exposed to enormous conflict.
It was the wife's evidence that the husband had been more interested in his investments than in the role of a parent. Again, the husband denied all of that.
The parties have had dispute since separation about the extracurricular activities of the child. The husband has sent the wife notes relating to tennis, drama classes, dance classes, golf, soccer, football, swimming, diving and so forth. She said that when she asked for the details, she did not receive a response. For her part, the wife has put the child in limited activities.
Even in correspondence between the parties and practitioners, allegations of fabrications and emotive language precluded any rational discussion about a resolution. I stress again the need for lawyers to act as filters for their clients’ strident views.
One of the issues in this case relates to telephone calls between the child and the husband. The wife set out the details about the child having a limited concentration span which in turn, upset the husband. Whilst the husband does not accept that view, a flexible arrangement clearly will not work and as the evidence of Mr B makes clear, I should be rigid in the rules I set out.
The wife also complained about child support but even there the dispute remained a mystery. It would seem that the Child Support Agency is holding a significant sum of money.
As I earlier mentioned, I am not in a position to make any finding about most of these facts but they do indicate a completely dysfunctional and uncooperative arrangement between two parents who have a great love for the child but whose focus is on anyone other than him.

The husband

It was the husband's view that prior to separation, he and the wife shared their activities and both undertook parenting tasks such as changing nappies, feeding the child and putting him to bed. It was noticeable however that he said they otherwise lead separate lives. He said that he structured his worklife around the child and that he took the child to various events including Christmas functions and birthday parties.
The husband referred to the same arguments as the wife complained about that occurred prior to separation but he accused her of being the culprit. He talked of throwing two full cans of Pepsi at the windscreen of his car while she was holding the child.
He confirmed that changeovers were occurring on some days at police stations and that they had been able to reach agreement about the children's centre for the purpose of changeovers.
After separation, he said that he was not able to see the child for the seven weeks after the wife left and he thought that as she had applied for an intervention order, which was granted, he was precluded from requesting time with the child. The child was listed on the order. When eventually he did see the child, he complained that the wife restricted his time to two periods of four hours per week which in his view was a substantial reduction in the time that he had had prior to separation.
It would seem that when negotiations were taking place, the parties could not agree on what time the husband was to spend with the child and hence, celebrations that the husband planned for his birthday did not eventuate. The same applied in respect of the Christmas celebration in 2010.
The husband too set out the problems of negotiating. He complained that the wife was obstinate on issues such as her refusal to swap days or to extend his hours for a brother's wedding. He said that when he was unwell and requested a change of schedule, the wife’s solicitors disputed his claim that he was unwell and demanded medical evidence.
The husband said that he had been willing to care for the child when the wife was unable to do so but that the wife had refused all of his offers. He said that he had made it clear that he would be flexible and accommodate any changes the wife wished to make but that she had not been reciprocating.
As far as the husband was concerned, telephone calls had been problematic and unlike the wife's view that the child did not want to speak for long, he accused the wife of terminating the call or that she set about distracting the child while he was talking. He said that the calls were often disconnected. When text messages were sent back to the wife asking her to call, those messages were ignored. All of this indicates a serious problem of communication between the parties but also points to parallel parenting.
The parties had a dispute about whether the telephone calls were to be a landline or mobile event and it was only in discussion with counsel that that issue was resolved.
The husband complained that the wife had refused to communicate with him about the child's long-term development. He said that on numerous occasions he wanted to go to mediation or counselling to discuss schooling but despite correspondence and direct requests, the wife had refused to do so. He said that she interpreted that as his desire to be controlling her.
He pointed to police officers being required to intervene in their disputes to calm the wife down and on other occasions, she pulled faces at him, stuck her tongue out at him and openly laughed at him. He said this justified the video taping of the handovers. What it also does is indicate the level to which these two parents had stooped and having regard to the evidence of Mr B, even if I was prepared to find that one party was more culpable than the other, it is clear that even on the limited opportunity to make any findings, each has contributed to the dilemma.
I have set out in the wife's evidence what I described as a litany of allegations in relation to conduct by the husband but he too made a chronology of denials that was extensive. Again, I am not in a position to make any findings of fact about any of those issues and the only objective evidence I have is that of Mr B.
One particular incident of concern which in my view is very telling occurred in July 2012 when the child was admitted to hospital suffering from a gastro problem. The wife did not notify the husband for 18 hours and even then, the parties had an argument about the husband’s attendance to see the child because according to the husband, the wife took the view that this was her time with the child. According to the husband again, the wife limited his time with the child to 15 minutes. Just what caused all of that is hard to know and it was not disputed by the wife that much of it was right even if the finer details were disputed. It was the husband's view that all of the difficulties associated with communication had been greatly exaggerated by the wife and she had deliberately instigated conflict in order to assist the case. That comment was hardly consistent with the objective evidence of Mr B.
It was the husband's view that if the proceedings ended, there would be no impediment to he and the wife communicating enabling the making of decisions about the child's wellbeing. Enticing as that thought may be, the very arguments put by counsel on behalf of both parties, the nature of the conflict and the evidence of Mr B would suggest otherwise.
All of the immediate foregoing matters relate to the question of whether or not there should be some sort of sharing of parental responsibility.

Mr B

In June 2011, Mr B saw the parties for the purposes of the preparation of a family report. At that time, he thought that the husband believed that the only way to proceed was through the court. That was prophetic. He described the wife's view as having concluded that communication was at a very low ebb such that they were handing each other notes and there was no discussion.
The child presented as an extremely articulate child whose language skills were sophisticated and he was able to engage with both of his parents in a narrative well beyond his expected age ability. There was no doubt that the child had a good relationship with his father and nothing that was observed indicated a problem.
With his mother, the child had no problems either.
The psychologist observed the child's distress but in his view, it was explainable. He gave advice as to what the parties should do, particularly encouraging them to seek assistance around their relationship as separated parents and to use the services of a suitably qualified mental health practitioner to assist in their discussions and negotiations. He suspected that they would not mediate well because of the fundamental conflicts they had. Again, it was a prophetic statement.

In March 2013, the psychologist saw the parties again and bluntly reported that nothing had changed. The relationship between the parties was dysfunctional in the extreme. He said the wife saw all the faults belonging to the husband and reflected little upon her own contribution to those. From the husband's perspective, the court option was the only one available and there was no avenue to meaningful discussion. That statement strongly supports the conclusion that I have come to that a sharing of the arrangement associated with the decision-making about the child would never work. But as I shall detail in relation to the submissions of counsel, I am not convinced that dividing up the responsibilities would be in the child's best interests either, having regard to the fact that Mr B was of the view that the parents would parallel parent the child.
Mr B reported that the husband said that he would love to be able to work with the wife to make good decisions about the child but was not hopeful that psychological counselling together would achieve the outcome. I have no doubt that Mr B was concerned about that.
Interestingly, when Mr B had both parties together, the child was simply playing in the background. He said that despite his efforts to maintain a positive, constructive conversation between the adults, the parents inevitably slipped into their normal conflict and he observed the child become increasingly agitated and ultimately bursting into tears.
The evidence of Mr B refers to the complaints I have detailed but it was obvious that he saw the child being adversely affected by conflict. In my view, that conflict must be reduced by stopping it at a stage where it festers. One party needs to decide what to do with the child and for the child’s sake, the parties should not be near each other. That affects the handovers as well as the extensions of time.

The answers to the questions

In my view, it is in the best interests of the child that the answers to the questions posed in paragraph 2 of these reasons are as follows:
(a)the wife should have sole parental responsibility;
(b)if the parties cannot agree upon a common exchange point for the child in circumstances where the pick-up and drop-off is not the child care centre or school, it must be a contact centre even if that means curtailing the time for one or both parties to fit around the contact centre’s operations;
(c)there should not be an extension for Easter and having regard to the duration of the period away from the wife, my view is it is better for the child to be collected at 5.00pm rather than from the school;
(d)there is little doubt in my mind that the child should return to his mother’s base on the evening prior to school resuming rather than to school and the husband’s request to be present on the first day of a school year or term can be sorted out with the school principal who will obviously be concerned about other children and parents particularly if the parties behave the way that I have described above;
(e)Yes, and the orders should provide for specific times so that each party knows their obligation in relation to telephoning and facilitating those calls. The orders I have set out at the commencement of these reasons, provide for that; and
(f)Yes, the husband should be permitted to have someone present at a handover that does not occur at school or kindergarten but as I anticipate that most of those situations will be at a contact centre, the problem should be eliminated anyway. I would not be prepared to restrict the husband by being on his own even to the extent of someone being required to remain in a car.

The legal issues

The law to be applied in this determination is that set out in Part VII of the Act.
Section 60CA provides that in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, the Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.
The objects and principles of Part VII guide the determination of the assessment of what is in the child’s best interests. Section 60B urges the court to ensure that children:
(a)have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with their best interests;
(b)are protected from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence;
(c)receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and
(d)have their parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.
The principles underlying those objects are that (except when it is or would be contrary to a child's best interests):
(a)children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and
(b)children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and
(c)parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and
(d)parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and
(e)children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).
The unambiguous theme of s 60B is that it is important for children that their parents have a significant role in their development providing them with not just physical needs but also giving them security which brings confidence and trust along with consistency of lifestyle and protection from the exposure to harm. It is obvious from what I have said above that whilst the child may not be significantly affected at this stage by his parents’ conduct although one must question that having regard to what Mr B said, it is clear that as he grows older, things will become significantly worse if the parents do not contemplate his rights as I have described them above.
The Court is mandated by s60CC to consider a number of things which direct attention to what is in the child’s best interests. They are:
(a)the benefit of the child having a meaningful relationship with both of his parents;
(b)The child’s protection from physical or psychological harm through the exposure to abuse or family violence; and
(c)a series of other important factors about which I make findings below.

The presumption

Section 61DA provides that when making a parenting order, the Court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. That presumption is rebutted if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent has engaged in family violence. That in turn requires the Court to consider the definition of family violence. In s 4 of the Act, family violence was defined as:
Conduct, whether actual or threatened by a person towards, or towards the property of, a member of the person’s family that causes that or any other member of the person’s family reasonably to fear for, or reasonably to be apprehensive about, his or her personal wellbeing or safety.
The only person who has a family violence order against them at this stage is the wife. However, both parties sought family violence orders and the issues between them were resolved on undertakings. It is likely therefore that even without admission, there were sufficient problems to conclude that either or both of them was reasonably apprehensive about their personal wellbeing if not their safety.
Section 61DA provides that the presumption may be rebutted if the Court is satisfied that it would not be in the best interests of the child for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. The Court must rebut the presumption if the Court is satisfied that a parent of a child has engaged in family violence. Whilst I have some difficulties because the evidence was untested about the latter, I am certainly satisfied that the former applies and the presumption must be rebutted.
Section 60CA provides that in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, the Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. The best interests are determined by reference to the factors set out in s 60CC.
In respect of s 60CC, I make the following findings:
·    The child clearly has a good relationship with both parents and it is a meaningful one. He enjoys the benefit of it and nothing that I propose to order will alter that;
·    The child’s dependence upon the wife was not seriously challenged and the husband accepted that she will be the dominant person in his life giving her responsibilities for his daily care. There is a need to protect the child from exposure to the psychological harm from the family violence which is very much a part of his parents’ life. It is important that conflict be reduced by making orders accordingly;
·    Neither party has any respect for the other regardless of the significant role each party plays;
·    The child clearly wants to spend as much time as possible with each parent but it is in his best interest that he spends a very clear and unequivocal time as set out in orders. As Mr B commented there should be no room for argument;
·    The child is too young in my view to have any views about what time he should spend and what orders should be made despite the fact that Mr B thought that he was advanced for his age. I do not propose to take in views that I might have detected from the parties’ evidence into account in this case;
·    The nature of the relationship between the child and the wife is a strong one and is dependent upon her. He has an excellent relationship with his father who has shown a clear desire to be involved in his life and participate in the child’s activities and vice versa. The orders I propose will hopefully continue that;
·    There are no practical difficulties in this case because the parties have sufficient resources to enable them to work out travel arrangements;
·    Both parties have the capacity to provide for the needs of the child and it would seem on the evidence, have done so save for their attitude towards each other and hence, in my view, to the responsibility of parenting;
·    It is important for final orders to be made in this case to avoid ongoing conflict.
My limited findings in respect of the family violence issue and nothing further needs to be said about that. Similarly, in respect of s 60CC(4) and (4A) the findings above will indicate that I could not find either party has been positive in respect of the relationship between the child and the other and endeavour to positively facilitate that relationship.
Thus, having accepted the evidence of Mr B albeit it is limited, it is my view in the best interests that the person who will have the greater responsibility for the daily care of the child should be the person who makes the decisions about his future.
Senior counsel for the husband submitted that there was no need for the parties to consult about major long term decisions but it was not good for the child for one party to have all of the decision-making power. Indeed, by inference, it would be destructive. However, there are very few decisions of a major long term nature that really should be made through the consultative process between parents.
Section 65DAC provides that if parents are to share parental responsibility, they are taken to be required to consult with one another and make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision about that issue. That provision does not necessarily mean that parents have to have equal shared parental responsibility. If they are to share the responsibilities, there must be a modicum of respect and ability to consult and make decisions together. It was submitted that I had in previous decisions set up ways in which particular tasks were undertaken by particular people. In my view, that is not the correct approach here because the dispute is about major long term issues and not daily ones. I would not be prepared to restrict the husband in relation to decisions that were not of a major nature.
Section 61B defines parental responsibility as all of the duties, powers, responsibility and authority which by law, parents have in relation to children. Despite my best researches, I have not been able to find any decision which is much clearer than that wide definition. Indeed, it has stood the test of many years without much judicial comment.
Children have the rights that are set out in s 60B to which I have referred above. Those are the responsibilities that parents have for their children. Here, there is little prospect that those responsibilities could be fulfilled together in any joint sense. Similarly, even if I gave the parties an opportunity to comment on each other’s proposed decisions, conflict would be likely to follow. In circumstances where one parent had the responsibility for one thing and the other for another major long term responsibility, where they were parenting in their own way oblivious to the views of the other, the child must be at risk. If major long term health issues includes psychological assistance, a school welfare counsellor might be conflicted if the wife had the health responsibility and the husband the education responsibility. Similarly, if the wife is responsible for the major daily activities of the child, having the husband make long term decisions in relation to education, could be problematic if he chose a school that was difficult for the wife to attend or at which she did not have a reasonable relationship with other parents. Conversely, if she was responsible for the education but the husband health, he could create problems that would ultimately place the wife in a position where if she disagreed with the decision, she would still have to produce the child for whatever medical examination or treatment the husband dictated.
As such, until such time as the parents can have a modicum of respect for each other and make decisions in a consultative way, the person who has the major responsibility for the daily activities including giving the child a home base, should be the person who has the responsibilities for making those long term decisions. In this case, that is clearly the wife.
The husband also sought a variety of other orders and the underlying theme was flexibility. Mr B baulked at such a concept of flexibility and so should this Court.
Because these reasons may alter the agreed position of the parents on some minor issues, I propose to stand the case down for minutes to be drawn reflecting both the agreed positions and Court-ordered determinations.

I certify that the preceding Seventy Four (74) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Cronin delivered on 17 April 2013.

Associate:

Date: 17 April 2013

[2013] FamCA 255

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Family Law

Legal Concepts

Procedural Fairness

Jurisdiction