Penny & Brant - [2023] FedCFamC1F 332

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Penny & Brant [2023] FedCFamC1F 332

File number(s): ROC 592 of 2014

Judgment of: JARRETT J

Date of judgment: 4 May 2023

Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Protracted litigation between the parties – Where the applicant previously alleged that the respondent posed an unacceptable risk of physical or emotional abuse to the children – Where the applicant abandoned that case at the final hearing – Where the applicant’s evidence was found to be embellished or taken out of context – Where the applicant was found to have committed physical and emotional harm on the children – Orders made for change of residence

Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC

Division: Division 1 First Instance

Number of paragraphs: 179

Date of hearing: 30 & 31 January 2023, 1 & 2 February 2023

Place: City D

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Hanlon

Solicitor for the Applicant:: DD Solicitors

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Linklater-Steele

Solicitor for the Respondent: Wilsons The Family Lawyers

Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Mr Waterman

Solicitors for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Feeney Family Law

ORDERS

ROC 592 of 2014

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:
MS PENNY

Applicant

AND:
MR BRANT

Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN”S LAWYER

order made by:

JARRETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 May 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent have sole parental responsibility for making decisions concerning the major long-term issues for the long term care welfare and development of the children X born 2009, Y born 2010 and Z born 2013.
2.Commencing upon the making of these orders, the children shall live with the respondent when they are not otherwise living with or spending time with the applicant pursuant to these orders.
3.Commencing on Friday 19 May, 2023 the children shall live with the applicant at all times as agreed between the parties, and failing agreement as follows:
(a)from 3.00pm/after school Friday until 9.00am/before school Monday each alternate weekend during school terms; and
(b)for the second half of each of the children’s school holiday periods in odd numbered years and the first half of each of the children’s school holiday periods in even-numbered years.

4.Commencing from Friday 19 May, 2023 the children shall spend time with the parents on special occasions as follows, with the arrangements pursuant to order 3 to be suspended during these periods:
(a)if the children are not already in the care of the applicant, the children will spend from 5:00pm on the day before Mother’s Day until 5:00pm on Mother’s Day with the applicant;
(b)if the children are not already in the care of the respondent, the children will spend from 5:00pm on the day before Father’s Day until 5:00pm on Father’s Day with the respondent;
(c)if the children are not already in the care of the applicant, the children will spend time with the applicant on her birthday as follows:
(i)if a school day - from 3:00pm/after school until 7:00pm;
(ii)if a non-school day - from 9:00am until 7:00pm;

(d)if the children are not already in the care of the respondent, the children will spend time with the respondent on his birthday as follows:
(i)if a school day- from 3:00pm/after school until 7:00pm;
(ii)if a non-school day - from 9:00am until 7:00pm;

(e)for the children’s birthdays, the children will spend time with the parent whose care they are not otherwise in as follows:
(i)if a school day - from 3:00pm/after school until 7:00pm; and
(ii)if a non-school day - from 2:00pm until 7:00pm;

(f)for Easter:
(i)in even numbered years, the children will spend time with the applicant from after school on the day before Good Friday until 5:00pm on Easter Monday; and
(ii)in odd numbered years , the children will spend time with the respondent from after school on the day before Good Friday until 5:00pm on Easter Monday;

(g)for Christmas:
(i)in even numbered years, the children will spend time from 9:00am on Christmas Eve until 2:30pm on Christmas Day with the respondent, and from 2:30pm on Christmas Day until 5:00pm on Boxing Day with the applicant; and
(ii)in odd numbered years, the children will spend time from 9:00am on Christmas Eve until 2:30pm on Christmas Day with the applicant, and from 2:30pm on Christmas Day until 5:00pm on Boxing Day with the respondent.

5.Changeovers for the purposes of orders 3 and 4 are to occur as follows:
(a)during the school term, at the children’s school; and
(b)during the school holidays, at E Town service station.

6.Both parties are restrained and an injunction hereby issues restraining each party, by themselves, their servants or agents, from recording or filming a changeover event.
7.Both parents must use their best endeavours to ensure that no other person present at a changeover event records or films the changeover.
8.Unless otherwise provided for in these orders, the children shall communicate with the applicant by telephone and FaceTime as agreed between the parents in writing and unless otherwise agreed in writing between 6.00pm and 6.30pm on Tuesday and Thursday and the children be also at liberty to communicate with either of their parents at any time.
9.For the purposes of the children’s communication with the applicant, the respondent must:
(a)ensure that the children are available to receive the telephone call from the applicant;
(b)arrange for the children to telephone the applicant on the following night between 6.00pm and 6.30pm if for any unforeseen reason the communication pursuant to order 8 was not facilitated; and
(c)ensure he respects the children’s privacy when speaking with the applicant and does not attempt to listen to, record or otherwise interfere with the children’s conversations.

10.For the purposes of the children’s communication with each parent, both parents must ensure they respect the children’s privacy when speaking with the other parent and not attempt to listen to, record or otherwise interfere with the children’s conversations.
11.These orders hereby authorise each of the children’s health care providers (including general practitioner, medical specialist, dentist, orthodontist, physiotherapist, dietician, optometrist, psychologist, and any other person providing health care in the practice of a profession or the ordinary course of business) to discuss any aspect of the children ‘s health care with either of the children’s parents and to furnish them with any information that they may require concerning the children’s health and medical treatment.
12.The process to be used for resolving disputes about the terms or operation of these orders will be as follows:
(a)the parties will consult with an agreed Family Dispute Resolution practitioner to assist with resolving any dispute or reaching agreement about changes to be made;
(b)they will pay the costs of the Family Dispute Resolution practitioner equally;
(c)in the event that they are unable for any reason to have an appointment with the agreed Family Dispute Resolution practitioner and cannot agree on an alternate Family Dispute Resolution practitioner, the respondent will nominate three (3) practitioners and advise in writing details of their fees, experience and availability;
(d)the applicant will choose one of the listed practitioners within seven (7) days of receipt of the list; and
(e)if the applicant fails to choose then the respondent may choose.

13.Pursuant to s 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), leave is granted to the parties and their legal representatives to provide a copy of these orders to:
(a)any school, education institution, or care provider;
(b)any treating medical practitioner, hospital, or health care professional; and
(c)any government department or instrumentality;

that may seek or require to hold a copy of these orders for the purpose of discharging any duties, legislative, or policy requirements on the condition that these orders are not further published and are held by the relevant person or entity seeking them in accordance with the Australian Privacy Principles as set out in Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).

UPON NOTING THAT ON 28 APRIL, 2023 THE COURT MADE AN ORDER FOR THE CHILDREN TO BE DELIVERED TO COURT CHILD EXPERT MR G, THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:
14.Save for the purposes of attending upon he solicitor at their place of business, immediately upon the making of these orders the applicant shall vacate the central business district of City D.
15.The terms of these orders and the reasons for making them shall be explained to each of the children (together or separately in the discretion of the court child expert) by a court child expert of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) immediately upon the making of these orders.
16.Upon the completion of order 15 by a child court expert, the children may be removed from the presence of the court child expert only by the respondent, his servants and/or agents.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Penny & Brant has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JARRETT J:

Parental conflict is insidious. There was consensus at the bar table that exposing children over the long term to parental conflict is not in their best interests and may lead to a great many difficulties for children so exposed, both in the short term and long-term.
This application is about the parenting arrangements for three children: X (now 13 years of age), Y (now 12) and Z (now 9). They have been the focus of litigation between their parents for nearly nine years now – the initial proceedings were commenced in 2014. There were final parenting orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it then was) in May, 2020.
The parental conflict that existed between the parties to that point was the subject of comment by that judge in a written judgment delivered by her Honour on 27 May, 2020. Her Honour wrote:
26.The children otherwise know that each of their parents love them, although the children are in every way, and have been for a long time, aware of their parents’ conflict, and that is where the harm is going to come from for these children.
27.In the earliest family reports, the older two children, [Z] being too young to be interviewed, were reporting things which their father had plainly told them to report. The children continue to be very aware that their parents do not like each other and are in conflict with each other. The children have been interviewed by people for family law purposes, but also have been the source of investigations in child safety and police. The children are, in every way, completely aware that their parents dislike each other and are in constant conflict with each other.
28.The children are now 10, nine and six. As the children move into their adolescence years, the parents will no longer have the capacity to make corrections to the children’s understanding of the parents’ core relationship. If the parents do not sort out their way of communicating with each other and developing a more healthy respect for the other parent’s role in the children’s lives in a very urgent way, when the children reach the adolescent years, the damage that they have suffered all of these years with their parents’ conflict may well come home to roost.
29.The part of that damage which is happening is the fact that in the respondent’s household, there seems to be a real conversation able to happen about the children’s wish to spend more time with him or to live with him. That is damaging to the children and will damage their relationship with both of the parents. So that is something which is another source of harm to the children.
30.So I am satisfied that both parents are responsible for psychological harm to all three children as a result of the children being exposed to their parents’ conflict and their parents’ attitudes about the other parent.
Later, after discussing various of the matters arising in s 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and reiterating her view of the parties’ conflict, her Honour said:
54.The mother has sought Orders that each parent do a further parenting Orders program. The mother herself has already done it a couple of times. I cannot see any change in behaviour as a result of the parents doing a parenting Orders program, and it does not seem to me that I should be burdening the parenting Orders program by compelling further attendance for people who seem to be choosing not to take on-board the many helpful things that a parenting Orders program could teach them.
Then, presciently, her Honour said:
56.The parents may well continue to disagree with each other and they may well continue to use the Court for a forum in which they seek to assert their goodness and the other parent’s badness. It seems to me that whether orders are brief or whether they are detailed and specific, that is not the basis upon which these parents are arguing. They are arguing because they continue to choose to argue. Of course it would be preferable to make an Order that is least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings. In this family, there can be no predictor of what that might mean.
Her Honour’s words were prescient. As far as the applicant and the respondent are concerned, this case is not about the best interests of their children, but rather about “their goodness and the other parent’s badness” as her Honour put it. These parents are arguing because they continue to choose to argue with each other and in doing so have robbed their children of time and space to be children.
The present application now before me was commenced by the applicant, the children’s mother, in December, 2021. Prior to that she had filed an Initiating Application in January, 2021 – less than twelve months after final orders were made in May, 2020. The effect of each application was more or less the same – that the children should live with the applicant and spend no time with the respondent, or as ordered by the court.
The January, 2021 proceedings were prompted by the respondent, the children’s father, retaining the children in his care at the conclusion of school holiday time over the 2020/2021 Christmas school holidays. Those proceedings seemed to have quietened down such that there was an order made dismissing all outstanding applications in late 2021. However, a second Initiating Application was filed in December, 2021 by the applicant. I have set out the details of this and some subsequent interim orders later in these reasons. For present purposes what is important is that in June, 2022 an order was made placing the children in the applicant’s care and suspending their time the time with the respondent completely. Subsequently, an order for supervised time between the children and the respondent was made, but it has been unsuccessful. Only one of the children has spent any time with the respondent and then, it was only for a short period. Thus, two of these children have spent the last almost 10 months without spending any time with one of their parents. The other has spent a very minimal amount of time and certainly none since late last year.
The applicant says that the children do not wish to spend any time with the respondent and despite her best endeavours she cannot ensure that they will spend time with the respondent.
The existence of the final parenting orders made in May, 2020 requires the court to consider whether there has been a material or significant change in circumstances since the making of those orders and if there has been, whether that change warrants a fresh inquiry into the welfare of the children.
The evidence demonstrates a change of the requisite character. The children have gone from an arrangement where they were spending time with each parent to spending no time with one of them. Their wishes have changed from wishing to spend time with the respondent to not wanting to spend any time with him. These are significant matters in the context of this case and the children’s relationship with each of their parents. I am satisfied that there have been such significant changes in circumstances since the final orders were made in May, 2020 such that a fresh inquiry into the welfare of these children is warranted. No party contended to the contrary.
THE PROPOSALS
By the final orders made in May, 2020, the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for decisions concerning the major long-term issues for the children, the children are to live with the applicant and spend each alternate weekend from after school on Wednesday to before school on Monday (or Tuesday if Monday is a pupil free day) and half of the children’s school holidays with the respondent. Those orders were suspended by an interim order made on 22 June, 2022. Orders for supervised time between the children and the respondent were made on 29 September, 2022. Those orders remain current, although have been unsuccessful.
In her outline of case filed on 21 January, 2023 the applicant seeks orders that would provide her with sole parental responsibility, for the children to live with her and for them to spend no time with the respondent for twelve months. Thereafter she proposed that the time would be reintroduced if and when the applicant considered it appropriate having regard to the opinion of a registered psychologist with whom she proposed that the respondent engage for a “minimum of twenty sessions” and after having consulted with “the children’s counsellor or therapeutic mental health provider”. Irrespective of any recommendations, the applicant sought a restrictive and controlled reintroduction as specified by her in her proposed orders. Thereafter she proposed:
8(c)That following the periods of fully supervised and semi-supervised, and provided always that the children either individually or collectively express a wish to do so, the Parents will attend upon a Family Dispute Resolution Conference with a professional mediator utilizing a shuttle conference system, to establish a period of unsupervised daytime visits and any progression to overnight time.
In the course of the trial, counsel for the applicant told the court that the applicant abandoned the orders set out in her case outline document. She now sought orders that would see the children living with her and spending from Thursday after school to before school on Monday with the respondent. That was repeated, in a fashion, in final submissions by counsel for the applicant who said:
The mother asks that you make the orders that I presented to the – I orally presented to the court at 10.30 on whichever day it was, and it seems to resemble what my learned friend, the independent children’s lawyer’s counsel says, but it’s a matter for you whether you adopt that change of the commencement date, the ratcheting up, or you don’t. At the end of the day, your Honour, you’re the final determiner of what happens here.

I was not assisted by counsel’s approach in understanding just what it was that the applicant was asking me to order.
In her case outline filed on 24 January, 2023 the independent children’s lawyer sought orders that the children live with the applicant, she have sole parental responsibility for the children and that they have no contact with their father. Those orders were expressed to be preferred on a preliminary basis subject to the “credibility of the parties and the competing allegations”.
In submissions, counsel for the independent children’s lawyer submitted that the orders that were in in the best interests of the children, having regard to the evidence at the trial, were for a “nine-five arrangement in favour of the applicant, and in relation to the respondent, the independent children’s lawyer sees no need for time to be supervised”. The independent children’s lawyer recommended that the children attend counselling with a therapist and that the counselling be non-reportable. She recommended that the respondent continue with his psychologist. No minute of the proposed orders was provided to me.
In his case outline filed on 20 January, 2023 the respondent seeks orders for sole parental responsibility for the children, that they live with him and that they spend time with the applicant from 3.00pm or after school on Friday until 9.00am or before school on Monday each alternative weekend. He proposes a range of other orders to do with special occasions and the like. The respondent continued to press for these orders in final submissions.
THE ISSUES
Notwithstanding the orders sought by the applicant and the independent children’s lawyer in their case outlines, by the time closing submissions were made neither of them were suggesting that the children should not spend any time with the respondent or that the time they might spend with him (five nights per fortnight and half of the school holidays) should be supervised. Thus, to the extent that the applicant initially sought to advance a case that the respondent represented an unacceptable risk of physical or psychological harm to these children, that case had evaporated by the conclusion of the trial.
Analysed in terms of s 60CC of the Family Law Act and having regard to the evidence and the submissions of the parties then, the significant issues that emerge for determination are:
(a)whether there is a need to protect the children from psychological harm by reason of being exposed to their parents’ conflict;
(b)whether there is need to protect the children from physical or psychological harm by reason of being exposed to physical abuse from the applicant;
(c)the views of the children and the weight that might be ascribed to those views; and
(d)the capacity of each of the parents to meet the emotional needs of the children by ensuring that they have the opportunity to have a proper and meaningful relationship with the other parent.
THE APPLICANT
The applicant was born 1985 and is presently 37 years old. She is currently employed as a trainer and she has in the past conducted classes in E Town. She resides in a property at H Street, E Town.
The applicant is presently in a relationship with Mr J, although they do not live together. Mr J spends most nights sleeping in the applicant’s house according to reports from the children.
The applicant has one daughter from a previous relationship (which came after her separation from the respondent) who is presently about five years old. Her name is W.
The applicant’s evidence was less than impressive. Her trial affidavit, lengthy as it was, contains very little evidence. Her case was obviously built around the notion that the court would accept her statements, opinions, conclusions, speculations and assertions as sufficient to find that the respondent represented an unacceptable risk of psychological and perhaps physical harm to the children.
While her affidavit was not completely bereft of any evidentiary value on its face, cross‑examination revealed that much of what was said by the applicant in her affidavit could not be supported by any objective evidence. Even where the applicant asserted in her written testimony that her experiences (expressed in general ways) were supported by other corroborative evidence (such as tape recordings, video recordings or CCTV footage) none was produced to the court. Cross-examination also revealed her evidence to be internally inconsistent. Her evidence on particular points in cross-examination changed as documents were put to her to demonstrate the falsity of what she was saying.
Cross-examination revealed the applicant to be disingenuous in her evidence. Matters relied upon by her in her written testimony as demonstrative of some form of risk on behalf of the father (the video recording of her daughter W for example) was presented in such a way as to be apt to mislead. When properly analysed, the father’s conduct in taking a video recording of W, the half sibling of the parties’ three children, at a performance in public was hardly remarkable. The applicant, however, presented that material in such a way that the court was asked to infer that there was something less than satisfactory about the respondent’s conduct and it was part of his relentless campaign of harassment and intimidation of the applicant.
Cross-examination revealed the applicant to have a tendency to exaggerate her evidence and, on other occasions, to be, in my view, untruthful. There are many examples, but the applicant’s evidence about attempting to have the respondent removed from his employment makes the point. The applicant accepted that she made a complaint for the purposes of having the respondent removed from his role. Her oral evidence was that she was concerned that he was filming or videoing whilst he was working. Her written letter of complaint made in early 2019 was put to her and it demonstrated that the complaint that she raised was that the respondent was using a headset or mouthpiece to talk while working. When she was confronted with this her evidence became confused and confusing. The reason she complained about the respondent also changed from the issue of filming to an assertion that the respondent had taken one of the parties’ children, Y, from school without consent.
I do not accept any of the applicant’s assertions unless they are accepted by the respondent or are established by other independent evidence. Cross-examination demonstrated her written evidence to be so generally unreliable as to be of no probative value.
THE RESPONDENT
The respondent was born 1972. He is presently 50 years old. He is not currently in paid employment. He was previously employed by K Company, in education, and in various other industries. At the time of the trial, the respondent was reliant on Centrelink benefits for support. He was seeking reinstatement in his most recent role.
The respondent lives on a rural property owned by him a short distance outside of E Town. The purchase of the property was financed by a loan from his parents.
The applicant describes himself as being in good health although in the past he has suffered some “mental health issues as a result of my [pets dying] and the significant stress associated with my relationship and separation from [Ms Penny].” The evidence shows that he has sought professional support in relation to stress.
In that respect, I have evidence from Dr M, a psychologist with whom the respondent has engaged since mid-2022. The respondent’s engagement with Dr M has been regular and frequent according to the Dr M’s evidence. According to Dr M the respondent suffers from an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depression and some embitterment around the role of police alleging facilitating miscarriages of justice against himself and his children. According to Dr M:
This embitterment also extends to some extent towards Child Safety, whom he regards as simply believing his ex-wife rather than investigating matters, and interfering with his access to his children on her behalf. Nevertheless, he works hard to forgive the mother despite the ill treatment by her that the children have allegedly reported, which reports the mother blames on him rather than her own actions, and he expresses no hint of vengeful sentiments, preferring that the children have access to both sides of the family, despite the mother’s apparent wish to deny them access to his side of the family.
Dr M has observed no diagnosable conditions in respect of the respondent’s personality. The respondent continues to engage with Dr M.
Following his separation from the applicant, the respondent formed another relationship with Ms N. That relationship lasted for approximately three years until it ended in 2022. The relationship ended when the children, who were in the respondent’s care at that time, were removed from him by “Child Safety”. At that point the respondent says that he ended his relationship with Ms N “as I needed to focus on the children and these current proceedings”.
Despite the relationship coming to an end, the evidence shows that Ms N and the respondent remain close friends. Ms N is employed as an educator. She has two children from a previous relationship, a son aged nine and a daughter aged seven.
Although the respondent’s evidence was not without its difficulties, I found the respondent to generally be a responsive witness who did his best to answer the questions that were put to him. Unless I have otherwise stated, I have no difficulty in accepting his evidence.
THE RELATIONSHIP AND ITS SEQUALAE
A complete recitation of all of the facts of this long and complex matter is not likely to be helpful. What follows is a precis of the evidence as I have found it. It is not intended to be an account of the lives of these parties or children.
The parties commenced their relationship in 2008 and commenced cohabitation shortly thereafter. X was born 2009. Y was born 2010 and Z was born 2013. During the course of proceedings leading to the making of the May, 2020 orders, Y was diagnosed with a serious illness and required extensive medical assistance. The evidence before me is that he has now overcome this difficulty but it was no doubt a very stressful and worrying time for the parties.
Throughout their relationship the parties frequently moved between various towns in South Australia, O Region, and Queensland before finally settling in in E Town, Queensland in either 2012 or 2013.
The evidence demonstrates that 2014 was a tumultuous year for this family. The applicant says that in late 2014, she returned home from work to find the house empty. She alleges that the respondent had taken the children. The parties engaged in conversation and the respondent says that the parties agreed that he would remain at home and care for the children. Despite this, the applicant’s evidence is that in September, 2014 the parties separated and the respondent took the children to South Australia to live with his parents. They were only returned upon her starting court proceedings in November, 2014.
For his part, the respondent says that acting upon the advice of local police, in late October, 2014 he took the children on a brief holiday to South Australia. In the course of his trip to South Australia, he says that the applicant pleaded with him to return the children and that she would change her behaviour. He returned to E Town with the children, but he says that the applicant’s behaviour did not change. He left for South Australia again in November 2014.
On 24 November, 2014 the applicant commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court for the return of the children and on 28 November, 2014 the court made orders for the children to return to E Town and to live in a 3-day equal time arrangement with each parent.
It is about this time – December, 2014 that the respondent alleges the relationship between the parties ended, although the applicant put the time of final separation much earlier in 2014.
To the extent that it is relevant (and I do not consider it is particularly relevant) I prefer the respondent’s evidence about these events to that of the applicant’s evidence. The date of the commencement of proceedings and the subsequent court event is more consistent with the respondent’s evidence than that of the applicant.
The parenting arrangements settled by the interim order made in November, 2014 seem to have been observed by and large until December, 2015.
In mid-2015 a protection order was made on the respondent’s application naming the respondent as the aggrieved and the applicant as the respondent. The children and paternal grandparents were also named as protected persons on the order. The order was made in the applicant’s absence because, she says, her lawyers confused the appearance date. But there is no evidence that any action was taken to rectify the error. No doubt the state court was satisfied that the applicant had perpetrated family violence towards the respondent and perhaps the children because the order was made.
The applicant filed her own application for a protection order against the respondent and in mid-2015 a protection order was made naming the respondent as the respondent and the applicant as the aggrieved. The children were named as protected persons. The order made after a defended hearing, where the respondent cross-examined the applicant, and the Court making findings of fact, although what was found in particular is not in evidence.
There is no assertion by either party that either of these protection orders were breached. They have since expired.
Meanwhile, the Federal Circuit Court proceedings continued and on 7 August, 2015 Ms P issued a family report. On 17 November, 2015 a Dr CC issued a psychiatric report in respect of each of the parties.
On 9 December, 2015 there was an interim application heard in the Federal Circuit Court. A decision was given on 11 December, 2015 that changed the parenting arrangements for the children. Orders were made for equal shared parental responsibility between the parties and for the children to live with the applicant and spend time with the respondent each alternate Thursday to Monday and half of the school holidays.
On 26 July, 2016 an updated Family Report authored by Ms P was issued.
The Federal Circuit Court proceedings came to trial on 1 and 2 August, 2016. Judgment was reserved.
In the meantime the parties struggled with the parenting arrangements. They appear to have been in dispute regularly and their dispute spilled over to infect other aspects of their children’s lives, such as their schooling. As the Independent Children’s Lawyer points out, in early 2017 the parties received correspondence from the children’s school. It impressed upon the parents the need for disputes to be resolved outside of the school and outlined what the school would and would not do regarding parental disputes. It also noted that “Parents who seek to volunteer […] should understand that if they are accepted as volunteers it is not for the purpose of facilitating contact with their child.” This intervention from the school appears to have been necessary because the respondent, I accept, had taken to using the opportunity to volunteer at the children’s school as a means by which he could spend time with them. His actions caused conflict with the applicant who seemed put out by the proposition that the respondent should spend more time with children during their school hours (for example through his voluntary assistance with reading). She seems to have interpreted his behaviour as harassing and intimidating rather than considering that it might have been directed towards facilitating, maintaining and improving the children’s relationship with him.
Soon after this, the respondent began employment related to the school. This too, seems to have antagonised the applicant.
On 22 May, 2017 the respondent filed an Application – Contravention. On 22 August, 2017 the applicant was found to have contravened the extant parenting orders without reasonable excuse on eleven occasions in respect of telephone time and non-denigration. Although she was also found to have contravened the orders on six occasions in respect of the spend time with provisions and some telephone time, it was determined that she had a reasonable excuse for those contraventions. The applicant was ordered to attend a post separation parenting course. Notably, the parenting orders were amended such that the children commenced to spend time with the respondent from 3.00pm Friday until Monday 8.30am each alternate weekend and otherwise live with the applicant. That is to say, the time they could spend with the respondent was reduced.
The respondent alleges that at some point in 2017 (I am unable to better determine a precise date from the evidence) X and Y disclosed to him, the paternal grandmother and a paternal aunt that the applicant has put duct tape over Z’s mouth when he was crying. No evidence was called from the paternal grandmother or the paternal aunt about this matter.
On 27 September, 2018 the respondent filed another Application – Contravention. This application was heard and determined on 29 November, 2019. The mother was found to have contravened the orders five times, but with reasonable excuse. Two further counts were found to be not proven.
The respondent alleges that in mid-2019 Y told him that the applicant had pinched him on the neck with her nails, leaving visible scratches.
In 2019, the applicant commenced her relationship with Mr J.
The respondent’s evidence, unchallenged by the applicant, is that in or about mid-2019 at the school on the occasion of a changeover, Z ran towards the respondent with his arms out to embrace him but the applicant restrained Z and forced him to wait thirty seconds until the changeover time at 3.00pm arrived. Such is the level of pettiness between these parties.
An episode occurred at a local venue between the parties and their partners in late 2019. The parties give different accounts of the event. I prefer the account of the respondent given at paragraph 406 of his trial affidavit. Whilst the respondent’s evidence does not show any of the “adults” involved in it in a good light, it demonstrates the attitude exhibited by the applicant towards the respondent and the children’s relationship with him. It demonstrates the applicant to be an angry person who herself is given to anger and violence through the destruction of property. The altercation and her actions are consistent with the conclusion that the applicant and respondent are incapable of cooperating with respect to the children (for example by attending one of the children’s extracurricular activities at the same time) because the applicant simply does not wish for that to occur.
On 22 November, 2019 the applicant filed an Application – Contravention.
The respondent swears that at some point in 2019, Z disclosed to him that the applicant had locked him outside with three large dogs “known to be aggressive”.
The respondent filed another Application – Contravention on 10 January, 2020. The application was dismissed.
On 23 January, 2020 the two extant contravention applications were dismissed. The application was set down for a further days hearing on 6 March, 2020 although it is not apparent that there was any order made for the reopening of either party’s case. That seems to be implicit because there was direction for each party to file and serve one further affidavit by themselves or any witnesses upon which they wished to rely before a specified date.
It seems that a further hearing took place on 6 March, 2020 and judgment on the applicant’s application was delivered on 27 May, 2020. Final parenting orders were made on that day providing generally for equal shared parental responsibility between the parents, for the children to live with the applicant and for them to spend time with the respondent each alternate Wednesday until Monday.

The orders did not hold the fort for long.
The applicant alleges that in or around late 2020 the respondent would drive slowly past her place of work. On one occasion, the respondent shouted to the children across the facility. Z and Y acknowledged their father with a brief wave. Her evidence in this respect was repeated by Ms Q. Ms Q’s evidence, which was generally consistent with that of the applicant’s, gives little specificity to the assertion that in late 2020, or around then, the respondent started driving slowly past the workplace and looking in. Her evidence in cross-examination did not assist to bring any more certainty to this evidence.
The respondent also alleges that in late 2020, she asked if Ms Q would collect the children from changeover as she was unavailable due to work commitments. Ms Q attended the Service Station in E Town to facilitate changeover but was notified by the applicant that the respondent emailed her to state he would not be attending changeover given the children were frightened of Ms Q.
In Ms Q’s affidavit of evidence-in-chief she says that in late 2020 the applicant showed her CCTV footage of the respondent driving by her residence multiple times. The CCTV footage is not in evidence before me and its absence is not explained. Ms Q says nothing more in her evidence about this than what I have said.
The respondent alleges that in early 2021 the children told him that the applicant had a physical altercation with X, who was then 11 years old. According to the respondent, X told him that the applicant pinned the boys down and cut their hair. When X tried to avoid this, the applicant ‘slammed” him into the wall and pushed her elbow into X’s face. Y, then nine, and Z, then six, reportedly said “Mum why are you child abusing [X]?” The mother then allegedly pushed them onto the stairs and waved an object at them saying “if you want child abuse, I’ll show you child abuse.” X told the respondent that the applicant kneed him in the side and stomach saying “if you ever disrespect me, this is what you’ll get.”
The respondent contacted Child Safety and informed them of his discussions with the children. The respondent says that Child Safety advised him to withhold the children from the applicant and to not take them to school because she was likely to collect them from the school.
The children told their psychologist, Mr R about this episode. The evidence demonstrates that Mr R was so concerned that he made a notification to the Department about what the children had told him. When the Department’s representative was cross-examined about this matter, she informed the court that the Department did not contact Mr R to discuss his concerns about the disclosures. Nor did they contact the father about them. The evidence given by Ms S in answer to the questions put to her in cross-examination by counsel for the respondent was reminiscent of the types of conversations between Jim Hacker and Sir Humphrey Appleby.
On 25 January, 2021 the respondent withheld the children, alleging that the applicant was physically abusing them and exposing them to family violence. She responded by filing an Initiating Application on 28 January, 2021 in which she seemingly sought fresh parenting orders for the children and a recovery order for their return to her care.
The application came before the court on 16 February, 2021. Orders were made for the children to be returned to the applicant. Police needed to be involved in the changeover. The children did not want to return to their mother’s care and expressed concern about their safety. When the applicant returned home with the children, Z and Y ran away to a home owned by a friend of the respondent’s about 250m away from the applicant’s house. The applicant contends that this was contrived by the respondent but I reject that suggestion. Their actions are consistent with the children being afraid of the applicant as they had told the respondent they were.
The children continued to have contact with the respondent. He records that they continued to make statements to him to the effect that the applicant was hurting them. In particular he gives evidence that on:
(a)February, 2021 Y ran away from the applicant’s home when she made him wear a size 6 shirt. He usually wears a size 12. She allegedly grabbed him by the ears and attempted to pick him up. When Y returned to the respondent’s care two days later he informed the respondent his ears are still hurting. The children informed the respondent that the applicant had confiscated their electronic devices for failing to return to her care on 16 February, 2021;
(b)March, 2021 Y told him that the applicant pulled him out of a car by his ear and threatened to leave him on the side of the road;
(c)or about April, 2021 the applicant allegedly grabbed X by the shirt and pushed him hard against the wall before putting her hand around his neck;
(d)May 2021, X told the respondent that the applicant had struck him across the right side of his head.
That the children said these things to the respondent was not challenged in cross-examination. I accept his evidence that the children said these things to him. I accept his evidence about the conversations that occurred in January, 2021.
In mid-2021 the applicant was interviewed by the police regarding a report of child abuse. The detective informed her that X has already been spoken to. She explained to the police her experience of the respondent engaging in long-term monitoring of her.
The applicant said that she told the police officer “about how [Mr Brant] was always following me and the Children, recording us, monitoring us, and that this was causing the Children and myself untold stress.” She says that she told the police officer that “even with the court order of 20 May 2020 where neither [Mr Brant] nor myself was to follow or videorecord or approach within 100 metres of each other that [Mr Brant] continued his relentless harassment of me”. She told him that she had “changed my route to school, avoided going into town as often, changed where I do my grocery shopping, spent more time locked in the house, installed CCTV cameras that record who is coming to my driveway, avoided going to public places as often, reduced my social media, changed my job. [Mr Brant] always seems to find me”. She says that she told the police officer that the respondent drives by her house “multiple times a day when the children are with me, that I was increasingly worried about [Mr Brant’s] obsession had escalated to the point that I was scared for my safety and that one day I will end up in a box.” She says that she told the police officer that she was “frightened [Mr Brant] would reach a breaking point and would kill us all”.
These statements by the applicant to the police seem to be the genesis for the notion that the respondent presented a risk of harm to the applicant and the children. This statement, seemingly taken at face value by all who have subsequently heard it, has led to much upheaval and turmoil in the lives of these children. There is not a shred of evidence before me that any person, be it the Queensland police, officers from the Department or the family consultant in this matter, critically analysed the statement to understand whether there was a factual basis for it. One might have expected that the applicant would have led evidence of the facts upon which she reached a conclusion that the respondent would “kill us all”. Instead, there is none. Nor is there in any of the evidence that has been tendered to me by either the independent children’s lawyer or the respondent.
It seems that as a consequence of this information the relevant officer from the Queensland Police Service determined to make an application for a protection order against the respondent. The application was made and the applicant was given a copy of it. The copy of the application in evidence is not signed but appears to be dated mid-2021.
The applicant’s case is that she has suffered because of the respondent’s “withholding the children, his relentless parenting applications, contraventions, appeals, subpoenas, hearings, adjournments and letters” that have caused her “huge emotional and financial strain”. Objectively, however, the evidence does not support that the respondent has been engaged in relentless parenting applications. All of the parenting applications filed since the final orders made in May, 2020 have been filed by the applicant. Those applications have gone beyond merely seeking the return of the children when the applicant has withheld them. The respondent filed an application following the May, 2020 orders for the purposes of securing a copy of a transcript of the oral reasons for judgment given by the Federal Circuit Court Judge and the delivery of written reasons for the making of the orders in May 2020. The applicant responded to that application and sought its dismissal although why that might be so is on is entirely unclear. One might have thought that she had absolutely no interest in the success of that application. In any event, she chose to participate in it for reasons that are not explained. The application was unsuccessful and spawned an appeal from the respondent. Again, it is difficult to see how the applicant was interested in that appeal.
It was not just the respondent that filed applications for contravention. The applicant filed applications as well. Some of the respondent’s allegations of contravention were successful. None of the applicant’s were successful.
The applicant says that as a result of the emotional toll on her she reached out to a support organisation and two of their workers visited her at her home. This prompted correspondence from the respondent’s solicitors seeking to find out who it was that the children had told the respondent they had spoken to at the applicant’s house. The applicant responded (through her solicitors) that the persons who visited her were nothing to do with children – they were just for the applicant. However, the evidence demonstrated that the support workers had significant involvement with the children including direct discussions with them about the time that they wished to spend with their father.
The respondent alleges that in mid-2021 the principal and other employees at the BB School took the boys out of class and forced them to change their clothes, leaving them with no shoes or belongings and nothing but shorts and a t-shirt for changeover into the respondent’s care. The respondent says this was instigated by the applicant, and the principal would keep the uniforms the respondent provided for the boys for the applicant to collect. The applicant accepted that she organised for this to occur. In cross-examination she said it occurred on a couple of times, but I accept the respondent’s evidence that it was more than a couple of times. It must have been confusing if not distressing for these children to have to change out of the school clothes into other clothes before they could leave the school grounds with the respondent. I accept the respondent’s evidence about the difficulty that this caused for him because sometimes the children did not have appropriate clothes or footwear to wear to school when he was to return them there. There is correspondence from school to the respondent confirming these difficulties on one occasion.
In her case outline, the applicant alleges that in mid-2021 “Police execute a search warrant on the respondent’s property, find large amounts of [weapons]”. Her evidence to support this allegation is found in her trial affidavit at paragraph 68:
In that application, I learned that the Police has earlier conducted a search warrant at [Mr Brant’s] home [in mid] 2021. I learned that during that search warrant, a large amount of [weapons] was located at [Mr Brant’s] address along with sealed PVC pipes, and that the Police strongly suspected that [Mr Brant] had additional hidden [weapons] which were not located. The Application also states that [Mr Brant] also had several large [pieces of hunting equipment].
That evidence is a recitation, word for word, of what appears in section 9 of an application for a protection order made by local E Town police against the respondent. A copy of the application is annexure 2 to the applicant’s trial affidavit. No temporary protection order was made in respect of this particular application and it was subsequently dealt with by way of a consent order without admissions on 29 June, 2022. As best as I can tell, no evidence was placed before the Magistrates Court that made the protection order.
Neither the applicant nor the independent children’s lawyer adduced any other evidence about what is alleged to have been found at the father’s property in mid-2021. Nor did they attempt to adduce any evidence designed to give some particularity to those allegations. That is notwithstanding that the records of the Queensland Police Service were the subject of subpoena and some documents were tendered from the records so produced.
In mid-2021 the respondent was charged with multiple counts of various offences.
The respondent gives evidence about this matter. His evidence shows that in mid-2022 he entered a plea of guilty in respect of several of the charges. The police offered no evidence in respect of some charges. The respondent says that in relation to many of the charges, they related to heirloom weapons that he had inherited from his late grandfather. They were not in working condition and although the respondent did not possess a licence for them, he was in the process of obtaining a license. Other charges related to small amounts of different ammunition, most of which was stored in a safe in the respondent’s shed. His evidence was that some of the ammunition was accumulated from hunting activities.
The respondent’s evidence is that the Magistrate acknowledged that the weapons were heirloom items and that the ammunition was accrued over time and were not being used in the commission of an unlawful act. The Magistrate permitted one of the weapons that was confiscated to be return to the respondent’s father’s possession because it had sentimental value and his father held the necessary licence.
Charge one was a drug offence. According to the respondent the particulars of the charge related to him possessing a mixture of seeds and green plant material which was identified as an illicit substance. The plea was made on the basis that he was the occupier of the residence in which the substance was found. According to the respondent’s evidence, the Magistrate accepted that he was not a drug dependant person and that he was not in ownership of the illicit substances, but rather that they were merely in his possession as the occupier of the residence. The respondent’s evidence is that he does not know how the illicit substance and seeds came to be in his shed.
No convictions were recorded in respect of any of the offences to which the respondent pleaded guilty. That seems consistent with the explanation given by the respondent as to how the material the subject of the charge came to be in his possession. A probation order was made. That has now expired. Particulars of the property seized from the respondent appears in the particulars of the “Judgment or Order of the Court” section of the Verdict and Judgment Record to be found at MB22 the respondent’s trial affidavit.
In the event that any of the respondent’s evidence about these matters, the basis upon which he pleaded guilty and the basis upon which he was dealt with by the court was inaccurate it was open to the applicant or the independent children’s lawyer to tender the fact sheets or the transcript from the respondent’s hearing to demonstrate the factual basis upon which he had pleaded guilty to the charges. No such evidence was led and he was not challenged about these matters in cross-examination. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary I accept the respondent’s evidence about these matters. I accept his explanation as set out in his affidavit in respect of each of these charges and as expanded upon by him in the course of cross-examination. I expressly accept his evidence that none of the weapons nor ammunition were concealed or buried as suggested by the applicant.
In mid-2021 the children were present when the respondent was arrested. He was later released on bail.
The respondent opposed the protection order applied for by the police. Subsequently in late 2021 the police applied for a protection order in favour of the father’s then partner Ms N. This application was later dismissed.
In late 2021 the police executed a further search warrant on the respondent’s property. Following that, the police charged the respondent with various offences. The children were present when the respondent was arrested. He was released on bail, with strict “no contact” conditions.
In the meantime, the parties’ children continued spending time with each of the applicant and the respondent. According to the respondent’s evidence, there were occasions when Z ran away from the applicant or school and reports of Z in particular not wanting to return to his mother’s care.
The applicant gives evidence, which I accept, that in November, 2021 the children were due to spend time with the respondent. According to her evidence Y had a “meltdown” as he was wearing a size 10 shirt rather than a size 12. He called the applicant a “bitch” and said “[I] fucking hate you”. This is consistent with the respondent’s evidence of the children had complained to him that one of them was required to wear a shirt that was too small in size for them.
The applicant filed a further Initiating Application on 6 December, 2021. It is that application which is now before me. The reason she filed that application is not clear although on one occasion she indicated that she commenced the proceedings because the respondent indicated that he intended to travel alone with the children from Queensland to South Australia. On another occasion she indicated that the reason she commenced those proceedings was because of the weapons found that the respondent’s property in mid-2021. Issues about the respondent using drugs were also raised.
Whatever is the case, an interim hearing took place on 15 December, 2021 and orders were made for the children to return to the respondent’s care on Christmas Day, to remain in his care for 23 nights and a recovery order was to issue if they were are not delivered into his care. The respondent was ordered to provide the results of a drug screen prior to the children returning to his care. The evidence reveals that he did that and his results were unremarkable.
The evidence shows that in late 2021, the applicant contacted the Department and brought to a child safety officer’s attention the respondent’s charges and made a complaint about his conduct. She repeated her allegations about the respondent stalking her.
In early 2022 the Department commenced an investigation and assessment. Cross-examination of Ms S revealed that at no time during this “investigation and assessment” was any contact made with the respondent to obtain any information from him. Despite that, in early 2022 a determination was made that the children were in “Need of Protection”.
In May, 2022 the respondent withheld the children from the applicant’s care. He swears that at 3.31pm he received a call from his friend that lived close by the applicant. His friend told him that Y and Z were at his place. Y informed him that upon returning from school after having attended school from the respondent’s care, the applicant enquired about their weekend in the respondent’s care. Y informed her they had been riding dirt bikes. The mother imposed chores for riding dirt bikes in the respondent’s care. There was then an altercation wherein the applicant grabbed Y by his jumper and gnashed her teeth at him. When Z interjected, the applicant said ‘shut the fuck up, [Z]”. When Y escaped the applicant’s grip, the boys left, with the applicant saying “Good, fuck off and don’t come back.” At 4.30pm, the police attend at home to which the children had fled and asked Y about what had occurred.

I accept that Y said these things to the respondent.
In mid-2022 the respondent went to X’s school for a meeting with the vice principal. X was present and said to both adults that he wanted to return home with the respondent and not going to the applicant’s. The vice principal and the respondent organised for the respondent to collect X at 2.30pm that afternoon so as to avoid the applicant, but he was unable to collect him. X had apparently had a change of heart and told the vice principal that he would go home to his mother, as the applicant had said “Judge Demack will always send us back.”
On 7 June, 2022 the respondent filed an application in a proceeding seeking that the children live in his care and that there be a discrete hearing on whether or not the applicant posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the children.
On 8 June, 2022 X returned to the applicant’s care in accordance with the orders in place although Y and Z had remained in the respondent’s care.
On 14 June, 2022 X informed the respondent that the deputy principal asked whether he wished to return to the applicant’s care and X replied he did not. Z and Y were taken to discuss contacting their mother with the principal of their primary school.
The children lived in the respondent’s care between May, 2020 and June, 2022.
In the meantime, the Department was undertaking its “investigation and assessment”. The evidence of Ms S indicates that there were a number of meetings between early and mid-2022 some of which included the applicant and none of which included the respondent.
In mid-2022 the department was provided with a copy of the family report prepared by Dr C. The report had not been provided to the parties at that stage. Dr C’s report speaks for itself. Dr C expressed serious concerns about the safety of the applicant, the children and herself as result of the information that she read the Queensland Police Service and the Department. She was also concerned about information given to her by the applicant. She seemed to give no weight to the matters explained to her by the respondent.
In mid-2022 “child safety conducted a case consult with a number of key stakeholders present”. One of those stakeholders was not the respondent. One of the persons present was Ms T described as the Domestic and Family Violence Principal Project Officer. According to Ms S’s evidence Ms T gave advice to “now engage with the father as it is believed he is most likely aware of the intervention” and to “engage with the father to make further assessments”. Notwithstanding that advice, the responsible child safety officers chose not to engage with the respondent at all and instead determined to make an application for a temporary assessment order without notice to the respondent. The evidence of Ms S contained at paragraph 23 of her affidavit demonstrates the basis for the making of the application. It is expressed as follows:
a) [Mr Brant] has continued to demonstrate coercive control behaviours toward [Ms Penny], despite their separation in 2014. This is known by the mother to escalate in severity around times of status-quo change, such as Family Law Court dates, with the next being 30 June 2022. [Mr Brant's] violence has included stalking, harassment, social isolation, intimidation and engaging the children in the degrading of [Ms Penny]. This has had a detrimental impact on the relationship of the children with their mother, as the father's actions toward the children are emotionally abusive. There continues to be concerns of domestic and family violence ("DFV") impacting the children's immediate physical and emotional well-being, with his current relationship to [Ms N] and also the significant concern that with the potential of the status quo change following the hearing in the Family Court on 30 June 2022, the perceived loss of control by [Mr Brant] could result in an escalation to physical violence.
b) Furthermore, [Mr Brant] has [multiple] drug offences in 2021, relating to [illicit substances]. There is an absence of further information, and an assessment needs to occur to further evaluate the impact this may be having on his mental health and ability to provide safe care for the children.
There is no basis in any of the evidence before me for any of these assertions. Moreover, the respondent did not have “[multiple] drug offences in 2021” because although he had been charged with offences, those offences had not been dealt with. In mid-2022 he was dealt with for the charge of possession of an illicit substance on the basis I have set out earlier and another charge did not proceed as the police presented no evidence in relation to it.
Nonetheless, the Department secured a temporary assessment order in mid-2022.
At that time, the application for a protection order brought by the police in mid-2021 was heard in the Magistrates Court. The respondent attended that hearing and consented to the making of an order without admission. Concurrently, the temporary assessment order was made in the children’s court.
The Department removed the children from the respondent’s care in most traumatic circumstances. I do not ready to recount them. This was the last time, save for 30 minutes in October, 2022 that the children have spent any time with the respondent.
It is remarkable that the Department took this action when according to the evidence of Ms S the child safety officers knew that there was pending before the Federal Circuit Court an application for interim orders by the respondent that was listed to be heard and determined the following day, 30 June 2022. Rather than await the determination of the Federal Circuit Court in the course of proceedings of which it was already seized and managing, the Department usurped the authority of the court so as to secure an order to have the children removed from the respondent’s care without either the respondent or the applicant for that matter having the opportunity to be heard. Whilst Ms S sought to provide an explanation for the Department’s conduct, the explanation was unsatisfactory.
Upon their seizure by the Department, the children are placed in foster care. Five days later, the temporary assessment order expired and the children were returned to the applicant’s care.
The applicant resisted any attempt by the respondent to organise supervised time between the children and him until such time as there was an order for that made in September, 2022.
The first contact between the departmental child safety officers and the respondent occurred on 3 August, 2022. The respondent met with them at their request for the purposes of developing a “fathering plan”.
As I have earlier indicated, the criminal charges proffered against the respondent in 2021 were dealt with in mid-2022. I have recorded earlier the charges to which he pleaded guilty in relation to weapons and the like. In relation to the charges preferred against him in late 2021, the police offered no evidence in relation to the charges.
On 29 September, 2022 Baumann J ordered that the children spend time with the applicant, supervised by Mr B, at prescribed locations each Saturday from 9.00 am until 1.00 pm, subject to Mr B’s availability.
On 7 October, 2022 Mr B, reports in his correspondence of 15 October, 2022 that the applicant said “I am not telling you what to do, but next weekend the 15th would be a really good day for you to be unavailable. Because the boys have a sports event and they work really hard, so they would appreciate being able to go”. The applicant accepts that she said this although considers that she said it in a “light-hearted manner”.
On 8 October, 2022 Z and the respondent spent time together supervised by Mr B. X and Y refused to attend. Later that day, Mr B provided a summary of what occurred when he attended to collect the children for time with the respondent, it includes:
(a)that the applicant said “[X] and [Y] had decided that they probably wouldn’t go today but she would let the boys share that”;
(b)X said “I do not want to go today because it all happened really quickly and I am not ready. That was mostly the reason but also a little bit because I never asked for this. Definitely next week though”; and
(c)Y said “yea, that is why for me too because it happened too quick. But also because I feel like I get an attitude against Mum when I spend time with Dad”.
On 15 October, 2022 Mr B sent correspondence to all solicitors describing his attempts to collect the children on this date, in it he reports:
(a)the children did not attend supervised time with the respondent;
(b)when Mr B arrived, the children were waiting out the front of the applicant’s home with Mr J;
(c)X walked inside as Mr B arrived;
(d)Mr B asked Y and Z why they did not want to see their father, to which Y replied: “I just don’t feel like it”;
(e)Z said: “Yeah same”;
(f)X returned, and upon being asked if he wanted to see the respondent he said “no”;
(g)Upon being asked why, X said: “Because we are going to the [sports event]”;
(h)Mr J then said “No, no, you boys have been told that is not the reason.”;
(i)X then said: “Oh yea, just don’t feel like it. But we will next week.”;
(j)Mr B reminded the children of the court order, and Mr J said: “I thought this was just an opportunity for the boys to see their dad”;
(k)Mr B said: “I wish it was that nice, this is a court order”;
(l)Mr J then said: “If you want to go see him that is okay, we can always head to [sports] later on”; and
(m)the boys then said: “no, it’s okay.”
On 22 October, 2022 Mr B sent correspondence to the parties solicitors describing his attempts to collect the children on this date, in it he reports:
(a)the boys said “No” and “I don’t want to go see him today” individually;
(b)Y said “yea, not this week, next week or the week after that”; and
(c)X said “I don’t ever, really want to see him”.
On 30 October, 2022 Mr B sent correspondence to the parties’ solicitors describing his attempts to collect the children for time with the respondent on 29 October, 2022. He reports:
(a)X said “I just don’t want to see him, I hate him, I hate his guts. He lied to us about the [weapons] and drugs”;
(b)Y said “I don’t want to see him because I am really annoyed that [Ms N’s] kids are following me around at school and asking why I am not going to see Dad. It just makes me want to see him less because I don’t want to see them if we go back to Dads.”;
(c)Z said “I just don’t want to see him. I get an attitude anytime we go and see him, we get an attitude against Mum”;
(d)when Mr B asked him to explain what he meant by an attitude, Y said “It is mostly me that picks up on it and tells him, hey stop that”;
(e)the applicant said “I have explained many times, you have to go. Even if you just want to go for closure”; and
(f)Mr B then gave the children a card from their father, which X requested to keep.
On 5 November, 2022 Mr B sent correspondence to the parties’ solicitors describing his attempts to collect the children for time with the respondent, in it he reports:
(a)the children came out of the applicant’s home with the applicant;
(b)X said: “I don’t want to go see him today, I am not ever going to go see him”;
(c)Z said: “Yea, I am the same”;
(d)Y said: “Yea, that’s me too”;
(e)the applicant said: “you boys know this is a court order and you have to go. Last week [X] came in with the card really angry and upset and asked her to rip it up and throw it in the bin” and that Y said to her: “can you tell your solicitor that I am not happy about this”;
(f)Y said: “Dad knew what he was doing, he was just trying to make us go see him. I got an attitude against mum for like two weeks after that card, I have been like swearing at her and stuff”;
(g)X said: “It has only been one week”
(h)the applicant said “he is not allowed to give them cards, it goes against the court order”;
(i)at the end of the interaction, the applicant said X is getting worked up because things he is saying are being misconstrued.
It is uncontroversial that in late 2022 the applicant, her partner and the children went to U Town. It is also uncontroversial that the respondent and his then partner also went there and whilst they were standing in the reception of the accommodation that they attended, one of the children came in and saw them. The respondent’s case is that he did not know that the mother and children had been going there and that he and his partner had wished to go there for a short break as was their habit. As soon as he realised the children were there, he and his partner departed. I accept the respondent’s evidence about how it is that he came to end up in U Town.
On 19 November 2022, Mr B sends correspondence to all involved solicitors describing his attempts to collect the children for time with the respondent, in it he reports:
(a)he asked the boys how they were;
(b)X said: “pretty annoyed” and, when asked if he wanted to see his father: “no way, not after what he did to us on our holiday” to which the other boys agreed; and
(c)Y said: “yea, he showed up at our [accommodation] and we had to go home. [Z] saw dad and came back to the cabin crying”.
On 26 November 2022, Mr B sent correspondence to the parties’ solicitors describing his attempts to collect the children for time with the respondent, in it he reports:
(a)no time between the children and the respondent occurred;
(b)Y said: “I just don’t want to go see him, not after he showed up at our work, I’m just not going”;
(c)X said: “No way, not after what he’s done, he lied to us about everything, he’s the reason we went into foster care, I just hate him”;
(d)Z said: “Yea, I don’t want to see him, and what [X] said.”
On 28 November, 2022 the respondent receives the “Fathering Plan” developed between himself and the Department of Child Safety in mid-2022.
On 3 December, 2022 Mr B arrived to supervise time at around 9.00am. The children told him they do not want to go. They had a private conversation with Mr B. When they return to the applicant they have another card from their father. The card read “hey boys, please come and spend time together today. I miss you sooo much and I love you even more. That will NEVER change ever.”
CONSIDERATION
Each party and the independent children’s lawyer gave passing recognition to the possibility that these children will benefit from an ongoing meaningful relationship with each parent in their submissions. Indeed, the orders that each of the parties and the independent children’s lawyer seeks must be underscored by that notion. However, I formed the view that the applicant did not truly value the children having a relationship with the respondent. Her actions in tolerating a situation where the children spend no time with their father at all notwithstanding an order for supervised time bespeaks her ambivalence to the children’s relationship with the respondent.
In my view, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that these children will not benefit from a meaningful relationship with the respondent. The evidence clearly establishes that they have had a good relationship with him in the past and have sought him out.
I am also satisfied that these children will benefit from a meaningful relationship with the applicant. No party nor the independent children’s lawyer suggested to the contrary.
Parental conflict
The ongoing conflict between these parents means, I think, that it is inevitable that these children will suffer some form of emotional or psychological harm. They have been exposed to their parents’ conflict for a very long time and there is no sign that they will be given any respite. Neither parent seems to be motivated to change the way in which they deal with the other so as to reduce or avoid conflict. The attendance of post separation parenting courses and the like seems to have been of no particular benefit.
It is unlikely, in my view, that any order that is made in these proceedings will result in the children being exposed to less parental conflict. On the orders promoted by each of the parties and the independent children’s lawyer, these children will spend time between both parties’ households regularly and frequently. The parties and the children will continue to live in a small town with a small population where the chances of them unintentionally coming into contact with each other are consequently greater than if they lived in a larger centre.
More importantly, neither party nor the independent children’s lawyer was able to suggest to me how it was that the conflict between these parents would abate if the orders promoted by that particular party were made.
Both parents unduly involve the children in the parental conflict and, on my assessment, will continue to do so. The independent children’s lawyer has conveniently catalogued some of the evidence demonstrating this to be so:
(a)on 5 November, 2022 the applicant says that she told Mr B that X was getting worked up about things he is saying are being misconstrued. It is difficult to understand why X needs to know how anything he is saying is being construed in the course of the proceedings;
(b)on 26 November, 2022 X is reported to have stated that he did not want to spend supervised time with his father “not after what he’s done, he lied to us about everything, he’s the reason we went into foster care”. This is information that could only have been provided to X by the applicant;
(c)on 19 April 2022, Y is reported to have said, “I’m not talking to you [Mr V], I will talk to someone who will help and does their job properly, and who’s not mum’s friend”. This statement suggests that Y understands the issue of Mr V’s alleged conflict of interest. He could only have got that information from the respondent;
(d)children have told the respondent that the applicant has informed the children that he was “going to jail”. It was not suggested the children did not say these things to the father.
(e)the applicant gave evidence that whilst she attempts to protect the children from these proceedings, sometimes she is unsuccessful.
These are but a few examples.
Dr C considers that the children have suffered significant psychological harm as a result of these proceedings and the parties’ conduct of them. In her opinion such harm will have enduring consequences for their emotional wellbeing into the future. I accept her opinion about that.
The orders promoted by the independent children’s lawyer and the applicant will essentially see a return to the orders that were made in May, 2020 (albeit with less time in the father’s household). I do not consider that will go anyway towards ameliorating the conflict between these parents. It will simply be more of the same. The orders promoted by the respondent have not been tried but I expect that they will be equally unsuccessful in quelling the parental conflict. Sadly, it is my assessment that these children are destined to live the rest of their childhoods in the shadow of their parents’ uncontrolled conflict.
Risk of harm from the respondent
The applicant’s case was, although no longer is, that the children were at a risk of harm by reason of being exposed to the father’s family violence constituted by his coercive and controlling behaviour.
The independent children’s lawyer submits that the applicant’s evidence about these matters is almost entirely her subjective opinion that smacks of reconstruction and revisionist hindsight. The independent children’s lawyer directs me to various statements by the applicant in her evidence such as “When [Mr Brant] and I were together, there were a number of events that I now realise were domestic violence.” She gives no evidence of the “number of events”. She references only one specific event that she asserts occurred shortly after Z was born during which she says, in a very general way, the respondent pulled her arms and pinned her by her throat against a wall.

The respondent also submitted that the applicant’s case is without an evidentiary basis. For example:
(a)the applicant’s allegation that the respondent has driven past her home repeatedly was never put in context by the applicant. Her home is adjacent to the block of land upon which the respondent would park for his employment and so was required to drive down her street or past her house multiple times on most days. Nor did she accept that some of her observations might simply have been made of the respondent visiting a friend of his who lived close to the mother’s home in the same street; and
(b)the applicant’s allegation that the respondent repeatedly videoed her was not supported by any evidence even though the applicant gave evidence that she herself video recorded the respondent video recording her or that she had captured him near her residence on her CCTV. At one point in her evidence she suggested that the police had copies of some of the videos. None, however, were ever produced in evidence before me.
The most convenient and comprehensive summary of the applicant’s case appears in the statement of particulars of the application for the protection order made by the police in mid‑2021 (annexure 2 to the applicant’s trial affidavit). None of the matters alleged in that application, adopted by the applicant, are made out in the evidence.
Part of the applicant’s case hinged upon what she considered to be inappropriate conduct on the part of the respondent in videoing the applicant’s daughter W. She does not mention in her evidence however, that the event at which the video was taken was a recital attended by family members. Whilst the respondent accepted that he had taken a video of W, he explained that he had done so because he thought her half-brothers might wish to see it in the fashion akin to photographs taken on important occasions. I do not consider there was anything sinister about the respondent videotaping W at a recital.
Counsel for the respondent submitted that the applicant’s evidence was given to exaggeration and hyperbole. I accept that submission. For example, her evidence about the number of weeks the children missed school because the respondent took them to counselling was a clear exaggeration when measured against the school attendance records. She did not resile from her claims. She also embellished her evidence about physical violence and threats from the respondent to her to include an allegation, not made anywhere else in these proceedings, that after assaulting her in front of the children, the respondent stormed off and grabbed a weapon. One might have thought that such a serious episode would have been reported to the police. The applicant had plenty of opportunity to report such an episode to the police but there is no suggestion that she ever did so. Given her proclivity for making complaints (to the police, the principal of the school and others) the inference is reasonably open that she did not report the matter to the police because it never occurred. I am not satisfied that it ever occurred. The applicant’s evidence relies on labels. For example, her claim that she has experienced “relentless harassment” at the hands of the respondent is not supported by any factual material. Her use of labels throughout her lengthy affidavit is of no assistance because she does not provide evidence of particular events or other matters which would allow findings to be made from which appropriate conclusions could be drawn.
Worse, in many parts of her affidavit, after making generalised allegations of harassment through stalking and the like, the applicant claims to have corroborative evidence to support her claims. However, none has been produced. She took her claims that the respondent was stalking her to the police. The police charged the respondent but when that matter was before the court in mid-2022 the police offered no evidence. When asked about this in cross‑examination, the applicant said that the evidence was all in the police file. The police file had been subpoenaed for the purposes of this trial and no evidence of stalking was produced. I infer from the fact that the police offered no evidence to support the charge against the respondent and that the applicant produced no such evidence in the trial before me that such evidence simply did not exist. That is to say, the applicant’s assertions about the respondent stalking her are either misunderstandings on her part at best or at worst deliberately false evidence designed to advance her case in this court.
Given the almost complete failure to produce any evidence to support her assertions about the father’s “coercive and controlling behaviour” towards her, it is little wonder that the applicant abandoned the extraordinary orders that she sought in her case outline and fell into line with the orders sought by the independent children’s lawyer.
That capitulation is telling because it happened in the face of what the applicant asserted was a genuinely held belief by her (most recently expressed to Dr C) that the respondent was liable to kill her and the children.
As to that, there is no basis in the evidence for a finding that there are any reasonable grounds upon which the applicant could conclude that the respondent was liable to kill her and her children. There is no evidence of any threats to do so. There is no evidence of behaviour on his part suggestive of such action. This assertion made by the applicant to the police, it seems for the first time in or around mid-2021 has developed a life of its own without any person at any point attempting to critically analyse its veracity. The Department appears to have picked up the assertion either from the applicant or the police but not analysed the basis for the assertion at all. It was said by Ms S, and reference to her assertion appears in the material annexed to her affidavit, that the Department took the applicant’s concerns as credible because of the respondent’s “escalating” behaviour. But there is no particularisation of the “escalating” behaviour let alone any evidence of any behaviour on the part of the respondent which meets that description. Despite the assertions by Ms S that the various complaints made by the applicant to the Department were investigated, the material before me reveals no investigation at all but rather an abject failure to critically analyse and properly investigate those allegations.
On the other hand, the material demonstrates an abject failure on the part of the Department and the police to investigate the complaints made by the children through the respondent and Mr R about the mistreatment they have received at the hands of the applicant. Those complaints seem to have been dismissed out of hand given that they have come via a person who quite frankly has been labelled by the police and the Department as the perpetrator of family violence without a shred of evidence to support such an assertion.
This approach has infected the approach of Dr C and her family report. That is not to be critical of Dr C as it is no part of her role to make determinations of facts where the facts are in dispute. As she explained in cross-examination, she had regard to the material that was placed before her and took it at face value. She acted on the basis of the conclusions expressed by the Department and the police without enquiring into the basis upon which those conclusions were formed. As it turns out, on the evidence before me, there was no basis to those conclusions whatsoever. Dr C’s conclusions and recommendations are premised on the basis that the conclusions of the Department and the Queensland Police Service are sound. They are also based on the proposition, inferentially, that the applicant’s assertions are sound. They are not.
It follows that I do not accept the opinion of the family report writer to the effect that the children need to be protected from the ongoing psychological harm and potential physical harm from the respondent’s deliberate acts of undermining the applicant’s authority as a parent and influencing the children to view the applicant’s parenting style as unacceptable behaviour and abusive. The evidence does not establish that he has done those things and the factual basis for Dr C’s opinion about those matters is not made out in the evidence.
Risk of harm from the applicant
The respondent alleges that the children have disclosed several instances of physical abuse perpetrated by the applicant to the children. He gives evidence that the children have told him, that the applicant has placed duct tape on Z’s mouth when he was crying. Y told him that the applicant had pinched him on the neck with her nails, leaving visible scratches. X told him that the applicant had pushed Y onto the ground, straddled him with her knees pinning his arms to the ground and squirted liquid soap into his mouth. There are other matters about which the respondent gives evidence. I do not intend to repeat them all. The children have told their psychologist Mr R about some of them.
The alleged physical abuse has been reported to Queensland Police Service and the Department but there is no evidence before me about any investigation conducted by either organisation into those allegations. It was said in the independent children’s lawyer’s written submissions that documents would be tendered from the file produced under subpoena by the Queensland Police Service, but no such documents were tendered. The evidence of Ms S and the material attached to her affidavit bespeaks a lack of proper investigation of these matters.
I accept the respondent’s evidence about the children’s statements to him concerning their experiences at the hands of the applicant. I accept that what the children have reported to the respondent is likely to have occurred. That is the most likely explanation for the statements to him and no other was suggested. I find that there is a need to protect these children from physical and psychological harm from the applicant.
Having regard to the respondent’s evidence of what it is that the children have told him, the children are likely at a risk of physical harm flowing from the physical violence inflicted upon them by the applicant.
In addition to a risk of physical harm, there is a risk of psychological or emotional harm to these children from the applicant’s conduct. The creation of an atmosphere in which these children have been continuously subjected to involvement in court proceedings, the involvement of police and the involvement of the Department is apt to be psychologically damaging to these children. So much is clear from Dr C’s evidence.
The evidence demonstrates that the applicant is either unwilling or unable to allow the children to have a relationship with the respondent in a way that is relaxed and comfortable for them. The respondent’s evidence given in paragraphs 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 237, 240 of his affidavit, which I accept, are examples that demonstrate the applicant’s unwillingness or inability to facilitate the children’s relationship with the respondent.
In my view, the applicant’s capacity to properly facilitate a meaningful relationship between the children and the respondent is significantly compromised. Her inability to ensure that the children’s relationship with the respondent was maintained albeit through a regime of supervised contact put in place by orders made in September, 2022, bespeaks her incapacity. The evidence of Mr B demonstrates that essentially, the applicant has abandoned her parental decision-making insofar as it concerns the children’s relationship with the respondent, to the children themselves. In such a highly conflicted situation, that is entirely inappropriate.
The orders contended for by the respondent provide a greater benefit to these children than do the orders contended for by the independent children’s lawyer and the applicant because the respondent’s orders reduce the amount of time that the children spend in the care of the applicant and thereby reduce her opportunity to interact with the children in ways which will undermine their relationship with the respondent.
Views of the children
The evidence demonstrates these things:
(a)during the family report interviews on 19 May 2022, X (then 12 years of age) and Y (then 11 years of age) expressed that they wished to live with their father. In her evaluation, Dr C expressed serious concerns about the extent to which the children’s views should be considered given the possible influence by the respondent;
(b)during interviews with Child Safety in mid-2022 the children expressed a wish to primarily reside with the respondent and have limited contact with their mother;
(c)between mid-2022 and late 2022 the children expressed that they were happy primarily residing with the applicant and in late 2022 X expressed he did not wish to see his father. Y was open to having telephone contact and a face to face on his birthday but did not want regular face to face visits. Z expressed he would like to spend time with his father. All children wished to have another adult present for any time spent with the respondent;
(d)since the introduction of supervised time on 29 September, 2022 the children have not expressed a desire to spend time with their father apart from Z (then 9 years of age) spending supervised time with the respondent on 8 October, 2022.
The independent children’s lawyer submits that these children have been drawn from one hostile household to another and then to foster care briefly. She suggests that it is open to consider that the children’s experience is that they inevitably return to the applicant’s care, the applicant’s behaviour escalates where they express an interest in their father and therefore they have concluded it is unsafe to seek to spend time with their father. To this end, she submits that the views the children espouse seem to follow which household they are living in when they express them. Dr C’s report is dated 21 June, 2022 eight days prior to their removal from the respondent’s household by the Department. The independent children’s lawyer suggest that an alternative view open on the evidence is that the views of the children are an expression of immediate self-preservation, rather than their true beliefs. She submits that I should not have confidence that the views recorded by Mr B or by Dr C are reliable.
This view is supported by the contrast between the comments made to the family report writer some short months before returning to their mother’s care, and the subsequent comments they have made to Mr B.
I accept the independent children’s lawyer’s submissions about this. I cannot accept the children’s views at face value and give them significant weight. Given the approach of the applicant to the orders that should be made, it must be the case (although no submissions were made on the point) that the children’s views must necessarily carry little weight.
The evidence demonstrates that the children have been primarily cared for by the applicant and the assessment of Dr C appears to be that the children have a good relationship with her. At the time of Dr C’s report, the children also had a good relationship with the respondent. Indeed the views that they expressed at the time of Dr C’s report were consistent with them being desirous of a greater relationship with the respondent than they had at that time. Since the children have been removed from the respondent’s care and have spent little or no time with him, it seems that their relationship with him has dwindled, if their current expressed wishes are any gauge of that relationship.
The orders proposed by each of the parties and the independent children’s lawyer will permit a restoration of the relationship between the children and the respondent. But on the applicant’s proposal, it will take place with the children living in her household for a majority of the time. That arrangement has been tried before and it has led to the present predicament. The respondent is untested as a primary parent and the children do not have any experience of living with him as they have done with the applicant since the parties separated. Nonetheless, I consider that the respondent’s proposal has real potential to deliver more benefits to these children than detriments. I reached that conclusion because I consider that the respondent has shown a far greater willingness and ability to facilitate the children’s relationship with the applicant than she has their relationship with him. The comments of Dr M in his report support that view.
No party suggested that any other aspect of the matters set out in s 60CC of the Family Law Act had any role to play in these proceedings.
CONCLUSIONS
I am satisfied that the respondent’s proposed orders present more benefits to these children than the orders proposed by the independent children’s lawyer or the applicant. In her report, Dr C opined that the father had been engaging in behaviours that were undermining of the children’s relationship with the mother. I reject that view. The evidence before me simply does not support it. Rather, the evidence very clearly supports the proposition that the applicant has been undermining the children’s relationship with the respondent. She has demonstrated either an unwillingness or incapacity to properly facilitate the children’s relationship with the respondent. She has unnecessarily and inappropriately engaged the children in the conflict between her and the respondent in a way which, I am satisfied, is likely to have caused them emotional and psychological harm.
The fractious nature of the parties’ co-parenting relationship is such that I do not consider that an order for equal shared parental responsibility is in the best interests of these children. Although there has been such an order in the past, it has not worked well. These children, in my view, require some respite from the conflict between their parents and vesting in one of their parents the capacity to make decisions for them without reference to the other parent will go some way towards reducing the parental conflict because it will reduce the number of occasions upon which the parents will have to interact. Given that my view is that the children ought to live primarily in the father’s household, it is he who should retain decision-making capacity in respect of major long-term issues for the children to the exclusion of the applicant.
ORDERS
No party addressed me on the particular terms of the orders that each promoted at the conclusion of the trial. As I have indicated above, I have decided to make orders consistent with the father’s proposal. I have considered the terms of the orders proposed by him in his case outline. They do not appear to make any provision for school holiday time. I do not consider that it is inappropriate for these children to spend extended time with the applicant on school holidays. Accordingly, I have included an order for the children to spend one half of the school holidays with each of their parents, the first half in odd-numbered years with the respondent and the second half with the applicant, alternating each year thereafter.
The respondent seeks orders for the children to continue to attend counselling. That order is unnecessary given the order for sole parental responsibility. He also seeks orders for the appointment and engagement with a parenting coordinator. There is no evidence before me about the nature of the tasks that such a person would perform, their qualifications or the necessity for such an appointment. Accordingly, I decline to make that order.
I have determined that the orders that provide for the children to spend time with the applicant should not commence for two weeks after the making of these orders. It will be necessary, in my estimation, for there to be a short period of time for these children to settle into the care of the respondent. In the absence of any evidence on the point, it seems to me that two weeks would be appropriate. I am cognisant that that will mean that the children will not be able to spend time with the applicant for Mother’s Day.

The parties agreed (and indeed the applicant seeks as part of the orders she places before the court in her case outline) that the orders and the reasons for the making of them be explained to the children by a court child expert. I have arranged for that to occur immediately upon the delivery of these orders and reasons.
Having regard to the evidence in these proceedings, I harbour grave concerns for the conduct of both of these parents but in particular the applicant upon the making of these orders and for that reason I have included an order that she immediately vacate the central business district of City D so that children may transition into the respondent’s care with as little fuss as possible. There will be an order that authorises the release of the children into the care of the respondent only.
Otherwise, the orders will be as the respondent has proposed.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and seventy-nine (179) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Jarrett.
Associate:
Dated:4 May 2023

File number(s):	ROC 592 of 2014
Judgment of:	JARRETT J
Date of judgment:	4 May 2023
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Protracted litigation between the parties – Where the applicant previously alleged that the respondent posed an unacceptable risk of physical or emotional abuse to the children – Where the applicant abandoned that case at the final hearing – Where the applicant’s evidence was found to be embellished or taken out of context – Where the applicant was found to have committed physical and emotional harm on the children – Orders made for change of residence
Legislation:	Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC
Division:	Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs:	179
Date of hearing:	30 & 31 January 2023, 1 & 2 February 2023
Place:	City D
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Hanlon
Solicitor for the Applicant::	DD Solicitors
Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr Linklater-Steele
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Wilsons The Family Lawyers
Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer:	Mr Waterman
Solicitors for the Independent Children’s Lawyer:	Feeney Family Law

ROC 592 of 2014
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:	MS PENNY Applicant
AND:	MR BRANT Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN”S LAWYER

order made by:	JARRETT J
DATE OF ORDER:	4 May 2023