Penn and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

[2017] AATA 1159

Penn and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2017] AATA 1159 (26 May 2017)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2016/3746

Re:Carol Penn

APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Social Services

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Mr D. J. Morris, Member

Date:26 May 2017

Date of written reasons:        20 July 2017

Place:Perth

The Tribunal affirmed the reviewable decision.

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Mr D. J. Morris, Member

CATCHWORDS

SOCIAL SERVICES – Disability Support Pension (DSP) – whether qualified – whether impairments fully diagnosed, fully treated and fully stabilised – spinal condition – lower limb condition – whether fully diagnosed, fully treated and fully stabilised at time of claim –– no assessable functional impact of  conditions – not qualified for DSP – decision affirmed – written reasons requested – written reasons may elaborate on oral reasons given

LEGISLATION

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 36(1)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 43(2A), 43(2B)
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), ss 94(1), 94(2), 94(3B), 94(5)

Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth), sch 2 cl 4(1)

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Work-related Impairment for Disability Support Pension) Social Security (Tables for the Assessment of Determination 2011

Social Security (Active Participation for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2014

CASES

Eid and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2013] AATA 558

Negri v Secretary, Department of Social Services (2016) 70 AAR 103

REASONS FOR DECISION

D. J. Morris, Member

20 July 2017

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Ms Carol Penn applied for Disability Support Pension (DSP) on 22 April 2015.  An officer of the Department of Human Services (the Department), having considered her application, rejected it on 4 August 2015.  This is the original decision.

2. Ms Penn asked for a review of the original decision by an Authorised Review Officer (ARO), an officer of the Department not involved in the original decision.  The ARO affirmed the original decision to reject the claim on 9 March 2016. 

3. Ms Penn sought a review by the Social Services and Child Support Division of this Tribunal (AAT1).  On 9 June 2016 AAT1 affirmed the original decision.

4. Ms Penn sought a hearing before the General Division of the Tribunal.  A hearing was held on 26 May 2017.  Ms Penn represented herself and gave evidence under affirmation. The Respondent was represented by Ms Ada Wong.

5. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Tribunal made its decision ex tempore and provided oral reasons. On 13 June 2017, in accordance with section 43(2A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act), the Applicant requested a statement in writing of the reasons of the Tribunal for its decision. The Tribunal therefore provides reasons in writing for the decision which, in accordance with s 43(2B) of the AAT Act, include findings on material questions of fact and a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.

6. In the recent decision of Negri v Secretary, Department of Social Services (2016) 70 AAR 103 (Negri), Bromberg J considered a matter before the Tribunal where an oral decision had been made and a statement of written reasons had been subsequently supplied. In considering the extent to which the Tribunal could edit or elaborate its oral reasons when producing written reasons, His Honour stated at [27]:

   … as long as the reasoning remains consistent, there can be no objection to the provision of a more-elaborate exposition of the same reasoning that was orally explained. What is not permissible is altered or new reasoning. The Tribunal is not permitted to substantially divert from the reasoning upon which its decision was made, but is permitted to explain that reasoning differently and, in doing so, is required to address the matters specified in s 43(2B).

7. In preparing the written reasons which follow, the Tribunal is satisfied that they reflect the hearing held on 26 May 2017, in line with the approach suggested in Negri.  New reasoning for the decision has not been introduced, but this written statement is a fuller explanation of the reasons given orally.

8. This statement of reasons is divided into two parts.  The first is the applicable law and the background to the matter.  The second is a rendering of the reasons given by the Tribunal orally.

   PART 1 – APPLICABLE LAW AND BACKGROUND TO HEARING

   Qualification for DSP under the Act

9. In order to qualify for DSP, a person’s claim must be assessed under section 94(1) of the Social Security Act 1991 (the Act) and the qualification criteria for DSP must be satisfied.  It must be established that:

   (a)the person has a physical, intellectual or psychiatric impairment; and

   (b)the person's impairment is of 20 points or more under the Impairment Tables; and

   (c)one of the following applies:

   (i)the person has a continuing inability to work;

   (ii)the Secretary is satisfied that the person is participating in the program administered by the Commonwealth known as the supported wage system; and

   (d)…

10. Ms Penn’s written claim for DSP was made on 22 April 2015. She had previously been granted DSP in July 1995 but that benefit was cancelled in June 2001 when she returned to work. The Impairment Tables under which she must be assessed under the Act in relation to this claim are the Impairment Tables which came into force on 1 January 2012. These are set out in Social Security (Tables for the Assessment of Work-related Impairment for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2011. 

11. In terms of the criteria under s 94(1)(c) of the Act, no contention was made that Ms Penn had participated in the supported wage system. She was therefore required to establish a ‘continuing inability to work’. Relevantly, section 94(2) of the Act provides that:

    (2)A person has a continuing inability to work because of an impairment if the Secretary is satisfied that:

    (aa)in a case where the person's impairment is not a severe impairment within the meaning of subsection (3B) … the person has actively participated in a program of support within the meaning of subsection (3C), and the program of support was wholly or partly funded by the Commonwealth; and

    (a)in all cases--the impairment is of itself sufficient to prevent the person from doing any work independently of a program of support within the next 2 years; and

    (b)in all cases--either:

    (i)     the impairment is of itself sufficient to prevent the person from undertaking a training activity during the next 2 years; or

    (ii)    if the impairment does not prevent the person from undertaking a training activity--such activity is unlikely (because of the impairment) to enable the person to do any work independently of a program of support within the next 2 years.

12. Section 94(3B) of the Act provides that:

    A person's impairment is a severe impairment if the person's impairment is of 20 points or more under the Impairment Tables, of which 20 points or more are under a single Impairment Table

13. The consequence of this is that if Ms Penn is assigned 20 points under the Impairment Tables but does not have a ‘severe impairment’ for the purposes of section 94(3B) of the Act, then the Secretary must be satisfied that the Applicant has met the requirements of having ‘actively participated in a program of support’ as provided in the Social Security (Active Participation for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2014. If Ms Penn does have a ‘severe impairment’, she is only required to satisfy sections 94(2)(a) and 94(2)(b) of the Act.

    What is the relevant period for considering the claim?

14. The Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (the Administration Act) provides, at clause 4(1) of Schedule 2, as follows:

    If:

    (a)a person (other than a detained person) makes a claim for a relevant social security payment; and

    (b)the person is not, on the day on which the claim is made, qualified for the payment; and

    (c)assuming the person does not sooner die, the person will, because of the passage of time or the occurrence of an event, become qualified for the payment within the period of 13 weeks after the day on which the claim is made; and

    (d)the person becomes so qualified within that period;

    the claim is taken to be made on the first day on which the person is qualified for the social security payment.

15. Section 36(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (the Interpretation Act) sets out in a table how a period of time is to be calculated in legislation where there is no express contrary meaning. Item 5 in the table in section 36(1) of the Interpretation Act states that if the period of time is expressed to begin from a specified day, it does not include that day.

16. Therefore, there are two questions for the Tribunal to consider. First, the Tribunal must consider whether Ms Penn qualified for DSP on the date lodged she lodged her claim, 22 April 2015. If not, the Tribunal must then consider whether, applying the provisions of clause 4(1) of Schedule 2 of the Administration Act and the Interpretation Act, the Applicant become qualified on a day within the 13 week period from 23 April 2015 to 22 July 2015 (the claim period).

    PART 2 – THE HEARING

17. The Respondent tendered documents under section 37 of the AAT Act (T-documents and supplementary T-documents).

18. The Applicant provided a document titled “Applicant’s Response and Further Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions”, received by the Tribunal on 28 November 2016, to which were attached three annexures CP1, CP2 and CP3. 

19. CP1 was a medical letter dated 20 May 1993 from Dr C. J. A. Holme, radiologist, to Dr Birgitta Wypch, general practitioner, relating to an examination of Ms Penn’s skull and cervical spine.  CP2 was a cover sheet recording Ms Penn as a patient at the Collins Street Centre in West Perth dated “6/9/01”.  CP3 was a letter dated 7 August 1995 from Mr Christopher Nash of the firm of Fiocco Hopkins Rattigan, barristers and solicitors.  Mr Nash recorded that Ms Penn (under her former name) had been employed at the firm as his secretary from the end of 1994 to July 1995 but had resigned owing to having to undertake “some extensive medical treatment in the form of manipulative therapy for her lower back”.  This document and the three annexures were admitted into evidence by the Tribunal as Exhibit A1.

    Ms Penn’s claim

20. Ms Penn lodged with the Department a medical report in connection with her claim for DSP, provided by Dr Cheryl Koh, her general practitioner (T7).  Dr Koh said that the condition with the most impact on the Applicant was Chronic degenerative disc disease C4/5, C5/6, C6/7.  Degenerative facet joint change L side mild to moderate at C2/3 and C3/4.  Chronic degenerative disc bulge at L5/S1, multilevel degenerative disc bulges in lumbar spine.  Disc bulge L4/5.  Mild facet joint L4/5 and L5/S1.  She gave a date of onset of 1995.

21. Dr Koh said that this condition has been confirmed by a CT scan conducted on 23 March 2015 (T4).  The Tribunal had before it a copy of the CT scan conducted on that date by Dr Tony Briede of the Perth Radiology Clinic at Morley which confirmed Dr Koh’s description of the condition.

22. Dr Koh advised that Ms Penn was being treated with specific medicaments since 2005 for this condition.  She said that the Applicant had had specialist consultation with Mr George Wong, neurosurgeon, in 2015 and with Dr John Quinter, rheumatologist, in 1995.  Dr Koh advised (T7, p.39): “She will see chiropractor & review.  I will refer her to pain clinic.”

23. The Tribunal accepted that Ms Penn’s spinal condition, as described in Dr Koh’s medical report completed on 13 April 2015, was fully diagnosed at the date of her claim.

24. Dr Koh listed the clinical features of this condition on Ms Penn as moderate to severe neck and back pain, headaches, painful arms and legs and said these symptoms affected her lifestyle, work and sleep and made her dependent on analgesia.  In terms of affecting Ms Penn’s ability to function, Dr Koh recorded:

    “Movement & dexterity as carrying heavy files & trolley.  Affects concentration when in pain + when on analgesia.  Affects sleep & lifestyle.  Constant pain.”

25. Dr Koh was of the opinion that the condition was expected to persist for more than 24 months.  She said that the effect of this condition on Ms Penn’s ability to function in the next two years is “uncertain”, recording:

    “Depending when she gets to see pain clinic & have intervention & further management.”

26. Dr Koh listed no other medical conditions of the Applicant.  Dr Koh provided a letter to the Applicant dated 7 April 2016 which records (T23, p.139):

    “Dr De Souza has seen you in December 2013 and noted that you had heel pains.  On examination, you were tender under your heels. I understand that you have seen a podiatrist and have been using orthotics to help manage the plantar fasciitis.  I understand you will try and obtain a report from your podiatrist.”

27. The Tribunal also had before it a letter dated 7 June 2016 from Ms Liz Rich, a podiatrist at ArchRite Podiatry in Beechboro (T27).  Ms Rich recorded:

    “Carol first attended ArchRite Podiatry on 10th January 2014 complaining of chronic R>L plantar and posterior heel pain and ankle swelling.  Pain was exacerbated by walking and standing for long periods.

    Clinical diagnoses:

    -Plantar fasciopathy

    -Achilles tendinopathy /enthesopathy”

28. On the medical evidence of Dr Koh, Dr Briede and Ms Rich, the Tribunal found that the diagnoses of a degenerative spinal condition and a plantar and posterior foot pain are referrable to the claim period.

29. The Tribunal found on the basis of the medical evidence before it that Ms Penn did satisfy section 94(1)(a) of the Act in the claim period, in that she had impairment, namely a spinal condition and a lower limb condition.

30. The Tribunal notes that Dr Koh also referred to Ms Penn suffering from left knee osteoarthritis in a medical certificate dated 20 July 2016 (T28, p.144) and recorded that Ms Penn had seen Mr Gavin Clark, orthopaedic surgeon.  At T26, p.142 was a medical letter from Mr Clark to Dr Oscar D’Souza of Lockridge General Practice relating to Ms Penn.  Mr Clark referred to a diagnosis of “medial compartment osteoarthritis which is somewhat problematic.” It was not apparent when this diagnosis was made and this condition is not mentioned in Dr Koh’s medical report relating to this DSP claim, so in the absence of evidence of this condition in the claim period, the Tribunal did not consider this knee condition further.

    Ms Penn’s evidence

31. Ms Penn told the Tribunal that she had been on DSP previously.  She tried to return to work, and did so as a legal secretary, but had to give that up because of her spinal problems.  The annexures to her submission, CP1 and CP2 provide some evidence of that. 

32. At the time of this claim for DSP she was working as a sole legal practitioner.  She studied law as a mature age student and had set up a practice.  That she undertook this study and set up her own business in spite of chronic back problems is to be admired. At the time she made her claim, she had previously had an office but was then working from home.  At this time she employed one full-time staff member, a paralegal.

33. Ms Penn underwent an Employment Services Assessment Report on 22 June 2015 (T11, p.79).  She told the assessor that she did her own laundry and cooking and was able to drive.  She was able to sit for 30 minutes and could read for an hour at a time.

34. Ms Penn said she underwent a face to face Job Capacity Assessment on 3 August 2015 (JCA1) (T13, p.84 et seq), and she noted that the assessor recommended that her spinal condition was fully diagnosed in the claim period but not fully treated or fully stabilised.  This was on the basis that her general practitioner’s opinion was that the impact on Ms Penn’s ability to function was “uncertain” and will depend on when her patient sees the pain clinician and has access to further treatment and management.  JCA1 also noted Mr Wong’s opinion of 8 April 2015 that further specialist pain management intervention is recommended.

35. Ms Penn referred to a further Job Capacity Assessment dated 8 January 2016 (JCA2) (T19, p.120 et seq), and conducted on the papers, which recommended that her spinal condition should be regarded as fully diagnosed, fully treated and fully stabilised on the basis that the Applicant had now seen a pain specialist, Dr John Akers, of the Cambridge Pain Clinic.  In his medical letter to Dr Koh dated 2 November 2015 (T18, pp.114-116), Dr Akers recommended a number of measures to assist Ms Penn in managing her pain.

36. The Tribunal explained that job capacity assessors make recommendations; they are not decision-makers in regard to claims for DSP, but decision-makers may have regard to Job Capacity Assessment recommendations, as well as other information before them.  The Tribunal referred to a previous Tribunal decision of Deputy President Forgie in, Eid and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2013] AATA 558, which emphasised this distinction and the context of the role of the job capacity assessors in the Tribunal’s consideration of whether a decision about a claim was correct.

37. Ms Penn felt that the two job capacity assessment reports provided contradictory evidence and that her spinal condition had been diagnosed as long ago as 1993 and was treated and stable, and should be able to be assessed as it was only pain management that she was seeking.  The Tribunal noted that the conclusions in regard to Ms Penn’s spinal condition in JCA1 and JCA2 were different, but in the intervening period, Ms Penn had attended a pain specialist as her treating doctors were recommending at the time she made her claim.

38. The Tribunal stressed that the way the Determination is applied is to assess the functional effect of impairments on a person and explained that eligibility for DSP is not purely diagnosis-based, but is also based on the functional impact of impairment or impairments in gauging a person’s continuing inability to work.

39. Ms Penn contended that the ARO said, in the letter advising her that the original decision had been affirmed (T21, p.130), that he had tried to contact her on 7 and 8 March 2015, but she did not believe this had been the case because she had been home at the time and had not received any contact.

40. The Tribunal noted that if this was the case, it was regrettable, and may affect the quality of the decision, but not necessarily undermine the decision.  Preferably, a review officer should have the benefit of a personal conversation with an applicant.

41. Ms Penn conceded that Dr Koh had referred her to the Pain Clinic at the Royal Perth Hospital.  She told the Tribunal that there were funding difficulties with the pain clinic and that was why she eventually decided to see Dr Akers as a private patient.  She agreed with the Tribunal’s suggestion that the level of pain she was experiencing would have an effect on her functional capacity.

42. In answer to questions from Ms Wong, the Applicant said at the time of her claim in April 2015 she was winding down her legal practice.  She had stopped taking new clients late in 2014 or early in 2015 and was working from home, finalising matters.  Ms Penn said she had around 20 files at the time and kept them on a large table, generally in lever arch folders.

43. She gave evidence that she was living alone except for her two dogs.  She told the Tribunal that, at the time, she walked them twice a week for about 15 or 20 minutes but they were small dogs so did not require more regular walks.  The Tribunal notes AAT1 reported that Ms Penn told that hearing that she tried to walk for 30 minutes a day but was not currently doing that (i.e. at the time of the first hearing), owing to an ankle break in April 2016.

1. Ms Penn said she did cook but not “three course meals” and she did not need help showering or with self-care.  She gave evidence that her main supermarket shopping was done online, but she drove locally to the local shops and to visit friends or medical appointments; if she had to go into the city, she would ask her son to drive.

2. In terms of reading, Ms Penn told the Tribunal that at the time she would occasionally print off judgments and brain-storm them with legal colleagues, as well as working to finalise the matters for her remaining clients, or arrange transfers of files to other firms.

3. She told the Tribunal that “about three years ago” she flew to Sydney with family to see her granddaughter participate in a national dancing competition.  She said the hotel she stayed in was only ‘five or ten minutes’ walk from the venue.

4. When asked by the Tribunal whether she could reach down to pick up a light object, Ms Penn said she had a “grabber stick”, because she had difficulty bending.  She said she had not used a clothes line for some years since a motor vehicle accident and she was advised at that time by a pain manger to purchase a dryer because of difficulties she had lifting items up and putting her arms up.

5. Ms Penn was asked by the Tribunal whether she was still appearing in court in early 2015, but she said she could not recall.

6. The Respondent submitted that Ms Penn’s assessment by Dr Akers could not be taken into account in this review because it happened well after the claim period.  Ms Wong submitted, if the Tribunal disagreed with the Secretary’s contention that Ms Penn’s spinal condition was not fully treated or fully stabilised in the claim period, that in the alternative zero points should be allocated for this condition under Table 4 – Spinal Function because, under the Descriptors applicable to that Table, Ms Penn was able to undertake household duties, could drive locally and could park.

7. The Respondent submitted, in terms of Ms Penn’s plantar fasciitis condition, there was no functional impact; she took her dogs for a walk for “15 to 20 minutes” and lives alone. 

   
   

   The Respondent also noted that Ms Penn did not satisfy section 94(1)(c) of the Act because she had not satisfied the program of support requirements in terms of assessing a continued inability to work, so her claim for DSP could not succeed unless 20 or more impairment points were allocated under section 94(1)(b).

8. Ms Penn, in her closing submissions, said that the assessors were not medically trained.  She said the only thing not stabilised in terms of her spinal condition was pain.  She informed the Tribunal that she had been on Newstart Allowance at the time of her DSP claim but had been medically exempted from seeking work because of her medical conditions.

9. Ms Penn contended that she should be allocated 20 points under Table 4.  She said she could not bend, and had difficulty turning her head which is why she did not drive long distances.  Ms Penn submitted that she should be granted DSP, backdated to April 2015 because the reason she had not seen a pain specialist in the claim period was because of funding for the public hospital pain clinic.

   Tribunal’s oral decision

10. The Tribunal noted that Ms Penn’s chiropractor, Ms Lorraine Combrinck (T16, p.100) recorded that the Applicant only first consulted her on 13 April 2015, one day before she contacted the Department in relation to a claim for DSP and some nine days before she lodged her written claim.  The first chiropractic treatment was on 16 April 2015.  Ms Combrinck stated “the intensive phase of treatment has been completed” but it is not clear when that was.

11. The Tribunal also noted, that Dr Koh and Mr Wong had both recommended referral for pain management, as it was clear on their analyses that Ms Penn’s current medication regimen was not providing sufficient relief of pain.  However, the Applicant did not see the specialist in pain management until November 2015, well after the claim period.

12. The Tribunal noted there were gaps in the corroborated history of ongoing treatment for this condition before the Tribunal, and accepts Ms Penn’s evidence that she had moved a number of times and therefore did not have a consistent chain of evidence of treatment for this condition for that reason.  The Tribunal notes that provision of an envelope cover that the Applicant had been a patient at a particular medical clinic is not a piece of strong evidence.

13. On balance and after careful consideration of the consistent medical opinion, including radiological reports, that Ms Penn’s spinal degenerative condition was a well-established and chronic condition, the Tribunal concluded that the preferable decision was to find that it was a permanent condition in terms of the Determination in the claim period and could be assessed for impairment points under the Determination.

14. The Tribunal noted the evidence of Ms Penn that she used a “grabber” and had difficulty bending and that she said she had some difficulty turning her head.  While accepting her evidence as truthful, the Tribunal noted that, under section 8(1) of the Determination, symptoms reported by a person in relation to his or her condition can only be taken into account where there is corroborating evidence.

15. The Tribunal noted that there was no evidence from the Applicant of difficulty in using mirrors and noting other traffic when she drove a car.  The Tribunal also noted that Ms Penn’s evidence of travelling by aeroplane from Perth to Sydney around the time of the claim for DSP, or perhaps a little earlier, and her evidence of walking her dogs twice a week at the time, militated against a finding of a mild functional impact under the Descriptors in Table 4 of the Determination.

16. The Tribunal noted that there was no corroborative evidence that Ms Penn had difficulty turning her head and noted that on her evidence she was able to lift lever arch folders with legal documents from a table at that time.  While she may on her evidence satisfy the Descriptors for  an allocation of 5 impairment points, that is not possible because of the mandatory statement in the introduction to Table 4 that “self-report of symptoms” is insufficient.  The Tribunal is bound by that stipulation in the Determination.

17. The Tribunal found that zero impairment points should be allocated for this condition in the claim period.

    Plantar and posterior foot pain

18. The correct table to consider this condition is Table 3 – Lower Limb Function.  For the assignment of 5 impairment points, a person must not only meet one of the Descriptors in part 1(1), (b) or (c) of the table, but must also use a prosthesis or a walking stick or, if not, must be unable to stand for more than ten minutes.

19. There was no corroborative evidence before the Tribunal of this level of impairment.  In fact, there was evidence to the contrary, especially Ms Penn’s evidence to AAT1 that she liked to walk for 30 minutes a day at the time of the claim.  So while the Tribunal accepted that this foot condition was fully diagnosed, fully treated and fully stabilised, it did not attract impairment points in the claim period.  While it is accepted that her foot condition may lead to some difficulties for Ms Penn in walking and moving about, the mandatory requirements for the allocation of 5 points in section (2) of the matrix describing a mild functional impact on activities using lower limbs had not been met.

    Conclusion

20. As the Applicant has not been assigned 20 or more impairment points under the Determination in the claim period, she did not satisfy the requirements of section 94(1)(b) of the Act. Section 94 is a cumulative provision; to qualify for DSP, each provision must be satisfied. Therefore the Tribunal found that Ms Penn’s claim made on 22 April 2015 cannot succeed.

21. The Tribunal stated that, given the requirements of section 94(1)(b) had not been met, it was not necessary for the Tribunal to go on to consider whether Ms Penn has satisfied the continuing inability to work provisions set out in section 94(1)(c) of the Act.

22. The Tribunal noted that there are other medical conditions which have been mentioned by Ms Penn’s medical advisers, but which were not raised by her in the hearing.  These include chest pain, a fracture of her ankle and arthritis in the knee and there is some corroborative evidence of these conditions, but this information falls after the claim period and so cannot be taken into account in this particular review.

23. The Tribunal made clear that it did not question that Ms Penn suffers from impairment and noted that she had given evidence at the hearing about the functional impact on her and her daily life which the Tribunal has no reason not to accept and which is also generally supported by the various letters of her treating general practitioner, but the requirements of the Act and the Determination were not met at the time of her claim lodged on 22 April 2015, or in the thirteen weeks thereafter.

24. The Tribunal therefore found that the original decision that the Applicant was not qualified for DSP in the relevant period was the correct decision, and is affirmed.

25. In conclusion, the Tribunal noted that the Applicant’s evidence that she transferred to age pension in February 2017 and that this benefit is paid at the same rate as DSP but which does not include the medical review requirements or limitations on travel outside of Australia that the DSP benefit has.

    DECISION

26. The Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.

I certify that the preceding 69 (sixty nine) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of

....[sgd]...............................................................

Administrative Assistant - Legal

Dated: 20 July 2017

Date(s) of hearing:	26 May 2017
Applicant:	In person
Representative for the Respondent:	Ms A Wong
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Mills Oakley Lawyers