SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Pembroke Olive Downs Pty Ltd v Namrog Investments Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 87
PARTIES:
PEMBROKE OLIVE DOWNS PTY LTD
ACN 611 674 376
(applicant)
v
NAMROG INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
ACN 120 177 148
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 12172 of 2024
LAC No 3 of 2023
LAC No 1 of 2024DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave Land Court Act
ORIGINATING COURT:
Land Appeal Court at Rockhampton – [2024] QLAC 2 (Crow J, Clarke DCJ, Acting Member of the Land Court and Member Isdale)
DELIVERED ON:
30 May 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
19 March 2025
JUDGES:
Boddice and Brown JJA and Crowley J
ORDERS:
1. Leave to appeal is refused.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave to appeal.
CATCHWORDS:
STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – GENERAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION – GENERALLY – where the respondent is an owner of land the subject of a recommended approval for mining leases to facilitate a large open cut coal mine – where the applicant applied for the mining leases – where, in the proceedings of the Land Appeal Court, the respondent sought declarations as to what constitutes “restricted land” under s 68(1)(b)(i)(A) of the Mineral Resources (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (“the Act”) – where the definition of “dam” and “an area used for a dam” is in dispute – where the Land Court construed “dam” narrowly as the dam wall and necessary supporting works – where the Land Appeal Court construed “dam” more broadly to include both the dam wall and the area of land impounding water – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal the decisions of the Land Appeal Court – whether the Land Appeal Court erred in adopting a broad interpretation of “dam” for the purposes of the Act – whether the broader construction created uncertainty contrary to the legislative purpose of the Act – whether the broader construction is consistent with the text, context and purpose of s 68 of the Act – whether leave to appeal should be granted
Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld), s 68
COUNSEL:
S C Holt KC, with K McAuliffe-Lake, for the applicant
G A Thompson KC, with D A Quayle, for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Allens for the applicant
McCullough Robertson for the respondent
THE COURT: On 2 August 2024, the Land Appeal Court allowed appeals from the Land Court as to the proper construction of s 68(1)(b)(i)(A) of the Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (the Act).
The applicant seeks leave to appeal the decisions of the Land Appeal Court, contending that its construction of that section was erroneous in law and that leave to appeal should be granted, having regard to the significant impact of that construction on access to mineral resources across Queensland.
For the reasons set out below, we would refuse leave to appeal. No error of law is established in the construction given the…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Pembroke Olive Downs Pty Ltd v Namrog Investments Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2025] QCA 87
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the Land Appeal Court correctly interpreted the term "dam" to include not only the dam wall and necessary supporting works but also the area of land over which water is impounded by the dam wall when the dam is at maximum capacity. The applicant argued that the narrower interpretation adopted by the Land Court, which limited the term "dam" to the dam wall and necessary supporting works, was preferable. The applicant contended that the broader interpretation adopted by the Land Appeal Court created uncertainty and was inconsistent with the legislative purpose of the Act.
The court found that the Land Appeal Court's interpretation of the term "dam" was consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word, the context of the legislation, and the purpose of the statutory provision. The court held that the term "dam" commonly includes the area of land over which water is impounded by the dam wall, and that the broader interpretation provided a certainty of meaning consistent with the statutory text and its purpose. The court rejected the applicant's contention that the broader interpretation created uncertainty and found that it was in line with the purpose of the Act, which is to provide a degree of protection for the rights of landowners.
Accordingly, the court refused the applicant's application for leave to appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave to appeal. The decision underscores the importance of interpreting statutory provisions in light of their ordinary meaning, context, and purpose, and the need to construe remedial provisions beneficially to achieve the legislative intent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal is refused.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave to appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Accordingly, the Land Appeal Court allowed the appeal finding that for the purposes of s 68(1) of the Act:“(a)the words “an area used for … [the purpose of a] dam” in s 68(1)(b)(i)(A):(i)do include:1. the dam wall and the necessary works required to support the dam wall.2 the area of land over which water is impounded by the dam wall when the dam is at maximum capacity.3. the water impounded by the dam.(ii)but do not include:1. an area of land over the surface of which water flows and supplies water to a dam; or2. a watercourse along which water flows and supplies water to a dam.”Consideration The principles of statutory construction are not in dispute. The text of s 68 of the Act is to be considered, in its context and in light of its purpose, to ascertain the true meaning of its statutory text.[1][1]Thiess v Collector of Customs (2014) 250 CLR 664 at [22]–[23]; SAS Trustee Corporation v Miles (2018) 265 CLR 137 at [20], [41] and [64]. The applicant submits that the Land Appeal Court erred in law in adopting a broader construction of the words “a dam”. The construction adopted by the Land Court was to be preferred, as its interpretation required no implication of words into s 68 of the Act and afforded an interpretation which was practical and consistent with the statutory purpose and the text of the provision, in the context of the legislation as a whole. Contrary to the applicant’s contentions, the interpretation adopted by the Land Appeal Court provides a certainty of meaning consistent with the statutory text, both in its words and in its context in the legislation, as a whole, having regard to the purpose of the statutory provision. First, the definition of the word “dam” commonly includes “a barrier constructed to hold back water and raise its level, forming a reservoir or preventing flooding”.[2][2]Concise Oxford English Dictionary; Oxford Australian English Dictionary. Second, the Act is to be read and construed with, among other Acts, the Mineral Resources Act 1989, the principle objectives of which include minimisation of land use conflict and the encouragement of a responsible land care management with respect to, relevantly, mining. Third, s 68 of the Act is directed to land “uses” such that the purpose of the restricted land provision is to remedy interference with land uses from mineral exploration. Fourth, s 68 defines “restricted land”, relevantly, as not merely land within a specified distance of a dam, but as land within the specified distance of “an area used for” the purposes of a dam. The inclusion of the words “an area used for … the purposes of … a dam” is consistent with the restricted land being more than the dam wall. That construction particularly arises when regard is had to the identification of other water holding infrastructure, such as artesian wells, bores and water storage facilities. Fifth, the Land Appeal Court’s interpretation is more consistent with the purpose of the legislative provision which is, as the Land Appeal Court found, a provision intended by Parliament to provide a degree of protection for the rights of a landowner. Remedial provisions of that nature are properly to be construed beneficially. A beneficial construction is one that is in the interests of the landowner.