Pekar v Rickards Legal - [2015] FCCA 2888

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PEKAR v RICKARDS LEGAL

[2015] FCCA 2888

Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Application for annulment of bankruptcy pursuant to s.153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.120, 121, 153B

Supreme Court Rules 1970 (Vic), r.56

Applicant:

FIMA PEKAR

Respondent:

RICKARDS LEGAL

File Number:

MLG 1636 of 2015

Judgment of:

Judge Hartnett

Hearing date:

14 September 2015

Last Submission:

21 September 2015

Delivered at:

Melbourne

Delivered on:

28 October 2015

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant:	In person
Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr Rickards

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Rickards Legal

ORDERS

The Application filed on 17 July 2015 is dismissed.
There is leave to the parties to make submissions as to the costs claimed by the Respondent to be paid out of the bankrupt estate of the Applicant. The Respondent file and serve such written submissions within 14 days hereof and the Applicant may file and serve any submission in response within a further 14 days thereafter.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 1636 of 2015

FIMA PEKAR

Applicant

And

RICKARDS LEGAL

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(As Corrected)

On 17 July 2015, the Applicant made application for the following orders:-
“1. The sequestration order made on 2 October 2014 against the estate of Fima Pekar be annulled pursuant to s.153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2. The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs.
3. Such further or other orders as this Honourable Court deems appropriate.”[1]
[1] Application filed on 17 July 2015.
The Applicant relies upon affidavits sworn by him on 16 July 2015, 10 August 2015, 18 August 2015, 11 September 2015 and 15 September 2015 (this last Affidavit being filed and served post the hearing and in accordance with Orders made on the hearing).
The Respondent filed an Affidavit sworn by the Trustee of the bankrupt’s estate, Mr Timothy Mark Shuttleworth Holden, on 6 August 2015. Thereafter, the Respondent filed two affidavits sworn by Mr Michael Aiden Rickards on 10 September 2015, together with annexures. The Respondent relies upon that affidavit material. There is further before the Court correspondence from the Respondent dated 21 September 2015 (and copied to the Applicant) pursuant to an Order made by the Court on 14 September 2015, and limited to the question of the setting aside of an Order made by Magistrate Barrett on 3 April 2013 in the sum of $1,613.80. By that correspondence of 21 September 2015, Rickards Legal confirmed that pursuant to minutes of proposed consent orders entered into by the parties of 16 August 2013, an Order was made setting aside the Orders of Magistrate Barrett of 3 April 2013 (Magistrates’ Court proceedings numbered C12177391) and as referred to in paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Affidavit of Mr Holden sworn on 6 August 2015. Mr Rickards thus confirmed that, as submitted by the Applicant, the Order of Magistrate Barrett had been set aside and thus that debt was not owed by the Applicant in this proceeding to the Respondent at any time after the making of the Order on 3 April 2013. This matter needed clarification because at the hearing of this matter, Mr Rickards indicated that to the best of his knowledge and recollection the monies were still owed. He confirmed that was indeed not the case, as had been asserted by the Applicant. I am satisfied on the evidence of both parties that Order was so set aside.
Statements of fact in these Reasons are findings of facts on the balance of probabilities.
Section 153B of Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (‘the Act’) is relevantly as follows:-
“(1) If the Court is satisfied that a sequestration order ought not to have been made or, in the case of a debtor’s petition, that the petition ought not to have been presented or ought not to have been accepted by the Official Receiver, the Court may make an order annulling the bankruptcy.
(2) In the case of a debtor’s petition, the order may be made whether or not the bankrupt was insolvent when the petition was presented.
(3) The trustee must, before the end of the period of 2 days beginning on the day the trustee becomes aware of the order, give to the Official Receiver a written certificate setting out the former bankrupt’s name and bankruptcy number and the date of the annulment.
Penalty: 5 penalty units.”

History

On 14 August 2014, the Respondent issued a Creditor’s Petition against the Applicant returnable on 2 October 2014. The amount claimed in the Creditor’s Petition was $13,002.28 pursuant to an Order made by Costs Registrar Conidi in the Supreme Court of Victoria on 28 May 2014.
On 2 October 2014, Registrar Caporale made a Sequestration Order against the estate of the Applicant. The date of the act of bankruptcy is 25 July 2014. Mr Matthew Terence Gollant and Mr Timothy Mark Shuttleworth Holden were appointed joint and several trustees of the Applicant’s bankrupt estate. Mr Holden is now the sole trustee of the estate.
On 20 October 2014, the Applicant filed an Application for Review of the decision of Registrar Caporale. On 31 October 2014, the Applicant completed his Statement of Affairs. The Application for Review was heard by Judge Burchardt and, on 12 February 2015, His Honour affirmed the Sequestration Order and dismissed the Applicant’s application for review. In addition, an order was made that the Respondent’s costs be paid out of the bankrupt estate of the Applicant in accordance with the Act. His Honour said, in paragraph 10 of those Reasons for Judgment, the following:-
“It would appear from the court file that on 2 October 2014, the applicant filed a statement (dated, it would seem, 2 May 2014). The statement relevantly assets (sic) that the creditor has not proven that the debtor is unable to pay his debts as and when they become due. The statement asserts, effectively, that the applicant had not ever indicated that he could not afford to pay but, rather, that he refused to do so because the costs orders upon which the Petition was based were obtained by fraud inasmuch as the work charged for had not, in fact, occurred. The statement went on to assert that the applicant was willing and able to pay his debt providing the creditor provided proof, including bank statements, of an amount payable of $8,218.05.”
His Honour said further, at paragraph 26 of those Reasons for Judgment:-
“Contrary to Mr Pekar’s position, it is clear that there is a debt owed to the creditor of more than $5,000 (albeit arising from various different cost orders made from time to time). It is also clear, contrary to his submissions, that the sums are liquidated sums due at law and are payable within the meaning of s.44(1)(b)(ii). The Petition was presented on 14 August 2014, and the Bankruptcy Notice which gave rise to it was served on 4 July 2014, so clearly the conditions in s.44(1)(c) are met.”
And further, at paragraphs 30 and 31 of those Reasons for Judgment:-
“30. Here, although Mr Pekar has asserted (albeit not on affidavit at any point) that he is able to pay his debt but simply does not wish to do so, the materials he has filed go nowhere near to proving he is able to pay his debts as and when they fall due. His Statement of Affairs (which Mr Rickards has deposed on an inadmissible hearsay basis to be untruthful) does not indicate that Mr Pekar has any assets with which to satisfy the debt in this Petition. This leaves to one side other debts asserted by Mr Rickards’ most recent affidavit which are not contradicted by Mr Pekar, although I note that he is not legally represented and may not, therefore, have understood the need to respond.
31. Assuming in Mr Pekar’s favour, I as think I should, that his Statement of Affairs is truthful, he cannot, it would seem to me, afford to pay the debts he has owing. He is a pensioner, and he has cash of between $1000-$12,000. He has a car he values at $5,000 and appears also to have a mortgage of some $58,000. There is simply no other meaningful information in the Statement of Affairs, and even assuming, as I do, that Mr Pekar has a pension income, there is nothing to suggest that the court should be satisfied that he is able to pay his debts as and when they fall due.”
Some five months passed before the Applicant filed this latest application. I note in paragraph 31 as stated in paragraph 10 above, there appears to be a typing error as the Applicant’s Statement of Affairs refers to a cash amount of between $1,000 to $1,200, not $12,000. Koroneos Lawyers acted on behalf of the Applicant until ceasing to so act by Notice of Withdrawal of Lawyer filed on 10 August 2015. The Applicant thereafter appeared as a litigant in person. The Respondent in these proceedings is the principal of Rickards Legal, a firm of solicitors in Caulfield South. The Respondent opposes the Applicant’s application for annulment of the Sequestration Order made on 2 October 2014. He seeks costs on an indemnity basis.
On 14 September 2015 this matter proceeded to hearing. Each of the Applicant and Respondent were cross-examined by the other in the proceedings. The Court ordered, on that day, that there was leave to the parties to within seven days produce any court order setting aside or otherwise the Order of Magistrate Barrett of 3 April 2013. These Reasons at commencement deal with that matter.
The Applicant deposed in his Affidavit sworn 16 July 2015, that at the time of the making of the Sequestration Order he was solvent. He described making full disclosure of his financial position in the Statement of Affairs filed by him, including details of all liquidated liabilities. He claimed the only liquidated amount due and owing to the Respondent as at the date of his Sequestration Order related to the Costs Order. To 2 October 2014, the amount owing under the Costs Order, together with accrued interest, was $13,507.77. The Applicant deposed that he had the ability to discharge that debt immediately and was prepared to make the payment as a condition of any order that this Court might make to annul his bankruptcy in accordance with the Act.
The Applicant said, in paragraph 6 of his Affidavit sworn on 16 July 2015:-
“6. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I was solvent at the time the Sequestration Order was made. At that time, my only unsecured creditor was the Respondent and I had the ability to draw funds from my existing accounts to pay the debt in full. As at 2 October 2014, I had the following immediate and available sources of funds totalling $30,606.11 to discharge the debt due to the Respondent;
a. $3241.69 in NAB Account No. 54-657-4153;
b. Approximately $7,409.35 available under my NAB Visa Account No. 4557 0168 4435 9419;
c. $17,955.07 that was available to be re-drawn from ANZ Residential Investment Loan Account No. 3617-06033; and
d. $2,000.00 cash in hand.”
The Respondent opposes the application on the grounds as set out in paragraph 5 of the Affidavit of Mr Rickards sworn 10 September 2015.
Paragraph 5 is as follows:-
“5. This application should not be granted as :
i The Applicant has failed to disclose all his debts in both his statement of affairs and the Applicant’s affidavits sworn on 16 July 2015 and 10 August 2015 totalling $65,000 as set out in paragraphs 37 and 38 below.
ii Since the sequestration orders were made, a further costs order was made by his Honour Judge Burchardt in relation to the Applicant’s application for review of the orders made by Registrar Caporale of 2 October 2014. His Honour Judge Burchardt dismissed the Applicant’s application for review and made an order that he Respondent’s costs be paid out of the bankrupt estate of the applicant in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
iii The Respondent’s costs of the application for a review are approximately $4,000. These costs are yet to be taxed;
iv In addition, the Respondent’s costs of obtaining the sequestration order against the Applicant are approximately $6,000. These costs are yet to be taxed.
v In addition, the trustees (sic) costs to date in acting as Trustee of the bankrupt estate of the Applicant are in excess of $30,000.”
Mr Holden, Trustee of the bankrupt estate, in his Affidavit sworn 6 August 2015 confirmed in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 the Respondent’s costs of the application for a review to be approximately $4,000 and still to be taxed; the Respondent’s costs of obtaining a sequestration order against the Applicant being approximately $6,000 and still to be taxed; and the trustees’ costs in acting as trustee of the bankrupt estate of the Applicant to be in excess of $30,000.
In paragraph 5 of his Affidavit sworn on 6 August 2015, Mr Holden deposed to the Applicant failing to disclose all his debts in both his Statement of Affairs and his Affidavit of 16 July 2015. In paragraph 4 of that Affidavit Mr Holden said the following:-
“4. In fact, as at 2 October 2014, the Respondent had debts owing as follows:
(a) To Rickards Legal, the Respondent, the following sums:
(i) $13,002.28 pursuant to the costs order made by Registrar Conidi on 28 May 2014 in relation to Supreme Court proceedings SCI 0504, 0505, 0511)
(ii) $1,613.80 pursuant to costs orders made by Magistrate Barrett on 3 April 2013 in Magistrates Court proceedings C12177391;
(iii) $3,195 pursuant to the orders made by Magistrate Lauritsen on 24 February 2014 in relation to Magistrates Court proceeding D13289017; and
(iv) $3,300 pursuant to orders of Associate Justice Mukhtar on 1 August 2014 in relation to Supreme Court proceeding SCI 2014/02762.
b) To AIG Australia Limited the sum of $60,254.79 as set out in the Proof of Debt dated 11 February 2015.
(c) To Karen Katz the sum of $3,725.80 pursuant to orders made by Magistrate Johnstone on 18 June 2013.
(d) To the ANZ Bank the sum of approximately $58,000 being a loan secured by a mortgage over a third party property situated at 1/64 Alexander Street, East St Kilda 3183 in the State of Victoria as set out in Part B in the applicant’s Statement of Affairs.”
As described elsewhere in these Reasons, Mr Pekar did not have a debt as described at 4(a)(ii) above. I am satisfied however, that the remaining debt as described is accurate, as is the accusation that the Applicant failed to disclose the true extent of his debt.

Relevant prior history

There is context to the ongoing litigation between these parties.
The Applicant was involved in numerous legal proceedings against the owner’s corporation, Gough Partners Pty Ltd, in the units where he resides.
In or about 2010, the Applicant retained Rickards Legal to assist him in dealing with two costs orders which had been made against him in the Magistrates’ Court in favour of Gough Partners Pty Ltd, amongst other matters. In fact, Gough Partners Pty Ltd has obtained a number of costs orders against the Applicant including the following:-
a)VCAT reference OC1155/2011, Order of Member Buchanan of 22 December 2011;
b)Magistrates’ Court proceedings numbers YO18867945 and YO2555108, Order of Magistrate Holzer of 15 July 2010;
c)Supreme Court, Judicial Review and Appeal List Number SCI 2010 of 2008, Orders of Efthim AsJ of 30 June 2012 and Cavanough J of 17 August 2012.
The bills of costs in relation to the costs orders described above total $47,591.79. They have not proceeded to taxation. A Proof of Debt dated 11 February 2015 has been lodged with the Trustee in bankruptcy by AIG Australia Limited, the insurers for Gough Partners Pty Ltd in respect of the legal costs incurred by Gough Partners Pty Ltd as a result of defending multiple proceedings commenced by the Applicant. The Proof of Debt lodged is in the sum of $60,254.79, and I note includes a further Costs Order to those referred to in the preceding paragraph. The amount paid by the insurer in full and final settlement of the claim was $49,750, paid on 23 June 2011. The Applicant has never paid any amounts owing to Gough Partners Pty Ltd. He claimed in evidence that no demand had been made against him with respect to any of those costs orders, and that they were not complete until after a Costs Court proceeding. In fact, demand had been made and the Respondent was engaged to, amongst other things, negotiate an outcome.
A tax invoice for $6,302.73 dated 29 July 2011 (‘the tax invoice’) was sent to the Applicant for work carried out on his behalf by Rickards Legal in relation to the Gough Partners Pty Ltd matters.
The Applicant has taken numerous proceedings and other steps to seek to attack the tax invoice and to seek a refund of the monies paid by him pursuant to the tax invoice.
On 8 September 2011, the Applicant lodged a Complaint with the Legal Services Commissioner in relation to the tax invoice together with a disciplinary Complaint (‘the first Complaint’).
On 31 October 2011, the Applicant issued a Summons for Taxation in the Costs Court of the Supreme Court (‘the first Summons’). Later, a supporting Affidavit was sworn by the Applicant dated 14 November 2011 detailing his objections to the tax invoice.
On 2 November 2011, the Applicant was advised by the Legal Services Commissioner that the first Complaint could not be resolved by the Legal Services Commissioner.
On 20 February 2012, the Applicant issued an application in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘VCAT’) seeking relief, including repayment of all money paid to the Respondent pursuant to the tax invoice, compensation and disciplinary action against the Respondent (‘the VCAT proceeding’).
The first Summons for taxation was heard on 4 May 2012 by Wood AsJ. The Applicant made unsustainable allegations of fraud against the Respondent and, after a warning by Wood AsJ, the Applicant sought leave to withdraw the first Summons. Wood AsJ granted leave and ordered the Applicant to pay the Respondent’s costs of the first Summons.
On 27 June 2012, the Applicant lodged a Complaint with the Legal Services Commissioner against the Respondent in relation to the tax invoice (‘the second Complaint’).
By letter dated 28 June 2012 to the Applicant, the Legal Services Commissioner dismissed the second Complaint, noting that it was the second time he had lodged this same Complaint. Further, the Applicant had issued proceedings at VCAT, to be heard on 26 July 2012 and, therefore, his issue should be raised at that hearing.
On 16 July 2012, shortly after he issued the VCAT proceeding against the Respondent, and after the Costs Order was made by Wood AsJ on 4 May 2012 against the Applicant, the Applicant transferred his interest in his real property, held jointly with his wife since October 1994, situated at 1/64 Alexandra Street St Kilda East in the State of Victoria (‘the property’) to his wife, Ida Pekar, for natural love and affection. The mortgage encumbering the property remains in his sole name. The Applicant’s evidence in these proceedings was that he transferred the property to his wife because he “got very scared”. He subsequently claimed he was being sarcastic in effect in the giving of that evidence and that the transfer of the property had nothing to do with the VCAT proceeding. His evidence was:-
“It has nothing what to do with the proceeding. The reason for what I have done it, I am a carer for my wife. I was about to go back to my natural land and I was about to spend some time in it – maybe a few months – and I wanted to ensure as – in case anything happen to me, my wife will have a roof on her head. That is what I did. I – I really went overseas in a month’s time after I transfer and I can – my wife is the love of my life. I do love my kids. I do love my grandchildren. I love my wife – my poor, ill wife in as a carer.”
The transfer, as described in the preceding paragraph, is the subject of a legal proceeding issued by the Trustee, Mr Holden, against Ida Pekar in this Court (matter number MLG932/2015) seeking an order that the transfer is void pursuant to ss.120 and 121 of the Act.

On 29 August 2012, the VCAT proceeding was heard before Senior Member Smithers. By an Order made on 3 October 2012, the Applicant’s claim was dismissed. On 11 January 2013, Senior Member Smithers ordered the Applicant to pay the Respondent’s costs in the VCAT proceeding from the date of the settlement offer made on 3 July 2012 on a party-party basis, to be determined by the Costs Court of the Supreme Court (‘the Costs Court’) in default of agreement.
On 10 October 2012, the Applicant issued a second Summons for taxation in the Supreme Court of Victoria, again seeking a taxation of the tax invoice. The Respondent opposed the second Summons on the basis that the Applicant had already issued the first Summons and elected to withdraw it. The second Summons was an abuse of process. On 4 March 2013, Wood AsJ dismissed the second Summons with no order as to costs on the basis that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it.
On 14 March 2013, the Applicant issued Magistrates’ Court proceedings (D10723108) against Karen Katz, an employee of Rickards Legal, in relation to the tax invoice. On 18 June 2013, Orders were made by Registrar Johnson dismissing the Applicant’s Complaint and ordering the Applicant to pay Karen Katz’s costs of the proceeding on an indemnity basis of $3,725.80. A stay of one month was ordered.
On 5 April 2013, the Applicant lodged a Complaint with the Legal Services Commissioner against the Respondent in relation to the tax invoice (‘the third Complaint’).
By letter dated 29 April 2013 to the Applicant, the Legal Services Commissioner dismissed the third Complaint, noting that it was the third time he had lodged his Complaint.
On 8 May 2013, the Applicant issued an appeal in the Supreme Court of Victoria seeking to appeal the decision of Wood AsJ of 4 May 2012. By Order made on 30 May 2013, Pagone J dismissed the appeal and ordered the Applicant to pay the Respondent’s costs limited to the appearance of Counsel on 30 May 2013 to be assessed by the Costs Court in default of agreement.
On 1 November 2013, the Applicant issued Magistrates’ Court proceedings (D13289017) against the Respondent in relation to the tax invoice. The Respondent made an application to the Magistrates’ Court seeking an order to summarily strike out the Applicant’s proceeding on the basis that it raised the same issues as the issues already raised by the Applicant which were the subject of the VCAT proceeding. On 24 February 2014, Orders were made by Chief Magistrate Lauritsen dismissing the Applicant’s Complaint and ordering the Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of the Complaint fixed at $3,195.10, with a stay of one month.
On 31 January 2014, the Respondent issued a Summons for taxation in the Costs Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria. On 28 May 2014, the costs as ordered by Pagone J on 30 May 2013, Wood AsJ on 4 May 2012, and Senior Member Jonathan Smithers on 11 January 2013, were taxed by the Costs Court and Orders were made by Costs Registrar Conidi in relation to the costs payable by the Applicant.
Approximately one week prior to the above Costs Court Order, and on 21 May 2014, an Order was made by VCAT dismissing the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal one of the decisions of Wood AsJ. On 4 June 2014, the Applicant applied for judicial review pursuant to r.56 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 of the VCAT decision of 21 May 2014, refusing to grant an order for rehearing. The Applicant sought a rehearing of the matters which were heard by VCAT on 29 August 2012. On 1 August 2014, Mukhtar AsJ dismissed the Applicant’s application and made an order for costs, fixed at $3,300 with such order stayed for 30 days.
On 5 August 2014, the Applicant lodged a Complaint with the Legal Services Commissioner against the Respondent in relation to the tax invoice (‘the fourth Complaint’). By letter dated 7 November 2014, the Respondent was informed by the Legal Services Commissioner that the Complaint had been dismissed.

The bankruptcy proceedings and matters thereafter

On 4 July 2014, the Respondent had served the Applicant with a Bankruptcy Notice seeking payment of his costs as ordered by the Supreme Court on 28 May 2014, and as described in paragraph 40 of these Reasons.
The judgment debt, the basis of the creditors’ petition, was the Order in the Costs Court on 28 May 2014 in the sum of $13,002.28. That sum remains unpaid.
Since the making of the Sequestration Order, the Applicant’s debts have accumulated and now include Rickards Legal’s costs of the application for review of approximately $4,000 to be taxed, together with the Rickards Legal costs of obtaining the Sequestration Order against the Applicant of approximately $6,000, still to be taxed, together with the trustees’ costs in excess of $30,000. That total of $40,000 does not include any costs of this proceeding that might arise and statutory interest.
In a conversation between the Applicant and Respondent at the offices of the Respondent on 5 December 2014, the Applicant informed the Respondent that he owned two other properties which he had failed to disclose to the Trustee. The details of those properties had not been disclosed by the Respondent in his Statement of Affairs dated 31 October 2014. In addition, on 10 August 2015, the Applicant again informed the Respondent and additionally the Trustee, that he owned two other properties which he had not disclosed in his Statement of Affairs.
On 18 August 2015, the Trustee sent a letter to the Applicant requesting that he disclose all relevant information, including details of the two properties and details of lump sum payments made by him in relation to the loan secured by way of a mortgage over the property in which he resides. The Applicant failed to comply with that request. The Applicant’s evidence as to these matters was that he was joking when he made such claims to the Respondent and Trustee.
The Trustee has lodged an objection to the Applicant’s discharge from bankruptcy and an offence referral to the Australian Financial Security Authority’s Regulation and Enforcement Department.
A National Australian Bank statement of the Applicant obtained by the Trustee reveals mortgage repayments of $10,000 each on 12 August 2013 and on 12 March 2014, made by the Applicant. No explanation has been provided by the Applicant as to how he came into receipt of such funds, save that he and his wife receive Centrelink benefits of sufficient nature, and that they are assisted by their two children.

Conclusion

As at 2 October 2014, the Applicant had debts, including the following, of which I am satisfied:-
a)owing to Rickards Legal in the following sums:-
i)$13,002.28, pursuant to the costs Order made by Costs Registrar Conidi on 28 May 2014;
ii)$3,195.10, pursuant to the Orders made by Magistrate Lauritsen on 24 February 2014; and
iii)$3,300, pursuant to Orders made by Mukhtar AsJ on 1 August 2014;
b)owing to AIG Australia Limited in the sum of $60,254.79, as set out in the proof of debt dated 11 February 2015;
c)owing to Karen Katz the sum of $3,725.80, pursuant to Orders made by Magistrate Johnstone on 18 June 2013; and
d)owing to the National Australian Bank the sum of approximately $57,214.90.
e)total: $140,692.87.
The Applicant, as at 2 October 2014 and indeed thereafter, has had no capacity to pay his debts as and when they fall due. He had and has no assets of any significance at the relevant times. There was then, and indeed remains, no other sufficient cause why a Sequestration Order ought not be made.
There is no evidence before this Court that would satisfy it that the Sequestration Order ought not to have been made. Indeed, there is significant evidence to the contrary.
This application is entirely without merit and shall be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-three (53) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Hartnett

Date: 28 October 2015

Corrections

Paragraph 11 line 2: delete “32” insert “31”
Paragraph 11 line 2: delete “above” insert “in paragraph 10 above”
Paragraph 17 line 24: insert “$”
Paragraph 21 line 14: insert “was”
Paragraph 46 line 7: delete “both”
Paragraph 46 line 7:: delete “Applicant” insert “Respondent”
Paragraph 46 line 7: insert “additionally”