Pekar, in the matter of Pekar

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pekar, in the matter of Pekar [2021] FCA 362

Judgment of: WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 15 April 2021
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by a person subject to a vexatious proceedings order for leave to institute a proceeding – proposed proceeding seeks to appeal the vexatious proceedings order and summary dismissal of applicant’s claims – where applicant failed substantially to comply with s 37AR(3) – where applicant has a history of commencing proceedings against respondents in connection with the same subject matter – where proposed appeal seeks to re-litigate claims for damages previously determined by the Court – application of Anshun estoppel, issue estoppel and res judicata – proposed proceeding vexatious – application dismissed. 
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 104

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 31A(1), 37AM(1), 37AO(2)(a), (5), (6)(a) and (b), 37AQ(1)(a), 37AR, (2) and (3)(b), 37AS(1), (2) and (3), 37AT and (4)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 79

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01

Cases cited:

Clark v Macourt [2013] HCA 56; 253 CLR 1

Croker, in the matter of Croker [2019] FCA 359

Fuller v Toms [2015] FCAFC 91; 234 FCR 535

Gargan, in the matter of Gargan [2018] FCA 871

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499

Pekar v Rickards Legal (No 3) [2017] FCCA 1196

Pekar v Holden [2021] FCA 141

Pekar v Holden (Trustee) [2019] FCA 442

Pekar v Holden (Trustee) (No 2) [2019] FCA 1212

Pekar v Holden (Trustee) (No 3) [2019] FCA 1928

Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; 147 CLR 589

Todorovic v Waller [1981] HCA 72; 150 CLR 402

Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
Number of paragraphs: 34
Date of hearing: Heard on the papers

 

ORDERS

IN THE MATTER OF PEKAR

FIMA PEKAR

Applicant

JUDGE:

WHEELAHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 APRIL 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to institute a proceeding, lodged on 9 March 2021, be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WHEELAHAN J:

Introduction

  1. The applicant, who is self‑represented, is subject to a vexatious proceedings order made by a judge of this Court on 26 February 2021 in proceeding VID 614 of 2020. By that order, the applicant is prohibited from instituting in any registry of the Federal Court of Australia any proceedings other than proceedings pursuant to section 104 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). At the same time, the Judge ordered that the proceeding before his Honour be dismissed pursuant to s 37AO(2)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act), or alternatively, s 31A(1) of the Act, or in the further alternative, r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The applicant seeks to institute an appeal from these orders to the…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 362
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Pekar, in the matter of Pekar, the applicant sought leave to institute a proceeding against the trustee of his bankrupt estate and another individual. The proposed proceeding aimed to appeal a vexatious proceedings order and the summary dismissal of the applicant’s claims. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the proposed appeal was vexatious and if the application for leave to appeal should be granted.

The central legal issues revolved around whether the proposed appeal was vexatious, and if the applicant's affidavit substantially complied with the requirements of s 37AR(3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The court had to consider whether the proposed appeal sought to re-litigate claims that had already been determined and if the application for leave to appeal was frivolous or otherwise vexatious. Additionally, the court examined whether the principles of Anshun estoppel, issue estoppel, and res judicata applied to the proposed appeal.

The court found that the proposed appeal was vexatious for several reasons. Firstly, the applicant had a history of commencing proceedings against the respondents concerning the same subject matter, indicating a pattern of vexatious litigation. Secondly, the proposed appeal sought to re-litigate claims for damages that had already been determined by the Court, which would involve repeating arguments already rejected. The court also noted that the applicant's affidavit did not substantially comply with s 37AR(3) as it failed to list all other proceedings the applicant had instituted in any Australian court or tribunal. Given these findings, the court dismissed the application for leave to institute the proposed appeal.

The court dismissed the applicant's application for leave to institute a proceeding, finding the proposed appeal to be vexatious and in substantial non-compliance with the statutory requirements. The dismissal was based on the vexatious nature of the proposed appeal and the failure to comply with the procedural requirements set out in the legislation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to institute a proceeding, lodged on 9 March 2021, be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The vexatious proceedings order, and the order made dismissing the proceeding to the extent that it was founded upon s 37AO(2)(a) of the Act, were final orders: s 37AO(5). It follows that leave to appeal those orders is not required pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Act, as the orders were not interlocutory. However, the effect of the vexatious proceedings order is that leave is required pursuant to s 37AQ(1)(a) and s 37AR(2) of the Act to file a notice of appeal so as to institute an appeal, including an appeal from the vexatious proceedings order itself: Fuller v Toms [2015] FCAFC 91; 234 FCR 535 at [18] (Besanko, Logan and McKerracher JJ). I shall treat the applicant’s application for leave to appeal as an application under s 37AR(2) of the Act for leave to institute an appeal.Background The respondent to the proposed appeal was the trustee of the applicant’s bankrupt estate from the time of his appointment on 2 October 2014 until 18 November 2019, when a different judge of the Court in proceeding VID 991 of 2018 ordered that he cease to be the trustee of the applicant’s bankrupt estate: Pekar v Holden (Trustee) (No 3) [2019] FCA 1928. The order removing the respondent as trustee was not opposed, and was in consequence of findings made in earlier reasons that the respondent had repudiated an agreement made between the applicant and the respondent by failing to administer the applicant’s bankrupt estate in a timely manner, which repudiation the applicant had accepted: Pekar v Holden (Trustee) [2019] FCA 442; Pekar v Holden (Trustee) (No 2) [2019] FCA 1212. Among other orders, the Court ordered that the respondent forthwith pay to the applicant $180,102.24, being the balance of monies held by the respondent as trustee and which the applicant had paid pursuant to the agreement that had been discharged upon the applicant’s acceptance of the respondent’s repudiation. However, a claim by the applicant for damages in respect of claimed losses resulting from the respondent’s breach of the agreement was rejected by the Court: [2019] FCA 1928 at [11]-[14]. On 1 September 2020, the applicant commenced proceeding VID 614 of 2020 against the respondent and one other person. On 1 December 2020, the proceeding against the second respondent was dismissed, and the applicant was given leave to file and serve an amended originating application. On 8 January 2021, the applicant filed an amended originating application seeking the following relief –1.Relief in the form of aggravated compensation arising from breach of a contract, and criminal negligence by the respondent in a sum [determined] by [the] Court.2.Refer the respondent for criminal prosecution for “perjury” and [embezzlement].3.An order that the respondent is personally liable for all remuneration and legal cost of the new trustee of the estate and the official trustee for past, present, and future remuneration and legal cost of the new trustee. The applicant filed three affidavits in support of the originating application, including two affidavits described as amended affidavits. The tenor of those affidavits was –(a)to allege financial losses as a result of the respondent’s breach of the agreement that was the subject of the reasons and orders in proceeding VID 991 of 2018 to which I referred at [3] above; and(b)to challenge the evidence in an affidavit of the respondent filed in proceeding VID 991 of 2018 that he had paid the sum of $6,000 in discharge of liabilities under costs orders made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in favour of the petitioning creditor, Rickards Legal, in the successful application for a sequestration order in respect of the applicant’s estate.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant’s claim that the Judge made some sundry errors, which he acknowledged were immaterial, should also be addressed because my conclusions in relation to them contribute to the proper characterisation of the proposed appeal. The applicant complains that at [28] of the Judge’s reasons, his Honour incorrectly stated that the applicant had claimed $12,200.35 in compensation in connection with capital gains tax. That complaint is mistaken. The Judge was referring to the sum claimed in proceeding VID 991 of 2018, which was indeed $12,200.35: Pekar v Holden (Trustee) (No 3) [2019] FCA 1928 at [11]. Second, the applicant’s complaint that the Judge at [28] incorrectly identified the applicant to have claimed $4,596.26 in compensation for legal expenses, is similarly mistaken. The Judge was, again, referring to the sum claimed in the earlier proceeding: [2019] FCA 1928 at [11].Conclusions For the above reasons, I am not satisfied that the proposed appeal is not a vexatious proceeding, and therefore I refuse the applicant’s application to institute it. Further, by reason of the absence of merit in the proposed appeal, and the proposed perpetuation of unsubstantiated allegations of a serious nature against the respondent, I am affirmatively satisfied that the proposed appeal is vexatious and I am bound by s 37AS(2) of the Act to dismiss the application. Finally, as I have indicated, I would also dismiss the application pursuant to s 37AS(1) of the Act on the independent ground that the applicant’s affidavit in support of his application does not comply substantially with s 37AR(3), in that it fails to list all other proceedings that the applicant has instituted in any Australian court or tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established