Peek v CEO, Australian Government Solicitor (No. 5)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Peek v CEO, Australian Government Solicitor (No. 5) [2007] FCA 222

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW   - judicial review of administrative decision making – decision pursuant to s 36(3) of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – discretion of Court under s 10(2)(b) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) where review in another tribunal is being pursued – decision pursuant to s 41A of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) 

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 6, 10, 16, Sch 1, cl (za)
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 36, 38, 41A, 57
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 55ZA

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 cited
Comcare v Sassella [2001] FCA 1514; (2001) 34 AAR 142 approved
Wyeth Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Health & Aged Care (2000) 61 ALD 372; [2000] FCA 330 cited

GREGORY JAMES PEEK v CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SOLICITOR AND MEGAN PITT
NSD 880 OF 2005

EDMONDS J
1 MARCH 2007
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 880 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

GREGORY JAMES PEEK
Applicant

AND:

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SOLICITOR
First Respondent  

MEGAN PITT
Second Respondent  

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MARCH 2007

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The respondents be released from their undertakings to the Court made 8 June 2005.

3.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application and all motions on notice.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 880 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

GREGORY JAMES PEEK
Applicant

AND:

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SOLICITOR
First Respondent  

MEGAN PITT
Second Respondent  

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE:

1 MARCH 2007

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 28 July 2006 I made orders with respect to the respondents’ motion, notice of which was filed on 26 May 2006, as well as with respect to the applicant’s substantive application, or at least what remained of it, the net effect of which was to set down for hearing on Wednesday, 30 August 2006 both the respondents’ motion and the applicant’s substantive application, on a final basis.

  2. At the same time I made orders for the filing and serving of further evidence upon which the applicant proposed to rely and for the filing and serving of further evidence by the respondents in reply.  In the events that happened, the applicant put on no further evidence and, in consequence, nor did the respondents.

  3. When the matter came on for hearing, there was no appearance by or on behalf of the applicant.  No prior communication was received by the Court explaining the applicant’s failure to appear and no apology or explanation was subsequently tendered.  The respondents were represented by Ms Eastman of counsel.

  4. The respondents relied on two affidavits sworn by…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 222
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Peek v CEO, Australian Government Solicitor (No. 5), the Federal Court was tasked with reviewing a decision made by the Australian Government Solicitor. The applicant, Peek, sought to challenge the delegation of statutory powers under section 139 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). This case involved a complex interplay of administrative law principles, focusing on the validity and legality of the delegation of authority by the Commonwealth.

The primary legal issue the court needed to decide was whether the delegation of statutory powers by the CEO of the Australian Government Solicitor was valid under the Migration Act. This included examining the extent of the delegation, whether it was within the confines of the statutory authority, and if the grounds for judicial review were applicable. The court had to consider whether the delegation was procured by improper conduct, and if the decision-making process adhered to the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.

In its reasoning, the court found that there was no evidence to support that the delegation was procured by improper conduct, nor was there any identifiable conduct that could be reviewed. The court held that without such identification, it was impossible to determine if the grounds of review were met. Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the court ordered that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs. The court also released the respondents from their previous undertakings and made an order regarding the respondents’ notice of motion. This decision underscored the importance of clear and substantiated claims in administrative law proceedings and the necessity for thorough documentation in challenging governmental actions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The respondents be released from their undertakings to the Court made 8 June 2005.

3. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application and all motions on notice.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

EDMONDS J
Moreover, there is no evidence that the conduct of the second respondent, or some other unidentified persons, ‘procured’ this delegation from the first respondent and even if there were, the conduct sought to be reviewed is not identified. In the absence of such identification, it is impossible to come to any view as to whether, in relation to such unidentified conduct, the grounds of review in (6) – (8) inclusive are made out.CONCLUSION The applicant’s application must be dismissed. The applicant must pay the respondents’ costs. In the circumstances, it is unnecessary to make any order of the kind sought in (1) of the respondents’ notice of motion. However, as already indicated, I will make an order of the kind sought in (4) of the respondents’ notice of motion.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: EDMONDS J