FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Pearson v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA 1427
TRUSTS – beneficiaries – right to bring action without joining trustee – where trustee in liquidation – proceedings commenced by beneficiary to appeal an objection decision by Commissioner of Taxation under Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 – whether beneficiary has standing to commence derivative action in respect of statutory right of appeal – whether Court has discretion to permit derivative action – grounds for exercising discretion – appropriate steps to be taken by beneficiary to request trustee to commence proceeding
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth)Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioner (1948 - 1949) 78 CLR 62 cited
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) (1964) 112 CLR 125 cited
Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124 cited
Prestige Motors Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 48 ALR 497
Lamru Pty Ltd v Kation Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 432 cited
Lidden v Composite Buyers Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 560 cited
Ramage v Waclaw (1988) 12 NSWLR 84Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (5 ed, 1986)
JANETTE ANN PEARSON & ORS v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION & ANOR
Q54 OF 2001
TAMBERLIN, MANSFIELD & EMMETT JJ
11 OCTOBER 2001
BRISBANE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q54 OF 2001
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
JANETTE ANN PEARSON
as a beneficiary of the Jancy Trust
FIRST APPELLANTJANETTE ANN PEARSON
as the public officer of Jancy Pty Ltd
SECOND APPELLANTPROPCOMBE PTY LTD (ACN 090 599 607)
as trustee of the Jancy Trust
THIRD APPELLANTAND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
FIRST RESPONDENTJANCY PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 010 482 747)
SECOND RESPONDENTJUDGES:
TAMBERLIN, MANSFIELD & EMMETT JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
11 OCTOBER 2001
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q54 OF 2001
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
JANETTE ANN PEARSON
as a beneficiary of the Jancy Trust
FIRST APPELLANTJANETTE ANN PEARSON
as the public officer of Jancy Pty Ltd
SECOND APPELLANTPROPCOMBE PTY LTD (ACN 090 599 607)
as trustee of the Jancy Trust
THIRD APPELLANTAND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
FIRST RESPONDENTJANCY PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 010 482 747)
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
TAMBERLIN, MANSFIELD & EMMETT JJ
DATE:
11 OCTOBER 2001
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
TAMBERLIN & MANSFIELD JJ:
This appeal is from the summary dismissal under O 20 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules of an application to the Court under s 14ZZ of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (“the TA Act”) on the motion of the first respondent Commissioner of Taxation (“the Commissioner”). Although s 14ZZ refers…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Pearson v Commissioner of Taxation and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2001] FCA 1427
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court needed to decide were primarily centered around the interpretation of clause 3 of the Settlement Deed and its effect on the tax assessment. Mrs Pearson argued that clause 3 should result in her and her husband being presently and absolutely entitled to any undistributed income of the Trust, thereby making section 99A of the Assessment Act inapplicable. The court had to determine whether the Commissioner's reliance on section 99A was correct or if there was an error that warranted reassessment under section 97(1) of the Assessment Act.
The court reasoned that for a derivative action to be permitted, certain prerequisites must be met, including the beneficiary furnishing the trustee with advice on the prospects of success, requesting the trustee to file an appeal, undertaking to fund the costs of the appeal, and indemnifying the trustee against any costs orders in case of an unsuccessful appeal. None of these actions were taken by Mrs Pearson. Therefore, the prerequisites for a derivative action were not established, and the court had no reason to permit the proceeding to continue as a derivative action. The court further noted that while Mrs Pearson's contention might lead to a potential windfall for the Commissioner or a loss for the beneficiaries, those issues were not before the Full Court.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the Full Court ordered that the appellants pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining whether the prerequisites for a derivative action had been established. It noted that Mrs Pearson did not provide the Trustee with advice on the prospects of success, request the Trustee to file a notice of appeal, undertake to fund the costs of the appeal, or indemnify the Trustee against costs in the event of an unsuccessful appeal. Consequently, the court found that the prerequisites for a derivative action were not met, and the proceeding should not have been allowed to continue as such. The court then proceeded to consider whether the Commissioner erred in relying on s 99A of the Assessment Act for the tax assessment. The court found no error in the Commissioner's reliance on s 99A, as the provisions of clause 3 of the Settlement Deed did not change the applicability of s 99A to the Trustee. Lastly, the court addressed the issue of whether the primary beneficiaries should have been assessed under s 97(1) of the Assessment Act. The court held that this question was not before it and did not affect the outcome of the appeal, as it would have arisen only in a properly constituted appeal under the Administration Act. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that for a derivative action to be permissible, all prerequisites must be met, and the court may not permit such an action if any prerequisite is unfulfilled. The court also affirmed that the Commissioner's reliance on s 99A of the Assessment Act was correct, and the question of alternative assessment under s 97(1) was not pertinent to the current appeal.