Pearson v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pearson v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA 1427

TRUSTS – beneficiaries – right to bring action without joining trustee – where trustee in liquidation – proceedings commenced by beneficiary to appeal an objection decision by Commissioner of Taxation under Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 – whether beneficiary has standing to commence derivative action in respect of statutory right of appeal – whether Court has discretion to permit derivative action – grounds for exercising discretion – appropriate steps to be taken by beneficiary to request trustee to commence proceeding

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth)

Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioner (1948 - 1949) 78 CLR 62 cited
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) (1964) 112 CLR 125 cited
Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124 cited
Prestige Motors Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 48 ALR 497
Lamru Pty Ltd v Kation Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 432 cited
Lidden v Composite Buyers Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 560 cited
Ramage v Waclaw (1988) 12 NSWLR 84

Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (5 ed, 1986)

JANETTE ANN PEARSON & ORS v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION & ANOR

Q54 OF 2001

TAMBERLIN, MANSFIELD & EMMETT JJ
11 OCTOBER 2001
BRISBANE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q54 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

JANETTE ANN PEARSON
as a beneficiary of the Jancy Trust
FIRST APPELLANT

JANETTE ANN PEARSON
as the public officer of Jancy Pty Ltd
SECOND APPELLANT

PROPCOMBE PTY LTD (ACN 090 599 607)
as trustee of the Jancy Trust
THIRD APPELLANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
FIRST RESPONDENT

JANCY PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 010 482 747)
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

TAMBERLIN, MANSFIELD & EMMETT JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

11 OCTOBER 2001

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q54 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

JANETTE ANN PEARSON
as a beneficiary of the Jancy Trust
FIRST APPELLANT

JANETTE ANN PEARSON
as the public officer of Jancy Pty Ltd
SECOND APPELLANT

PROPCOMBE PTY LTD (ACN 090 599 607)
as trustee of the Jancy Trust
THIRD APPELLANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
FIRST RESPONDENT

JANCY PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 010 482 747)
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

TAMBERLIN, MANSFIELD & EMMETT JJ

DATE:

11 OCTOBER 2001

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

TAMBERLIN & MANSFIELD JJ:

  1. This appeal is from the summary dismissal under O 20 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules of an application to the Court under s 14ZZ of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (“the TA Act”) on the motion of the first respondent Commissioner of Taxation (“the Commissioner”). Although s 14ZZ refers…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1427
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Pearson v Commissioner of Taxation involved Janette Ann Pearson, a beneficiary of the Jancy Trust, who appealed a decision made by the Commissioner of Taxation in relation to an assessment of the Trustee for tax for the year ended 30 June 1991. The Commissioner had disallowed an objection by the Trustee against the assessment. The appeal was initially dismissed by a judge of the Court, and Mrs Pearson now appeals to the Full Court from that decision.

The legal issues the court needed to decide were primarily centered around the interpretation of clause 3 of the Settlement Deed and its effect on the tax assessment. Mrs Pearson argued that clause 3 should result in her and her husband being presently and absolutely entitled to any undistributed income of the Trust, thereby making section 99A of the Assessment Act inapplicable. The court had to determine whether the Commissioner's reliance on section 99A was correct or if there was an error that warranted reassessment under section 97(1) of the Assessment Act.

The court reasoned that for a derivative action to be permitted, certain prerequisites must be met, including the beneficiary furnishing the trustee with advice on the prospects of success, requesting the trustee to file an appeal, undertaking to fund the costs of the appeal, and indemnifying the trustee against any costs orders in case of an unsuccessful appeal. None of these actions were taken by Mrs Pearson. Therefore, the prerequisites for a derivative action were not established, and the court had no reason to permit the proceeding to continue as a derivative action. The court further noted that while Mrs Pearson's contention might lead to a potential windfall for the Commissioner or a loss for the beneficiaries, those issues were not before the Full Court.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the Full Court ordered that the appellants pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The first appellant, Janette Ann Pearson (“Mrs Pearson”) is a beneficiary of the Jancy Trust (“the Trust”) constituted by a deed of settlement bearing the date 1 November 1983 (“the Settlement Deed”). By application filed on 19 November 1999, Mrs Pearson commenced an appeal in the Court “for and on behalf of” the second respondent, Jancy Pty Ltd (In Liquidation)(ACN 010 482 747) (“the Trustee”), against an appellable objection decision made by the first respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation (“the Commissioner”). The Commissioner disallowed an objection by the Trustee in relation to an assessment of the Trustee for tax in respect of the year ended 30 June 1991 pursuant to s 99A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (“the Assessment Act”). The Commissioner applied to the Court for summary dismissal of that appeal. On 2 March 2001, a judge of the Court ordered that the application by Mrs Pearson be dismissed with costs. Mrs Pearson now appeals to the Full Court from the orders of 2 March 2001.BACKGROUND The Jancy Trust may be described as discretionary in the sense that the distribution of income derived by the Trustee in respect of the Trust is at the discretion of the Trustee. The Settlement Deed defines two classes of beneficiaries being “the primary beneficiaries” and “the discretionary beneficiaries”. The primary beneficiaries are Mrs Pearson and her husband, Cyril John Pearson (“Mr Pearson”). The discretionary beneficiaries, subject to qualifications not presently relevant, are:· the primary beneficiaries;· the children of the primary beneficiaries and the spouses, widows, widowers and issue of those children; and· any of a class of natural persons or other entities set out in the Settlement Deed which the Trustee may at any time and from time to time nominate in writing as a discretionary beneficiary. Clause 3 of the Settlement Deed deals with the distribution of the net income of the Trust to discretionary beneficiaries at the discretion of the Trustee. Clause 3 provides that so much of the net income in each accounting period as is not dealt with in the discretion of Trustee is to be held in trust for the primary beneficiaries living at the end of the accounting period “who shall be presently and absolutely entitled thereto in equal shares”. In the relevant year of income, the period ended 30 June 1991, the Trustee, in its capacity as trustee of the Trust, was the holder of units of the Corplan Financial Network Unit Trust (“CFNUT”). The Trustee of CFNUT was Pearson Associates Pty Limited (“Pearson”). The Trustee also held units in the Corplan Financial Unit Trust (“CFUT”). The trustee of CFUT was Corplan Group Holdings Pty Limited (“Corplan”). Minutes of a meeting of the directors of Pearson, as trustee for CFNUT, record that on 30 June 1991 it was resolved that the income of CFNUT for the year ended 30 June 1991 be distributed as a whole to the Trust. In addition, minutes of a meeting of the directors of Corplan, as trustee for CFUT, record that on the same day it was resolved that the income of CFUT for the year ended 30 June 1991 be distributed as to the whole to the Trust.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appropriate course would have been for Mrs Pearson, as a beneficiary of the Trust, to:· furnish the Trustee, through its liquidator, with a copy of any advice as to the prospects of success;· request the Trustee, through its liquidator, to file a notice of appeal to the Federal Court;· undertake to the Trustee, through its liquidator, to fund the costs of the appeal; and· undertake to indemnify the Trustee in respect of any costs orders being made in the event of the appeal being unsuccessful.None of those things was done. In the circumstances, the prerequisites for a derivative action have not been established. Accordingly, there is no reason why this Court should have permitted the proceeding to continue as a derivative action. CONCLUSION Mrs Pearson contends that, having regard to the provisions of clause 3 of the Settlement Deed, the Commissioner clearly erred in relying on s 99A of the Assessment Act in his notice of assessment to the Trustee of 10 December 1996. The effect of clause 3, it is said, is that Mr and Mrs Pearson, as primary beneficiaries, should be taken as being presently and absolutely entitled to whatever income of the Trust not distributed. Accordingly, s 99A would have no application. Rather, the primary beneficiaries should be assessed under s 97(1) of the Assessment Act. That question would have arisen on the hearing of a properly constituted appeal under the Administration Act. However, it does not arise on the hearing of this appeal to the Full Court. If Mrs Pearson’s contention is correct, there could be a windfall for the Commissioner by reason of the failure of the liquidator to cause the Trustee to lodge an appeal from the objection decision. There would, of course, be a corresponding loss to the beneficiaries. If that is so, they may have a claim for that loss against the Trustee. In turn, the Trustee could have a claim against the liquidator. However, those questions are not before this Full Court. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining whether the prerequisites for a derivative action had been established. It noted that Mrs Pearson did not provide the Trustee with advice on the prospects of success, request the Trustee to file a notice of appeal, undertake to fund the costs of the appeal, or indemnify the Trustee against costs in the event of an unsuccessful appeal. Consequently, the court found that the prerequisites for a derivative action were not met, and the proceeding should not have been allowed to continue as such. The court then proceeded to consider whether the Commissioner erred in relying on s 99A of the Assessment Act for the tax assessment. The court found no error in the Commissioner's reliance on s 99A, as the provisions of clause 3 of the Settlement Deed did not change the applicability of s 99A to the Trustee. Lastly, the court addressed the issue of whether the primary beneficiaries should have been assessed under s 97(1) of the Assessment Act. The court held that this question was not before it and did not affect the outcome of the appeal, as it would have arisen only in a properly constituted appeal under the Administration Act. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that for a derivative action to be permissible, all prerequisites must be met, and the court may not permit such an action if any prerequisite is unfulfilled. The court also affirmed that the Commissioner's reliance on s 99A of the Assessment Act was correct, and the question of alternative assessment under s 97(1) was not pertinent to the current appeal.