Pearce & Anor v Body Corporate for Riparian Plaza Apartments CTS 34665 - [2012] QCAT 72

CITATION:

Pearce & Anor v Body Corporate for Riparian Plaza Apartments CTS 34665 [2012] QCAT 72

PARTIES:	John Marshall Pearce Sandra Anne Pearce (Applicants)
v
Body Corporate for Riparian Plaza Apartments CTS 34665 (Respondent)

APPLICATION NUMBER:

OCL102-11

MATTER TYPE:

Other civil dispute matters

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Justice Alan Wilson, President
Kenneth Barlow SC, Member
Patricia Hanly, Member

DELIVERED ON:

8 February 2012

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

DECLARATIONS AND ORDERS MADE:

The tribunal declares that:

1 the order of the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal made on 24 November 2008 in Pearce v Body Corporate for Riparian Plaza Apartments CTS 34665 (Application No. KL046-058) constitutes an “adjustment order” for the purposes of Part 9 of Chapter 8 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997;

2 the order of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal made on 23 August 2010 in Harburg v Body Corporate Management for Riparian Plaza Apartments CTS 34665 [2010] QCAT 421 constitutes an “adjustment order” for the purposes of Part 9 of Chapter 8 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997;

3 the “pre-adjustment order entitlements” for the Riparian Plaza Apartments Community Titles Scheme 34665, for the purposes of Part 9 of Chapter 8 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997, are the contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots included in the scheme as they were immediately before the order of the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal made on 24 November 2008 referred to above.

The tribunal orders that:

1. there be an adjustment of the contribution schedule for the scheme so that the respective contribution schedule lot entitlements recorded in the community management statement for the scheme are in accordance with the schedule to this order;

2. the body corporate, within 28 days of this order, lodge a new community management statement incorporating changes to the contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots included in the scheme in accordance with order 1.

CATCHWORDS:

BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT – CONTRIBUTION SCHEDULE LOT ENTITLEMENTS – ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE – whether earlier tribunal order made without opposition was an “adjustment order”

Body Corporate and Community Management Act1997, s 378

APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):

The proceeding was determined on the papers under s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009.

REASONS FOR DECISION

PRESIDENT

I have had the advantage of reading the reasons of Mr Barlow SC in draft. I agree with them, and the conclusions he reaches and the orders he proposes.

MEMBER Patricia Hanly

I have also had the advantage of reading the reasons of Mr Barlow SC in draft. I also agree with them, and the conclusions he reaches and the orders he proposes.

MEMBER Kenneth Barlow SC

Introduction

This is an application pursuant to s 385(8) of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act1997, for an order for the adjustment of the contribution schedule for the scheme to reflect the pre-adjustment order entitlements for the scheme, and associated declarations.
The applicants, Mr and Mrs Pearce, are the owners of a lot in the scheme. The scheme is a residential scheme encompassing 13 levels of a high-rise building and including a total of 46 lots and common property. This scheme is known as the Riparian Plaza Apartments.
The scheme was established in 2005 with (at the time) 48 lots. In 2010, lots 4602 and 4603 were amalgamated into present lot 4602 and lots 4501 and 4502 were amalgamated into present lot 4501.
When the scheme was first established the contribution schedule provided that the contribution lot entitlements of Mr and Mrs Pearce’s lot were 5,020 and the total of all contribution lot entitlements was 68,420. Accordingly, Mr and Mrs Pearce’s contribution schedule lot entitlements (CSLEs) constituted 7.4% of the total of all CSLEs.
On 24 November 2008, the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal made an order, in an application brought by Mr and Mrs Pearce, to adjust the contribution schedule of the scheme. By that order, the total of all CSLEs became 10,002 and the CSLEs of Mr and Mrs Pearce’s lot became 246, therefore representing 2.46% of all the CSLEs in the scheme.
On 23 August 2010 this tribunal ordered a further adjustment to the contribution schedule, by which the total of all CSLEs became 9,994 and the CSLEs of Mr and Mrs Pearce’s lot rose to 253, therefore comprising 2.53% of all CSLEs.
Each of those orders was made under Part 5 of Chapter 2 of the Act as it then was.
The Act was amended with effect from 14 April 2011, relevantly, to alter the manner in which CSLEs may be adjusted under Part 5 of Chapter 2 and to add Part 9 of Chapter 8, providing transitional provisions for the Act by which the amendments were made. Division 4 of the latter part of the Act relevantly provides a regime for the adjustment of CSLEs where an “adjustment order” has previously been made. In essence, it allows a lot owner, whose proportion of the total CSLEs for a scheme was increased by an earlier adjustment order, to submit a motion to the body corporate or its committee to adjust the contribution schedule to reflect the schedule as it had been before the earlier adjustment order was made. Effectively, it then requires the body corporate to make such a change to the contribution schedule.
Shortly after the commencement of the amending Act in 2011 the owners of four lots in the scheme, whose respective proportions of the total CSLEs for the scheme had been increased by both the 2008 order and the 2010 order, submitted to the committee of the body corporate a motion proposing the adjustment of the contribution schedule for the scheme to reflect the “pre-adjustment order entitlements”[1] for the scheme, which they contended were the entitlements that existed before the 2008 order. By a notice to owners dated 3 August 2011 the body corporate informed owners that the committee had decided to change the contribution schedule in the manner proposed by the motion, subject to adjustments to take account of the amalgamation of four lots into two which I have described above.
[1]A phrase defined in s 378, relevantly, as meaning the CLSEs that existed immediately before the only, or the earliest, “adjustment order” that had previously been made.
In this application, Mr and Mrs Pearce challenge the committee’s decision. They contend that the 2008 order was not an “adjustment order” as defined in s 378 of the Act and therefore the only adjustment which can be made under the transitional provisions is to the position in which the contribution schedule was immediately before the order made in August 2010. They seek an order that the contribution schedule be adjusted in that manner and declarations that the 2008 order was not an “adjustment order”, while the 2010 order was.
The issue in this case is whether the 2008 order was an “adjustment order” within the meaning of that phrase as defined in s 378 of the Act. In particular, was it an order giving effect to a decision that was not made by the Tribunal and therefore excluded from being an adjustment order by paragraph (b) of the definition?

A preliminary matter

Mr and Mrs Pearce requested that the Tribunal make its decision after an oral hearing, rather than determining the matter on the papers under s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act2009. They submitted that the matter involves complex questions of law and fact in respect of which the tribunal would be assisted by oral submissions by the parties’ legal representatives. They also contended that it would be assisted by an explanation of the rationale for the previous contribution schedule which they contend is the appropriate one to return to.
As will become clear from the discussion below, the parties have provided detailed and comprehensive written submissions to the tribunal. Those submissions appear to cover all issues with sufficient clarity for the tribunal to understand and deal with them. There are no substantive issues of fact, if any. Further, I do not see how the rationale for any previous contribution schedule can be relevant: the issue is which of the two contribution schedules contended for by the parties applies in accordance with the Act, regardless of their rationale. I do not consider it necessary for an oral hearing, but rather it is appropriate to conduct the proceeding entirely on the basis of the documents.

Relevant factual history

In order to understand and consider the parties’ submissions it is necessary to go into some detail of the circumstances in which the 2008 order was made and, briefly, to compare those circumstances with those in which the 2010 order was made.
On 25 June 2008 Mr and Mrs Pearce submitted to the body corporate a motion to adjust the contribution schedule, which they proposed be placed on the agenda of the annual general meeting. They accompanied that motion with a copy of a report prepared by Mr Tim Sheehan of Stewart Silver King & Burns (SSKB) about the CSLEs, in which Mr Sheehan concluded that the existing CSLEs did not comply with the “equality” principles required by the Act, as elucidated by the Court of Appeal.[2] The motion proposed that the body corporate adopt the contribution schedule recommended by Mr Sheehan and take the appropriate consequential steps to have a new community management statement, including the proposed schedule, registered.
[2]In Fischer v Body Corporate for Centrepoint Community Titles Scheme 7779 [2004] QCA 214.
The body corporate committee commissioned a review of Mr Sheehan’s report by Kaylene Arkcoll of Leary & Partners, in which Ms Arkcoll generally concurred with Mr Sheehan’s report. The committee subsequently resolved to include the motion and to recommend that it be adopted.
At the annual general meeting of the body corporate on 29 September 2008, the motion was put to the meeting and was lost when 24 votes were cast in favour and two votes were cast against it. (Such a motion may only be passed without dissent.) However, a motion was also put, and was passed, to the effect that the body corporate should not contest any application made to the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal (CCT), under s 48 of the Act, for an order for the adjustment of the contribution schedule in accordance with that proposed by Mr and Mrs Pearce.
Mr and Mrs Pearce subsequently filed an application in the CCT seeking such an order. The body corporate manager then wrote to the tribunal to inform it that the body corporate had resolved not to defend the application.
On 24 November 2008 the CCT ordered that the contribution lot entitlement schedule be adjusted in accordance with the recommendation in Mr Sheehan’s report. That order was apparently made on the papers without a hearing. The tribunal member prefaced the order with the following:
“Upon consideration of an Application filed on 6 November 2008, correspondence received on behalf of the respondent dated 12 November 2008 and noting that the respondent has passed Motion 25 which resolved not to defend any action brought against the Body Corporate through the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal, the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal makes the following orders by consent”.
The effect of the CCT’s order was that, upon the registration of a new community management statement adopting the schedule in accordance with the order, Mr and Mrs Pearce’s proportionate CSLEs reduced from 7.34% to 2.46% of the total CSLEs in the scheme.
The circumstances leading to the 2010 order were different. In 2010, the owner of lots 4602 and 4603 (which, it will be recalled, were amalgamated into what is now lot 4602) applied to QCAT seeking the adjustment of the CSLEs for the scheme. They relied upon a report prepared by Mr Martin Walsh of SSKB.
In contrast to the body corporate’s attitude to Mr and Mrs Pearce’s application in 2008, it opposed the 2010 application. However, on 23 August 2010, the tribunal ordered that the CSLEs be adjusted in accordance with Mr Walsh’s report.[3] A new community management statement was subsequently registered to record the new schedule.
[3]Harburg v Body Corporate Management for Riparian Apartments 34665 [2010] QCAT 421.

The parties’ submissions

In response to the motion submitted to the committee of the body corporate by the owners of four lots, Mr and Mrs Pearce made detailed submissions to the committee of the body corporate in an attempt to persuade it that the motion should fail because the 2008 order was not an adjustment order. They have adopted those submissions in this application and have supplemented them by an attachment to the application and by two sets of written submissions drawn on their behalf by Mr David Williams of Counsel.
The body corporate filed a response to the application setting out reasons why it should not succeed, and seeking an order or declaration that the committee correctly identified the pre-adjustment lot entitlements and that it is entitled to proceed to lodge a new community management statement reflecting those entitlements. It supplemented that response by written submissions.
Mr and Mrs Pearce contend that the 2008 order gave effect to a decision of the body corporate, recorded in motion 25 adopted by the annual general meeting, not to defend the proceedings which, it was then anticipated, Mr and Mrs Pearce would bring in the CCT for an adjustment of the CSLEs. They accept (indeed they make a detailed submission to the effect) that, faced with the application and with no opposition (or even if it had been faced with supporting submissions by the body corporate), the CCT had a discretion that had to be exercised in accordance with the Act as it was at the time, and therefore it could only make an order consistent with the principle stated then in subsection 48(6): namely, that the respective lot entitlements should be equal except to the extent to which it was just and equitable in the circumstances for them not to be equal.
Nevertheless, Mr and Mrs Pearce submit that the CCT styled its decision as a “consent order” because the member was aware of the results of motions 24 and 25 at the AGM. They contend that it was indeed a consent order because the body corporate was willing to submit to an order on certain terms, even though there was no agreement between the parties specifically to seek consent orders to that effect. They submit that the 2008 order was a consent order of that type (and not one which embodied the terms of a contract between the parties) and therefore the order gave effect to the decision of the body corporate not to defend the proceedings, or, in other words, to submit to the proposed order.
Accordingly, Mr and Mrs Pearce submit, the 2008 order falls within the exception contained in paragraph (b) of the definition of “adjustment order” in s 378, because it was an order giving effect to a decision that was not made by the tribunal.
Mr and Mrs Pearce also contend that, in order for ss 378 and 379 to operate logically and fairly, they should be construed so that an adjustment order, as defined in paragraph (a) of the definition in s 378, is an order that was made after a contest between the owner of a lot and the body corporate, and the exclusionary definition in paragraph (b) of the definition should be construed as remedial in the sense that if an owner secured a readjustment without opposition from the body corporate, that owner should not be susceptible to the “draconian unilateral right” of another owner to reverse the entitlement as a consequence of the amendments to the legislation made in 2011.
Thus, Mr and Mrs Pearce contend, the 2008 order was not an “adjustment order” and therefore the pre-adjustment order entitlements in this case are determined by reference only to the one adjustment order that was made, namely the 2010 order. That would result in Mr and Mrs Pearce’s proportion of the total CSLEs for the scheme reverting from 2.53% to 2.46%, rather than to 7.34%.
Finally, Mr and Mrs Pearce make reference to the examples which are given in paragraph (b) of the definition of “adjustment order” in s 378. They submit that, if a body corporate was to settle a dispute, or to enter into a written agreement with an applicant lot owner, it could only do so with the consent (by resolution without dissent) of the body corporate in general meeting[4]; yet, if an owner was able to secure an unanimous resolution to consent to an adjustment of lot entitlements, then no application would be required to QCAT. They say, therefore, that there is no room for the operation of paragraph (b) unless it can refer to the type of situation that occurred in this case.
[4] They refer in this respect to s 47A of the Act.
The body corporate submits that paragraph (b) does not apply, and that therefore the 2008 order was an adjustment order, because there was no decision made outside the CCT to which the order gave effect. It submits that, having regard to the failure of motion 24 and the passing of motion 25 at the annual general meeting in 2008, the only decision the body corporate made was not to incur the expense and go to the trouble of defending any application which Mr and Mrs Pearce might bring, having regard to the report of Mrs Arkcoll. In particular, the body corporate did not consent to or reach agreement with Mr and Mrs Pearce to consent to the CSLEs which they proposed.
The body corporate submits that the intention of the legislature revealed by paragraph (b) of the definition is to exclude, from a right to readjustment, cases where there had been genuine agreement between all lot owners in a scheme to adjust the lot entitlements. Such an agreement must have been properly ratified by the body corporate by a motion without dissent, which did not occur in this case.
Both parties refer to the decision of the President of QCAT in Raby v Body Corporate for 1 Holman Street [2011] QCAT 449, in which his Honour considered the effect of the definition of “adjustment order” in determining whether an order that had been made by the CCT was within paragraph (a) or (b) of the definition.
As to the exception in paragraph (b) of the definition, his Honour said (at [26]):
“The exception in the definition is, rather, intended to apply to a different circumstance where parties reach agreement before any determination is made by the Tribunal, and simply seek that the Tribunal makes an order giving effect to their agreement. That conclusion is supported by the two examples given for it.”
However, nothing said by his Honour in that case really assists in dealing with the different factual situation here.
The respondent also referred to and relied upon the decision of an adjudicator in McCarthy v Body Corporate for Q1 [2011] QBCCMCmr394. The circumstances in that case were very similar to those which preceded the 2008 order being considered in this proceeding. The lot owner made an application in January 2010, supported by expert evidence, seeking an adjustment order. The body corporate obtained its own expert evidence, which the applicant lot owner agreed to adopt. He asked the body corporate committee to agree to a consent order based on the body corporate’s expert’s report. The committee declined to sign a consent order, because it was unable to do so without the approval of owners in general meeting. The lot owner then informed QCAT that he would proceed with his application on the basis of the body corporate’s expert’s report. QCAT subsequently made an order directing that the contribution schedule be adjusted in accordance with that report.
The adjudicator noted that it was clear that the body corporate did not agree to an adjustment of the lot entitlements, because the committee was unable to do so on behalf of the body corporate and a general meeting was not held. He noted that there is a legal distinction between both parties actively agreeing to settle a dispute and one party accepting the evidence put forward by the other. The decision under consideration was that of QCAT. It was not a decision of the parties themselves or of their expert, nor was it an order giving effect to a decision not made by the tribunal. It was, therefore, an adjustment order.

The same adjudicator subsequently made a decision in similar circumstances in Forster v Body Corporate for 2^nd Avenue [2011] QBCCMCmr402. Again, in that case, the committee did not put the application to adjust lot entitlements to a general meeting, but determined on its own not actively to defend the application, nor to object to an order being made by the CCT reflective of the lot entitlements proposed by the applicant to the CCT. The adjudicator again considered that, although the body corporate did not defend the application, it did not decide that the lot entitlements should be adjusted, nor agree to adjust the contributions. Therefore, the order did not give effect to a decision that had not been made by the tribunal, nor did it give effect to the terms of settlement of a dispute between an owner and the body corporate.
It should be noted that both of those decisions are currently on appeal to the Appeal Tribunal of QCAT. Mr and Mrs Pearce submit, for the purpose of this application, that they are wrong and, being decisions of an adjudicator, they have no effect either as precedents or as persuasive decisions.

Discussion

The crucial question is whether an order of a tribunal or court adjusting a contribution schedule, which is made without dissent by the respondent to the application, but in circumstances where that respondent does not specifically consent to the order and there is no agreement between the parties resolving the application by consenting to agreed orders, is an order that gives effect to a decision that is not made by that court or tribunal.
It is correct to say that one form of consent to an order is to offer no resistance to the orders sought by the applicant. That is recognised by the authorities to which Mr Williams refers in his submissions.[5]
[5]Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Pneupac Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 185, at 189 and Moga v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd [2008] QCA 79, at [44].
An order can be described as a consent order if it is a true consent order made by the court in accordance with an agreement reached between the parties or if it is one made without opposition, in the sense that one party (or indeed all parties) submits to the order. But there is a substantial difference between the legal effects and consequences of these two types of consent order. A court will not generally set aside a consent order that is based on an agreement unless there are grounds to set aside the agreement. In contrast, a court may set aside a consent order that has been “submitted to” in the same circumstances as it would set aside any order made without the parties’ consent.[6]
[6]Siebe Gorman at 189 referred to above.
There is therefore a difference, in substance and in legal effect, between:
a)an agreement as to the orders to be made;
b)one party saying that it will consent to the orders sought by the other, without any agreement between them to do so; and
c)one party not opposing, but not consenting to, the orders sought and therefore putting the other side to the task of persuading the court or tribunal that the orders sought should be made.
In my opinion, example (a) above would clearly fall within the exception set out in paragraph (b) of the definition of “adjustment order” in s 378. Example (b) may do, although it is unnecessary to decide that in this case. But, in my opinion, example (c) does not fall within that exception, as the court or tribunal still has to deal with the submission that it should make the orders sought and be persuaded that it should do so. The court or tribunal’s decision is its own and is not simply giving effect to somebody else’s decision.
I do not consider that an order made without dissent by one party, but also without the consent of all parties, is an order that is giving effect to the decision of one party not to dissent to the orders sought by the other.
Mr and Mrs Pearce submit that the existence of s 47A makes a mockery of the examples in paragraph (b) of the definition of adjustment order. In my opinion that submission is not, with respect, correct. First, of course, s 47A did not exist at the time orders to which s 379 applies, were made, because s 47A was inserted by the same Act that inserted ss 378 and 379. Nonetheless it is true that, under s 62(2) of the Act as it existed at the time of the 2008 order, a body corporate could, by a resolution without dissent, alter the community management statement to adjust the lot entitlements. In those circumstances, Mr and Mrs Pearce submit that there could never be any room for operation of paragraph (b) if it referred only to a consent order because a body corporate could not agree to a consent order without a resolution without dissent and, if it were to make such a resolution, it could simply resolve without dissent to amend the lot entitlements itself and so it would be unnecessary to consent to an order by a tribunal.
I disagree with this submission. The owner of a lot may have chosen to make an application for adjustment by the CCT or QCAT rather than go to a general meeting in order possibly to obtain consent under s 62. Having made such an application, and in the light of evidence put forward before the tribunal by both parties, it is possible that in a general meeting a resolution might be made without dissent authorising the committee to enter into an agreement with the applicant lot owner to seek by consent orders giving effect to a certain lot entitlement adjustment. Such a resolution might be made without actually considering a motion to resolve itself to adjust the lot entitlements in the face of the application to the tribunal.
There may also be other circumstances, which neither I nor the parties have currently considered, that would fall within paragraph (b) of the definition.
Mr and Mrs Pearce also submit that there could be no such thing as a real consent order under the Act, as the Tribunal may only make an order that complies with s 48 and therefore must use its own discretion in any event even if the parties come to it seeking an order by consent. But an order giving effect to an agreement can only ever be made by a court or tribunal if that court or tribunal has the power to make it and, if the agreement does not reflect the law, such an order will not be made. The situation under the Act is no different to any consent order.
I also disagree with the submission by Mr and Mrs Pearce that there is some unfairness in construing the definition in the manner contended by the body corporate, because it would result in the ability to overturn an adjustment that had been made in the face of dissent by only one or two of many lot owners and yet not an adjustment that had been made with no dissent at all. They contend that Parliament cannot have intended such unfairness. But to the contrary, it seems clear to me that the object of the amendments to the Act in 2011 was to create what was seen by Parliament to have been an unfair right in some lot owners to adjustment orders based upon a principle of equality which, on reflection, Parliament considered to be unfair. The only exception to that (and the circumstance in which it would not be unfair to allow lot entitlements based upon equality to continue) would be where there had been express agreement between the parties to the proceeding in which an adjustment order was made. In that circumstance, there would be no unfairness in the equality principle continuing to be applied to that particular scheme.

Conclusions

In my opinion, therefore, the 2008 order does not fall within paragraph (b) of the definition of adjustment order. Rather, it was an order of the CCT, made before the commencement of s 378, that provided for an adjustment of the contribution schedule for the scheme, and therefore it was an “adjustment order”.
The result is that paragraph (b) of the definition of “pre-adjustment order entitlements” in s 378 applies, so that the owner of a lot who falls within subsection 379(1)(a) may submit a motion proposing adjustment of the contribution schedule for the scheme to reflect the entitlements of lots included in the scheme as they were immediately before the 2008 order was made. That is, in effect, what the owners of the lots who submitted the motion to the committee sought.
Because of the amalgamation of former lots 4602 and 4603 into the present lot 4602 and the amalgamation of former lots 4501 and 4502 into present lot 4501, the committee was also correct in its view, expressed in its notice to owners dated 9 June 2011, that the lot entitlements of the present lots 4501 and 4602 should be the sum of the pre-adjustment order entitlements of the respective former lots. Accordingly, the lot entitlements of lots 4602 and 4501 should become respectively 2626 and 2362, as stated in the schedule to that notice.
Mr and Mrs Pearce seek certain declarations as well as an order adjusting the CSLEs. I consider it appropriate that declarations reflecting these reasons be made so that they are binding on all lot owners as to the effect of the 2008 order.
I therefore consider that it would be appropriate for the tribunal to make the following declarations and orders:
The tribunal declares that:
1    the order of the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal made on 24 November 2008 in Pearce v Body Corporate for Riparian Plaza Apartments CTS 34665 (Application No. KL046-058) constitutes an “adjustment order” for the purposes of Part 9 of Chapter 8 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997;
2    the order of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal made on 23 August 2010 in Harburg v Body Corporate Management for Riparian Plaza Apartments CTS 34665 [2010] QCAT 421 constitutes an “adjustment order” for the purposes of Part 9 of Chapter 8 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997;
3 the “pre-adjustment order entitlements” for the Riparian Plaza Apartments Community Titles Scheme 34665, for the purposes of Part 9 of Chapter 8 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997, are the contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots included in the scheme as they were immediately before the order of the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal made on 24 November 2008 referred to above.
The tribunal orders that:
1     there be an adjustment of the contribution schedule for the scheme so that the respective contribution schedule lot entitlements recorded in the community management statement for the scheme are in accordance with the schedule to this order;
2     the body corporate, within 28 days of this order, lodge a new community management statement incorporating changes to the contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots included in the scheme in accordance with order 1.

SCHEDULE

Lot No.	Contribution Schedule Lot Entitlements
Lot 4101	2248
Lot 4103	1328
Lot 4104	1022
Lot 4105	1142
Lot 4201	1370
Lot 4202	1280
Lot 4203	1250
Lot 4204	1310
Lot 4301	1250
Lot 4302	1070
Lot 4303	1352
Lot 4304	1040
Lot 4305	1202
Lot 4401	1394
Lot 4402	1304
Lot 4403	1274
Lot 4404	1334
Lot 4501	2362
Lot 4503	1376
Lot 4504	1058
Lot 4505	1226
Lot 4601	1418
Lot 4602	2626
Lot 4604	1358
Lot 4701	1298
Lot 4702	1106
Lot 4703	1400
Lot 4704	1076
Lot 4705	1250
Lot 4801	1442
Lot 4802	1352
Lot 4803	1322
Lot 4804	1382
Lot 4901	1322
Lot 4902	1124
Lot 4903	1424
Lot 4904	1094
Lot 4905	1274
Lot 5001	1466
Lot 5002	1376
Lot 5003	1346
Lot 5004	1406
Lot 5101	1773
Lot 5102	2163
Lot 5103	2410
Lot 5201	5020
TOTAL	68,420