PCR Plaster Setting Pty Ltd [No.2] v De Brito
[2008] NSWWCCPD 7
•18 January 2008
WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION:PCR Plaster Setting Pty Ltd [No.2] v De Brito [2008] NSWWCCPD 7
APPELLANT: PCR Plaster Setting Pty Ltd
RESPONDENT: Manuel De Brito
INSURER:Employers Mutual NSW Ltd
FILE NUMBER: WCC15597-06
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: 24 September 2007
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: 18 January 2008
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: Whether a notice issued pursuant to section 54 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 was properly served; adequacy of reasons
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: Acting Deputy President Robin Handley
HEARING:On the papers
REPRESENTATION: Appellant: Edwards Michael Lawyers
Respondent: Joseph G Capogreco & Associates, Solicitors
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL: The decision of the Arbitrator dated 24 September 2007 is revoked and the matter is remitted to another arbitrator for determination afresh in accordance with these reasons.
There is no order as to the costs of this appeal.
BACKGROUND TO THE APPEAL
On 16 October 2007, PCR Plaster Setting Pty Ltd (‘PCR’) sought leave in the Workers Compensation Commission (‘the Commission’) to bring an appeal against the decision of an arbitrator dated 24 September 2007. The Respondent to the appeal is Manuel De Brito. PCR’s workers compensation insurer is Employers Mutual NSW Ltd (‘EMI’).
Mr De Brito was born in Portugal on 27 July 1956 and is aged 51. On 2 September 2000, while working with PCR on a building site at Lidcombe, he injured his left leg when a circular saw he was operating slipped and cut his left thigh.
On 4 February 2004, Judge O’Toole of the District Court of NSW, exercising the residual jurisdiction of the Compensation Court, made an award in favour of Mr De Brito ordering: (1) the payment of $7,500 compensation pursuant to section 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (‘the 1987 Act’) in respect of a 10% permanent loss of efficient use of the left leg at or above the knee; (2) the payment of weekly compensation of $150 pursuant to section 40 of the 1987 Act in respect of partial incapacity from 12 September 2002 to date and continuing; and (3) the payment of medical and related expenses pursuant to section 60 of the 1987 Act. Her Honour also made a determination pursuant to section 53 of the 1987 Act that Mr De Brito’s “incapacity resulting from his employment is likely to be of a permanent nature”, and he was therefore entitled to receive weekly compensation notwithstanding that he had left Australia to live in Portugal.
On 20 April 2005, EMI served a Notice of Discontinuance of weekly compensation payments on Mr De Brito, pursuant to section 54 of the 1987 Act, addressed to 19 D’Arcy Avenue, Lidcombe, stating two grounds for discontinuing payment of weekly compensation from 1 June 2005: (1) that Mr De Brito had received weekly compensation for partial incapacity for more than 104 weeks, and (2) that he was not currently suitably employed nor seeking suitable employment.
On 3 October 2006, the Commission registered Mr De Brito’s ‘Application to Resolve a Dispute’ seeking reinstatement of his weekly compensation. On 1 February 2007, an arbitrator conducted a conciliation/arbitration hearing with the parties, following which, on 23 February 2007, she made a determination ordering reinstatement of the payment of weekly compensation to Mr De Brito and ordering PCR to pay Mr De Brito’s costs as agreed or assessed.
On 22 March 2007, PCR appealed against this decision. In an appeal decision dated 18 July 2007 (PCR Plaster Setting Pty Ltd v De Brito [2007] NSWWCCPD 159), Acting Deputy President Moore found that section 52A of the 1987 Act was applicable (discontinuation of weekly payments for partial incapacity after two years where, relevantly, the worker is not suitably employed and not seeking suitable employment) and could be invoked where an award of compensation is being paid to a worker who resides outside Australia pursuant to section 53 of the 1987 Act. However, the Acting Deputy President found that the arbitrator had failed to determine relevant issues raised in the proceedings, for example, the validity of the notice given by EMI pursuant to section 54 of the 1987 Act and whether Mr De Brito was in fact seeking suitable employment at the relevant time within the meaning of section 52A. The Acting Deputy President therefore revoked the arbitrator’s decision and remitted the matter to another arbitrator for redetermination in accordance with her reasons. She made no order as to the costs of the appeal.
On 19 September 2007, conciliation having proved unsuccessful, a different arbitrator conducted an arbitration hearing with the parties, at the conclusion of which he gave an oral decision. On 24 September 2007, the Commission issued the Arbitrator’s decision in the terms set out below.
THE DECISION UNDER REVIEW
The ‘Certificate of Determination’, dated 24 September 2007, records the Arbitrator’s determination as follows:
“Findings
1. I find that the notice of discontinuance of compensation payments dated 20 April 2005 issued pursuant to s 54 of the 1987 Act was not served on the Applicant.The orders made are as follows:
1. The Respondent will resume payment of weekly compensation in accordance with the judgment of O’Toole J of 4 February 2004 from 1 June 2005 to date and continuing.2. The Respondent will pay the Applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed as follows:
(a) The costs of the arbitration before Arbitrator D’Souza on 22 February 2007 I certify as being complex and order an uplift of 30%.
(b) In relation to the resolution at today’s arbitration I order pursuant to Schedule 6 Clause 9(2)(b) of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2003 on the application to [sic] the Applicant that this resolution is to be treated as a separate resolution for the purposes of the calculation of assessment costs.”
In his oral Statement of Reasons given at the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the Arbitrator found that the notices sent to Mr De Brito by EMI were addressed to 19 D’Arcy Avenue, Lidcombe, NSW 2141. The Arbitrator ‘inferred’ EMI was aware that Mr De Brito was in fact living in Portugal because this was obvious even at the time of the hearing before Judge O’Toole. EMI argued that the notices were legitimately served because of a letter from Mr De Brito’s solicitors to EMI’s then solicitors dated 7 June 2004. This stated:
“RE: De Brito v Plaster Setting Pty Ltd
We refer to the above and enclose the Tax File Number Declaration.
Kindly send all further weekly entitlements to:
C/- 19 D’arcy Avenue
LIDCOMBE NSW 2141.
We thank you and apologise for the delay in returning the above form.”
The Arbitrator agreed with Mr De Brito’s solicitor that the letter only referred to further weekly entitlements and was limited in its compass. It was not an authority to send documents affecting those entitlements to that address (transcript page 27). Thus, the Arbitrator concluded that the section 54 notice dated 20 April 2005 had not been properly served, and Mr De Brito was entitled to the restoration of his weekly payments from 1 June 2005.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
The grounds of appeal identified by EMI are that the Arbitrator erred in fact and law: (1) by finding that the notice dated 20 April 2005 “was not a valid notice within the meaning of section 54 of the 1987 Act”, and (2) by failing to give adequate reasons for his decision. The parties’ submissions on these issues are considered below.
ON THE PAPERS REVIEW
Section 354(6) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (‘the 1998 Act’) provides:
“(6)If the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under this Act without holding any conference or formal hearing.”
Having regard to Practice Directions Numbers 1 and 6, the documents before me, and the submissions by the parties that the appeal can be determined on the basis of these documents, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’, without holding any conference or formal hearing, and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.
Neither party sought to adduce fresh evidence.
LEAVE
Before proceeding to deal with an appeal, the Commission must determine whether the application meets the requirements of section 352 of the 1998 Act. Despite the submissions of Mr De Brito’s solicitors to the contrary, in my view the decision appealed against was made in connection with a dispute over a claim for compensation, namely Mr De Brito’s claim to continuing weekly compensation payments, and the Commission therefore has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The appeal was lodged within 28 days of the Arbitrator’s decision in compliance with section 352(4) of the 1998 Act. With regard to section 352(2), I am satisfied that the amount of compensation at issue exceeds $5,000 and constitutes more than 20% of the amount awarded in the decision appealed against. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the section 352 threshold has been met, and I grant leave to appeal.
SUBMISSIONS, DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
The role of the Presidential Member on appeal is to review the Arbitrator’s decision as a whole. The review is not a rehearing. In this case, EMI must demonstrate that the decision of the Arbitrator is affected by some legal, factual or discretionary error (Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172; The King Island Company Limited v Deery [2005] NSWWCCPD 1) in order to enliven the Presidential Member’s power to interfere with the Arbitrator’s decision pursuant to section 352(7) of the 1998 Act.
Notice dated 20 April 2005
Section 54 of the 1987 Act states relevantly:
“(1) If a worker:
(a) has received weekly payments of compensation for a continuous period of at least 12 weeks, and
(b) has provided the worker’s employer, or the employer’s insurer, with a certificate by a medical practitioner specifying the expected duration of the worker’s incapacity,
the person paying the compensation shall not discontinue payment, or reduce the amount, of the compensation during the period of incapacity so specified without giving the worker the prescribed period of notice of intention to discontinue payment of the compensation or to reduce the amount of the compensation.
Maximum penalty: 50 penalty units.
(2) If the payment of compensation to a worker is discontinued, or the amount of compensation is reduced, by a person in circumstances involving the commission by that person of an offence under subsection (1), the worker may, whether or not that person has been prosecuted for the offence, recover from the person an amount of compensation that:
(a) if no period of notice has been given - is equal to the amount of compensation, or additional compensation, that would have been payable during the prescribed period of notice if payment of the compensation had not been discontinued or if the amount of compensation had not been reduced, or
(b) if less than the prescribed period of notice has been given - is equal to the amount of compensation that would have been payable during the balance of the prescribed period of notice if payment of the compensation had not been discontinued or if the amount of the compensation had not been reduced.
(3) The prescribed period of notice referred to in this section is:
(a) if the worker has been receiving weekly payments of compensation for a continuous period of at least 12 weeks but less than 1 year - 2 weeks, or
(b) if the worker has been receiving weekly payments of compensation for a continuous period of 1 year or more - 6 weeks.
(4) The notice referred to in this section shall:
(a) be given to the worker personally or by post, and
(b) if the regulations so require, be in such form (or contain such information) as may be prescribed by the regulations.”
EMI’s submissions
EMI states that when Mr De Brito gave evidence in the Compensation Court on 22 July 2003, he stated he had been residing in Portugal since May 2002 and deposed to one or possibly three addresses there. EMI states the evidence “was lacking in sufficient clarity to assure the insurer that letters so addressed would reach the worker” (submissions paragraph 7). Following the award in Mr De Brito’s favour, EMI was unsure of the correct address for payment of the award. EMI infers that an approach was made to Mr De Brito’s solicitors who responded by letter dated 7 June 2004 requesting the sending of all further weekly entitlements to care of 19 D’Arcy Avenue, Lidcombe. Thereafter, all cheques for weekly compensation were sent to that address, no difficulties arose, and the cheques were duly presented. EMI states that in addition to the cheques, four formal notices – dated 16 August 2004, 17 February 2005, 23 February 2005 and 30 March 2005 - concerning Mr De Brito’s obligations under the 1987 Act, were also sent to that address. No issue was ever raised with EMI as to the appropriateness of the address. It was also to this address that the section 54 notice dated 20 April 2005 was sent.
EMI states the issue of service of the section 54 notice was first raised during the course of the first arbitration hearing on 1 February 2007. Moreover, at no stage has Mr De Brito asserted that he did not receive the various notices sent to him, including the section 54 notice.
EMI submits that nowhere in the workers compensation legislation is there any provision as to where a notice given by post to the worker must be sent. Reference to the service of notices in section 236 of the 1998 Act adds nothing further. EMI notes that there are many examples of Australian legislation affecting people’s rights specifying expressly where notices are to be sent, such as the person’s last known address or place of residence. Moreover, elsewhere in the workers compensation legislation, section 66 of the 1998 Act prescribes the place to which a notice given by post regarding a claim for compensation is to be sent. EMI submits that in the absence of specific requirements providing where section 54 notices are to be sent, it must be inferred that the legislature intended not to define or restrict the places to which section 54 notices might be sent. What is important is whether, as a question of fact, notice has been given to the worker.
EMI refers to the principle of statutory interpretation that words may not be implied into legislation unless, amongst other things, the court is able to say with certainty what words the legislature would have used had its attention been drawn to the omission: DC Pearce & R Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (6th edition, 2005), at paragraphs 2.28 to 2.33. Further, section 76 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), which deals with service by post, is also silent on the question of where notices are to be sent:
“76 (1) If an Act or instrument authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the word “serve”, “give” or “send” or any other word is used), service of the document:
(a) may be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting a letter containing the document, and
(b) in Australia or in an external Territory - is, unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt is adduced to the contrary, taken to have been effected on the fourth working day after the letter was posted, and
(c) in another place - is, unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt is adduced to the contrary, taken to have been effected at the time when the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of post.
(2) In this section:
‘working day’ means a day that is not:(a) a Saturday or Sunday, or
(b) a public holiday or a bank holiday in the place to which the letter was addressed.”
EMI submits it is well established that it is the deemed delivery of a letter, rather than whether it was actually received by the person, which activates the presumption that service has been properly effected. In Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 (‘Fancourt’), the Full High Court held, at paragraph 21, that:
“As the present case shows, delivery may be different from receipt by the intended recipient and, provided that delivery is not disproved, the fact of non-receipt does not displace the result that delivery is deemed to have been effected at the time at which it would have taken place in the ordinary course of the post.”
EMI submits the Court took a practical and commonsense approach in recognising that “the postal address of a person's abode does not necessarily coincide with the physical location of that abode”. Thus, a notice sent to a person "C/- Post Office, Sapphire, Q." was held to be addressed to the person’s place of abode. The Court held, at paragraph 17, that in such instances where,
“the only means of reaching those persons at their abode by the use of postal services may be through the post office ... a letter addressed to a person at the appropriate post office may be said to be addressed to him at his abode because that is his appropriate postal address in the sense that a letter so addressed may be expected to reach him at his place of abode in the ordinary course of post. A letter addressed to ‘Blackacre’ care of a post office or a post office box is none the less addressed to Blackacre if that is the postal address which Blackacre has, notwithstanding that the physical location of the property and of the post office are different.”
EMI submits that what is material is the address the intended recipient has identified as one to which correspondence should be sent, particularly where there is no express requirement that the notice go to a specified place, such as a ‘place of abode’. EMI seeks to distinguish the decision of Curtis J of the Compensation Court of NSW in Hughston v Hughston & Sons Ltd (1999) 18 NSWCCR 312 (‘Hughston’), to which the Arbitrator was referred in the arbitration hearing, on the ground that, in that case, the worker had conferred only a limited agency on his solicitor, upon whom the notice was served.
In summary, EMI submits (paragraph 29) that “in the absence of any express provision to the contrary, the notice under section 54(4) was required only to be sent to an appropriate place, being a place where it was likely to come to the attention of the worker”, and the address supplied in the letter from Mr De Brito’s solicitors dated 7 June 2004 was an appropriate place because (1) this was the place nominated by the worker as that to which his weekly compensation payments should be sent, (2) the insurer could be confident correspondence sent to that address was being received as the cheques were being presented, (3) it was reasonable for the insurer to assume the address provided was an appropriate one for relevant correspondence, (4) the worker had not provided any other address, (5) no complaint had been received regarding the delivery of the four previous notices, and (6) the worker provided no evidence that the notices had not been delivered to the address provided, received by him or brought to his attention. EMI submits that in these circumstances, section 76 of the Interpretation Act 1987 operates to deem the giving of the section 54 notice to have been effected.
Mr De Brito’s submissions
Mr De Brito’s solicitors submit, as a preliminary issue, that the Arbitrator erred in law in admitting the letter dated 7 June 2004 into evidence. The objection made at the arbitration hearing (transcript page 5) was that the letter was not disclosed in the ‘Reply’ and was not relevant, being relevant solely to where weekly compensation payments were to be sent. EMI responded that the letter was relevant to the issue of service of documents. The discussion then moved on to the issue of service of a section 54 notice. Ultimately, the Arbitrator decided to admit the letter, noting that what was important was the use that could be made of the letter in relation to service (transcript pages 12 - 13).
I am not satisfied from Mr De Brito’s solicitors’ submissions on this preliminary issue that the Arbitrator erred in the exercise of his discretion. I note EMI’s explanation that the issue of service of the section 54 notice was first raised during the course of the first arbitration hearing on 1 February 2007. Further, I note that the arbitrator’s decision in the original proceedings before the Commission was revoked by Acting Deputy President Moore’s decision on appeal. Thus, in my view, the issue of the address for service was clearly a material issue and documents informing discussion of that issue were clearly relevant.
With regard to EMI’s submissions set out above, Mr De Brito’s solicitors respond that the Arbitrator followed the decision in Hughston and therefore did not err in law. They submit that there was no evidence of EMI being unsure about the address to which weekly compensation was to be paid. EMI “bears the onus of service of notices” (submissions paragraph 20(d)). Moreover, the reference to section 76(1) of the Interpretation Act 1987, which prescribes the process or method of postal service and when service is effected, does not assist.
With regard to EMI’s summary of its contentions, Mr De Brito’s solicitors submit there was no evidence that correspondence sent to the Lidcombe address was being received, and disputes that it was reasonable for the insurer to assume that the address provided was an appropriate one for correspondence. The insurer had the means to establish the worker’s address and, if it failed to do so, must suffer the consequences of an invalid service of a section 54 notice. A lack of complaint as to the delivery of the four previous notices may have occurred because the worker was not aware of those notices. Moreover, EMI has provided no evidence of service to establish the date of service. This is essential because the date of service determines the ‘relevant time’ referred to in section 52A(2).
Mr De Brito’s solicitors submit that section 236 of the 1998 Act adds nothing to the issue of where a notice sent by post is to be sent. Furthermore, section 66 of the 1998 concerns the service of claims on employers and is not relevant here.
Was the section 54 notice properly served?
The issue to be determined is whether the Arbitrator erred in fact or law in deciding that the section 54 notice dated 20 April 2005 was not properly served. I find EMI’s submissions on this issue persuasive. Relevantly, section 54(4) requires that a section 54 notice shall “be given to the worker personally or by post”. There is no reference to where a notice should be sent by post to a worker. Section 76(1) of the Interpretation Act 1987, set out above, which clearly applies, is concerned with when service is deemed to be effective. Service by post must be (a) by properly addressing, prepaying and posting a letter containing the document, and (b) where service is in Australia or an external Territory, it is taken to have been effected on the fourth day after posting, or (c) where service is in another place, it is taken to have been effected at the time when the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of the post, unless, in both cases, evidence sufficient to raise doubt is adduced to the contrary.
The High Court decision in Fancourt (see above) distinguished between service of a document, deemed to have been effected, for example, in accordance with section 76(1) above, and actual receipt of the document. I agree with EMI’s submission that the High Court took a pragmatic approach in recognising that a person’s postal address does not necessarily coincide with where the person is physically residing. It is a matter of using an appropriate postal address where the letter addressed to the person can be expected to reach him/her.
I also agree with EMI that the decision in Hughston should be distinguished on its facts. The solicitor on whom the notice was served in that case only had instructions from the client in relation to a claim for compensation for permanent impairment and pain and suffering (and not in relation to the client’s weekly compensation) and, at the time the section 54 notice was issued, no originating process had been issued in relation to the claim for compensation for permanent impairment and pain and suffering. In the case of Mr De Brito, EMI was aware he had been living in Portugal since May 2002. EMI addressed the section 54 notice to Mr De Brito care of a house in Lidcombe, being the address his solicitors had notified EMI, by letter dated 7 June 2004, as the address to which Mr De Brito’s weekly compensation payments should be sent.
Was the section 54 notice properly served? My reasoning is as follows. If there is evidence (1) that EMI had no other address for Mr De Brito, and (2) that EMI had been sending weekly compensation cheques to the Lidcombe address as a result of which those cheques had been cashed, then (3) in the absence of evidence of Mr De Brito having notified EMI of another address to which other correspondence should be sent, in my view it was reasonable, in these circumstances, for EMI to assume that the address in Lidcombe was an appropriate place to which letters for Mr De Brito, containing notices issued pursuant to the workers compensation legislation, could be addressed. Thus (4), if there is evidence establishing that EMI’s letter to Mr De Brito dated 20 April 2005, containing the section 54 notice, was properly addressed, pre-paid and posted, then (5) in the absence of evidence from Mr De Brito raising doubt that the letter containing the notice had been served, service of the notice is taken to have been effected on the fourth working day after the letter was posted (section 76(1) Interpretation Act 1987).
In my view, the Arbitrator erred by failing to properly address the applicable law and failing to undertake an analysis of the facts by reference to the applicable law. The decision must therefore be revoked. One of the difficulties in this matter is the apparent lack of evidence, or lack of clarity in the evidence, from both parties relevant to the five steps in my reasoning. As a consequence, I am not satisfied that I can make the necessary findings to enable me to make a determination on the issue of whether the section 54 notice was properly served. In my view, whilst it is regrettable in the light of this being the second appeal and the matter having already been before two arbitrators, the appropriate outcome is for me to revoke the Arbitrator’s decision on this issue and remit the matter to a different arbitrator for the issue of whether the section 54 notice was properly served to be redetermined in accordance with these reasons. Should the arbitrator determine that the notice was properly served, then the arbitrator will need to address other outstanding issues, such as whether Mr De Brito was in fact seeking suitable employment at the ‘relevant time’ within the meaning of section 52A of the 1987 Act.
Adequacy of Reasons
EMI submits the Arbitrator’s Statement of Reasons is patently inadequate and, in particular, fails to set out his understanding of the law concerning section 54, his reasoning process and his view of where, in the circumstances of this case, a section 54 notice should have been sent.
Mr De Brito’s solicitors contend that the Arbitrator did give his reasoning process as to why service of the section 54 notice was invalid, and did not address other issues now raised by EMI concerning section 54 notices because they were not put to the Arbitrator in submissions at the hearing, the Arbitrator having been asked to make a finding as to whether the notice was properly served.
Section 294(2) of the 1998 Act requires that a brief statement setting out the Commission’s reasons for the determination be attached to the Certificate of Determination. Subrule 15.6(1) of the Workers Compensation Commission Rules 2006 requires that the statement of reasons is to include:
“(a) the Commission’s findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based, and
(b) the Commission’s understanding of the applicable law, and(c) the reasoning processes that lead the Commission to the conclusions it made.”
Subrule 15.6(2) requires that the reasons “are to be stated sufficiently (in the opinion of the Commission) to make the parties aware of the Commission’s view of the case made by each of them”. While lengthy reasons are not necessary (Snow Confectionary Pty Ltd v Askin [2004] NSWWCCPD 56, at paragraph 45), there must be sufficient clarity to meet the requirements of rule 15.6 and enable the parties to understand the basis of the decision.
In this case, the Arbitrator gave an oral Statement of Reasons for his decision at the conclusion of the hearing. In my view, the Arbitrator did not address all the material questions of fact – to which I have referred in paragraph 34 above – and did not undertake a proper analysis or adequately set out his understanding of the applicable law, apparently accepting the applicability of the decision in Hughston, but without setting out his reasons for doing so (transcript pages 27 – 28). Thus, I am not satisfied that the Arbitrator provided an adequate statement of reasons for his decision, thereby making an error of law.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the decision of the Arbitrator dated 24 September 2007 must be revoked and the matter remitted to a different arbitrator to be redetermined in accordance with these reasons.
During the course of reviewing the Arbitrator’s decision, I received further submissions from EMI seeking a stay of the Arbitrator’s decision. As EMI recognises in those submissions, there is no express provision in the workers compensation legislation empowering the Commission to issue a stay. EMI submits, nevertheless, that in order for a presidential review under section 352 of the 1998 Act to have any practical or meaningful effect, such a power may be implied to enable the Commission to take practical steps to secure the effectiveness of a review.
In view of my decision to revoke the Arbitrator’s decision and remit the matter for redetermination, it is unnecessary for me to address these further submissions and I therefore decline to do so.
DECISION
The decision of the Arbitrator dated 24 September 2007 is revoked and the matter is remitted to another arbitrator for determination afresh in accordance with these reasons.
COSTS
There is no order as to the costs of this appeal.
Robin Handley
Acting Deputy President
18 January 2008
I, MELANIE CURTIN, CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF ROBIN HANDLEY, ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
ASSOCIATE
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