PCL Holdings Pty Ltd v Hans Peter Mollinger

Link copied
Case Copied 15 min read

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PCL HOLDINGS PTY LTD v HANS PETER MOLLINGER [2010] FMCA 216
BANKRUPTCY – Appropriate application of interest in a Bankruptcy Notice.
Bankruptcy Act 1966, s.41
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth), rr.4.02, sch. 1
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss.101, 136
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r.36.7
Bank of WA Ltd v Loiterton [2006] FMCA 361
Provident Capital Ltd v Mollinger & Anor [2009] FMCA 525
Provident Capital Ltd v Mollinger [2009] FMCA 536
Re Mangan Ex parte Andrew (1983) 123 ALR 633
Applicant: PCL HOLDINGS PTY LTD
Respondent: HANS PETER MOLLINGER
File Number: SYG 1491 of 2008
Judgment of: Lloyd-Jones FM
Hearing date: 18 June 2009
Date of Last Submission: 2 July 2009
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 31 March 2010

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Nolan
Solicitors for the Applicant: Tiernan & Associates
The Respondent: The respondent appeared as a self-represented litigant.
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 1491 of 2008

PCL HOLDINGS PTY LTD

Applicant

And

HANS PETER MOLLINGER

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

  1. This judgment addresses the issue left unresolved in Provident Capital Ltd v Mollinger [2009] FMCA 525. The remaining issue to be addressed in this judgment is equally applicable to the judgments in respect of each of the Mollinger Respondents, being: Beau Joshua Mollinger in proceedings Provident Capital Ltd v Mollinger [2009] FMCA 536; Hans Peter Mollinger and Jillian May Mollinger (heard together) in proceedings Provident Capital Ltd v Mollinger [2009] FMCA 525. By way of background to the original proceedings, paragraph [1] –[2] of the judgment Provident Capital Ltd v Mollinger [2009] FMCA 536 provides:

    This application for review was filed by Beau Joshua Mollinger, the respondent debtor, opposing a Creditor’s Petition filed on 11 June 2008.  Similar applications were filed by his father, Hans Peter Mollinger, and his mother, Jillian May Mollinger.  All three were parties to Supreme Court of New South Wales proceedings 1319 of 2004 which resulted in consent orders being made on 31 January 2005.  Separate Bankruptcy Notices were issued against all three individuals.  The failure to satisfy those Notices led to the issue of separate Creditors Petitions to each debtor which is the issue in these proceedings.  Hearings of the Creditor’s Petitions were heard concurrently and I also delivered/deliver a judgment in relation to Hans Peter and Jillian May Mollinger (Provident Capital Ltd v Mollinger & Anor [2009] FMCA 525) and this separate judgment in respect of Beau Joshua Mollinger. 

    A Notice Stating Grounds of Opposition to the Petition was filed on 8 July 2008.  The hearing of the Creditor’s Petition was initially set down for 11 July 2008, however the petitioning creditor sought three consecutive adjournments on 11 July, 1 August and 26 August 2008 to allow time to prepare and present its evidence.  The Duty Registrar transferred the matter to this Court for hearing on 26 August 2008.

  2. In the earlier judgment, I had requested the parties to provide written submissions, supported by authorities,…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read PCL Holdings Pty Ltd v Hans Peter Mollinger and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2010] FMCA 216
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

PCL Holdings Pty Ltd brought an application against Hans Peter Mollinger in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, seeking orders to enforce a judgment for unpaid debt. The primary dispute centred on the interpretation and application of sections 101 and 136 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (Cth). The court had to determine whether payments made by the debtor could be applied to interest on the debt under section 85 of the same Act, given the introduction of section 101 which deals with interest on judgments. The crux of the matter was whether the introduction of section 101 intended to exclude the concurrent operation of section 85 for pre-commencement judgments.

The court examined whether section 136, which codifies the common law presumption that payments on a debt are applied to interest before principal, was sufficient to indicate an intention to exclude the operation of section 85. The debtor argued that the introduction of section 101, which was not previously found in the District Court Act, indicated an intention to supersede and exclude any concurrent operation of the old interest provision. The court considered authorities such as Re Mangan; Ex parte Andrew (1983) 123 ALR 633, which affirm that payments on a debt are to be applied first to interest. The Federal Magistrate concluded that section 136 merely codified a long-established common law presumption and did not indicate an intention to exclude the continuing operation of section 85 as a source of accrued liability to interest on pre-commencement judgments.

The court held that payments made on account of a judgment debt should be applied first towards interest, as per the common law rule codified in section 136, unless the court orders otherwise. The introduction of section 101 did not exclude the operation of section 85 for pre-commencement judgments. The decision relied on the principle that to apply payments directly to the principal when interest is accrued and unpaid would deprive the creditor of the benefit to which they are entitled under the contract.

The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application, affirming that the debtor's payments should be applied first to interest on the judgment debt under section 85, unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court did not find merit in the argument that the introduction of section 101 intended to supersede the operation of section 85.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Both parties identify the decision of His Honour Smith FM in Bank of WA Ltd v Loiterton [2006] FMCA 361 as relevant to the discussion of s.136. Of this, His Honour makes the following observation at [22]-[23]:The only provision of the Civil Procedure Act, which was pointed to by counsel for the debtor in aid of his submission that s 101 was intended to be the exclusive source of liability for interest on pre-commencement judgments, was s 136. This provides:136 Appropriation of payments towards judgment debtUnless the court otherwise orders, any payment made on account of a judgment debt is to be appropriated:(a) firstly, towards such part of the judgment debt as comprises interest payable under s 101, and(b) secondly, towards the balance of the judgment debt.[23] In its terms s 136 does not show the intention which is now argued, but counsel for the debtor argued that it was not a provision previously found in the District Court Act, and therefore showed that s 101 was part of a novel scheme in relation to interest on judgments which implicitly was intended to supersede and exclude any concurrent operation of the old interest provision. He did not refer me to any extrinsic material or authorities which provide background to s 136. However, in my opinion, the provision did no more than codify a long established presumption of common law (see Re Mangan; Ex parte Andrew (1983) 123 ALR 633 at 639–640, and Laws of Australia [7.5.32]). Even if s 136 introduced some novelty when s 101 is invoked, I am not persuaded that this would show an intention to exclude the continuing operation of s 85 as a source of accrued liability to interest on pre-commencement judgments. In Re Mangan Ex parte Andrew(1983) 123 ALR 633, His Honour Beaumont J considers at p.639- p.640:Where the debtor claims to be discharged by reason of payments which were not specially made in respect of either the principal or the interest of the mortgage, the rule is that a general payment shall be applied in the first place to sink the interest, before any part of the principal is discharged: see Fisher & Lightwood's Law of Mortgage, 9th ed p 543. In Falk v Haugh (1935) 53 CLR 163, Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ said (at 173):It has long been a rule that when payments are received generally on account of a debt, which is in part interest and in part principal, they are treated as applicable to interest in priority to principal. In Crisp v Bluck (1673) Rep Temp Finch 89 ; 23 ER 48, 123 ALR 633 at 640a bond creditor received some payments, and afterwards recovered judgment. It was decreed that the payments ought to go in discharge of the interest first. The rule was again enunciated by Lord Keeper Wright in Chase v Box (1702) Freem Ch 261 ; 22 ER 1197. It has, however, been little discussed. The most recent statement of the rule is contained in Venkatadri Appa Row v Parthasarthi Appa Row (1921) LR 48 Ind App 150. There Lord Buckmaster said at 153: ``There is a debt due that carries interest. There are moneys that are received without a definite appropriation on the one side or the other, and the rule which is well established in ordinary cases is that in those circumstances the money is first applied in payment of interest and then when that is satisfied in payment of capital. That rule is referred to by Rigby LJ in the case of Parr's Banking Co v Yates (1898) 2 QB 460 at 466 in these words: `The defendant's counsel relied on the old rule that does, no doubt, apply to many cases, namely, that, where both principal and interest are due, the sums paid on account must be applied first to interest. That rule, where it is applicable, is only common justice. To apply the sums paid to principal where interest has accrued upon the debt, and is not paid, would be depriving the creditor of the benefit to which he is entitled under his contract.' '’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.