Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 1)
Paviello & Paviello (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 795
File number(s): SYC 2323 of 2017 Judgment of: WILSON J Date of judgment: 24 October 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – NATIONAL ARBITRATION LIST– application for indemnity costs – application dismissed – party/party costs ordered. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 45A(6), s 70NFB(1), 117(1),(2), 117AC and s 117(2A) Cases cited: Agosti & Agosti [2021] FedCFamC1F 72
Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394
Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172
Al-Medinni v Mars UK Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1041
Anison & Anison [2019] FamCAFC 108
Bant v Clayton (Costs) (2016) 56 Fam LR 31
Calderband v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333
Chang v Su (2002) 29 Fam LR 406
Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225
Fitzgerald v Fish (2005) 33 Fam LR 123
Grimshaw v Dunbar [1953] 1 QB 408
Hatcher v Cohn (2004) 139 FCR 425
Haven & Haven [2020] FamCA 954
In the Marriage of Gelley (No 2) (1992) 15 Fam LR 483
In the Marriage of Higginbotham & Robinson (1991) 14 Fam LR 559
In the Marriage of Hogan (1986) 10 Fam LR 681
In the Marriage of Kohan (1992) 16 Fam LR 245
In the Marriage of Weir (1992) 16 Fam LR 154
International Finance Trust Company Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319
Kyle & Kyle [2022] FedCFamC1F 251
Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311
Paviello & Paviello [2022] FedCFamC1F 592
Phillips & Hansford [2020] FamCAFC 28
Re JRL, ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342
Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd and others v Mastercard Inc and others (European Commission intervening) [2020] 4 All ER 807
Sfakianakis v Sfakianakis (2019) 59 Fam LR 419
Smith & Fields [2013] FamCA 505
Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256
Sommer & Sommer [2021] FedCFamC1F 37
Summit v Summit [2009] FamCA 365
Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1
Urban Transport Authority of New South Wales v Nweiser (1992) 28 NSWLR 471
Worth & Worth (No 2) [2019] FamCAFC 126
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 108 Date of last submissions:: 29 September 2022 Date of hearing: On the papers Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J. Morris SC with Mr A. Todd Solicitor for the Applicant: Jordan Djundja Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M. Stevens Solicitor for the First Respondent: Blanchfield Nicholls Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr D. Dura Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Parker Law ORDERS
SYC 2323 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS PAVIELLO
Applicant
AND: MR B PAVIELLO
First Respondent
MR A PAVIELLO
Second Respondent
order made by:
WILSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 October 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The wife’s application dated 14 September…
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- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC1F 795
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court commenced by addressing the husband's costs application, which was based on the wife's failure to accept a compromise offer made in accordance with Calderbank v Calderbank. The court noted that the husband's proposal for a settlement offered the wife 60% of the net proceeds from the sale of a property, with each party retaining their vehicles, personal effects, and superannuation. The arbitral award, which divided the assets 57.5% to the wife and 42.5% to the husband, was not significantly more favourable to the husband than his proposal, thereby negating his entitlement to costs on the basis of the wife's imprudent refusal to accept the offer. Furthermore, the court found the husband's claim for $450,000 in costs to be excessive and disproportionate given the total pool of approximately $3 million. The court ultimately refused the husband's application for costs.
Following this, the court addressed the second respondent’s costs application. The court found no merit in the second respondent’s argument that the arbitrator had determined him to be a financial resource for the husband. Instead, the arbitrator had explicitly stated that he could not ascertain the husband’s total income from all sources, thereby refuting the wife's submission. The court concluded that the second respondent was not entitled to the costs he sought, either on a party/party or indemnity basis.
In summary, the court dismissed the husband's application for costs and the second respondent's application for costs. No party was ordered to pay the costs of the other.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Neither of those paragraphs provide support for the wife’s submission that the arbitrator found that the second respondent was a financial resource for the husband. To the contrary. The arbitrator stated that he was unable to say what was the husband’s income from all sources. Far from that being an explicit finding, as the wife’s counsel submitted in paragraph 71 of his submissions, it was wholly erroneous to submit that either paragraph was to be so construed. Consideration of the husband’s costs applications Paragraph 1 of the husband’s application in a proceeding related to his claim for payment of a fixed sum in the amount of $450,000 being the husband’s costs of and incidental to – (a)the wife’s application filed 13 April 2017; (b)the wife’s review application following arbitration; and (c)this costs application. That paragraph of the husband’s application was headed “the entirety of the proceedings”.[20] It was the husband’s attempt to procure an order that the wife pay him $450,000 for his costs of the whole litigation from the commencement of this proceeding to the review application following the arbitration to this costs application.[20] Reference to “proceedings” (in the plural) was erroneous. One only proceeding was involved in this case so the heading should have been in the singular. Before revealing my path of reasoning for my conclusion to refuse that application, it is utile to observe that the sum claimed of $450,000 was ambit in nature, unparticularised and bore all the hallmarks of an amount properly characterised as indemnity costs, that is to say, the figure appeared to represent full recompense for the husband’s legal expenditures. No attempt was made by the husband to break the amount of $450,000 down into component parts by which it was possible to ascertain whether and to what extent a particular amount claimed related to a particular activity and whether the sum sough for that activity was reasonable in the circumstances. The sum of $450,000 is remarkably large, approximately half a million dollars in circumstances where the pool, as found, was approximately $3 million. In any event, it would be disproportionate and unjust to order one party to pay the other’s costs of $450,000 in a case involving a pool of approximately $3 million. I refuse to make an order in those terms. It then became necessary to examine the grounds on which the husband said he was entitled to an order for his costs to be paid by the wife. The first related to the husband’s offer of compromise. It will be recalled that he proposed that the wife was to be paid 60% of the net proceeds of sale of the Suburb P property and that each party retained motor vehicles, personal effects and superannuation. The arbitrator made orders that included superannuation and the net proceeds of the Suburb P property, ordering the wife to receive 57.5% thereof and the husband receive 42.5%. When properly construed the upshot of the arbitration was not more favourable to the husband than were the terms of his 26 May 2021 proposal to settle the litigation. He is not therefore entitled to a costs order in his favour on the basis that the wife imprudently refused to accept his 26 May 2021 proposal.