Paul Wilson and Australian Postal Corporation

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[2014] AATA 805

Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

File Number(s)

2013/6222

Re

Paul Wilson

APPLICANT

And

Australian Postal Corporation

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal Ms J L Redfern, Senior Member
Date 30 October 2014
Place Sydney

The decision under review is set aside and in substitution the tribunal decides that Australia Post is liable to pay Mr Wilson compensation pursuant to s 24(1) of the Act based on 10% whole person impairment. Pursuant to s 67(8) costs are awarded to the applicant, other than for the first three days of hearing.

.................[sgd]..................................................

Ms J L Redfern, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

COMPENSATION – employee of licensed corporation – claim for compensation for injury resulting in permanent impairment – whether accepted psychological injury arising from 2009 road rage incident resulted in permanent impairment – assessment of the degree of permanent impairment – costs – decision set aside

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s 2A

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 5A, 24, 27, 28, 67

CASES

Canute v Comcare (2006) 226 CLR 535

Jordan v Australia Post Corporation (2007) 99 ALD 303; [2007] FCA 2028
Martin v Australian Postal Corporation [1999] FCA 655

Perry v Comcare (2006) 150 FCR 319; [2006] FCA 33

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Comcare Australia, Guide to the Assessment of the Degree of Permanent Impairment, Edition 2.1 (Comcare, 2011)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Ms J L Redfern, Senior Member

30 October 2014

INTRODUCTION

  1. Mr Paul Wilson is a postal delivery driver with the Australian Postal Corporation (Australia Post), where he has worked since 1997. On 24 April 2009 Mr Wilson was the victim of a road rage incident while undertaking his postal delivery duties. A number of men attacked him at traffic lights and he was forced to flee from his van. Mr Wilson sustained both physical and psychological injuries as a result of this incident. This is not in dispute.

  2. On 27 August 2012, Mr Wilson was involved in a motor vehicle accident, again while he was working. He sustained physical injuries to his spine and right shoulder.

  3. Liability was accepted by Australia Post for Mr Wilson’s work-related injuries arising out of both incidents.

  4. On 17 May 2012, Mr Wilson made a claim for permanent impairment in respect of the psychological injury sustained by him as a result of the April 2009 incident. By determination made on 5 October 2012 Australia Post denied liability to pay compensation for permanent impairment on the basis that the degree of Mr Wilson’s permanent impairment was less than the 10% threshold required to enliven their obligation to pay lump sum compensation. Mr Wilson did not seek reconsideration of this decision but made another claim for lump sum compensation in respect of this psychological injury on 11 September 2013. By determination dated 23 October, 2013, Mr Wilson’s claim was again rejected. Australia Post accepted Mr Wilson had a psychological injury arising from the April 2009 road rage incident, accepted his impairment was permanent but did not accept that the impairment reached the 10% permanent impairment threshold.…

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Details
Case
[2014] AATA 805
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter between Paul Wilson and the Australian Postal Corporation was before the tribunal, which had to decide if Mr Wilson's accepted psychological injury from a 2009 road rage incident resulted in permanent impairment. The tribunal had to assess the degree of this impairment and determine if costs were to be awarded. The tribunal concluded that the 2009 incident resulted in 10% permanent impairment and found in favour of Mr Wilson. It set aside the original decision and ordered Australia Post to compensate Mr Wilson for the impairment.

The critical issue before the tribunal was whether Mr Wilson's 2009 psychological injury resulted in a permanent impairment of at least 10%, according to the Guide. The tribunal considered that it was not possible to precisely isolate the effects of the injury from Mr Wilson's non-compensable conditions. Therefore, the assessment should be made in his favour, leading the tribunal to find that the 2009 injury resulted in 10% permanent impairment.

In its reasoning, the tribunal relied on the High Court's decision in Canute v Comcare, which emphasized the need to focus on the degree of permanent impairment resulting from an injury. The tribunal also took into account the comments of Buchanan J in Jordan, which suggested that the decision-maker must attempt to isolate compensable effects from non-compensable conditions when assessing permanent impairment. The tribunal concluded that Professor Robertson's third report, which assessed Mr Wilson's impairment arising from the 2009 incident, adequately addressed the critical issue for determination.

Regarding costs, the tribunal exercised its broad discretion under s 67(8) of the Act and found that Mr Wilson was entitled to recover his costs. The tribunal considered it unjust for Australia Post to incur unnecessary costs, as it was not until the last day of the hearing that Australia Post and its advisers could have known about the evidence supporting Mr Wilson's case. The tribunal found that the applicant had acted reasonably and that the exercise of its discretion had not miscarried.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Section 67(8) of the Act confers discretion to award costs, or part of those costs, where the Tribunal varies or sets aside and substitutes a decision that it is that is more favourable to the claimant than the reviewable decision.BACKGROUND FACTS AND EVIDENCE Mr Wilson worked in the oil industry for many years prior to being retrenched in 1995. He joined Australia Post in July 1997. According to a memorandum from Mr Wilson’s personnel file produced by Australia Post, he was asked to leave work and go home on 24 December 1997 because his behaviour was observed to be erratic. His manager suspected that Mr Wilson was under the influence of alcohol. The note also records that Mr Wilson was interviewed about his behaviour on his return to work after Christmas and he accepted counselling. Mr Wilson apparently signed the note on 29 December 1997. There was a further incident alleged to have taken place on 28 July 1998 which was recorded in an undated report by his supervisor to the Manager of the South Parcel Centre, the receipt of which was acknowledged by the Manager on 4 August 1998. The report referred to discussions between the supervisor and Mr Wilson regarding complaints by Mr Wilson about pain to his back and arm and included the following:During our conversation he was very agitated, nervous and smelt of alcohol. This drinking problem has been ongoing since last Christmas when he was sent home. I have been receiving constant complaints from staff concerning his behaviour and attitude.In my opinion if nothing is done to alter his above actions e.g. numerous forklift and driving accidents, there could be serious accident or injury forthcoming to himself and others.I am hoping my report will be taken into your kind consideration. NB already has received counselling once concerning his drinking habits. According to a leave application form signed by Mr Wilson’s supervisor and dated 27 January 2000, Mr Wilson was again sent home on 24 December 1999 and the reason recorded on the leave application form was “consuming alcohol”. It is unclear if any disciplinary action was taken following these incidents and no further information was provided by Australia Post in this regard. Mr Wilson was questioned about these incidents during the hearing. He agreed he was sent home before Christmas, although he did not specify which year he was referring to, and said this was because he had told his supervisor he wanted to resign. He said he was given a six pack of beer and told to go home. Mr Wilson denied he had alcohol problems at this stage and said that he disagreed with the report of the July 1998 incident. He did not deny signing the 1997 report but had little recollection of these incidents. This is not surprising given they relate to events over 15 years ago. There is no record of any subsequent alcohol-related incident at work after this date. On 24 April 2009, Mr Wilson was driving his work van when he merged into a lane before stopping at traffic lights. The driver behind him apparently took offence and got out of his car, together with his passenger, and abused Mr Wilson. On Mr Wilson’s account, and there is no contest on this, the driver said he was going to kill Mr Wilson. He and his passenger then proceeded to smash windows in Mr Wilson’s van. Mr Wilson said he fled the van and while he was running away, tore his hamstring. Mr Wilson did not take any time off work at this time. He was required to give evidence at the criminal trial and reported to doctors that one of his attackers confronted him at the local club after the sentence. Both attackers were apparently given a good behaviour bond. Mr Wilson gave evidence that he had wanted someone from Australia Post to accompany him when he gave evidence but colleagues refused because of concern of possible reprisals. He said he felt unsupported by Australia Post at this time.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Because of the complexities of Mr Wilson’s various conditions and stressors, it is not possible to precisely isolate the effects of the 2009 accepted psychological injury from the impact of Mr Wilson’s non-compensable conditions when assessing his permanent impairment under the Guide. Accordingly, the assessment should be made beneficially to Mr Wilson. Having regard to all of the evidence I therefore find that the 2009 accepted psychological injury resulted in 10% permanent impairment.CONCLUSION AND COSTS I have found for Mr Wilson and therefore the appropriate order is to set aside the decision under review and substitute a decision that Australia Post is liable to pay Mr Wilson compensation pursuant to s 24(1) of the Act based on 10% whole person impairment. The parties addressed on the question of costs. Counsel for Mr Wilson conceded that the applicant should not be entitled to costs thrown away for the first two days of the hearing but submitted that he otherwise should be entitled to recover his costs if he was successful in his application. Counsel for Australia Post submitted that Mr Wilson should not be entitled to any costs prior to the third report of Professor Robertson or indeed the last day of hearing when Professor Robertson’s evidence was fully tested and known. In Australia Post’s submission, Mr Wilson should not be entitled to costs until he brings a case that he can possibly win. It was relevant that Australia Post had declined Mr Wilson’s claim on the basis of the reports of Dr Rees and that there was nothing in the subsequent reports of Professor Robertson, including the second report, to challenge this decision. Unnecessary costs were incurred by Australia Post in the circumstances of this case it was not until the last day of the hearing when Professor Robertson, was cross-examined on his third report, that Australia Post and its advisers could have known about the evidence raised in support of Mr Wilson’s case. Where a claimant is successful in review proceedings, namely, where the tribunal makes a decision that is more favourable than the reviewable decision, s 67(8) of the Act gives the tribunal the discretion to order that the costs incurred, or part of those costs, be paid. It is clear from the cases that the discretion is broad. In dealing with a costs order made by the tribunal taking into account the effect of a “Calderbank” letter of offer, in Perry v Comcare (2006) 150 FCR 319; [2006] FCA 33 Greenwood J stated at [90] – [91]:[90] The Tribunal properly had regard to the letter of offer in exercising its discretion. That discretion was not fettered by any rule, policy or binding principle. The fundamental obligation of the Tribunal in the exercise of the discretion was to do justice between the parties according to its assessment of the circumstances of the case. Whether, in exercising the discretion, if conferred upon it, the Court might have taken a different view about the allocation of costs or circumstances influencing whether the respondent might be ordered to pay the costs or a part of the costs, is not to the point. The question of whether, in all the circumstances, the applicant acted reasonably is a question of fact to be determined by the Tribunal and it is not open to the Court to substitute its own view of those facts or the exercise of the discretion. [91] The applicant has not demonstrated that the Tribunal acted upon grounds outside the purposes for which the Tribunal was entrusted with discretionary power and nor has the Applicant demonstrated that the Tribunal made an error of law in exercising the discretion by applying a wrong principle or having regard to irrelevant matters. For the reasons indicated at [87], the applicant has not demonstrated that the Tribunal failed to consider material facts which resulted in a decision which is unreasonable or plainly unjust. The decision on the facts was open to the Tribunal although minds might legitimately differ about the assessment of those facts. Accordingly, the exercise of the discretion has not miscarried and the Tribunal has not made an error of law in making the order for costs it made. [Emphasis added.]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The critical issue for determination is therefore whether Mr Wilson’s accepted psychological injury in 2009 resulted in permanent impairment of at least 10% based on Table 5.1 of the Guide. CONSIDERATION AND FINDINGS According to the High Court in Canute v Comcare (2006) 226 CLR 535, s 24(5) requires attention to focus on the degree of permanent impairment resulting from an injury. Each injury suffered by an employee requires separate assessment of the degree of impairment. As such, it is not appropriate to aggregate impairment resulting from the 2009 and 2012 incidents to assess Mr Wilson’s permanent impairment for the purposes of s 24(1). Both Professor Robertson and Dr Rees took this approach in their earlier reports and to the extent they expressed an opinion about Mr Wilson’s impairment based on this assessment, their opinions did not relevantly address the critical issue for determination. This is not in dispute. The parties rely on the comments of Buchanan J in Jordan and accept that s 24 requires the decision maker to attempt to “isolate” compensable effects from effects of an underlying or non-compensable condition when making an assessment about permanent impairment. As observed by Buchanan J at [26]:The Act and the guide only contemplate and direct that a value will be assigned to the degree of permanent impairment arising from an “injury”. In her second report, Dr Rees made an assessment of the degree of Mr Wilson’s permanent impairment by taking a number of factors into account, including an underlying condition that she diagnosed as alcohol dependency, which she opined pre-dated the April 2009 incident. Dr Rees assessed Mr Wilson’s impairment from this underlying condition by reference to Table 5.1 as 5% and deducted this from her assessment of Mr Wilson’s whole person impairment to arrive at the percentage impairment for work-related factors. Dr Rees explained this reasoning process in her evidence. This does not assist the tribunal in determining the degree of Mr Wilson’s permanent impairment resulting from a compensable injury. This is not in contest. In his third report, Professor Robertson noted the difficulties in attributing a percentage of impairment to different events but concluded Mr Wilson had 10% permanent impairment “arising from the psychological injury that occurred in April 2009”. In his oral evidence Professor Robertson said that the 2009 incident was a material contributing cause of Mr Wilson’s permanent impairment. Counsel for Australia Post submitted that this was not enough. This was similar to the submissions made by Australia Post in Jordan, in which Australia Post contended that a relevant injury must be wholly related to work. In dealing with this submission, Buchanan J stated at [30]:To the extent that the submission invokes the definition of “injury” earlier set out and its associated effect on s 24 and the guide, it is clearly correct. However, neither the Act nor the guide exclude the possibility that some impairment might result from the combined effect of an underlying condition and a work-related aggravation of that condition. In those circumstances it is, strictly speaking, only the work-related aggravation which is compensable. The guide directs that, “where it is possible”, the compensable effects of any work-related aggravation should be isolated from the effects of the underlying condition for the purpose of assessing the degree of permanent impairment due to compensable effects. That may be easier said than done. If it is not possible the assessment made should operate beneficially to the claimant: see Martin at [29]-[30].