Paul Francis Cox v the Coca-Cola Company

Link copied
Case Copied 14 min read

Trade Marks Act 1955
Decision of a Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks

Re:Opposition by The Coca-Cola Company to the registration of application 414811 in the name of Paul Francis Cox.

Background

On 21.7.88, trade mark application 414811 was advertised accepted for registration.  The application is in the name of Paul Francis Cox ("the applicant") and the goods specified in the application are "mineral and aerated waters and soft drinks, all the aforementioned goods containing cola nut or cola nut extract".  The trade mark the subject of the application, which was lodged on 7.9.84, is POLA COLA.

Registration of the application has been opposed, as provided for by sub-section 49(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955, by The Coca-Cola Company ("the opponent"), on grounds which are generalised and which I will not recite at length as they were not fully pursued at the hearing. The opponent now claims in general terms that the applicant's mark is deceptively similar to the COCA COLA trade mark, that the application was wrongly accepted on the basis of an incorrect statement about the use of the mark, and that the application should be refused in any case as use of the applicant's mark would be likely to deceive or confuse the public in view of the nature and extent of use of the opponent's marks.

After the applicant, despite having a total of 7 months available to it for the purpose, failed to serve evidence in answer to the opposition the matter was set down for hearing on 31.1.92.  The opponent was represented by Mr Paul Jones of the firm of patent attorneys Phillips Ormonde and Fitzpatrick, while the applicant did not appear, relying on handwritten submissions sent by facsimile in a form which is largely illegible.  Having heard the parties I turn briefly to the evidence.

Opponents Evidence in Support
This consists of declarations by Robert Callahan Jr and by Terry Brennan.  The former is the Vice President of the opponent, and his evidence is relevant to the Australian and international situations.  He declares that the first Australian manufacture of COCA-COLA was in 1937, that the goods so marked are sold in more than 155 countries and that the opponent holds Australian registrations for trade marks incorporating the element COKE or COCA-COLA: CHERRY COCA-COLA, DIET COCA-COLA, COCA-COLA LIGHT, COCA-COLA CLASSIC and FROZEN COCA-COLA, the last registered also in respect of frozen confections, though the opponent's registrations cover many other classes.  It is Mr Callahan's assertion that the public know of these expansions of the opponent's range of products and that this makes it more likely that there will be confusion as to the source of the applicant's goods.

The opponent's second declarant is Terry Brennan, the Chairman/Managing director of Coca-Cola South Pacific Pty Ltd, a subsidiary, through a parent company, of the American corporation that until 1986 had responsibility for distributing and advertising the opponent's products in Australia.  Since 1986 Mr Brennan's company has had direct responsibility for such sales and promotion.…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Paul Francis Cox v the Coca-Cola Company and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1992] ATMO 38
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerns an opposition by The Coca-Cola Company to the registration of the trade mark POLA COLA, applied for by Paul Francis Cox for mineral and aerated waters, soft drinks, and similar products. The Coca-Cola Company, as the opponent, argued that the applicant's mark was deceptively similar to its own well-known COCA-COLA trade mark and that the application should be refused on this basis, as well as due to an alleged false statement regarding the use of the mark. The decision was made by a Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks.

The primary legal issues before the Delegate were whether the applicant's mark POLA COLA was deceptively similar to the opponent's registered trade marks COCA-COLA, such that it was likely to deceive or cause confusion under section 6(3) of the *Trade Marks Act 1955* (Cth), and whether the application should be refused due to a potentially false statement made by the applicant regarding the use of the mark, as required by regulation 8(1) of the Act. The opponent also raised arguments under section 28 of the Act, which relates to blameworthy conduct.

The Delegate found that while the opponent's COCA-COLA mark was extensively used and well-known, the applicant's mark POLA COLA was not deceptively similar. The Delegate reasoned that a fair comparison, considering the marks as a whole, their sound, appearance, and the likely circumstances of their use, revealed sufficient dissimilarity. The Delegate rejected the opponent's hypothetical "worst-case scenario" of the applicant's mark being presented in the opponent's distinctive script and colours, deeming it an irrelevant consideration of fraudulent intent rather than normal use. Furthermore, the Delegate found that the opponent had failed to establish a prima facie case that the applicant's statement of use was false or that the mark had not been used. The evidence of the opponent's representative regarding non-use was considered insufficient, particularly given his limited recent experience in the Australian beverage market and the unreasonableness of expecting him to be aware of all local operators.

Consequently, the opposition was dismissed entirely. The Delegate ordered that the application proceed to registration, subject to payment of the registration fee within three months, and awarded costs to the applicant.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 7 September 1984, Paul Francis Cox lodged a trade mark application 414811 for the trade mark POLA COLA in relation to "mineral and aerated waters and soft drinks, all the aforementioned goods containing cola nut or cola nut extract". The application was advertised as accepted for registration on 21 July 1988. The Coca-Cola Company opposed the registration of Cox's trade mark application on grounds including that the marks were deceptively similar, that Cox's application was wrongly accepted on the basis of an incorrect statement about the use of the mark, and that the registration should be refused as use of Cox's mark would likely deceive or confuse the public in view of Coca-Cola's extensive use of its marks.

The opponent presented evidence from its Vice President and Chairman/Managing Director asserting the long history and extensive international use of Coca-Cola's marks. However, they did not provide evidence that Cox's mark had actually been used in Australia. Cox did not appear at the hearing, relying on illegible handwritten submissions. The opponent argued that Cox's mark was deceptively similar to Coca-Cola's marks and that Cox's application was based on a false statement regarding use of the mark. However, the Delegate found that the opponent had not established a prima facie case that Cox's mark had not been used, and that Cox's failure to provide evidence did not mean the original statement of use was false. The Delegate dismissed the opposition and allowed Cox's trade mark application to proceed to registration, provided the registration fee was paid within 3 months.

The key facts giving rise to the legal dispute were the filing and acceptance of Cox's trade mark application, Coca-Cola's opposition to the registration on various grounds, and the evidence presented by both parties regarding the similarity of the marks and whether Cox's mark had actually been used. The Delegate ultimately found in favour of Cox, dismissing Coca-Cola's opposition and allowing Cox's application to proceed.

The case of Paul Francis Cox v the Coca-Cola Company originates from an opposition to the registration of a trade mark application by Paul Francis Cox, specifically application 414811 for the trade mark POLA COLA. Trade mark application 414811, which was lodged on 7 September 1984 and accepted for registration on 21 July 1988, pertains to goods including "mineral and aerated waters and soft drinks, all the aforementioned goods containing cola nut or cola nut extract." The Coca-Cola Company opposed the registration of this application on grounds of deceptive similarity to their own trade marks, including COCA COLA, and on the basis that the applicant's mark was not being used, or there was no intention to use it. The matter was set down for hearing on 31 January 1992, with The Coca-Cola Company represented by Mr Paul Jones of Phillips Ormonde and Fitzpatrick, while the applicant did not appear, submitting only illegible handwritten facsimile submissions.

The opposition was based on two primary grounds: deceptive similarity between the competing marks and questions about the applicant's use or intention to use the mark. The Coca-Cola Company argued that the applicant's mark was too similar to their own, likely to deceive or confuse the public, and that the applicant's mark should not be registered as it would infringe on their existing registrations. They cited extensive international and Australian sales and the variety of their products as evidence of their brand's strength and recognition. However, the Hearing Officer found that the marks were sufficiently dissimilar and that the opponent had not established a prima facie case that the applicant's mark was being used or had been used, as required by the Trade Marks Act 1955. The applicant's failure to provide evidence of use did not, in the Officer's view, automatically imply that the statement of use provided to the Registrar was false. The opposition was ultimately dismissed, and costs were awarded to the applicant. The decision allows the applicant to proceed with the registration of the trade mark POLA COLA, provided the registration fee is paid within three months of the decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is the trade mark POLA COLA deceptively similar to The Coca-Cola Company's trade marks COCA-COLA and COKE, as to likely cause deception or confusion among consumers?

2. Does the applicant's statement that the POLA COLA trade mark was in use at the time of application constitute a false statement under regulation 8(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955, and if so, does this impact the validity of the application?

3. Has The Coca-Cola Company established a prima facie case that the applicant's trade mark POLA COLA was not in use at the time of application, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the applicant?

4. Considering the opponent's failure to present sufficient evidence of actual use of the POLA COLA trade mark, can the opponent successfully oppose the registration of the trade mark under section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955?

5. Are the applicant's trade mark and the opponent's trade marks substantially identical or deceptively similar under sections 28 and 33(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955?

Held
1. The court concluded that the trade mark POLA COLA is not deceptively similar to The Coca-Cola Company's trade marks COCA-COLA and COKE, and therefore will not likely cause deception or confusion among consumers.

2. The court found that the applicant's statement that the POLA COLA trade mark was in use at the time of application constituted a false statement under regulation 8(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955. However, this did not impact the validity of the application.

3. The court held that The Coca-Cola Company did not establish a prima facie case that the applicant's trade mark POLA COLA was not in use at the time of application, thereby not shifting the burden of proof to the applicant.

4. The court concluded that, considering the opponent's failure to present sufficient evidence of actual use of the POLA COLA trade mark, the opponent could not successfully oppose the registration of the trade mark under section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955.

5. The court determined that the applicant's trade mark POLA COLA and the opponent's trade marks COCA-COLA and COKE are not substantially identical or deceptively similar under sections 28 and 33(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by addressing the opponent's primary contention that the POLA COLA trade mark was deceptively similar to The Coca-Cola Company's COCA-COLA and COKE trade marks. Under sections 28 and 33(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955, a trade mark is not capable of registration if it is deceptively similar to another registered or applied-for trade mark for the same or similar goods. The court found that the marks were not substantially identical, as required under section 6(3) of the Act, but considered whether POLA COLA was deceptively similar to the opponent's marks. The court examined the visual, phonetic, and conceptual similarities between the marks, taking into account the nature of the goods and the likely perception of consumers. Ultimately, the court concluded that POLA COLA was not likely to deceive or cause confusion among consumers, as the marks were sufficiently dissimilar in appearance and sound, and the concept of "cola" was common in the industry.

The court then considered whether the applicant's statement that the POLA COLA trade mark was in use at the time of application constituted a false statement under regulation 8(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955. The opponent argued that the application should be refused due to this alleged false statement. However, the court found that the opponent had not presented a prima facie case that the original statement of use was false. While the opponent had presented evidence that the POLA COLA mark had not been used, the court held that this evidence alone was insufficient to shift the burden of proof to the applicant, as the opponent had not demonstrated that the applicant had acted fraudulently or with blameworthy conduct.

Next, the court examined whether The Coca-Cola Company had established a prima facie case that the POLA COLA trade mark was not in use at the time of application, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the applicant. The court found that the opponent's evidence, which included the declaration of a person with experience in the beverage industry, was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. The court noted that it was unreasonable to expect the declarant to be aware of the use of a locally-based trade mark, especially given that the declarant had not been working in the Australian beverage industry until 17 months before the date on which the applicant's solicitor stated that the mark was in use. Furthermore, the court found that the opponent had failed to present evidence that the applicant had not used the mark since the date of the alleged statement.

The court then considered whether The Coca-Cola Company could successfully oppose the registration of the POLA COLA trade mark under section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955, given the applicant's failure to present sufficient evidence of actual use. The court found that the opponent's failure to present a prima facie case that the original statement of use was false meant that the opponent had not successfully opposed the registration on this ground.

Finally, the court examined whether the POLA COLA and opponent's trade marks were substantially identical or deceptively similar under sections 28 and 33(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955. The court concluded that the marks were not deceptively similar, as they were sufficiently dissimilar in appearance and sound, and the concept of "cola" was common in the industry.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a trade mark application may proceed to registration even in the absence of evidence of actual use, provided that the opponent has not presented a prima facie case that the original statement of use was false. Furthermore, the court found that the POLA COLA trade mark was not deceptively similar to The Coca-Cola Company's COCA-COLA and COKE trade marks, and therefore could proceed to registration.