Paul Arnold Stuart v Leah Michelle Potter & Amye Un - [2023] NTLC 29

CITATION:	Paul Arnold Stuart v Leah Michelle Potter & Amye Un [2023] NTLC 29
PARTIES:	Paul Stuart ARNOLD
v
Leah Michelle POTTER

AND:
Paul Stuart ARNOLD
v
Amye UN

TITLE OF COURT:	LOCAL COURT
JURISDICTION:	CIVIL – PERSONAL VIOLENCE
FILE NO(s):	22329668 & 22329670
DELIVERED ON:	24 October 2023
DELIVERED AT:	Darwin
HEARING DATE(s):	26 September 2023
JUDGMENT OF:	Judicial Registrar Leanne Gordon
CATCHWORDS:

PERSONAL VIOLENCE - PROCEDURE FOR INTERIM HEARING - TEST FOR INTERIM
ORDERS - HARM - INTIMIDATION

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Applicant: Ms Franz
Defendants: Mr Lawrence

Solicitors:

Applicant: Darwin Family Law
Defendants: Withnall Halliwell

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Judgment category classification:	B
Judgment ID number:	[2023] NTLC 29
Number of paragraphs:	71

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IN THE LOCAL COURT
AT DARWIN IN THE NORTHERN

TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

No. 22329668 & 22329670

BETWEEN:
PAUL STUART ARNOLD
Applicant
AND:
LEAH MICHELLE POTTER
Defendant (Court file 22329668)
AND:
AMYE UN
Defendant (Court file 22329670)

REASONS FOR DECISION

(Delivered 24 October 2023)

JUDICIAL REGISTRAR GORDON

1. This is an application for Interim Personal Violence Restraining Orders under section 19 of the Personal Violence Restraining Orders Act 2016 on Court files 22329668 & 22329670.
2. Submissions were received concurrently on both files, and noting the similarity of issues to be determined and the commonality of the Applicants evidence across both files, joint written reasons have been produced for both files.
3. Submissions on the making of interim orders were received on 26 September 2023, the first return date of the Applications filed 12 September 2023. The decision was reserved, noting additional evidence required consideration and there was no evidence of imminent or serious risk of physical harm to the applicant.
4. Section 19 of the Act provides:

“At any time during proceedings for the hearing of an application for a personal violence

restraining order, the Court may make an order… under this section.”
5. Section 19 thereafter deals with appearances at an interim order application and the date of commencement for any interim order, although notably it does not establish the test to be applied when making interim orders. This is likewise the case in the Domestic and

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Family Violence Act 2007, as noted by Judicial Registrar Norrington in Nguyen v Schroder[1], who found that the tests for finalising a substantive domestic violence application had application for the purposes of an interim order[2].
6. I share this view in relation to personal violence orders. Accordingly, the considerations for making an interim personal violence order should be the same as the test for the making of a final personal violence restraining order provided for in section 15, that is
the Court should be satisfied, ‘on the balance of probabilities a personal violence offence has
been committed or is likely to be committed by the defendant’.
7. Adopting this test however, must be done in the context of an interim hearing and not as a replacement or hybrid of the final hearing, where all allegations and disputed…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Paul Arnold Stuart v Leah Michelle Potter & Amye Un

Details

AGLC: Paul Arnold Stuart v Leah Michelle Potter & Amye Un [2023] NTLC 29
Case: [2023] NTLC 29
Decision Date: 24 October 2023

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter involved an application for interim personal violence restraining orders against two defendants, Amye Un and Leah Potter, by Paul Stuart Arnold. The dispute was heard in the Local Court of the Northern Territory. The central legal issues revolved around the test for interim personal violence orders, the definition of 'harm' and 'intimidation' under the Personal Violence Restraining Orders Act 2016, and whether the conduct of the defendants constituted personal violence offences. The court had to determine if the safety and protection of the applicant were paramount and whether the defendants' conduct warranted interim restraining orders.

In its reasoning, the court applied the test for interim personal violence orders, which required the court to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that a personal violence offence had been committed or was likely to be committed by the defendant. The court also considered the definition of 'harm' and 'intimidation', noting that the definitions should be broad to reflect evolving community standards. The court assessed the conduct of each defendant against these criteria. Amye Un's conduct was found not to constitute personal violence as it did not cause harm or intimidation. However, Leah Potter's conduct was deemed to cause mental harm to the applicant through a series of public, insulting remarks on social media. The court granted an interim personal violence restraining order against Leah Potter but not against Amye Un.

The final orders of the court were that an interim personal violence restraining order would issue against Leah Potter, prohibiting her from approaching, contacting, or discussing the applicant in public or social media, and from intimidating or harassing him. No such order was issued against Amye Un. The court emphasized that the decision did not curtail the defendants' right to free speech but highlighted the potential legal consequences of their conduct if it caused harm to others.

Orders