Paul Anthony McCauley v National Australia Bank
[1995] IRCA 404
•24 August 1995
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VI 2488 of 1994
B E T W E E N :
PAUL ANTHONY McCAULEY
Applicant
AND
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK
Respondent
Before: Judicial Registrar Staindl
Place: Melbourne
Date: 24 August 1995
REASONS FOR DECISION
Paul McCauley (“the Applicant”) commenced work with the National Australia Bank (“the Respondent”) on 28 June 1976. By letter dated 17 November 1994 - after 18 years service - he was dismissed summarily for “serious misconduct”.
The Applicant commenced his employment as a junior clerk when he was aged 17. In the ensuing years he “worked his way up” to be an accountant. His positions included junior clerk, batch clerk, senior general clerk, ledger keeper, teller, overseas officer and loans officer. He was appointed to the position of accountant in 1987 and in that position worked at a number of branches, sometimes on relief duties. There were some problems with the Applicant’s performance of his duties from about mid 1988 although these problems were not the reason for his termination.
The Applicant received performance appraisals, and at least some of these are in evidence. They indicate that from 1988 to 1991 the Applicant’s performance was assessed as adequate or satisfactory, although generally at the lower end of the scale. However in an appraisal conducted in May 1992 his overall performance was assessed as unsatisfactory. This appraisal was a special one and had apparently been performed due to an incident involving some keys for a branch of the bank. It is unnecessary for me to deal with any of the detail in relation to this incident: I only mention it as being the reason for the special performance appraisal. Because the Applicant’s performance was assessed as unsatisfactory a review date was set. A further appraisal was carried out on 15 July 1992 in which the Applicant’s performance was again assessed as being unsatisfactory. His performance was therefore subject to another review, the date set being 20 August 1992.
The Applicant’s understanding of his position was that if he received three unsatisfactory performance appraisals then he would lose his job. Understandably, therefore, he was very concerned about his position. On 20 August 1992 the Applicant was told by the branch manager that he was to attend the district office in Dandenong. He continued working at the branch office for a short time in order to complete some urgent tasks but then went to see his doctor (after obtaining permission). He has not returned to work since that time.
However on the day of the 20th August the Applicant’s area manager, Mr Greenwood, insisted that he meet with the Applicant. A meeting was arranged at a hotel that evening at which Mr Greenwood stated that the Applicant shouldn’t be in his present position. Subsequent to this discussion the Applicant was demoted to the position of security officer, Level L at a salary of $24,141 p.a. This represented a demotion of 2 levels. I should indicate at this stage that the Applicant obtained a certificate from his doctor on 20 August to the effect that he was unfit for work from that day for a period of 4 weeks due to a “work-related stress disorder”.
Liability for the Applicant’s illness was initially denied by the Respondent but was then admitted on 14 April 1993. The Applicant described himself as suffering from paranoia, such that he was reluctant to venture outside his home, his ability to answer the phone was affected, he felt lethargic, found it difficult to concentrate and lacked confidence and initiative. Certainly in the witness box he presented as a very fragile man lacking in self confidence (even taking into account the stress associated with legal proceedings).
The chronology of relevant events from 1992 to 1994 is important and I summarise it before discussing the individual events in more detail.
20 August 1992- The Applicant left work and obtained a medical certificate to the effect that he was unfit for work due to a work-related stress disorder.
13 August 1993- The Applicant wrote to the Superannuation Fund seeking details of his own contributions and the Respondent’s contributions and his level of benefits.
18 August 1993- The Respondent (via its Superannuation Fund) replied to the Applicant’s letter.
18 October 1993- The Applicant wrote to the Respondent concerning his salary level.
22 October 1993- The Respondent acknowledged receipt of the Applicant’s letter and advised it would investigate the matter.
8 December 1993- The Applicant’s wife obtained an intervention order against him.
10 December 1993- The Respondent wrote to the Applicant rejecting his claim for early retirement and setting a time (17 December 1993) for the Applicant to attend an interview to discuss his “ongoing employment options”.
10 December 1993- The Applicant’s mother died.
17 December 1993- The Applicant moved from the former matrimonial home at Chirnside Park to Altona Meadows.
17 December 1993- The Respondent wrote to the Applicant, referring to his application for Disability Retirement and asking him to attend at the Respondent’s Melbourne office to discuss his claim. The stated time was 22 December 1993. This meeting had in effect been substituted for the 17 December meeting.
22 December 1993- The Applicant attended the meeting previously arranged.
22 December 1993- The Respondent wrote to the Applicant confirming the meeting and advising that an offer which had been made at the meeting would remain open until January 14, 1994.
19 January 1994-The Applicant wrote to the Respondent and advised that his new postal address was care of the post office at Mooroopna in central Victoria.
17 February 1994- The Respondent wrote to the Applicant requesting him to attend an interview to “discuss possibilities in connection with your return to work and entry into a supportive rehabilitation program”.
31 August 1994- The Respondent wrote to the Applicant care of a Shepparton address to “discuss your ongoing sick leave situation”.
12 September 1994- The Respondent’s Manager of Workers Compensation wrote to the Applicant in relation to his Workcover claim. The letter was sent to the Applicant care of the Altona Meadows address.
17 October 1994-The Respondent wrote to the Applicant care of a Shepparton address and a Mooroopna address asking him to contact the Respondent “to discuss your ongoing employment”.
9 November 1994- The Respondent wrote to the Applicant care of the Altona Meadows address in the same terms to the letters dated 17 October 1994.
17 November 1994- The Respondent wrote to the Applicant at Altona Meadows and dismissed him summarily.
Section 170DC: Employee to Have an Opportunity to Respond to Allegations
It was submitted strongly by Ms Gyfteas, Counsel for the Applicant, that there had been a breach by the Respondent of s.170DC. She pointed out that the Applicant was not aware of the allegations made against him until after his dismissal. It is axiomatic from this that he was not given an opportunity to respond to the allegations.
Mr Forbes, solicitor for the Respondent, replied to this by arguing that all reasonable steps had been taken to contact the Applicant prior to his dismissal to give him an opportunity to respond to the allegations. He pointed out that the Applicant had written to the Respondent advising him of a change of address on 17 January 1994 and that he had not written to the Respondent after that time to advise it of any further change of address. The Respondent had written to the Applicant on 17 February 1994 and 31 August 1994 in relation to his return to work and ongoing sick leave. In fact Mr Bridgland gave evidence that he also wanted to talk to the Applicant about allegations concerning his signing of cash advance vouchers. This was not mentioned in this letter and cannot be relied upon by the Respondent as putting the Applicant on notice about the allegations. The Applicant did not reply to either of these letters. The first of these letters had been sent to the Mooroopna address whilst the second was sent to an address in Shepparton. The Applicant lived with his brother in Shepparton for a period and the fact that a letter was sent to this address indicates that the Respondent was aware that the Applicant was using this address for some time in 1994.
The critical letters from the Respondent’s point of view are two letters dated 17 October 1994 (sent to the Shepparton and Mooroopna address) and a letter in the same terms dated 9 November 1994 sent to the Applicant’s former address in Altona Meadows. A letter was sent to this address because Ms Venville had become aware that the Applicant was again living there. This information had come from one of two sources, either the Applicant’s estranged wife or from Mr Glen Mitcham from the worker’s compensation area. As the Applicant was receiving Workcare payments (and submitting medical certificates as to his continuing lack of fitness for work) then it could be expected that Mr Mitcham would have the Applicant’s current address. In fact Mr Mitcham had sent a letter to the Applicant care of the Altona Meadows address on 12 September 1994.
Because of the importance of these letters I set out their full text (the text of the 3 letters being identical, with the address varying as noted):
“Dear Mr McCauley,
We hereby request that you contact Mr John Bridgland, Head of Human Resources, Victoria and Tasmania to discuss your ongoing employment.
Mr Bridgland can be contacted on telephone no. 659 7262.
Your prompt attention is requested.
Yours sincerely,
Monica Venville
Human Resource Manager.”
The Applicant gave evidence that he received these letters although I am not sure as to the precise date on which he received them. However I accept that he received them prior to 17 November 1994 (the date of his letter of termination). He conceded that he did not respond to the letters but stated that he understood the letters to be referring to his continued absence from work. It was submitted on his behalf that these letters need to be considered in the context of the previous correspondence. This correspondence had not mentioned any alleged misconduct on his part but all related to his return to work and continuing sick leave. The Applicant had not responded to any of the earlier correspondence because of his strongly held view that he had been “ambushed” at the meeting of 22 December 1993.
Considerable evidence was led about this meeting, but it is unnecessary for me to make detailed findings about it. The Applicant had attended with his brother, Gary McCauley, and another friend, Mr O’Dwyer. He wished them to accompany him to the meeting but they were excluded and told that “we’ll (ie the Bank) will look after him”. In my view it was unfortunate that they were excluded: it should have been readily apparent the Applicant was in a fragile emotional state. Some pressure was put on the Applicant at the meeting to agree to a full settlement of his Workcare claim and to resign from his employment (although he was given further time to consider this offer). Because of the way in which the meeting was conducted and the exclusion from the meeting of those who attended to support the Applicant, he became deeply suspicious - even paranoid - about the Respondent’s motives and methods. Although this attitude was largely unfounded, it could probably have been avoided by allowing someone to attend the meeting with the Applicant.
One further point needs to be made about the three letters which were sent to the various addresses. As already noted the Applicant was asked to contact the Respondent to discuss his “ongoing employment”. There was nothing in these letters to suggest that if the Applicant did not contact the bank then his employment would be terminated. Further, there was nothing in the letters to suggest that his conduct or performance of duties was being investigated. The language of these letters was in general terms and did not put the Applicant on notice that his employment was at risk (particularly in light of the correspondence earlier in the year).
Apparently a deliberate decision was made by the Respondent not to make the letters more specific. Ms Venville gave evidence that she had been directed by her superior Mr Bridgland not to be more specific. In fact Mr Bridgland gave evidence that if he had put the “exact reason” or the “real reason” as to why he wanted to talk to the Applicant, then he felt that the Applicant would not have responded. Given the Applicant’s lack of response to previous correspondence I do not understand this reasoning. The previous correspondence had also been in general terms: why the Applicant would now respond to another letter in general terms when he had failed to in the past escapes me. However Mr Bridgland’s evidence on the point is revealing in that he recognised that the Applicant was not being told the exact or real reason for contacting the bank. This evidence does not sit easily with the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent that these letters put the Applicant on notice that his continued employment was at risk due to his alleged misconduct.
It seems to me that several things could have been done to put the Applicant on notice.
A follow-up letter could have been sent setting out in detail the allegations made against the Applicant and seeking a response from him within a reasonable period.
Attempts could have been made to telephone the Applicant. I find that no reasonable attempts were made. As previously noted Ms Venville had become aware between 17 October 1994 and 9 November 1994 that the Applicant was again living at the Altona Meadows address, and it was this address where he had been rung by bank officers earlier in 1994.
The Respondent was aware that solicitors were handling the Applicant’s claim for Workcare payments. Contact could have been made with these solicitors.
In summary, I think that far greater efforts should have been made to put the Applicant on notice about the allegations made against him and the risk to his employment should he fail to respond adequately to the allegations. Accordingly I find that the Respondent has breached s.170DC. I deal with the question of remedy later.
Section 170DE: Employer to Have a Valid Reason for Termination
The letter of termination dated 17 November 1994 from the Respondent to the Applicant is critical. It was sent to him at the Altona Meadows address and reads as follows:-
“Mr P A McCauley
c/- 23 Ascot Street
ALTONA MEADOWS VIC 3028
Dear Mr McCauley,
We refer to our letter of the 17th October, 1994 to which we have received no reply.
The Bank has over a period of time been investigating a number of fraud allegations relating to cash advances made by yourself on your ex wife’s Credit Card, together with misappropriation of a cheque totalling $5,175.00 also payable to your ex wife.
As a result of our investigations, we are satisfied that you have breached the Bank’s Code of Conduct, and failed to abide with the obligations and responsibilities of staff as set out in the Personnel Instructions.
Having regard to your failure to contact the Bank as requested and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we have no alternative but to treat your actions as serious misconduct, and accordingly you have been summarily dismissed from the service of the Bank as from the date hereof.
Yours sincerely
John W Bridgland
Head of Human Resources”
These allegations of fraud and misappropriation of a cheque are very serious. However it seems to me that the Respondent retreated significantly from these allegations in the case it presented in this Court. Mr Forbes concentrated on the Applicant’s alleged breach of the “Bank’s Code of Conduct” and his failure to follow the “Personnel Instructions.” Mr Forbes submitted that these matters were the reasons for termination and not the allegations of fraud and misappropriation. I will return to this later, but I now deal in detail with the allegations.
The Cash Advance Vouchers
Copies of 11 cash advance vouchers for the period October 1988 to May 1992 were tendered as evidence. The vouchers all related to the same National Australia Bank account in Heather McCauley’s name. There was provision for the “Cardholders signature” in these vouchers and in each case the Applicant’s signature appears there.
The Applicant and Heather McCauley were married in August 1993. At that time she worked as a primary school teacher. She ceased work outside the home in 1986 and gave birth to 2 children. In 1992 she resumed her former employment on a full time basis. The Applicant described the conduct of their financial affairs as a “melting pot scenario.” There was no separation of their income and the expenses incurred by each of them were treated as joint expenses.
The Applicant gave evidence that his wife was aware that cash advances were obtained by him against her credit cards. This evidence was not challenged, and in fact Mrs McCauley was not called to give evidence. One of the reasons for the Applicant doing this was one of convenience: given that the Applicant worked in the bank, it was easier for him to attend to the family’s financial affairs. This was especially the case when Mrs McCauley was looking after a baby and did not have a car to use through the day. It would be surprising if Mrs McCauley were not aware of the cash advances as she received regular statements relating to the relevant account.
The Applicant freely conceded that he signed the cash advance vouchers. On some of the vouchers the account was clearly identified as being “H. M. McCauley” or “H. McCauley”: it is not as if the Applicant was trying to disguise the real name of the account holder. I am satisfied that after completing a voucher the Applicant would hand it to a teller in order for it to be processed. It was then the teller’s responsibility to process it: however I am unable to determine whether or not these transactions were authorised by reference to the bank’s computers. Only one of the vouchers has an entry (being a tick) in the box for the authorisation number. I do note that the bank’s records should have enabled the tellers who were responsible for processing these transactions to be identified. None of the tellers involved in the transactions was called to give evidence.
At the time of the hearing the Applicant had only had copies of the cash advance vouchers for a short period of time. Nevertheless in some instances he had been able to corelate withdrawals of cash to payment of household accounts. This evidence was wholly credible and was not challenged. It is clear to me on the evidence that there was no fraud or dishonesty on the part of the Applicant in these transactions.
The Respondent emphasised the failure of the Applicant to follow correct bank procedures in respect to the cash advance vouchers. It argued that there were three critical elements in assessing such vouchers: the presence of the card, the signature on the voucher and whether or not the transaction was authorised. All of these elements were questionable in respect to the eleven vouchers. I note however that the absence of these elements led one of the Respondent’s witnesses to the view that “something was up”, i.e., that this was fraud by a bank officer involved. Accordingly she then referred the vouchers on for investigation of any fraud.
It was conceded by witnesses for the Respondent that on occasions a voucher may be presented which did not have the cardholder’s signature. In some circumstances it may be honoured. Similarly where the card was not presented with the voucher. However a voucher should not be honoured where both the signature was not that of the cardholder and where the card was not presented with the voucher. This seems to me to be a sensible policy. Failure to follow it may well warrant some sort of counselling or even disciplinary action against an employee, depending on the circumstances of an individual case. However in my view it falls a long way short of conduct which would justify summary dismissal. Furthermore, I think there is some force in the Applicant’s observation in this case that in its banking activities the Respondent is concerned primarily that it has recourse against someone (or an asset) so that it is not being exposed to undue risk. In this case recourse could be had against the Applicant, a long standing bank employee in respect to cash advances which were for relatively modest amounts (varying between $20 and $450). I do not regard the apparent lack of authorisation for these transactions as being significant in this case. This was the responsibility of the teller who conducted the transaction and I do not regard the Applicant as blameworthy in respect to this apparent lack of authorisation.
The SIO Cheque
The Respondent also relied on the Applicant’s conduct in dealing with a cheque for $5,175 from the State Insurance Office (SIO) and payable to “H. M. McCauley” (the Applicant’s wife). The cheque was dated 31 October 1989 and related to an insurance payout for a car that had been “written off” in an accident.
By letter dated 2 August 1994 Mrs McCauley wrote to the Respondent to complain that the Applicant had negotiated the cheque without her authority. As Mrs McCauley was not called to give evidence this letter was received as being evidence only of the complaint and not as to the truth of its contents. In the letter Mrs McCauley stated that she did not have a joint account with the Applicant until 1992 and so the cheque could not have been put into an account in her name. Apparently on the basis of this complaint by Mrs McCauley the Respondent paid her the amount of the cheque $5,175. It is clear that the Respondent was of the view that the Applicant was guilty of fraud in respect to this cheque. However, I find its actions surprising in the circumstances, but I shall refer to this aspect later.
The Applicant gave evidence that he and his wife agreed to use the proceeds of this cheque to try and pay off their credit card debts. This evidence was not challenged and I accept it. The documentary evidence certainly supports a finding that the proceeds were used in this way. The sum of $2,158.70 was used to pay off a Commonwealth Bank credit card account in Mrs McCauley’s name. Similarly, on 14 November 1989 the sum of $3,060.98 was paid into a Westpac account which I accept was in Mrs McCauley’s name. Although these two amounts are greater than the amount of the SIO cheque by $44.68, the Applicant contributed this extra amount to clear one of the accounts.
In the proceedings before me the Respondent relied on the Applicant’s negotiation of the SIO cheque. It was a special cheque in that it had “Account Payee Only” printed on it. The Applicant had signed the cheque in the space provided for the endorsement of the payee. As noted above the evidence is clear that the proceeds of the cheque were paid into two different accounts in the name of Mrs McCauley. However it is not clear to me how the proceeds were so paid. The Applicant was criticised by Mr Forbes for not being able to remember the details of the transaction: in my view such criticism is unfair given the transaction occurred more than 5½ years ago.
I have set out how the proceeds of the SIO cheque were used. The amount of $2,158.70 was paid into a Commonwealth Bank account. However this amount was actually receipted at the Belgrave Branch of the National Australia Bank (where the Applicant was working at the time). The amount paid into Mrs McCauley’s Westpac Bank account was receipted by the Belgrave Branch of the Westpac Bank. There were several possibilities as to how this occurred (i.e., how the funds were transferred to the Westpac Bank). I am unable on the evidence to determine which possibility in fact occurred (and it is the Respondent who hears the onus in proving it had a valid reason for the termination). However, even accepting the most damaging possibility from the Applicant’s point of view, I do not think it justified summary termination. The worst case scenario for the Applicant was that he received some of the proceeds of the SIO cheque in cash and then physically took that cash across the road to the Westpac Bank and paid it into his wife’s account. This would have meant that he received part of an account payee only cheque in cash (and the cheque was payable to some else’s account).
One further matter requires mention in relation to the SIO cheque. The Applicant countersigned the cheque in a signature which was different to his signature which appeared at the top of the cheque. Although this aspect initially caused me some disquiet, ultimately I accept the Applicant’s evidence that he was trying to use a shorter signature at the suggestion of a superior.
In order to justify summary dismissal the employee must be guilty of serious misconduct, that is “misconduct of a kind such that it would be unreasonable to require the employer to continue the employment during the notice period”. (See Section 170DB(1)(b)). In my view the misconduct must be of such a nature as to go to the heart of the employment relationship. At common law the misconduct necessary to justify summary dismissal was described by Smithers and Evatt JJ in North v Television Corporation Ltd 11 ALR 599 at 608-9 as being:-
“....conduct so seriously in breach of the contract that by standards of fairness and justice the employer should not be bound to continue the employment.”
It seems to me that this test is similar to that pursuant to Section 170DB(1)(b).
In finding that the Applicant’s conduct was not sufficient to justify summary dismissal I take into account the following:-
There was no dishonesty on the part of the Applicant.
There was no loss to the Respondent because of the Applicant’s conduct. In this regard I do not consider the Respondent’s payment to Mrs McCauley of the amount of the cheque as being due to the Applicant’s conduct.
The Applicant’s negotiation of such a cheque in the circumstances described was a “one-off” incident. This incident occurred in 1989 (although it was only brought to the Respondent’s attention in August 1994). There is no suggestion that the Applicant negotiated such cheques on any other occasion. Furthermore, a teller was apparently involved in order to negotiate the cheque. I can only infer that the transaction was permitted by the teller and was not one which involved an official query or complaint.
Reasons for Termination
It seems to me that as at the date of termination the Respondent considered that the Applicant was guilty of dishonesty involving the cash advance vouchers and the SIO cheque. The letter of termination refers to these matters. I find the Respondent’s argument that the termination was only due to the Applicant’s failure to follow the correct procedures unconvincing. If this were the case, then the reference in the letter of termination to the Applicant’s alleged fraud and misappropriation would be unnecessary.
Furthermore, at least one of the Respondent’s witnesses considered the Applicant’s alleged fraud as being a reason for the dismissal. Ms Venville was the Respondent’s Human Resource Manager for Victoria, in 1994. She gave evidence that the Applicant was dismissed summarily because the Respondent had taken the view that he had been fraudulent in his conduct. She further said that that was really the “sole issue” involved. Mr Bridgland, the Head of Human Resources and the person who signed the letter of termination, was more guarded in his evidence. For most of his evidence he maintained that the reason for the termination of the Applicant’s employment was the Applicant’s breach of bank procedures. However he ultimately conceded that the fraud and misappropriation allegations were “in the back of my mind” in deciding to dismiss the Applicant. I think it likely that these allegations paid a far more prominent role and Mr Bridgland’s evidence needs to be viewed in the context of him now knowing that those allegations were not true.
I make comment on two other aspects of this case. Firstly, the Respondent first received a complaint from Mrs McCauley by letter dated 14 January 1994. Although it would have taken some time to search and find the cash advance vouchers amongst the Respondent’s records, no satisfactory explanation was offered for the lengthy delay in dealing with this matter. A delay of over 7 months to deal with it is not acceptable.
Secondly, the Respondent was aware the Applicant and Mrs McCauley had separated and were involved in Family Court proceedings. Ms Venville was aware that Mrs McCauley was resentful of and hostile towards the Applicant. In these circumstances particular care should have been taken with Mrs McCauley’s allegations, especially as they concerned transactions which occurred between 2 and 5 years earlier. As already noted Mrs McCauley was not called to give evidence and no explanation was offered for this delay.
It follows from all of the above that in my view there was no valid reason for the Applicant’s termination. In addition, for the reasons already discussed I find the termination to be harsh and unreasonable.
Remedy
The Applicant is a long standing employee.
There is no evidence that the Applicant had ever received a warning for misconduct. He certainly presented as a dedicated employee, although I do not know if he will be able to resume his former employment due to his health problems. However he seeks reinstatement and no good reason has been advanced as to why it would be impracticable. I have found that the termination was unlawful pursuant to s.170DC and s.170DE(1) and (2). In my view reinstatement is the appropriate remedy.
In addition I propose to order that he be paid the remuneration he would have received but for the termination. I note that the Applicant was on Workcare payments during 1993. If those payments continued after the termination of his employment then he has not lost any remuneration because of his termination. If there are any difficulties arising out of the implementation of these orders then the parties should seek to have the matter listed for mention before me.
MINUTES OF ORDERS
THE COURT ORDERS:
That the Respondent reinstate the Applicant by reappointing him to the position in which he was employed immediately before the termination of his employment.
That the Respondent pay to the Applicant the remuneration he would have received but for the termination.
That the Applicant’s employment with the Respondent be treated as being continuous for all purposes.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules.
I certify that this and the preceding twenty one (21) pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judicial Registrar Staindl.
Associate:
Dated: 24 August 1995
Solicitors for the Applicant: Messrs Carroll & Dillon
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Gyfteas
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr Forbes
Date of hearing: 23, 24, 25, 26, 29 & 30 May 1995
Date of written submissions: 23 June 1995
Date of judgment: 24 August 1995
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VI 2488 of 1994
B E T W E E N :
PAUL ANTHONY McCAULEY
Applicant
AND
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK
Respondent
MINUTES OF ORDERS
Judicial Registrar Staindl 24 August 1995
THE COURT ORDERS:
That the Respondent reinstate the Applicant by reappointing him to the position in which he was employed immediately before the termination of his employment.
That the Respondent pay to the Applicant the remuneration he would have received but for the termination.
That the Applicant’s employment with the Respondent be treated as being continuous for all purposes.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules.
C A T C H W O R D S
INDUSTRIAL LAW - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT - OPPORTUNITY to answer allegations - lack of reasonable attempts to contact employee - NO VALID REASON - REINSTATEMENT.
Industrial Relations Act 1988 s. 170DB(1)(b), 170DC, 170DE, 170DE(1) & 170DE(2).
CASES: North v Television Corporation Ltd 11 ALR 599
PAUL ANTHONY McCAULEY v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK
No. VI 2488 of 1994
Before: Judicial Registrar Staindl
Place: Melbourne
Date: 24 August 1995
0
0
0